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FIRST edition, published in three volumes, 1768 1771. 

SECOND , ten 17771784. 

THIRD , eighteen 17881797. 

FOURTH , ' twenty 18011810. 

FIFTH , twenty 18151817. 

SIXTH , twenty 18231824. 

SEVENTH twenty-one 1830 1842. 

EIGHTH twenty-two 18531860. 

NINTH twenty-five 18751889. 

TENTH (ninth edition and eleven supplementary volumes), 1902 1903. 

ELEVENTH published in twenty-nine volumes, 1910 1911. 

TWELFTH (eleventh edition and three new volumes), 1922 . 


in all countries subscribing to the 

Bern Convention 


All rights reserved 


















Copyright, in the United States of America, 1922 

The Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. 






Indian Medical Service (retired). Professor of Medical Zoology in the University I ,., .. , ,, . , 
of London, at the London School of Tropical Medicine. Author of A Naturalist 1 Memcal "" 
in Indian Seas; Entomology for Medical Officers', etc. 

Falkland Islands Battle; 
" Goeben and Breslau " ; 
Heligoland Bight; 
Jutland, Battle of; 
Minesweeping and Mine- 
Naval History of the War. 

A. C. D. CAPTAIN ALFRED C. DEWAR, R.N. (RET.), B.Lrrr. (Oxon.). 

Gold Medallist, Royal United Service Institution. Late of the Historical Section, . 
Naval Staff, Admiralty. 


French Army Staff. Officer of the Legion of Honour. D.S.O. Director of the 
French Army Mechanical Transport Service during the war. Author of Les 
Transports Automobiles sur le Front franc.ais. 


Author of Die aelteste deutsche Uebersetzung Molierescher Lustspiele; Das biir- 
gerliche Drama; Litterarische Portraits aus dem modernen Frankreich; etc. 


Hon. Lecturer in Business Finance, Leeds University. Fellow of the Royal 
Economic Society. Author of The State in Business; The Nationalization of 
Railways; The Case for Nationalization', Land Nationalization; etc. 

A. E. M. A. E. MENDELL, B.L.I. 

Director of the Analytic Report of the Second Chamber of the States General, 


Superintendent, Nebraska State Historical Society. Author of History and 
Stories of Nebraska; Poems and Sketches of Nebraska; Nebraska Constitutional 
Conventions. Editor of Nebraska Blue Book. 


On the Staff of the Frankfurter Zeitung. Member of the Economic Council of 
the German Reich. Author of Die Konjunktur-Periode, 1907-13, in Deutsch- 
land; Handelspolitik und Krieg; etc. 


Secretary of the General Education Board, New York. 

Education in the United States. 

Author of Medical 

Motor Transport, Military. 

German Literature. 


Holland (in part). 


Germany: Finance. 

TTJ * TT j 
Education: United 



Lieutenant-Colonel, late R.A.M.C. Physician and Neurologist to Guy's Hos- , 


Professor of Modern History in the University of Vienna. Member of the Vienna 
Academy of Science, etc. 

,, .. . . 

Me lcme 

n . 
JHs ~ 

eases in the World War. 

Francis Ferdinand; 
Francis Joseph I. 

1 A complete list, showing all contributors to the New Volumes (arranged according to the alphabetical order of their surnames) toith 
the articles signed by them, appears at the end of Volume XXXII. 




A. H. E. T. 
A. L. C. 

A. M. 

A. M. H. 
A. R. A. 

A. R.W. 

A. S.* 

A. Sc. 
A. T. W. 


Author of The Future of the Southern Slavs; etc. 


See the biographical article: AUFFENBERG-KOMAROW, MORITZ. 


Distinguished Service Medal (U.S.A.). C.M.G. Legion of Honour. Formerly < Meuse-Argonne, Battle of. 
Co-editor of The Military Historian and Economist. 


Teacher of Russian Law, Institutions and Economics, King's College (London 
University). Formerly Member of the Russian Duma and Senator. Formerly 
Privatdozent at Petrograd University. 

s Montenegro. 

/Lemberg (Lvov), Battles 
\ Round: Part 1. 


Inland Water Transport. 



Sometime Scholar of Corpus Christi College, Oxford; Barrister-at-Law, Lincoln's Massey, W. F.; 
Inn; Barrister and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of New Zealand; Member of New Zealand, 
the New Zealand House of Representatives, 1899-1902. 


Executive Secretary, American Hospital Association. Superintendent Lakeside 

Hospital, Cleveland, Ohio, 1907-19. Member of the War Service Committee on ( Hospitals: United States. 

Hospitals during the World War. President American Hospital Association 

1918-9. Joint-author of Dispensaries. 


Hon. Professor of Physics in the University of Manchester. Author of Inlroduc- I T . 
lion to the Theory of Optics; etc. Joint-author (with Sir Arthur Shipley) of ] ernational bcience. 
Britain 's Heritage of Science. See biographical article: SCHUSTER, SIR ARTHUR. ( 


Professor of History and Political Science, Rutgers College, New Brunswick, <j New Jersey. 


Late Civil Commissioner in Mesopotamia and Political Resident in the Persian ! Mesopotamia (in part). 


B. E. P. 

B. K. L. 

B. Z. 

C. A. B. 

C. Ch. 

C. D. C. 
C. E. C. 

C. E. W. B. 


Late French Army. Commanded a Division 1915-6. Author of La Grande 
Guerre sur le Front Occidental; Les Batailles d'Arlois et de Champagne; and, under 
the pseudonym "Pierre Lebautcourt," of La Defense Nationale, 1870-1 and 
other works, including a general bibliography of 1870-1. 


Editor of the Cape Times. Formerly Foreign Editor of The Times. \ 

Flying Corps (in part). 

Frontiers, Battles of the 

(in part). 


University of Budapest. 


Consulting Surgeon to St. Thomas's Hospital and to the British Army in the 
World War. Vice-President of the Royal College of Science. 


Professor of the Science of Administration in the University of Vienna. 


Assistant Director, Meteorological Office, Kew. Past 
Society of London. Hughes Medallist, Royal Society. 


Late Director of Inspection of High Explosives, Ministry of Munitions. \ 

Jameson, Sir L. S. 
Hungary: Literature. 

Heart and Lung Surgery. 
Lueger, Karl. 

President, Physical { Magnetism, Terrestrial. 

Explosives (in part). 


Director of Military Operations, War Office, 1914-6. Author of Small Wars; { Kitchener, Lord. 
Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance; The Dardanelles; etc. 


Gloucestershire Regiment. Inspector of Grenade Training, G.H.Q., Great .-, ,. 

Britain, 1915-8. Experimental Officer for Grenades and Trench Stores, Ministry 
of Munitions, 1915-9. Control Officer, Inter-Allied Commission of Control, 1919. 


Late East Surrey Regiment. Distinguished Service Medal (U.S.A.). Order of 
Saint Anne (Russia). Formerly Scholar of Queen's College, Oxford. Staff 
Officer for Trench Warfare Research. 1915-7. British Instructor in Intelligence, 
American Expeditionary Force, 1918. Editorial Staff of the nth edition of the 
Encyclopedia Britannica. Author of Grant's Campaigns; The Wilderness and 
Cold Harbor; etc. 

Flamethrowers; Flying Corps 
(in part); Foch, Marshal; 
Grenades (in part); Intel- 
ligence, Military (in part); 
Liege; Masuria, Battles 
in; Maubeuge, Siege of; 
Namur; Narew, Battles of 
the (1915); Naroch Lake. 



C. F. C. 

C. F. Cl. 
C. H. M. 

C. J. M. 
C. J. M.* 


C. Ma. 

C. M. Wi. 

C. S. 

C. Se. 

D. F. T. 



E. B. M. 
E. B. S. 

E. D. G. 


Analytical and Consulting Chemist. Member of the firm of Cross & Bevan. i _., 
Joint-author (with E. J. Bevan) of Researches on Cellulose; Text-Book of Paper- ' es> 



Director-General of the Ordnance Survey of the United Kingdom. Author of { Map. 
Text Book of Topographical Surveying. 

CLIFFORD HERSCHEL MOORE, A.B. (Harvard), PH.D. (Munich ),Lixx.D. (Colorado 


Professor of Latin at Harvard University. Author of Religious Thought of the 
Greeks; Pagan Ideas of Immortality; etc. 

Harvard University. 


Financial Editor of The Times. 

National Debt. 


Director of the Lister Institute of Preventive Medicine. Professor of Experi- { Filter-Passing Germs. 
mental Pathology, University of London. [ 


Member of the Staff of the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung. 


Contributor on Finance, Shipping and Insurance to The Annual Register; etc. 
Representative of Admiralty Section of the British Ministry of Information in 
North America, 1918. 

C. M. WILSON, M.C., M.D. (Lond.), F.R.C.P. (England). 

Dean of the Medical School, St. Mary's Hospital, London. Secretary to the 
Faculty of Medicine, University of London. Physician to Out-Patients, St. 
Mary's Hospital, and to the Hospital for Epilepsy and Paralysis, Maida Vale. 
Consulting Physician to Paddington Infirmary. 


Professor of History in Yale University. Technical Delegate at the Paris Peace 
Conference. Author of The Diplomatic Background of the War; Woodrow Wilson 
and the World War. 


Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the U.S.A., 1912-21. 

DONALD FRANCIS TOVEY, MASTER OF Music (Hon., Birm.), Mus.D. (Oxon.). 

Reid Professor of Music in Edinburgh University. Author of Lessons in Musical 
Analysis; etc. 


Professor of Modern Irish in University College, Dublin. President of the Irish 
Texts Society. Author of Literary History of Ireland; tic. See the biographical 
article: HYDE, DOUGLAS. 


Deputy Chief Librarian, Manchester Public Libraries. Formerly President, 
Lancashire and Cheshire Antiquarian Society. Editor of Bygone Lancashire. 


Consulting Chemist. Author of Catalytic Hydrogenalion and Reduction; Am- 
monia and the Nitrides; etc. 


Civil Administration of Mesopotamia. Examiner in Kurdish to the Civil Ad- 
ministration of Mesopotamia. Author of To Kurdistan and Mesopotamia in Dis- 
guise; A Kurdish Grammar; An Elementary Grammar of Kurmanji; etc. 


Instructor in Government, Columbia University. Author of American Police 

Erzberger, M. (in part); 
Eucken,R. C. (in part); 
Germany: Political His- 
tory (in part). 

Insurance: United Kingdom. 

Medical Education (in part). 

Harding, Warren G. 

j Indians, North American. 



E. E. F. D'A. EDMUND EDWARD FOURNIER D'ALBE, D.Sc. (London and Birmingham), A.R.C.Sc., 


Inventor of the Optophone. Formerly Special Lecturer in Physics in the Punjab 
University. Author of The Electron Theory; Two New Worlds; Contemporary 
Chemistry; etc. 


Head of the Bureau for Sozialpolitik. Member of the Economic Council of the 
German Reich. Publisher and Editor of Soziale Praxis. 

Ireland: Language and 


Nitrogen Fixation. 


New York State. 


Germany: Social and 
Industrial Legislation. 



E. F. L. 

E. G. S. 


E. J.B. 
E. J. B.* 

E. L. C. 

E. L. F. 

E. N. McC. 

E. Ru. 

E.R. J. 
E. S. H. 

E. S. H.* 
E. T. H. 

E. W. MacB. 


Consulting Engineer. Formerly of the Armour Plate Department, Armstrong < Helmet. 
Whitworth & Co. 


Author of Franciscan Legends in Italian Art; Nature in Italian Art; etc. \ 



Judge at the Court of Berlin. Professor at the Commercial University College of < Germany: Administration. 
Berlin. [ 

MAJOR ERNST JOLY. fLemberg (Lvov), Battles 

Late General Staff, Austro-Hungarian Army. Now of the Kriegsarchiv, Vienna. < Round : Part II ; 
Part-author of the Austrian Official War Chronology Tables; etc. [Lodz-Cracow, Battles of. 

EDWIN JULIUS BARTLETT, A.M., M.D., D.Sc. (Hon., Dartmouth). 

Emeritus Professor of Chemistry, Dartmouth College, Hanover, N.H. 


Professor of History in Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio. Author 
of The W abash Trade Route; International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish- 
American War. Joint-author of Introductory American History; History of the 
United States. 

EDGAR LEIGH COLLIS, M.A., M.D. (Oxon.), M.R.C.P. (Lond.). 

Mansel Talbot Professor of Preventive Medicine, Welsh National School of 
Medicine. Late Director (Welfare and Health), Ministry of Munitions. H.M. 
Medical Inspector of Factories. 


Member of the Royal Economic Society. 
Samuel Montagu, London. 

New Hampshire. 


Industrial Medicine. 

Partner in the banking house of < Exchanges, Foreign. 


U.S. Marine Corps. Officer-in-charge, Historical Section, Marine Corps. 


Cavendish Professor of Experimental Physics, University of Cambridge. Author 
of Radioactivity; Radioactive Substances and their Radiations; etc. See the bio- 
graphical article: RUTHERFORD, SIR ERNEST. 


Professor of Transportation and Commerce and Dean of the Wharton School of 
Finance and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania. Author of Principles of 
Railroad Transportation; Principles of Ocean Transportation; etc. 


Member of Education Authority for Perthshire. Vice-Chairman, Territorial 
Force Nursing Service Committee. On Royal Commission on the Civil Service. 
Member of the Scottish Universities Committee. Author of The Life of Des- 
cartes; etc. 

| Marines: 

United States. 

Matter, Constitution of. 

Interstate Commerce. 

Nursing (in part). 

Late Royal West Kent Regiment. 
Office. Member of Gray's Inn. 

Formerly Mobilization Directorate, War < Marines (in part). 


Professor of History, University of Kentucky. 

Author of Government of Ken- < Kentucky. 

F. A. Cl. 


Senior Inspector, Intelligence Department, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisher- 
ies, Great Britain. 


Editor of American Machinist. Member A.S.M.E., A.I.E.E., A.S.T.M., S.A.E. 
Author of Broaches and Broaching; Electric Welding; Gas-Torch and Thermit 
Welding; United States Rifles and Machine Guns; United Stales Artillery Am- 
munition; Manufacture of Artillery Ammunition; etc. 


Emeritus Professor of History in the University of Pressburg. 

ERNEST WILLIAM MACBRIDE, D.Sc. (Lond.),M.A. (Cantab.), HON. LL.D. (McGill), 


Vice-President of the Zoological Society of London. Vice-Chairman of the Euge- 
nics Education Society. Formerly Professor of Zoology in McGill University, 
Montreal. Professor of Zoology in the Imperial College of Science and Tech- 
nology, London. Author of Textbook of the Embryology of the Invertebrata ; etc. 


Professor of United States Citizenship, Maxwell Foundation, Boston Univer- 
sity. Author of Organized Democracy; First Lessons in Finance; etc. 


Machine Tools. 

Hungary (in part) ; 
Kossuth, Francis. 


| Massachusetts. 



F. C. E. 

F. C. H. 
F. C. Mo. 
F. D. S. 
F. E. W.* 

F. G. Y. 

F. H. Br. 

F. H. H.* 
F. I. M. 
F. L. P. 

F. M. 
F. M. R. 

F. R. C. 



G. Ab. 

G. A. Bu. 
O. A. J. C. 

/Germany: Reform of the 
\ School System. 


On the staff of the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung. 


Major, late General Staff, Turkish Army. Author of a Life of Moltke; Die Ruine \ Essad. 
des Orients; etc. Member of Committee, German League of Nations Union. 


Late General Staff (Intelligence), V. Army, and Lecturer at the Intelligence fMe l Military 
School. Harrow-on- the-Hill. W P arl )- 



Head of the Sugar and Rationing Department for Ireland during the World { Ireland: Statistics. 

F. D. SANER, M.A. (Cantab.), F.R.C.S. 

Surgeon to Out-Patients, Great Northern Hospital, London. Surgeon, Evelina 
Hospital for Children. Late Consulting Surgeon, British Rhine Army. 


Late Prince of Wales's Leicester Regiment. Formerly Secretary, Historical 
Section, Committee of Imperial Defence. Author of The Marne Campaign; A 
History of Poland; M alike; etc. 


Dean of the School of Sociology and Professor of Sociology in the University of 
Oregon. Editor of the Quarterly of the Oregon Historical Society and of the 
Commonwealth Review of the University of Oregon. Author of Financial His- 
tory of Oregon; etc. 


On the Staff of The- Times for Indian Affairs. London Correspondent of The 
Times of India. Formerly Assistant-editor of the Bombay Gazette and Editor of 
the Indian Daily Telegraph, Lucknow. 


Professor of American History in the University of Kansas. 


Late Inspector-General of Training to the British Armies in France, 1918-9. 


Frontiers, Battles of the 

(in part); 
Guise, Battle of; 
Marne, Battle of the. 


Gokhale, G. K. ; 
Hyderabad, Nizam of; 

! Kansas. 


Professor of History in the University of Wisconsin. Sometime Major, U.S. M " mtlons of Wa *: United 
Conprsl st*ff States. 

General Staff. 


Professor at the University of Louvain. 


Royal Artillery. Chief Instructor, Artillery College, Woolwich (assisted by 
Instructional Staff, Artillery College). 


Editorial Staff, nth edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica. Editorial Staff of 
The Times. Author of South Africa from the Great Trek to the Union ; Problems 
of Exploration; Africa; The Sahara in 1915; The Great War in Europe; etc. 

Mercier, Cardinal. 

Magazines and Shell Stores; 
Ordnance (in part). 

Eritrea; Gambia; German 
East Africa; German South- 
West Africa ; Kenya Colony ; 
Liberia; Mauritius; Merri- 
man, J. X.; Natal; Nyasa- 
land; Orange Free State. 


General of Division, French Army. Formerly Governor of Belfort. Commanded Fr ntiers . Battles of the 
Belfort region in the World War. Author of La Place de Belfort. ( ^ n P a ">- 


Editor, of the Saturday Review. Author of With the Battle Cruisers; Master- J Fisher, Lord; 
singers; Ireland at the Cross Roads; Christopher Columbus and the New World; 1 Jellicoe, Lord. 
The Sands of Pleasure; When the. Tide Turns; etc. 


Formerly Correspondent of The Times in Paris. 


Chief of the Children's Bureau, U.S. Department of Labor. Formerly Director 
Child Labor Division, U.S. Children's Bureau, and Executive Secretary, Illinois 
Immigrants Commission, Chicago. 


Author, and Joint-author with Sir Dugald Clerk, of works on internal combustion < Internal Combustion Engines. 

/ France (in part) ; 

\ French Equatorial Africa. 

Juvenile Employment: 

United States. 


Professor of Geology in the Royal College of Sciencefor Ireland. Author of Aids 
in Practical Geology; Open- Air Studies in Geology; etc. 

Geology: Structural 



G. A. R. 

G. B. C. 
G. C. S. 

G. D. H. C. 

G. E. B. 

G. H. H. 
G. H. M. 

G. I. H. L. 

G. P. L.-C. 
G. R. S. 


G. T. B. 
G. W. Ri. 
H. A. B. 
H. A. G.* 

H. B. B. 


Formerly Correspondent of The Morning Post in Paris. 


Barrister-at-Law. Author of La Sicilia di oggi; Dal conflilto europeo alia guerra 
noslra; etc. 


Assistant Secretary, Inland Revenue Department, Somerset House. 


Sometime Scholar of Harvard University. Formerly Assistant Professor of 
Greek at the University of Missouri. Associate Editor of The Classical Journal. 
Member of the American Editorial Staff of the Encyclopedia Britannica. 


Formerly Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford. Hon. Secretary, Labour Re- 
search Department. Author of The World of Labour; Selj ^-Government in In- 
dustry; Guild Socialism Restated; Social Theory; etc. 


Formerly Scholar of New College and Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford. 
Editor of The Times, 1884-1912. Authorof Life of Disraeli (vpls. 3, 4, 5, and 6). 
See the biographical article: BUCKLE, GEORGE EARLE. 


Fellow of New College, Oxford. Savilian Professor of Geometry in Oxford 
University. Formerly Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. 


Consulting Surgeon to St. Thomas's Hospital, London. Late Consulting Surgeon 
to the British Expeditionary Force; etc. 

G. I. H. LLOYD. 

Assistant Director, Department of Overseas Trade. 

GIFFORD PINCHOT, A.B. (Yale), HON. A.M. (Yale and Princeton), Sc.D. (Michigan 

Agricultural College), LL.D. (McGill). 

Professor of Forestry, Yale University. U.S. Forester, 1898-1910. President of 
the National Conservation Association. Pennsylvania Commissioner of For- 
estry. Author of The Adirondack Spruce; The Training of a Forester; The Fight 
for Conservation ; etc. 

Superintendent of the Trigonometrical Survey of India. 


Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. Instructor in Supply, General Staff College, 
Washington, D.C. 

GEORGE SAUNDERS, O.B.E., B.A. (Oxon.), HON. LL.D. (Glasgow). 

Correspondent of the Morning Post in Berlin, 1888-97; and of The Times in 
Berlin, 1897-1908, and in Paris, 1908-14. 


Director of Fuel Research, Department of Scientific and Industrial Research. 
See the biographical article: BEILBY, SIR GEORGE THOMAS. 


Late President, New York State and City Osteopathic Societies. President, 
American Osteopathic Association, 1917-8. 

I France (in part). 
Italian Literature. 

( Excess Profits Duty: United 
\ Kingdom. 

Hoover, Herbert Clark. 

Guild Socialism. 

Grey, 4th Earl; Grey, Vis- 
count ; Haldane, Lord ; Hen- 
derson, Arthur ;Lansdowne, 
5th Marquess; Law, A. 
Bonar; Lloyd George, D.; 
Long, Lord ; Lyttelton, Al- 
fred ; McKenna, Reginald ; 
Milner, Viscount; Morley 
of Blackburn, Viscount. 

Mathematics: Theory of Num- 
bers; Theory of Series; The- 
ory of Functions. 

Medicine and Surgery: 

Surgery During the War. 

Munitions of War: United 
Kingdom (in part). 

Forestry: United States. 

Geodesy (in part). 

I Light Railways, Military 

I (in part). 

Erzberger, M. (in part); 
Eucken, R. C. (in part). 


| Osteopathy. 


Late Royal Field Artillery. Author of Modern Guns and Gunnery; Modern < Ordnance (in part). 
Artillery in the Field. { 


Lecturer in Public Administration at the London School of Economics, London 
University. Member of the International Labour Section of the League of 
Nations, Geneva. 


Formerly Editorial Writer on The Chicago Tribune. 


Deputy-Director, International Labour Office, League of Nations. Formerly 
Principal Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Labour. Member of the British 
Delegation at the Peace Conference. 

Hours of Labour (in part). 

< Newspapers (in part). 

International Labour 



H. Ca. 
H. Ch. 

H. Cl. 

H. C. D. 

H. E. A. C. 
H. F. Ba. 
H. I. P. 

H. Jn. 

H. J. W. 
H. L. C. 

H. M. Sa. 

H. P.* 

H. P. G. 
H. P. W. 

H. Sa. 

H. Si. 
H. v. H. 


Member of British Central Licensing Control Board (Liquor Traffic), 1916-21. 
Author of The Control of the Drink Trade; The Church and the New Age; etc. 


Formerly Scholar of Corpus Christi College, Oxford. Editor of the loth, nth 
and 1 2th editions of the Encyclopedia Britannica. Financial Editor of The 
Times, 1913-20. See the biographical article: CHISHOLM, HUGH. 


Governor of Nigeria. In the Federated Malay States, 1883-1903; in the West 
Indies, 1903-7; in Ceylon, as Colonial Secretary, 1907-9. Administered the 
British Sphere of Occupation in Togoland throughout the World War. Author 
of Studies in Brown Humanity; Further India; The German Colonies; etc. 


Fellow of the American Geographical Society. Professor of Economics and 
Political Science, University of Idaho. Author of The Ashley-Smith Explorations 
and the Discovery of a Central Route to the Pacific : 1822-1829; etc - 


Formerly Scholar of Jesus College, Oxford, and Advocate of the High Court at 
Calcutta. Author of Calcutta Old and New. Late Editor of India. 


Lowndean Professor of Astronomy and Geometry, Cambridge. 
John's College, Cambridge. 

Liquor Laws and Liquor Con- 
trol: United Kingdom. 

English Literature (in part); 
Finance ; 
George V. ; 
Holden, SirE.H.; 
Montessori System. 

Gold Coast; 


Gandhi, M. K. 

Fellow of St. < Mathematics: Geometry. 


Associate Professor of Mexican History and Librarian of the Bancroft Library, 
University of California. Author of Jose de Gdlvez, Visitor-General of New 
Spain; etc. 


Director of Research, British Scientific Instruments Research Association. 
Emeritus Professor of Chemistry, University of London. 

H. J. WILSON, C.B., C.B.E. 


Professor of Physics in the Imperial College of Science, South Kensington. 
Author of Properties of Steam; Thermodynamic Theory of Turbines. 


Assistant Secretary to the Board of Inland Revenue. Assistant Secretary to the 
Royal Commission on the Income Tax, 1919-20. 


Rector of the University of Ghent. Member of the Royal Academy of Belgium 
and of the Institute of France. Corresponding Member of the Royal Historical 
Society. Author of Histoire de Belgique; etc. 


Formerly Lecturer at the University of Berlin and Professor Public Law at the 
Berlin University College of Commerce. Municipal Deputy and Municipal 
Councillor in Berlin. After the Revolution Secretary of State for the Interior 
and Minister of the Interior for the Reich up to the German acceptance of the 
Peace of Versailles. Member of the Prussian Constituent Assembly and of the 
first Diet of the Republic of Prussia. Bore the leading part in drafting, and 
carrying through the Constituent Assembly of the Reich, the new Republican 
Constitution of Germany. Author of Das deutsche Volk und die Politik ; etc. 


Served in the World War. Deputy Governor of Jerusalem, 1918. Editor of A 
Brief Account of the Advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. 


Professor of Banking in Columbia University. Director of Research, Federal 
Reserve Board. Author of American Banking; The Federal Reserve; etc. 


Secretary of Embassy and Consul in the Japanese Diplomatic and Consular 
Service. Member of the Japanese Delegation to the Peace Conference in Paris, 
1919, and to other Inter-Allied and International Conferences in Europe, 1919-21. 


Professor in the University of Frankfort-on-Main. 


Late General Staff, German Army. Director in the Archives of the Reich. 
Formerly member of the Historical Section of the Great General Staff. During 
the World War a General Staff Officer with the troops. Representative of the 
Supreme Command at the Foreign Office, 1918. 

Guatemala; Honduras; 
Huerta; Madero; Mexico; 
Nicaragua; Obregon. 

Glass (in part). 

/Labour Legislation: United 
\ Kingdom. 


Income Tax: 

United Kingdom. 

Fredericq, Paul. 

Germany: Republican 

Hejaz Railway. 

Federal Reserve Banking 






\ Law. 

Factory Council 

Noyon, Battle of. 




H. W. W. 

J. A. Ro. 


Editor of the Financial Supplement of the Saturday Review. Formerly Editor of 
The Economist. Author of The Meaning of Money; Case for Capitalism; etc. 


J. Bro. 
J. C. P. 

J. de G. H. 

J. E. W.* 

J. F. M. 

J. H. Ho. 


J- J- C. 
J. J- T. 

J. M. L. 


Money Market. 

I Labour Ministry: United 
Labour Supply and Regula- 
tion: United Kingdom. 


Sometime Scholar of Trinity College, Oxford. Author of Ironclads in Action. 
Contributor to The Cambridge Modern History. Assistant Editor of The Daily 


Chief of the Near Eastern Division, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, 
Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. Managing Editor of The Hispanic 
American Historical Review. Co-editor of Blair and Robertson's The Philippine 
Islands, I49j-i8g8 (55 vols.). Compiler of Bibliography of the Philippine 
Islands; etc. 


Professor of American History, Indiana University. Member of the American 
Historical Society. Author of The American Republic and its Government; etc. 


Director of Statistics, Medical Research Council. 


Associate Editor of the State Historical Society of Iowa. Lecturer in Iowa 

History in the State University of Iowa. 
Robert Lucas; John Chambers; etc. 

Author of The Man with the Iron Hand; 


Mathematical Adviser to the Survey of India. Author of Formulae for Atmos- 
pheric Refraction and their Application to Terrestrial Refraction and Geodesy; 
Survey of India, Prof. Papers Nos. 14, 1913 (The Earth's Axes and Triangula- 
tion), and 16, 1918. 

Northcliffe, Lord. 



Epidemiology (in part). 


Geodesy (in part). 




Professor of History and Political Science in the University of Nevada. Execu- < Nevada, 
live Secretary of the Nevada Historical Society. 


Associate Professor of Social Ethics in Harvard University. Sometime Division I . . , 

Manager, U.S. Housing Corporation. Editor of the Report of the U.S. Housing 
Corporation. Author of Co-operation in New England; etc. 


Author of America, the Land of Contrasts, and of Baedeker's Handbooks to Lon- 
don, England, the United States and Canada. Editor of Muirhead Guidebooks, 
Limited (The Blue Guides). 


Kenan Professor of History and Government in the University of North Caro- \ North Carolina, 
lina. Author of Reconstruction in North Carolina; North Carolina since 1860; etc. ( 


Professor of Political Economy in Johns Hopkins University. Author of David 
Ricardo; The Abolition of Poverty; War Borrowing; etc. Treasurer of Porto Rico, 
1900-1. Financial Adviser of the Dominican Republic, 1908-10. 


Professor of Oceanography in the University of Liverpool. Author of Conditions < Oceanography. 
of Life in the Sea; British Fisheries; etc. ( 

Late Chief of the General Staff, Union of South Africa. 

See the biographical article: THOMSON, SIR JOSEPH JOHN. 


Manager in London of the Union Corporation, Limited. 


Austro-Hungarian Engineer Corps. Formerly of the Munitions Department of { Ml i ni tlons ,.\ V? r! Central 
the Austro-Hungarian War Ministry. 


Professor of History and Political Science in the University of Florida. Author < Florida, 
of The Virginia Committee System and the American Revolution; etc. 

I German South-West Africa. 

/ Gases, Electrical Properties 
1 of. 

| Gold. 






J. N. M.* 

J. O. P. B. 

J. R. Co. 

J. S. D. 

J. S. Ha. 

J. S. N. 

J. S. Nc. 

J. Wa.* 

J. We.* 
J. W. G. 

J. W. H.-M. 

J. W. S. 
K. C. M. S. 

L. C. W. 

Teacher of Philosophy in the Lycee of Laon, France. 


Author of Cassandra in Troy; Letters from Greece; The World in Chains; etc. 


Author of China; Japan and Korea; Houseboat Days in China. Joint-author of 
China under the Empress Dowager. Served in Chinese Maritime Customs, 
1883-96. Shanghai Correspondent for The Times, 1897-1910. 


Professor of Economics, University of Wisconsin. Author of Documentary 
History of American Industrial Society; History of Labor in the United States; 
Principles of Labor Legislation; etc. 


Lecturer at the University of Budapest. 

f Mathematics : Logic and 
\ Foundations. 

< Greece. 


Hart, Sir Robert; 



Hours of Labour: United 

Labour Legislation: United 

Labour Supply and Regula- 
tion: United States. 

Hungary (in part). 



Juvenile Employment: United 


Infantile Mortality: 



Author of Oxford and its Colleges; A < Oxford. 

JOHN STEWART Dow, B.Sc., A. C.G.I. f 

Assistant Editor of the Illuminating Engineer. Joint-author of Modern Illu- lUuminatmg Engineering; 
minants and Illuminating Engineering; etc. ^Lighting, Electric. 


Ordnance Department, U.S. Army. Member of the American Institution of 
Mining and Metallurgical Engineers. Life Member of the National Association 
of America. Experimental Engineer at the Government Small Arms Plant, ' 
Springfield Armory. Formerly Chief of the Machine-Gun and Small Arms Sec- 
tion, Ordnance Department. 


Professor of Political Economy in the University of Edinburgh. Author of Prin- 
ciples of Political Economy; Money and Monetary Problems; etc. 



Professor of American History in the University of Missouri. 

JANE HARRIETT WALKER, L.R.C.P., L.R.C.S.E., M.D. (Brussels). 

Medical Superintendent, East Anglian Makings Farm and East Anglian Chil- 
dren's Sanitoria, Mayland, Suffolk. Member of Departmental Committee on 
Provision for Treatment of Tuberculosis, 1911-2. President, Medical Women's 
Federation, 1917-20. Consulting Physician, Elizabeth Garrett Anderson Hos- 
pital, London, etc. 


Warden of Wadham College, Oxford. 

History of Wadham College. 


Professor of Geology in the University of Glasgow. Author of The Great Rift 
Valley; The Dead Heart of Australia; British Museum Catalogues of Fossil 
Bryozoa, etc. Victoria Medallist of the Royal Geographical Society. Bigsby 
Medallist of the Geological Society. 


Historical Adviser to the Foreign Office. Formerly Fellow of King's College, 
Cambridge. Author of Election by Lot at Athens; Life of Bismarck; Special Re- 
ports issued by the Board of Education on Classical Studies in Germany; The 
History of Twelve Days; The Issue; etc. 


Assistant Dean, Faculty of Medicine, McGill University. 


President of Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Maine. Candidate of the Democratic 
Party in Maine for the U.S. Senate, 1916. President of the Board of Visitors to 
the Naval Academy at Annapolis, 1920-1. 


Parliamentary Private Secretary to the British Minister of Health. Author of < Housing (in part). 
The Law and Practice of Housing; etc. 


First Assistant Librarian, Enoch Pratt Free Library, Baltimore. 
Parson Weems: A Biographical and Critical Study; etc. 


Commander of the Legion of Honour. Knight of St. Stanislas. Late Royal En- J .. __.,. 
gineers. Formerly Director-General of Trench Warfare Supply, and Controller ] ramin g Military, 
of Chemical Warfare Research, British War Office. 

Geology: Cosmic. 


Medical Education: Canada. 


Author of < Maryland. 

L. J. S. 



M. C. L. 

M. G.* 

M. K. W. 
M. Pa. 



N. N. G. 

O. G. L. 

O. J. R. H. 





Assistant Keeper in the Mineral Department, British Museum Natural History. < Mineralogy. 
Editor of the Mineralogical Magazine. Author of The World's Minerals. 


Author of biographies of Thackeray, Sterne and William Cobbett, and of many < Newspapers (in part). 
works on the social life of the Georgian period. 

SIR LEONARD ROGERS, C.I.E., M.D., F.R.C.P., F.R.S., I.M.S. (retired). 

Physician and Lecturer, London School of Tropical Medicine. Late Professor 
of Pathology, Calcutta. Author of works on fevers in the tropics and bowel dis- 
eases in the tropics; etc. 


Officer of the Crown of Italy. Chevalier of St. Maurice and St. Lazarus. Italian 
Croce di Guerra. Chevalier of the Legion of Honour. French Croix de Guerre. 
British Military Cross. Member of Staff of League of Nations. Formerly at- < 
tached to the Italian Foreign Office. During the war, Liaison Officer with the 
Allied Armies in Macedonia, and after the Armistice at Constantinople, and 
Secretary, Inter-Allied Commission, Smyrna. 


Director of the Light Leather Department of the Leathersellers' Company's 
Technical College, London. Author of Leather Dressing, including Dyeing, 
Staining and Finishing; etc. 



Medical Officer (Medical Statistics), Ministry of Health. 
Statistics, University of London. 


Reader in Medical | Epidemiology (in part). 


General Secretary of the French Ministry of the Devastated Regions. 

Conseiller d'Etat. 

Colonial Editor of Le Temps. 

{ France (in part). 

France: Invaded Regions. 

France (in part); 

French Equatorial Africa (in 

Indo-China, French. 

HON. MARTIN VOGEL, A.B. (Columbia). 

Formerly Assistant Treasurer of the United States, New York. 


Director of Hospital Services, Joint Council of the British Red Cross and the 
Order of St. John. Formerly Chairman, Hospitals Economy Committee, War 


Russian Cross of St. George. British Military C.B. French Croix de Guerre. 
Commander of the Legion of Honour. Formerly Professor in the Russian Gen- 
eral Staff College. 


Member of the Staff of the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung. 

ORIN GRANT LIBBY, PH.D. (Wisconsin). 

Professor of American History, University of North Dakota. Secretary of the 
State Historical Society. Editor of Collections of State Historical Society of 
North Dakota (vols. i.-iv. and vi. ). 


Assistant Secretary of the British Association. Sometime of the Geographical 
Section, Naval Intelligence Department. Editor of the Oxford Survey of the 
British Empire. 

OTTO KRIEGK, PH.D. (Gottingen). 

Member of the Staff of the Weser Zeitung, Berlin Office. 


Member of the Commissariat-General of the French Republic at Strasbourg. 


Professor of History in the University of Montana. Joint-author (with N. J. 
Lennes) of The West in the Diplomacy of the American Revolution. Author of 
The Story of Columbus; etc. 

PIETER GEYL, LiTT.D. (Leiden). 

Professor of Dutch Studies in the University of London. 

/ Liberty Loan Publicity Cam- 
\ paigns. 

Hospitals: United Kingdom; 
Medicine, International. 

Kaledin, Alexei. 

/Germany: Political History 
\ (in part). 

North Dakota. 


Malay States, Federated; 
Malay States, Non-Federated ; 
Netherlands India. 


France (in part). 


Holland (in part). 



P. H. N. 

P. M. H. 
P. T. M. 


R. A. V. 
R. B. F. 


R. C. F. 
R. D. O. 

R. E. F. 
R. Gi. 

R. G. C. 
R. G. H.-V. 

R. G. L, 
R. H. B. 

R. J. D. 
R. Jo. 

R. K. H. 

R. L. W. 
R. M. Wi. 


Formerly Professor of Economics in the Universities of Wisconsin and Minne- 
sota. Director of the Retail Research Association. Author of Economics and 
Retailing; Retail Selling and Store Management; Textiles; etc. 

PETER MARTIN HELDT. / ivr t v h' i 

Engineering Editor of A utomotive Industries. Author of The Gasoline A utomobile. \ Motor venicles. 


Editor of the Newfoundland Evening Herald. President of the Legislative 
Council, Newfoundland. 


Corpus Professor of Jurisprudence, Oxford. Author of Villainage in England; 
The Growth of the Manor; Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence; etc. See the 
biographical article: VINOGRADOFF, SIR PAUL. 


Assistant in History in the University of California. 


Formerly Commissioner of Accounts, City of New York. Author of American 
Police Systems; European Police Systems; Keeping our Fighters Fit; etc. 


Representative of Great Britain on the League of Nations Commission at the 
Peace Conference, 1919. Representative of South Africa at the Assembly of the 
League of Nations at Geneva, 1920. Chairman of the League of Nations Union. 
See the biographical article: CECIL, LORD ROBERT. 


R. C. FARMER, D.Sc., PH.D. 

Late Chief Chemist, Explosives Department, Ministry of Munitions. 


Gutchkov ; 
Kornilov (in part); 
Milyukov ; 
Nicholas II. 

Los Angeles. 

New York City. 

League of Nations. 

Explosives (in part). 


Author of numerous papers on various aspects of Geology and kindred sub- \ j eo ^' 



Dean of Undergraduates and Professor of English History in the University of 
Oklahoma. Author of The Formation of the State of Oklahoma ; etc. 


Fellow and Tutor of Pembroke College, Oxford. 


Royal Horse Guards. Served during the World War as Chief-of-Staff of 5th 
Cavalry Brigade and 5th Cavalry Division in France, and of Desert Mounted 
Corps in Palestine. 


Senator of France. Member of the Finance Committee of the Senate. 


Assistant Professor of Insurance at Columbia University. Author of Liability 
and Compensation Insurance. 


Late North Stafford Regiment and General StafL 

SIR ROBERT JONES, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.M. (U.S.A.), F.R.C.S., HON. D.Sc. (Wales), 

HON. LL.D. (Aberdeen). 

Lecturer in Orthopaedic Surgery, Liverpool University. Director of Orthopaedic 
Surgery, St. Thomas's Hospital. Surgeon to the Royal National Orthopaedic 
Hospital. Hon. Adviser in Orthopaedic Surgery, Ministry of Pensions. 


Late General Staff, Austro-Hungarian Army. Now of the Kriegsarchiv, Vienna. 


Royal Field Artillery. Superintendent of External Ballistics, Ordnance Com- 
mittee. Author of Nomography; Interior Ballistics; etc. 


President of Leland Stanford Jr. University, Cal. 

R. McNAiR WILSON, M.B., Cn.B. 

Fellow of the Royal Society of Medicine. Editor, Oxford Medical Publications. 
Late Research Worker in Cardiology, Medical Research Committee. Consultant 
to the Ministry of Pensions in Trench Fever. 

-, Medals and Decorations. 



Mounted Troops. 

France : Finance. 

Insurance: United States. 

/Intelligence, Military: 

\ Secret Service. 

Orthopaedic Surgery. 

< Luck, Battles of. 

/Leland Stanford Jr. TTniver- 

\ sity. 

Fasting; Heart Disease; Im- 
munity; Medicine and Sur- 
gery: General Progress. 

R. P.* 

R. P. B. 
R. P. D. 

R. Ro. 

R. S. T.* 

S. C. H. 

S. J. B. 

S. J. B.* 
S. L. C. 
S. McC. L. 

S. S. L. 

S. T. H. W. 

S. W. M. 

T. A. R. 

T. Ba. 

T. C. P. 
T. N. C. 



Professor of Mining in the School of Mines, Columbia University. Hon. Mem- 
ber of the Institution of Mining and Metallurgy, London. Author of Com- 
pressed Air Plant. Editor-in-chief of Peele's Mining Engineer's Handbook; etc. 


Dean of the School of Commerce, University of Georgia; formerly Professor of 
History. Author of A History of Georgia ; The A grarian Revolution in Georgia ; etc. 


Late Scholar of Balliol College, Oxford. Author of The Two Internationals. 
Editor of The Labour International Handbook. 


Labour Correspondent of the Eclair, Paris. 

COLONEL SIR RONALD Ross, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., F.R.S., F.R.C.S., HON. M.D., 

D.Sc., etc. 

Nobel Medical Prizeman, 1902. Author of The Prevention of Malaria; etc. See 
the biographical article: Ross, SIR RONALD. 


Georgia (U.S.A.). 

International, The. 
France (in part). 



Professor of Forestry in the University of Oxford. Author of The Silviculture of < Forestry (in part). 
Indian Trees; etc. 


I Industrial Councils. 




Chief Archivist and Librarian of the Norwegian Foreign Office, Christiania. 


Superintendent of the Minnesota Historical Society. Associate Professor of 
History in the University of Minnesota. Author of The Granger Movement; 
Illinois in 1818; The Agrarian Crusade; etc. 


Director, Bureau of Child Hygiene, Department of Health, New York City. 
Consultant in Child Hygiene, U.S. Public Health Service. Former President, 
American Child Hygiene Association. 


Colonel, Army Medical Service (retired). David Davies Professor of Tuber- J T fl 
culosis, University College of South Wales and Monmouthshire. Principal Med- 1 enza ' 

ical Officer, King Edward VII. Welsh National Association. 


Professor of Social Legislation in Columbia University. President of New York T . T ... 

Academy of Political Science. Editor of American Social Progress Series. Au- { ^9 uor . ^ aws ^n? "?** 
thor of Railway Labour in the United States; Financial Administration of Great ^ ontro1 : Umted Mates. 
Britain; etc. 


Infantile Mortality: United 


Literary Critic of Le Monde Nouveau, Paris. 


Assistant Director of Supplies, 1909-12. Director of Supplies and Quartering, 
1913-4. Director of Supplies and Transport, War Office, 1914-6. 


Assistant Director of Naval Ordnance, British Admiralty. 


Board of Trade, London. 


Editor and writer on social subjects. 


Barrister-at-Law. Vice-President and Acting President of the Institute of Inter- 
national Law. Author of Problems of International Practice and Diplomacy; New 
Methods of Adjusting International Disputes; Collapse and Reconstruction; etc. 


Assistant Professor of History in the University of Illinois. Author of The Level- 
ler Movement; The Frontier State (Vol. II. of Illinois Centennial History); etc. 


Professor of Political Economy in Harvard University. Author of The Distribu- >,,:, , -p. T 
lion of Wealth; Principles of Rural Economics; Principles of Political Economy; \ * 

, French Literature. 

Food Supply: Feeding of the 
British Army During the 
World War. 

Ordnance (in part), 
Glass (in part). 

Housing (in part). 

International Law. 




Professor of English Literature, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario. Assist- I ,, .. , T .. ,. . 

ant Editor of the Dictionary of National Biography, 1891-1901. Author of The ^g 11811 Literature (in part). 

Age of Johnson; etc. [ 

T. S. A. THOMAS SEW ALL ADAMS, PH.D. f Excess Profits Duty: United 

Professor of Political Economy in Yale University. Advisor on Taxation, U.S. < States; 
Treasury Department. [Income Tax: United Stales. 


Late Permanent Under-Secretary of State for India. Author of Peoples and I T .. 
Problems of India; Narrative of the Indian Famine, 1896-97. Editor of the 4th | 
edition of Strachey's India. 


Professor of American History in the University of Michigan. Author of The < Michigan. 
Life of Robert Toombs; American Negro Slavery; etc. 


Knight of the Dannebrog. Professor of Icelandic Language and Literature in 

the University of Copenhagen. Member of the Icelandic Parliament, 1894-1914. Iceland. 

Editor of the Periodical Eimreidin. Author of Privatboligen paa Island i Saga- 

tiden; Islands Kultur; etc. 

V. L. E. C. GENERAL VICTOR Louis EMILIEN CORDONNIER. /Frontiers, Battles of the: 

See the biographical article: CORDONNIER, VICTOR Louis EMILIEN. \ Part III. 


Consulting Surgeon to Guy's Hospital, etc. \ tatestmal Stasis. 

W. A. P. WALTER ALISON PHILLIPS, M.A. (Oxford and Dublin). 

Lecky Professor of Modern History in the University of Dublin. Member of 

the Royal Irish Academy. Author of Modern Europe; The Confederation of 
Europe; etc. 

Ireland: History. 

W. Bn. WILLIAM BATESON, M. A., F.R.S. f r 

Author of Materials for the Study of Variation; Mendel's Principles of Heredity; \ ^ n 
Problems of Genetics; etc. See the biographical article: BATESON, WILLIAM. 

W. B. S. W. B. SHAW. f 

General Secretary, Alumni Association, University of Michigan. Author of < Michigan, University of. 
, History of University of Michigan. [ 


Attorney-at-Law. Late Assistant Counsel and Liquidator, United States Food I -p . c rr-jc 

Administration. Representative, American Relief Administration, Berlin, Ger- ] * supply: United States. 
many, 1920. 


Professor of History in the University of Mississippi. \ -Mississippi. 

W. E. El. WALTER ELLIOT ELLIOT, B.Sc., M.B., Cn.B., M.P. f ... 

Secretary, Medical Committee, House of Commons. \ Health Ministry, 


Formerly Chief Justice and late Governor of Hawaii. Chairman of the Hawaiian 
Code Commission. Hon. Member of the Royal Geographical Society of Austra- Hawaii. 
lasia. Author of The Evolution of the Hawaiian Judiciary; The Development of 
Hawaiian Statute Law; etc. 


Professor of Economics and Statistics, Cornell University. Author of The 
Divorce Problem a Study in Statistics; Supplementary Analysis and Derivative 
Tables, I2th Census; etc. 


Regierungsrat in the Statistical Offices of the Reich, Berlin. Member of the I - . . 

German Statistical Society. Author of Abhandlungen uber Bewlkemngs-, Berufs-} < erman y : Statistics, 
und Betriebsstatislik ; etc. 

W. G. D. W. G. DUFFIELD. / 

Professor of Physics, University College, Reading. \ Mos eley, H. G. J. 


Director of London School of Economics and Political Science. Formerly Per- I _ . _ . ,. . 

manent Secretary of the Ministry of Food. Author of Unemployment: A Problem \* " '"WW V* Part), 
of Industry; etc. 

W. H. Di. WILLIAM HENRY DINES, B.A. (Cantab.), F.R.MET.S., F.R.AE.S., F.INST.P., F.R.S. /,, . 

See the biographical article: DINES, WILLIAM HENRY. \ Me eorol gy- 



W. H. W. 
W. J.* 

W. J. C.* 
W. K. McC. 

W. L. B. 
W. L. G.* 

W. M. Lo. 

W. O. S. 

W. R. N. 
W. R. Ma. 

W. T. L. 

W. W. M. 


Consulting Physician to the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force, 1916-9. 
cian to St. Mary's Hospital, London. 


Mesopotamia: Medical 


Austro-Hungarian Engineer Corps. Formerly of the Munitions Section of the I Munitions of War: 

Austro-Hungarian Military Technical Committee and the Munitions Depart- ] Powers (in part). 
ment of the War Ministry. 

W. J. CHILDS. f Georgia; 

Late of the Intelligence Department of the Admiralty (Geographical Section). \ Ottoman Empire. 


Late Correspondent of The Times in Rome. Correspondent of The Times on 
the Italian Front, 1915-7. Author of Italy's Part in the War; Italy in North 
Africa; Chapters on Italy in The Times History of the War; etc. 



French Croix de Guerre. Acting British Vice-Consul at Kovno, Lithuania. 


Permanent Secretary, Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London. 
Author of The Dominion of Canada; article on " Canada," Oxford Survey of the 
British Empire. 

Italian Campaigns; 
Italo-Turkish War. 

f Finland; Isvolsky, A. P.; 
1 Lithuania. 

Manitoba; New Brunswick; 
North-West Territories; 
Nova Scotia; Ontario. 

Lys, Battles of the. 



Late General Staff, German Army. Ober-Archivrat in the Reichsarchiv. For- 
merly in the Military History Section of the Great General Staff. During the 
World War served on the General Staff of XII. Corps and VI. and "A" Armies, ' 
and as a Regimental Commander. Author of Der Wendepunkt des Weltkriegs 
and other monographs. 


Financial writer on the New York Evening Post. Formerly Professor of Eco- 
nomics and Sociology, Louisiana State University. Author of Filibusters and 


Superintendent, Metallurgy Department, National Physical Laboratory. Author < Metallurgy, 
of Introduction to the Study of Physical Metallurgy; Glass Manufacture; etc. 


Economist, Latin-American Division, Department of State. Author of Noolka 
Sound Controversy (Justin Winsor Prize Essay of American Historical Associa- 
tion, 1904); Early Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Mexico 
(Albert Shaw Lectures, Johns Hopkins University, 1913); etc. 


Surgeon, University College Hospital. 


Fellow of Caius College, Cambridge. University Lecturer, Cambridge Univer- 
sity. Lecturer, Workers' Educational Association, 1916-9. Member of British 
Munitions Council during the World War. Temporary Director, Economic and 
Financial Section, League of Nations. Director, National Federation of Iron and 
Steel Manufacturers. Director, Welwyn Garden City. Author of Capital and 
Labour; Introduction to the Study of Prices. 


Editor of The Iron Age, New York. 

Initial used for anonymous contributors. 

Nervous System (Surgery). 

Munitions of War: United 
Kingdom (in part). 

Iron and Steel. 

Kornilov (in part). 




ENGLISH LITERATURE (see 9.645*). A retrospect, from the 
vantage-ground of 1921, over the progress of English literature in 
recent years showed no sign of degeneracy in literary quality. 
From a purely national point of view, English writers have prob- 
ably never stood higher comparatively in the world of letters. 
The commerce of the book-world and the ply of the " best 
sellers" may vary; but if we regard the curve of literature as a 
whole, it is justifiable to claim that, during the past generation, 
the best English work has not been deflected from the direction 
in which literary progress had been steadily moving. 

The acme of the English novel was reached already in the last 
quarter of the igth century. And among novelists still living in 
1921 Thomas Hardy held a position of lofty preeminence. In 
these later years his work as a poet had given him a second title 
to fame. Even more than in the case of his finest tragic novels, 
his tragic epic, The Dynasts, is full of a great pity and a great 
patience. Like all great tragedy it is cathartic. Like all great 
art, it exalts and enlarges. 

In Sir J. M. Barrie, by origin a typical Scot, who, together 
with Hardy, had received the Order of Merit, fantasy had achieved 
its highest embodiment since Midsummer Night's Dream. Faerie 
had, in him, become naturalized on the English stage; and it has 
been for the theatre that all his later work was done a constantly 
growing range of work, from Peter Pan to The Admirable Crich- 
lon, Cinderella, What Every Woman Knows, Dear Brutus, The 
Twelve-Pound Look, The Old Lady Shows Her Medals, and Mary 
Rose. Hardy and Barrie between them had created an atmos- 
phere of the theatre in which it had become possible for an 
imagination worthy of English literature to move and breathe 
and have its being. 

In the forefront of literary activity in 1921, the work of H. G. 
Wells and of Bernard Shaw, though less creative, sounded its 
challenge to the future Wells as the sociological autobiographer 
of his time, Shaw as a satirist, often as bitter as Swift, and with 
something in him of a new Gulliver. 

H. G. Wells's skill as a writer is shown in the almost animal 
realism of his presentment, not in one or two books merely, 
but a score. In his fiction he is specially autobiographic: 

" I recall an underground kitchen with a drawered table, a window 
looking up at a grating, a back yard in which, growing out by a dust- 
bin, was a gi'ape-vine; a red-papered room with a book-case, over 
my father's shop, the dusty aisles and fixtures, the regiments of 
wine-glasses and tumblers, the rows of hanging mugs and jugs, the 
towering edifices^ of jam-pots, the tea and dinner and toilet sets in 
that emporium, its brighter side of cricket goods, of pads and balls 
and stumps. Out of the window one peeped at the more exterior 
world, the High Street in front, the tailor's garden, the butcher's 
yard, the church-yard and Bromley church tower behind, and one 
was taken upon expeditions to fields and open places. This limited 
world was peopled with certain familiar presences, mother and father, 
two brothers, the evasive but interesting cat." 

Upper-class life he saw (from the point of view of the servants' 
hall) when on his father's death in 1878 his mother became house- 
keeper in the family in which she had formerly been lady's maid, 
at Up Park near Petersfield, the " Bladesover " of Tono-Bungay, 
which also enshrines some early experiences in the chemist's 
shop at Midhurst. He had a bitter struggle, both for livelihood 
and for education, beginning work as a draper's assistant at the 
age of 15, and experiencing in his own person some of the humilia- 
tions he has described in Kipps. Striving to educate himself, he 
took a humble post as assistant master in an obscure school, and 
from this in turn he escaped with the aid of a Government 
scholarship to the Royal College of Science, South Kensington. 
It was his good fortune to come under Huxley, the leading expo- 
nent of the new science of biology and one of the most stirring 
spirits in the intellectual unrest of the time. Economically and 
socially the immediate gain for Wells was the London B.Sc. 
degree with first-class honours in zoology; upon his mental 
development the effects were far-reaching. It is really of himself 
under the name of " Oswald " that Wells speaks in this pas- 
sage from Joan and Peter: 

" Those were the great days when Huxley lectured on zoology at 
South Kensington, and to him Oswald went. Oswald did indeed 
find science consoling and inspiring. Scientific studies were at once 
rarer and more touched by enthusiasm then than a quarter of a 
century later, and he was soon a passionate naturalist, consumed by 
the insatiable craving to know how. That little long upper labora- 
tory in the Normal School of Science, as the place was then called, 
with the preparations and diagrams along one side, the sinks and 
windows along the other, the row of small tables down the windows, 
and the ever-present vague mixed smell of methylated spirit, Canada 
balsam and a sweetish decay, opened vast new horizons to him. To 
the world of the eighteen-eighties the story of life, of the origin and 
branching out of species, of the making of continents, was still 
the most inspiring of new romances. Comparative anatomy in 
particular was then a great and philosophical ' new learning," a 
mighty training of mind; the drift of biological teaching towards 
specialization was still to come." 

It was partly due to ill-health as a hard-worked young don 
that Wells turned his attention from the more scholastic region 
of scientific journalism and text-book to writing romance of the 
Jules Verne variety. In this he achieved a rapid success. It is 
still delightful for a reader to recall the thrill of first contact with 
The Time Machine and Doctor Moreau's Island, soon to be fol- 
lowed by The Wheels of Chance, and the War of the Worlds, in the 
middle and later 'nineties. Some critics will maintain that, in 
technical skill and professional drollery, Mr. Wells never sur- 
passed The Wheels of Chance or The Sea Lady. In 1900, however, 
came Love and Mr. Lewisham, which was regarded as a landmark; 
but it was eclipsed in the direction of sociology of contemporary 
life by Kipps in 1905 and the more ambitious Tono-Bungay in 
1909. Nor will the war-period in England be understood 
without Mr. Britling Sees It Through. 

' These figures indicate the volume and page number of the previous article. 


George Bernard Shaw, who was born in Dublin in 1856, came 
of English Protestant middle-class stock. " I am a typical 
Irishman," he says; " my family came from Yorkshire. My 
father was an ineffective, unsuccessful man, in theory a vehement 
teetotaller, but in practice a furtive drinker. I never learnt any- 
thing at school, a place where they put Caesar and Horace into 
the heads of small boys, and expect the result to be an elegant 
taste of knowledge of the world. I took refuge in total idleness 
at school, and picked up at home quite unconsciously a knowl- 
edge of that extraordinary literature of modern music from 
Bach to Wagner, which has saved me from being at the smallest 
disadvantage in competition with men who only know the gram- 
mar and mispronunciation of the Greek and Latin poets and 
philosophers. For the rest my parents went their own way and 
let me go mine." He combined the unaccustomed arts of critic, 
logician and sceptical journalist. He was haunted by wit, largely 
of the caustic variety of Samuel Butler (the author of Erewhon). 
The conferencier of a silken skein, he drew an audience like a 
magnet, but he ridiculed English ideas of a " sport " and a 
" gentleman," his unpopularity flaring in 1914 in a tract called 
Common Sense and the War. To him a typical Englishman was a 
wildly absurd and enthusiastic fellow (Nelson); Wellington, a 
typical common-sense Irishman, was better. Church and public- 
school ideas became his butts. He preferred the provocative 
method to any other. From critic and quasi-novelist he became 
playwright. His first play, Widowers' Houses, written in 1885, 
was not produced until 1892, and then with scant success. He 
followed this with The Philanderer (1893), a satire on the eman- 
cipated woman, and Mrs. Warren's Profession, a treatment of 
commercialized vice, which was refused performance by the 
censor. Arms and the Man, a brilliant satire on military glory, 
Candida (1894), The Man of Destiny (1895), a mock-heroic skit 
on Napoleon, and You Never Can Tell (1896), a farcical treatment 
of the New Woman, followed. These seven plays were all dis- 
tinguished by their attack upon some time-honoured sham, 
their reduction to reality of some pretentiously false view. Per- 
haps because of their slight success as acting plays, Shaw pub- 
lished them in two series, Plays Pleasant and Unpleasant (1898). 
He made the prefaces to these volumes elaborate comments on 
the technical and social qualities of the plays; and, further to 
guide his readers, he expanded the stage directions into full 
descriptions, character sketches and explanations, thus adapting 
the play to a public which was accustomed to read novels. Prose 
drama was once more restored to the library. The later plays 
were more immediately successful on the stage, but Shaw con- 
tinued to publish them as books, and, by the aid of the prefaces, 
to use them as effective propaganda for his views on art, the 
theatre, history and society. He attacks the illusion of history 
in Caesar and Cleopatra, and of romantic morality in The Demi's 
Disciple, published in Three Plays for Puritans (1900). In Man 
and Superman (1903) he represents courtship as a war of the 
sexes, and man as the victim of woman, who is the incarnation of 
nature's purpose and the will to live. In John Bull's Other Island 
(1904) he attacked English domination of Ireland, and made the 
preface a powerful arraignment of military rule in Egypt. He 
attacks poverty in Butlerian vein in the persons of those weak 
members of society who accept it, and looks forward to their 
extinction with the extension of a better race. The attitude, 
called " pragmatism," of accepting as true only beliefs that will 
work, is shown by his attack on the ideas of reform by punishment, 
or of the improvement of society by marriage and the home. 
In such volumes as Androcles and the Lion and', later, Back to 
Methuselah, he conversationalizes and essayizes at the same time, 
giving modern dialect the benefit wherever possible. 

The psychology of the end of our period has forced us, more 
or less, to isolate these four outstanding personalities, Hardy, 
Barrie, Wells and Shaw, as representing the most dominant 
forces of contemporary influence. But an enumeration of other 
prominent living representatives of English letters in 1921 shows 
that there had been no falling-off in distinction since the century 
opened. A list of some 50 would find honoured veterans (Morley, 
Frederic Harrison, Bryce, Trevelyan) side by side with long- 

established critics in Saintsbury, Gosse, Sidney Colvin, W. P. 
Ker; dramatists in Pinero and Henry Arthur Jones; and, among 
the middle generation, writers of genius already fully recognized 
before 1900 in Rudyard Kipling, William Watson, W. B. Yeats, 
Alice Meynell and Robert Bridges. With them may be named, 
in alphabetical order: Lascelles Abercrombie, Maurice Baring, 
Max Beerbohm, Hilaire Belloc, Arnold Bennett, E. F. Benson, 
Laurence Binyon, " George Birmingham," Augustine Birrell, 
John Buchan, G. K. Chesterton, A. Clutton-Brock, A. Conan 
Doyle, Joseph Conrad, W. H. Davies, Walter De La Mare, C. M. 
Doughty, Oliver Elton, John Galsworthy, Charles Graves, Rider 
Haggard, Maurice Hewlett, R. S. Hichens, Anthony Hope- 
Hawkins, A. E. Housman, W. H. Hudson, Stephen Leacock, 
Sidney Lee, W. J. Locke, E. V. Lucas, J. W. Mackail, Stephen 
McKenna, Compton Mackenzie, John Masefield, George Moore, 
Henry Newbolt, Alfred Noyes, Herbert Paul, A. Quiller-Couch, 
Walter Raleigh, George W. Russell (" A. E."), Owen Seaman, 
May Sinclair, De Vere Stacpoole, A. B. Walkley, Hugh Walpole, 
Margaret Woods, Israel Zangwill. 

In fiction, preeminently among literary productions, the tem- 
porary displacements of popular vogue are numerous. During 
1910-21, while the cult of Henry James and of Joseph Conrad had 
gathered strength, the genius of Rudyard Kipling had found no 
new utterance. The most characteristic writers of fiction during 
this period were Wells, Arnold Bennett, Galsworthy, Compton 
Mackenzie, Stephen McKenna, E. V. Lucas, W. J. Locke, W. L. 
George, Hugh Walpole, Gilbert Cannan and May Sinclair. A 
great change had come over the spirit of fiction and its frankness 
since the days of the eminent Victorians. " Psycho-analysis " 
had become its theme. Galsworthy's Dark Flower and Beyond 
are almost entirely taken up with the analysis of sex-attraction; 
Wells and Shaw are strangely intent upon the life-force; and 
with writers like Compton Mackenzie, W. L. George, D. H. 
Lawrence and Gilbert Cannan, it becomes almost an obsession. 
The emancipation for which the novelists of an earlier generation 
had sighed was achieved with a lack of effort that was almost 
instantaneous in the 20th century. 

Yet withal, the humanitarianism of Galsworthy ^.nd the dra- 
matic regionalism of Arnold Bennett have formed solid enrich- 
ments of the literary stock in English fiction. Note must be 
taken, too, as characteristic also of the two last-named, of a fine 
vein of literary epicurism in those contemporary writers to whom 
style is inseparable from ideas. Among novelists who are also 
essayists this has been a marked feature of the work of Hilaire 
Belloc and E. V. Lucas; hardly less marked in the case of Filson 
Young; most marked of all in that of George Moore, whose 
Brook Kerith and Helo'ise and Abelard stand out as perhaps the 
most deliberately "artistic" pieces of English composition in 
the period. The epicurism of George Moore is even more 
definitely embodied in those intimate records of his Irish literary 
associations (Hail and Farewell: Ane; Salve; Vale) which may 
well be, to a later generation, more interesting than anything 
in his fiction. Nor from this selection of contemporary epicures 
in style can reference be omitted to the writings of Max Beer- 
bohm (Works; More; Yet Again; A Christmas Garland; And 
Even Now) an ironist of delightful fastidiousness. 

England is proud of her ironists. When Samuel Butler, the 
author of Erewhon, died in 1902, his views were set forth in the 
posthumous novel, The Way of All Flesh, one of the seminal 
satires of to-day. In his union of logic with irony Butler belongs 
with Huxley and Matthew Arnold, as he is their peer in the mas- 
tery of a superbly clear and idiomatic English style. He differs 
from them in that he possessed also a certain gnome-like impu- 
dence of fancy, which led him into strange ambiguities and throws 
a veil of seeming irresponsibility over much of his writing. 

Outside fiction, it is remarkable how much of the wealth of 
English belles leltres has revolved round historical biography and 
world history, as systematized in great men and "heroes." The 
conclusion of Swift that history was formed by the essence of 
innumerable biographies may indeed seem to have been demon- 
strated in recent years by the production in England of the 
Dictionary of National Biography and by such individual cases as 


G. E. Buckle's completion of the Life of Disraeli; while Lytton 
Strachey's re-readings in biography (Eminent Victorians and 
Queen Victoria) have added a new interest to its study. 

In tracing the contemporary developments of English poetry, 
it has been said that the " aesthetic " movement of the 'nine- 
ties came more or less definitely to fill the void caused by the 
ebb-tide of Tennyson, Browning, Rossetti and Morris. Swin- 
burne and Meredith, Bridges and William Watson, may be 
added to these names of poets already established by the end 
of the ipth century. In 1855, when Tennyson was crowned by 
the young men of England at the Sheldonian, poetry was " the 
thing," and this was due to Tennyson. Tennyson had, indeed, 
invented a new poetry, a new poetic English; every piece that 
he wrote was a conquest of a new region. The early attitude of 
Morris to Tennyson is described by Morris's biographer as 
defiant adoration. He perceived his limitations, however, in a 
manner remarkable for a man of twenty or so. Sir Galahad 
made too much noise and was not nearly mediaeval enough for 
him. The rise and reign of the Browningesque and the pic- 
turesque followed the decay of Victorianism as a purely decora- 
tive art. Then came the rise and decline of the aesthetic philoso- 
phy in the 'nineties, with the introduction of the muscular 
influence of Henley, Kipling, Davidson, Henry Newbolt, and, 
still more recently, Masefield, to whom have been added all 
those included among the Georgians. And yet there is no abrupt 
period of severance. A Shropshire Lad, written when A. E. 
Housman (b.iSsg) was little more than thirty, is not the most 
easy of modern verse, but is still the best-loved when it is most 
read. Rt>bert Bridges' early poems include lyrics which are 
among the most perfect work, in magic of cadence or in formal 
prosody, since Carew, Wither and Herrick. 

The conspicuous poets among the Georgians are not, perhaps, 
of the first rank, but far more than in the last century they are 
poets of democracy. They are poets of a diversity of ideas, and 
are acclaimed, as often as not, for refusing imaginative idylls in 
order to write of the common sights and sounds of the everyday 
world in which we live. Among the new poets are included 
Lascelles Abercrombie, C. M. Doughty, Sturge Moore, Belloc, 
Chesterton, W. H. Davies, A. Noyes, L. Binyon, James E. 
Flecker, Edward Thomas, Rupert Brooke, W. W. Gibson, Ralph 
Hodgson, John Masefield, W. De La Mare, John Freeman, 
Siegfried Sassoon, J. C. Squire. 

In 1895 the Yellow Book sought to shock the primness of the 
" eminent Victorians," as they came to be satirized. It scarcely 
needed Patience or The Green Carnation to disillusion the atti- 
tudinizing of A. Symons, Le Gallienne and their disciples. With 
the end of the century the philosophy of the aesthetes was wear- 
ing thin. The " Yea Man " and muscular Christian repudiated 
this languid aestheticism (" The first duty of life is to be artifi- 
cial "). But it was reinforced to some extent by the " Celtic 
revival " (you could hardly obtain a more artificial adjective 
than that), as represented by W. B. Yeats. Remarkable work in 
the Spenserian vein was achieved by Charles Montagu Doughty 
(b.i843), whose Dawn in Britain (1906) reacts against Victorian 
feeling as Walpole reacted against Brunswick. These constant 
reactions are typical of an over-studied literature. It needs the 
architecture of Hardy to surpass it in The Dynasts. The distant 
and almost planetary point of view taken in the immense poetic 
dramas is contradicted most exhaustively by John Masefield 
(b.i874), a " Shropshire Lad " in reality, who scorned the finished 
elegiac of Housman and the minute tedium of the novel for the 
Crabbe-like medium of The Everlasting Mercy (1911) and for 
the counterpoise to the Celtic dialect play in The Tragedy of Nan. 
Of Masefield's realistic novels in verse the best is probably 
Dauber (1912). Versatile though he is, he has never completely 
succeeded in developing the irony of circumstance so exactly 
as Hardy; but he has drawn others into it, like Lascelles Aber- 
crombie, who in Deborah (1913) achieves a fine approach to the 
Miltonic drama. The change that was foreshadowed in the. un- 
equal Daffodil Fields (1913) was completed by the battlefield and 
the great telling of Gallipoli (1916). Thence Masefield's prose 
and verse suffered a war change, and with it his writing gained in 

poetry and true utterance. In August 1914 he reached a noble 

These homes, this valley spread below me here, 
The rooks, the tilted stacks, the beasts in pen, 
Have been the heart-felt things, past speaking dear 
To unknown generations of dead men. 

Of poets lost during the war, memories of their craftsmanship 
is perhaps most insistent in the case of Rupert Brooke (1887- 
1915) and Edward Thomas (1878-1917). 

Edward Thomas, one of the little-known but most individual 
of modern English poets, was born in 1878. For many years 
before he turned to verse, Thomas had a considerable following as 
a critic and author of travel books and biographies. Hating his 
hack-work, yet unable to get free of it, he had so repressed his 
creative ability that he had grown doubtful concerning his own 
power. It needed something foreign to stir and animate what 
was native in him. So when Robert Frost, the New England 
poet, went abroad in 1912 for two years and became an intimate 
friend of Thomas, the English critic began to write poetry. 
Loving, like Frost, the minutiae of existence, the quaint and casual 
turns of ordinary life, he caught the magic of the English country- 
side in its unpoeticized quietude. Many of his poems are full of a 
slow, sad contemplation of life, and reflection of its brave futility. 
It is not disillusion exactly; it is rather an absence of illusion. 
Poems (1917), dedicated to Robert Frost, is full of Thomas's 
fidelity to little things, as unglorified as the unfreezing of the 
" rock-like mud," a child's path, a list of quaint-sounding villages, 
birds' nests uncovered by the autumn wind, dusty nettles the 
lines glow with a deep and almost abject reverence for the soil. 

In 1913 Rupert Brooke, of Grantchester, was elected a fellow 
of King's College, Cambridge, aged 36. After travel and recrea- 
tion he sought fresh faith and hope in the struggle. After seeing 
service in Belgium (1914) he spent the following winter in a 
training camp in Dorsetshire, and sailed with the British Medi- 
terranean Expeditionary Force in February 1915, to take part 
in the Dardanelles campaign. Brooke never reached his desti- 
nation. He died of blood-poisoning at Skyros, April 23 1915. 

Another poet whose early death extorted a rare eulogy from a 
fellow writer, D. Goldring, was James E. Flecker (1884-1915), 
a student of Andre Chenier and later of the Parnassians, whose 
beatified dreams sing in the Golden Journey to Samarkand (1913) 
and The Old Ship. His Burial in England Ode shows noble 
evidence of a faith to which English witnesses were many. 

Events in Ireland have emphasized the increased attention 
devoted of late years to the Irish literary revival (see IRISH 
LITERATURE). Anglo-Irish literature had its beginning in the 
early days of the igth century, but it was not until about 1840 
that there was a definite movement for the recreation of an 
Irish culture in English. This movement was forwarded by 
Thomas Davis, and 'it took its title from Davis's newspaper, 
The Nation. There were many eloquent writers then in prose 
and verse. Carleton, the Banims and Gerald Griffin were the 
novelists of the time; Mangan, Ferguson, Davis, Walsh and 
Cullinan were the poets; Mitchell and Davis were the political 
and social writers. But while Davis and his group were working 
for the creation of a new Irish culture, the famine of 1846-7 
altered the whole life of the country. Meanwhile, from the Nation 
period, when the poet Mangan worked with the scholar O'Dono- 
van to produce versions of the Irish bardic poems, there had 
been a close connexion between Celtic research and Anglo-Irish 
poetry. The most valuable poetry written in the next forty 
years came from Celtic originals or from suggestions in Celtic 
originals. Sir Samuel Ferguson, who survived from the Nation 
days, treated the famous " Ultonian " or " Red Branch " epic 
cycle (the cycle that has the hero Cuchullain for its central 
character) as Tennyson was treating the Round-Table cycle, 
writing narrative or dramatic poems about the different 
episodes. He translated a few of the modern folksongs, bringing 
into English poetry an unfamiliar rhythm in such versions as 
those of Cean Duv Deelish and Cashel of Munster, poems that 
have the beauty and the spirit of the originals. Aubrey de Vere 
wrote Catholic poetry, but the two poems by him that deal with 


Celtic life in Ireland, Bard Ethell and The Wedding of the Clans, 
represent his strongest work. Dr. Sigerson, in his generation, 
made metrical translations of Irish poetry from the 8th to the 
i8th century, and his collection, Bards of the Gael and Gall, was 
an important influence on the new Irish poetry. 

With the 'eighties came a period of social and political conflict 
in Ireland. But out of the political welter emerged the Gaelic 
League. And it was this organization that henceforth provided 
a soil and a shelter for the new poetry, although this new poetry 
was still to be in English. 

It must be said, "however, that, despite the heroic activity dis- 
played during well-nigh thirty years, the Gaelic movement as 
such, with its classes, societies, athletic clubs, readings and 
revivals, represented in 1921 something of a provincialism, with 
its future (to use a Hibernicism) rather behind it than before it. 
The Gaelic School is remarkably lacking in Irish jollity. The 
historic Irishman of literature, as shown by Moore, Thackeray, 
Lover, Lever, " George Birmingham," Somerville and Ross, has 
managed somehow to survive any modern Celtic presentment. 
At no time has Irish poetry as a whole been distinctly national; 
and the epithet " Celtic " is a misnomer if it be used to appro- 
priate to Irish poets the characteristics of brooding melancholy, 
wistful mysticism and fervent idealism. The inspiration of the 
Irish poets is at least as much climatic and local as racial. It is 
no depreciation of the work done by Irish writers in recent years, 
aggressively self-conscious and artificial though much of it is, to 
say that, even in those faculties more peculiarly attributed to the 
Celt, he has never approached the depth and breadth of the 
Teuton; the whole literary output of the" Celtic fringe, "so called, 
sinks into insignificance in comparison with the work of the 
Teuton and the Saxon. 

The unbiassed observer who does not allow his vision to be 
blurred by the rose-coloured haze that wraps the propaganda 
literature of Sinn Fein will indeed have no hesitation in declaring 
that, judged by its own aims and ideals, the Gaelic movement 
has, on the whole, been a failure. Gaelic may indeed survive and 
may even prosper, although the fruits of its revival as a language 
are likely to remain inaccessible to all but the elect, but it can 
never dominate, least of all will it be able to oust its rival, English. 
The odds are too great on the other side. This does not mean, 
of course, that the movement has been barren of results. It has 
provided a meeting-ground for thousands of Irish men and 
women who prior to 1893 seemed almost hopelessly separated by 
their own local political or sectarian associations. It has helped 
to bring to light again the old world of ancient Ireland from its 
manuscript tomb in Irish and Continental libraries. More im- 
portant than this, it has circulated the glad news that there is 
indeed a native Irish literature, and an Irish tradition. 

Such as it is in Irish literary circles, the group of writers which 
stands for distinct contemporary ideas is of almost exactly the 
generation of H. G. Wells, John Galsworthy and Arnold Bennett - 
W. B. Yeats (b.i86s), George W. Russell (" A. E. "), Douglas 
Hyde, Standish O'Grady, J. M. Synge and George Moore. The 
linguistic and dry-as-dust part, but much also that stands for 
the Irish Ireland idea that is for an Irish-speaking, -writing 
and -thinking country is mainly due to Hyde and O'Grady. 
But much also is due to the counter-influence of George Moore 
and of J. M. Synge, the latter of whom wrote unrivalled dialect, 
often poetic but often, too, rather quizzical comedy. 

For a good many people, Protestant and un-Irish in speech, 
the most self-conscious representative of the group, artificial 
though he be, William Butler Yeats, is, nevertheless, the in- 
dicating number of the Celtic revival. None of Yeats's lyric 
rises perhaps to the plane of the more inspired lines of " A. E." 
or the happier dialectic efforts of J. M. J5ynge, but in three poems 
of his earlier period, The Wanderings of Oisin (1889), The Coun- 
tess Cathleen (1892) and The Landof Heart's Desire (1894), Yeats 
has conceived and written something which is peculiarly his own. 
In the volume of The Wind among the Reeds (1899), Yeats 
reaches his finest and most original work in shorter lyrics. Yeats's 
mystical broodings of spirit lie outside the highway of poetry. 
They are as unintelligible to the common mind as the arcana of 

Blake. But Yeats has lived among men, and he is not guiltless 
of conscious artifice where Blake would have been wholly natural. 
Perhaps the most beautiful poems of the volume are " The Host 
of the Air," " Into the Twilight " and " The Song of Wandering 
Angus." The first-named, considered only as prosody, does not 
come short of " The Lake Isle of Innisfree." 

The year 1899 not only saw the publication of The Wind among 
the Reeds; it found the poet busied with the workings of the Irish 
Literary Theatre, and it marked a point of declination in his 
lyric powers. In the Seven Woods (1903) contains no poetry as 
individual as the preceding volume, though it includes the stir- 
ring stanzas of " Red Hanrahan's Song," a poem which, with 
splendid imagery of clouds, winds, yellow pools and "flooding 
waters, breathes the love of Ireland's bare hills, bog waters and 
warm soft rain. Other songs, however, suggest English and 
Elizabethan rather than Celtic models. The short series of love 
poems printed in The Green Helmet (1910) is metaphysical and 
not very distinctive; in The Wild Swans of Coole (1919) Yeats 
touches again the old melodies .skilfully, but in the mood of an 
imitation of his earlier self. If not altogether with the short lyric, 
with poems of a different kind Yeats has shown himself the poet 
of an esoteric beauty, in a character and a manner that are all his 
own. Further, the three poems already mentioned may be re- 
garded as the prelude to Yeats's phase as a dramatic poet. The 
first of these is in form derived from the Middle Irish dialogues 
of St. Patrick and Oisin, and represents the mythical hero relating 
to the saint the story of his wanderings in the paradises of pagan 
mythology, and his passionate love of Niam. The most striking 
characteristic of this early poem is that magical impression seldom 
surpassed or even approached in the modern mythology of poetic 
dream. We are caught once more in the faerie to which Huon of 
Bordeaux, of the mediaevals, primitively introduced the mechan- 
icals of Athens. 

George W. Russell, whose work appears under the monogram 
"A. E.," is, in the proper sense of the word, a mystic, though 
mysticism is scarcely a characteristic of the Irish; the Irish mind 
is rather intellectual than mystical. Like all mystics he is con- 
tent to express a single idea. In all his volumes of verse, in 
Homeward, in the Earth Breath, in the Divine Vision, he has put 
into pregnant verse his all-sufficing thought. Men are the strayed 
heaven-dwellers the angels who " willed in silence their own 
doom," the Gods who " forgot themselves to men." Involved in 
matter, now they are creating a new empire for the spirit. He has 
been drawn, too, to the study of Celtic remains; the old Irish 
mythology seems to him a fragment of the doctrine that was 
held by the Egyptians, the Greeks and the Indians. He alludes 
to the Irish divinities as if they were as well known as Zeus or 
Eros or Apollo. He is the mystical poet of our civilization, and 
nearly all of what the West has found in the Indian poet, Rabin- 
dranath Tagore, is in the poems of " A. E." 

In the 'nineties the ascendancy of the national drama of Nor- 
way made a few Irish writers, W. B. Yeats, George Moore, 
Edward Martyn, think of experimenting with a national theatre 
for Ireland. They began by producing in Lublin, for three 
successive seasons, plays written by Irish writers but presented 
by English actors. The experiment closed unsuccessfully in 1901. 
Meanwhile the activities of the Gaelic League and olher national 
societies had produced a company of Irish players. The company 
was now ready to further any experiments that Yeats, as the 
leader of the Irish dramatic movement, might make. Yeats 
brought into the company a writer who was to elucidate the 
movement, John M. Synge (1871-1909). Synge wrote six plays 
for the Irish theatre, five of which they produced, The Shadow of 
the Glen, Riders to the Sea, The Well of the Saints, The Playboy 
of the Western World and Deirdre of the Sorrows, the last a 
powerful dramatization of the Exile of the Sons of Usnech, which 
forms one of the three " Sorrows of Story Telling " and has 
persisted in Irish tradition for at least a thousand years. 

Amid the outpouring of new books, pointing in no special 
literary direction, creative English literature at its best, viewed 
from the standpoint of 1921, showed a stability of purpose, 
fundamentally unaltered by the advent of new ideas. In spite 


of the whirlpools of Armageddon, the old Laboriositas was re- 
turning to the book-world. The St. John the Baptist, moreover, 
of a series of events without a parallel in human annals had been 
a representative, and a very perfect one on the whole, of English 
belles lettres. John Locke, Smollett, Edmund Burke, in earlier 
days, had all been pointers of remarkable accuracy where mighty 
events were concerned; but they have been surpassed in our own 
day by George Meredith, as a forerunner of the world-upheaval. 
The whole of his prose work is topical to the main end. His 
greatest novel was most political and most prophetic. In mili- 
tary matters he claimed none of Mr. Wells's technique nor of 
Mr. Shaw's " common sense." But he had the advantage of 
kno wing -something about history, and he has written more to 
the point than any historian. 
In May 1909 Hardy wrote memorably: 

He spoke as one afoot will wind 

A morning horn ere men awake. 

His note was trenchant, turning kind. 

He was of those whose wit can shake 

And riddle to the very core 

The counterfeits that time will break. 

So that, when now all tongues declare 

His shape unseen by his green hill, 

I scarce believe he sits not there. 

No matter. Further and further still 

Through the world's vaporous vitiate air 

His words ring on as live words will. 

It is interesting to note that Thomas Hardy, Meredith's suc- 
cessor in the leadership of English letters, owed the form of his 
Desperate Remedies greatly, as it happened, to Meredith, the 
publisher's reader. But Meredith himself, curiously enough, was 
" afflicted by Hardy's twilight view of life." " Twilight view of 
life " is an extraordinary charge for Meredith to bring. If Hardy 
does not dwell upon happiness, something must be allowed for 
temperament; he is vocal to tragedy rather than to joy. He must 
not be held " unperceiving because undemonstrative." To dwell 
on happiness is, simply, not his business. To Hardy the world is 
very old, and the life of man is very brief. The Romans used to 
think and talk in Casterbridge as men do to-day; over Egdon 
Heath the generation of men pass ceaselessly and leave no trace. 
Men and women are always snatching at happiness, striving to 
express and to fulfil themselves, and breaking themselves against 
a power that takes no heed of them. The structure of Hardy's 
work, as became an architect, is unspeakably superior to Mere- 
dith's; and in spite oiJude, his style is never really " obscure." 
In reading the pages of Two in a Tower one is struck by the pure 
beauty of the prose. And Hardy, although determinist, is never 
a real pessimist. Watching from infinity, he shows human life 
as futile and trivial. But when individuality is intensified and 
desire exerted, as in the love of man and woman, then, despite the 
hostility or indifference of the governing power, we see human 
life heroically grand. There is no trace of contempt, except in 
case of life's " little ironies." The charge of pessimism cannot 
stand. In the normal view of passion and in the glorious view of 
rustic philosophy and humour, Hardy is Shakespearean at his 
best, just as Barrie, his nearest younger rival in English letters, 
is Shakespearean in his eerie twilight glimpses of faerie. In their 
successive preeminence the quality of English literature has been 
worthily maintained. (T. SE.; H. CH.) 

ENNEKING, JOHN JOSEPH (1841-1916), American painter 
(see 9.647), died at Hyde Park, Mass., Nov. 17 1916. 

ENVER PASHA (1881- ), leader of the Young Turks, 
was of very humble origin. He was born in Abana, near the 
Black Sea, where his father was a bridge-keeper and his mother 
followed the despised profession of laying out the dead. His 
father was Turkish, his mother Albanian, and he had a Circassian 
grandmother. He entered the Turkish army as a subaltern with- 
out money or influence but gained admission to the staff college 
at Constantinople, and from there went to Salonika, the head- 
quarters of the Young Turk movement. He fought with Bul- 
garian and Greek guerrilla bands, coming meanwhile in contact 
with the representatives of the new ideas, and finding in Talaat, 

the minor telegraph official, a politician after his own heart. 
In 1908, as aide-de-camp of Gen. Hussein Hilmi, he, with Niazi 
Bey, imported the flag of revolution in the Macedonian moun- 
tains, originally with the object of restoring the constitution of 
1876, which had been disregarded by 'Abdul Hamid, but also to 
save himself from a threatened arrest. 'Abdul Hamid professed 
to yield and Enver entered Constantinople as a feted hero. But 
he realized that Ms time was not yet come. He went to Berlin 
as major and military attache, and there, from 1909 to 1911, 
he pursued his military studies and enjoyed a social career as a 
ladies' favourite. His stay was only once interrupted, when, in 
1909, he hastened to Salonika, and with Mahmud Shevket under- 
took a brief and victorious campaign against the reactionaries, 
who hoped to regain unfettered power under "Abdul Hamid. 
After taking the capital and deposing 'Abdul Hamid, Enver 
returned to Berlin. Having learned to speak good German, he 
took command at Benghasi in the Italo-Turkish War. He also 
wrote a book called Tripoli, dealing with this period. 1 The Peace 
of Lausanne brought his work in Africa to an end, and he returned 
to Constantinople to find Turkey in the midst of the war with the 
Balkan States. During the Dec. armistice, Enver, then a lieu- 
tenant-colonel, was made chief-of-staff of the X. Army Corps, of 
which he soon was virtually in command. His attempt at a 
landing at Sharkoi (in the E. of the Gallipoli peninsula), on 
Feb. 8 1913, miscarried, as indeed did all Enver's military enter- 
prises. During the peace negotiations, when Kiamil, as Grand 
Vizier, took the wise course of deferring to the wishes of the 
British, Enver with his friends arrived in front of the Sublime 
Porte, shot the War Minister, Nazim Pasha, turned out Kiamil, 
forced himself upon the Sultan, and in collusion with the Young 
Turk Committee filled all the offices with Young Turks. 

The new Vizier, Mohamed Shevket, was assassinated in 
June 1913, and this further enraged the Committee against the 
Old Turks and the Union Liberate. The body of the state was 
now purged of all elements which would not blindly carry out 
the policy of the Committee. More than 1,200 officers, among 
them 1 53 generals and colonels, were dismissed by Enver in one 
day. Enver put himself at the head of the troops, and in July 
1913 made a triumphal entry into Adrianople, which had already 
been evacuated by the Bulgarians. On Jan. 3 1914 he promoted 
himself major-general and made himself Minister of War. 

Now began a period of hasty measures and reckless decrees. 
At one time the Turkish script was altered, with the result that 
officers were unable to read their reports or orders; then the 
Enverie, a highly unpractical head-covering, reminiscent of a 
child's paper hat, was invented and introduced; in March 1914 
he demanded and obtained the hand of Princess Nadjie, the 
Sultan's niece, made himself general of a division, and began, 
moreover, to take thought for his financial future. When at last 
he was forced to flee from Constantinople, the bridge-keeper's 
son owned 320 houses in the city, and he had also acquired 
interests in banks and mines. 

When the World War broke out Enver began to cherish 
strategical ambitions. In the winter of 1914-5 he led an entire 
Turkish army in the disastrous offensive in the snow-covered 
mountains on the Russo-Turkish border. With Liman von 
Sanders, the chief of the German military mission, his relations 
were strained, and the situation was not improved by certain 
Germans who flattered Enver and intrigued against Liman von 
Sanders. He became a megalomaniac to whom no one dared 
. offer a word of advice. He had no share in the Dardanelles 
defence, but took all the credit for it. In internal politics he 
became, by degrees, the absolute r.uler of the country. When the 
Turkish collapse came, he fled by way of Odessa to Germany. 
In 1919 he was condemned to death at Constantinople in con- 
tumaciam. In the same year, after a brief exile among friends in 
Germany, he fled to "Russia. There at first he helped Denikin 
to maintain the independence of the Caucasus, but when the 
latter made a political approach towards the Entente, Enver 
left him, stayed for a short time in Azerbaijan, and was mixed up 

1 A German version was issued in 1918. 


in adventures in Asia Minor. He was reported in ig2o-2i to have 
been employed at Moscow as director of the Asiatic department 
in the Soviet Government, and to have posed at the Baku 
Congress of Oriental Peoples as the leader of a great Socialist 
movement in the middle east and north Africa. 

EPIDEMIOLOGY. In recent years more study has been given 
to that branch of the science of medicine which, under the name 
of epidemiology, displays the general factors which operate upon 
populations or aggregates and lead to the outbreak of a sick- 
ness affecting several persons within a short interval of time. 
The unit of the epidemiologist is a population, while the unit 
of a physician is an individual. 

The first scientific epidemiologist was Hippocrates, whose treatises 
On Efridemics and On Airs, Waters and Places remain models of 
epidemiological inquiry. In the latter work, he displayed the cor- 
relation between the physique, habits of life and climatological 
advantages or disadvantages of various populations and the types 
of illness prevalent amongst them. In the former, by means of an 
intensive study of the diseases prevailing through a series of years 
in one and the same place, he established the conception of an 
epidemiological type or constitution determined to a greater or less 
degree by meteorological conditions. Incidentally Hippocrates 
described some forms of epidemic disease, such as mumps, in terms 
fully applicable to modern experience. He also recognized the 
tendency of particular types of epidemic sickness to appear at a 
change of season, especially near the vernal or autumnal equinox. 
In treating of disease as a mass phenomenon, of epidemics, Hippoc- 
rates exhibited the scientific caution and zeal for the collection of 
objective data upon which to found an induction which have 
rendered immortal his clinical studies. Galen, whose authority for 
many centuries overshadowed that of the founder of Greek scientific 
medicine, systematized the theoretical teaching of Hippocrates 
but recorded few fresh observations. According to Galen, a disease 
was a function of three variables: the innate or acquired constitu- 
tion (crasis or temperament) of the body, disordered habits of life, 
atmospheric changes (metastases). Illness became epidemic when, 
some abnormal modification of the atmosphere having occurred, 
the temperaments, or erases, of a sufficient number of the persons 
exposed were apt to give rise to illness. He recognized the contagious 
nature of certain diseases, such as ophthalmia and phthisis, but, in 
his terminology, contagion was very different from what we now 
understand by it. He had no notion of a vital infective principle, 
a contagium vivum, but looked upon the transmission of disease 
from person to person more as one now looks upon the setting into 
vibration of a series of tuning-forks when their fundamental notes 
are struck. None of the post -Galenical or Greek physicians or of the 
Arabian writers added much to our practical knowledge of epidemi- 
ology. In the i6th century, Girolamp Fracastoro (1483-1553) 
clearly enunciated the principle of contagium vivum and, in the next 
generation, Guillaume Baillou (1538-1616) in his Epidemiorum et 
ephemeridum libri II. (first printed in 1640) resumed the plan of 
actually describing the forms of illness prevalent in successive years 
which was the foundation of Hippocratic epidemiology. 

Neither the importance of Fracastoro's principle nor the value 
of the method originated by Hippocrates and adopted by Baillou 
were realized by contemporary physicians, and, although accurate 
description of particular outbreaks accumulated during the IJth 
century, a general science of epidemiology was still to seek. 

The honour of being the second founder of scientific epidemiology 
is usually assigned to Thomas Sydenham, and although this physi- 
cian had no notion of the importance of Fracastoro's ideas and in his 
adoption of the Hippocratic plan had been anticipated by Baillou, 
the attribution is just. 

To Sydenham (1624-89) belongs the credit of having realized 
that the succession of diseases is not chaotic and of having attempted 
to deduce from personal observations extended over more than 20 
years a general doctrine of epidemiology. Sydenham's observations 
are not always clearly recorded, nor were his conclusions entirely 
free from inconsistencies, but his main principles were the following. 
He thought that all types of disease prevalent at any one time bore 
the imprint of a common " constitution " the ultimate source of 
which he supposed to be indefinable telluric variations the overt 
expression of the constitution was a " stationary fever," found in 
different clinical settings. Hence two different specific " diseases " 
prevailing during one " constitution " resembled one another more 
closely than did instances of the same " disease " observed under two 
different " constitutions." To this distinction he attached the great- 
est importance as a practitioner of medicine: " This only, fortified 
by a multitude of exact observations, I do confidently hold, that the 
aforesaid species of disease, in particular the continued fevers, may 
vary so enormously that you may kill your patient at the end of the 
year by the method which cured sufferers at the beginning of it." 

Sydenham classified his successive " constitutions " in accordance 
with the clinical form of illness most usually observed under it and 
closely watched the changes of symptomatic form which heralded 
the emergence of a new " constitution." 

Although in modern times this notion of an epidemiological suc- 
cession has been a fruitful hypothesis and many of Sydenham's 
predictions as to the decline of reigning diseases and their replace- 
ment by others have been accurately fulfilled, his immediate in- 
fluence upon epidemiological thought was much less effective than 
his moulding of clinical practice. The reason is that to sift the wheat 
from the chaff of his ideas required a new instrument, viz. a sta- 
tistical method applied to numerical data. Neither method nor 
adequate data existed at the end of the I7th century. The science of 
epidemiology owes almost as much to Sydenham's contemporary, the 
London draper John Graunt (1620-74), who founded vital statistics, 
as to the English Hippocrates. During the i8th century some an- 
nalists of sickness, especially the elder Wintringham (1689-1748), 
Huxham (1692-1768), Van Swieten (1700-72) and Anton Storck 
(1731-1803), provided more data on the Hippocratic model, and 
practical contributions to the art of hygiene and the control of par- 
ticular epidemics were made by such investigators as Lind (1716-94), 
Pringle (1707-82), Monroe (1727-1802), Brocklesby (1722-97) and 
Blane (17491834). Contemporaneously, a series of illustrious math- 
ematicians, from Pascal to Laplace, were forging the instruments 
of statistical research which in the hands of Farr were destined to 
render great advances in scientific epidemiology possible. It cannot, 
however, be said that the general doctrines of epidemiology were not- 
ably improved or that the opinions entertained by physicians at 
the beginning of the igth century differed greatly from those of 
their predecessors. 

During the first 30 years of the ipth century unrivalled op- 
portunities were afforded for the study of particular epidemic 
diseases, especially typhus and typhoid, owing to the Napoleonic 
Wars and the industrial revolution with its attendant social 
disorganization. A new interest in public health matters, especial- 
ly in England, led to the accumulation of facts respecting the 
circumstances attending the outbreak of epidemic diseases. 
Before the establishment of the English General Register office 
(in 1837) official reports upon epidemiological matters, particu- 
larly cholera, had been furnished and the ground prepared for 
the work soon to be undertaken by William Farr (1807-83). 

Broadly speaking, the state of epidemiological knowledge 
at the beginning of the reign of Victoria was as follows. The 
contagious nature of the diseases known as zymotics was fully 
recognized and the specific difference between scarlet fever and 
diphtheria understood. The relation between pollution of water 
supplies, cholera and certain other forms of " continued fever " 
with intestinal lesions had also been perceived. Experience of 
vaccination had firmly established a belief in the possibility 
of immunizing mankind against one form of epidemic disease. 
At least one physician, Robert Watt, of Glasgow (1774-1819), 
had contributed new evidence of a statistical character in favour 
of Sydenham's doctrine of epidemiological succession, while the 
remarkable increase of malignity which began to characterize 
scarlet fever during the third decade of the century and the 
return of pandemic influenza (a disease described by many writers 
in and before the i8th century) had impressed the same ideas 
upon the general body of the medical profession. On the other 
hand, the fundamental distinction between typhoid and typhus 
fever and the epidemiological importance of the distinction had 
only been realized by a few exceptional men, and statistical data 
necessary for the assessment of the epidemiological factors com- 
mon to groups of diseases and for the testing of epidemiological 
theories were fragmentary. 

The Spread of Epidemics. Modern epidemiology is based on 
the collections of statistics which began half way through the 
igth century, and on the associated information which was ob- 
tained as to the causation and course of epidemics by careful lo- 
cal inquiry into all the conditions. It is true that before this 
some countries, such as Sweden, had published the figures of the 
deaths from numerous infectious diseases for series of years, but 
though these figures are very interesting they represent more or 
less special conditions. Since about 1840, especially in Europe, 
in India and America, carefully collected information exists 
respecting many epidemics and epidemiological conditions. 
Sufficient evidence is now available to examine any theory which 
may be offered to account for the facts. Advance has been made 
on a number of lines: on the modes of spread of infection; on the 
theory of the course, recurrence, and size of epidemics; on the 
relation of epidemics to climatic conditions and the cause of these 
relations; on the knowledge of the life history of the organisms 


which cause epidemics; on the conditions of living which favour 
the spread of infectious disease. 

With the discovery of the organisms which cause disease and 
with the careful observation in the field as to the manner in 
which disease spreads from person to person, many new points of 
view have emerged. It is no longer sufficient to talk vaguely 
of fomites. Most diseases have their special forms of spreading 
which account for practically all the cases. Thus measles and 
smallpox are exceedingly infectious from person to person. 
Enteric fever is nearly always carried by contaminated water or 
contaminated food. Cholera is spread by water and flies. Other 
diseases have been found to be practically non-infectious from 
person to person unless by means of an intermediate parasite. 
Thus typhus and trench fever are carried by lice, while yellow 
fever and malaria require the intervention of the mosquito. 
The mode of spread of some diseases, however, is still obscure. 
Among these scarlet fever must be placed. While direct infection 
undoubtedly takes place a satisfactory elucidation of J.he prob- 
lems of its dissemination has not yet been arrived at. 

For accurate thinking on infectious diseases it must be noted 
that disease-producing organisms possess two qualities: one, 
the power of causing the disease, and the second the power of 
producing a severe attack of disease. The first may be termed 
infectivity and the second virulence. These qualities must not 
be confused. In point of fact they are not associated in any 
constant degree. Sometimes an epidemic begins with a large 
number of severe cases and sometimes the reverse. In certain 
diseases the height of the epidemic seems to be associated with 
severe disease, in others with that of milder type. The former 
at least holds for a certain number of large epidemics of measles 
of which the statistics have been investigated. The latter is the 
case both in Glasgow and London in regard to the autumnal 
prevalence of scarlet fever. 

That an epidemic might possess a definite form capable of 
calculation seems to have been advanced first by Dr. Farr. 
In 1840 he graduated the decline of the great smallpox epidemic 
in England to the normal curve of error, and obtained a very 
close representation of the facts. He promised further discussion 
but seems to have given none till 1867. In this year he returned 
to the subject in connexion with the cattle plague, writing a 
letter to the Daily News in which it was stated that though in 
the popular conception plague was advancing with such rapidity 
that all the cattle of the country might be destroyed, in 
reality the force of the epidemic was spent, and that if the form 
of the epidemic curve up to that point were taken as a basis of 
calculation the future course could be foretold. The prediction 
proved to be very near the truth. 

The theory of the course of the epidemic, however, as a guide to 
the solution of the problem has unfortunately not proved so fertile 
as might have been hoped. Some facts are quite definite. The curve 
of the epidemic is generally found to be symmetrical, the fall cor- 
responding closely to the rise, though in some diseases the ascent is 
more rapid than the descent, and in some the reverse. The equation 
of the curve which describes the majority of epidemics, as found by 
trial apart from theory, is 


where y is the number of cases at time t, t being measured from the 
centre of the epidemic. Curves closely resembling that given by the 
above equation arise on a number of hypotheses of which two are 
discussed. First, the organism may be assumed to possess at the 
beginning of the disease a high degree of infectivity which decreases 
as the epidemic goes on. If the loss of infectivity is according to 
geometric law, the normal curve of error already used by Dr. Farr 
is the result. It is sufficient to state that on various probable 
hypotheses regarding exposure to infection, etc., the normal curve 
may be so modified as to take the form found by observation. 
Secondly, a similar type of curve arises if we consider an epidemic 
dies out from lack of susceptible persons. It is not possible to 
distinguish statistically these hypotheses from the consideration of 
the epidemic form alone. In one case, however, the second hypothesis 
can be tested. If the form of the epidemic be calculated by assuming 
different degrees of infectivity on the part of the organism, an in- 
fectivity which remains constant during the epidemic, it is found 
that this curve becomes flatter and flatter the smaller the degree of 

infectivity. Now with regard to plague in India among brown and 
black rats living more or less in the same circumstances, it is ob- 
served that many more brown rats are infected than 'black. In 
such circumstances the form of the epizootic should be different in 
the two species if the decline is due to lack of susceptible individuals. 
As a matter of fact it is nearly identical : a fact which tells strongly 
in favour of the hypothesis that the epidemic ends because of loss 
of infectivity on the part of the organisms. This example would be 
crucial but for the fact that the flea on which the spread of the epi- 
zootic depends has a law of seasonal prevalence of its own to which 
both the epizootics must conform. In many cases, however, the 
only feasible explanation of the course of an epidemic is that the 
organism loses the power of infecting as the epidemic proceeds. It 
is impossible to suppose, for instance, with regard to the great epi- 
demic of smallpox in London in 1901-2 that there were only 8,000 
people susceptible, out of a population of 6,000,000. As the course 
of this epidemic was typical, rising and falling in the manner found 
to be characteristic, it cannot be argued that the decline was due to 
the action of the health authorities ; all they can have done is to limit 
the extent of the epidemic, leaving its course unchanged. It is clear, 
therefore, that in circumstances like this there is some biological 
factor at work as distinct from a statistical factor. It may then be 
taken that epidemics in general have a particular form which is 
identical in many different diseases: plague, influenza, scarlet fever, 
etc. Even great differences of time dp not bring about much change, 
the form of the epidemic of plague in Sydney in 1900 being nearly 
identical with that in London in 1665. 

The next point requiring consideration is the periodicity in the 
epidemics of infectious diseases. Taking measles as an example, the 
common explanation is that each epidemic ends from the exhaustion 
of the number of susceptible persons, and that it is only when a new 
population of susceptible children has accumulated that a further 
outbreak occurs. This explanation fails to account for many of the 
facts. Even after the very large epidemic of measles in Glasgow 
in 1906, it was found that nearly half of the children admitted 
to the fever hospitals immediately thereafter suffering from other 
diseases had not suffered from measles so that there must have 
been, with the high infectivity of the epidemic, plenty of sus- 
ceptible material. The disease subject to the most extensive in- 
quiry hitherto has been measles. Using the method of the periodo- 
gram the statistics of London and all the chief towns of the British 
Isles have been analyzed. It is found that in almost no case is 
there only one period to be discovered. In London there are several, 
the chief of which is 97 weeks. This periodicity is found over the 
whole city. If the application of this mathematical method of 
analysis be admitted, this coexistence of epidemics of different 
periods, each appearing at its own time, seems to prove that the 
termination of an outbreak of the disease is due to loss of infectivity 
on the part of the organism. Periodicity in other diseases is well 
known. Thus in the city of Liverpool the epidemics of scarlet 
fever occurred at regular intervals of four years from 1850-78. On 
one occasion alone was there an exception when the interval between 
two epidemics was three years in place of four. A similar periodicity 
of five years has been observed in Glasgow. There is one specially 
interesting example, namely the occurrence of plague in Bombay. 
In many places, such as Hong-Kong, the period between each epi- 
demic is rigidly a year. In such a case the influence of the season of 
the year seems a sufficient explanation. But the case of Bombay is 
different. The first epidemic in 1897 had its maximum about the 
4Oth day of the year. From this point until the last year for which 
statistics are available (1918), the date of the maximum of the 
epidemic has steadily advanced into the year, advancing about 80 
days in 20 years or an average four days a year. It is difficult to 
account for a phenomenon like this except as being due to some 
property of the organism. The conclusion must be arrived at that 
while some periodicities of disease are strictly seasonal, others are 
not so, and require some further explanation. 

A further important application of mathematics to epidemiology 
has been made by Sir Ronald Ross in his studies on malaria. Here 
the factors influencing the spread of the disease are numerous. Rain- 
fall and temperature, the number of persons carrying the organism 
in their blood, and the number of mosquitoes and the proximity 
of the breeding-places of the mosquito to the abodes of men are all 
capable of quantitative measurement, and of furnishing guidance in 
the adoption of suitable administrative measures. 

Climate and Weather. The relationship of epidemics to cli- 
mate has received much attention in recent years, though in many 
cases the cause of seasonal prevalence is elusive. Thus why 
scarlet fever should be so regularly an autumnal disease is not 
at all clear. On, many cases, however, much light has been 
thrown. The discovery, for instance, that malaria was carried by 
the mosquito elucidates the seasonal distribution of that disease. 
A temperature of a certain height with associated pools of water 
is necessary for the rapid development of the mosquito and also 
a certain degree of temperature for the development of the 
parasite in the mosquito. In the same way the zone to which 



sleeping sickness is limited is a narrow region in which the climate 
and environment are suitable to the life history of one particular 
tsetse fly. Much light has been thrown on the epidemiology of 
plague by the discovery that it was carried to man from the rat 
by means of the flea. Humidity is necessary for the growth of the 
flea, and consequently epidemics of plague can hardly occur at 
seasons of the year when it is warm and dry. Thus the epidemics 
of plague in Bombay which have advanced progressively later 
and later into the year now occur when the flea is no longer at 
its greatest prevalence. With this change the number of cases 
and deaths has greatly diminished. 

The epidemics of summer diarrhoea are also obviously climatic. 
The organism which causes the epidemic has not yet been dis- 
covered, but there is definite evidence that the amount of the 
disease is very closely associated with the summer temperature. 
When in London the weekly average of the air temperature rises 
above 60 F. and remains above that limit a large mortality is 
the result. Some evidence exists associating the occurrence of the 
disease with the presence of the house-fly, the fly carrying pu- 
trefying organisms from the garbage on which it feeds; but the 
presence of the fly and of diarrhoea at the same time does not 
prove that they are cause and effect. Both may well be abundant 
purely as, or the result of, a coincidence, the climatic conditions 
favouring both in an almost equal measure. A more difficult 
problem is the relation of weather to such infective diseases as 
the pneumonia of childhood. This disease is clearly associated 
with the winter season of the year but it does not seem specially 
affected by any special class of weather in that season. In the 
present state of knowledge it is in those diseases which depend 
on the spread of the organism by means of parasites that the 
most close association with weather has been made out. 

Effect of Organisms. We now come to the question on the 
relation of epidemics to the organism which causes them. Why 
an organism should be capable at one time of causing a great 
epidemic and at another only a few sporadic cases of a disease 
has not yet been found out. That organisms do vary in the power 
of infecting in this manmr is a truism to anyone who has ad- 
ministered in the health departments of a large city. At one 
time the merest contact with a case of smallpox, for instance, 
will give rise to a large number of cases. At another time a pa- 
tient suffering from smallpox may even attend in the gallery 
of a theatre without giving rise to a case of infection. 

In recent years, a considerable amount of evidence has accumu- 
lated that an organism having found a suitable host or succession 
of hosts may have its virulence unusually exalted, and if the 
virulence can be exalted in this manner it is probable that some 
similar conditions may give rise to a great increase in the power 
of infection. At any rate, there is no doubt that in certain con- 
ditions organisms become highly infective and even the best 
sanitary precautions exercised in such circumstances can do little 
more than limit the amount of the disease. But there are further 
considerations which arise. It would seem as if at times two 
series of epidemics may coincide and may even mutually in- 
fluence one another so as to produce a profound joint effect. Thus 
the great epidemic of influenza in the autumn of 1918 was associ- 
ated with great activity of other pneumonia-producing organisms, 
the result being that the death-rate was of extreme amount and 
was distributed with age in a manner not found in any recent 
epidemic of influenza. 

Environment. While an epidemic may in many cases be 
chiefly or even wholly due to the active condition of the causal 
organism it is to be remembered that the vitality and environ- 
ment of the persons affected must also play a part. Thus, for 
instance, typhus fever introduced into a crowded slum in which 
lice are plentiful will almost certainly cause considerable havoc, 
but even here the havoc will be determined to a certain extent 
by the season of the year. If the weather be cold the people are 
crowded together on account of the demand for warmth, and 
the chance of infection is increased. In addition, in the winter 
food is often scarce and consequently vitality is low. If on the 
other hand the invasion of the organism takes place during the 
summer a large epidemic will be unlikely. But though these 

factors act, yet if an organism has an exalted state of activity, 
an epidemic of the disease may occur at any season of the year, 
even the most unlikely. Plague, for instance, especially in tem- 
perate climates, is essentially a disease of the warmer part of the 
year, yet it has been known occasionally to occur in large epi- 
demics in the middle of winter, while epidemics of typhus of 
considerable size have been recorded in the summer time. The 
great epidemic of influenza in the autumn of 1918 is a marked 
example, such a season being in the extreme degree a very un- 
usual one for an outbreak of this disease. What part special 
susceptibility on the part of the population, due to change in 
vitality, played in this case is not known. Some other influences 
also act. There is some evidence that fatigue predisposes to 
enteric fever, an army on the march drinking polluted water 
tending to have a larger number stricken than a similarly con- 
ditioned civil population. Further, it cannot be doubted that 
the accumulated effect of seasons may tend to depress health 
and increase susceptibility to certain diseases. The cumulative 
effect of winter cold may be perhaps traced in children in re- 
lation to death from whooping-cough, the average minimum 
temperature in the winter preceding the maximum number of 
deaths from whooping-cough by about six weeks, while the form 
of the two curves is very much the same. The deaths from 
whooping-cough are due very largely to broncho-pneumonia, 
yet the seasonal distribution of whooping-cough is not identical 
with that of the latter disease. Thus scarlet fever, being an 
autumnal disease and following the hot summer, might in the 
same way be ascribed to depression produced by continued hot 
weather, making certain persons more susceptible to the disease. 
But as scarlet fever is a disease almost absent in warm climates 
this explanation can hardly be complete, and some other factor 
must be necessary. None of these questions, however, have at 
present been sufficiently investigated to allow any dogmatism. 
Another point of importance requires special reference, and 
that is the problem of " carriers," as individuals infected with a 
disease and cured as regards themselves, but who yet continue 
to harbour and distribute the parasite, are called. Cholera 
follows the pilgrims' way, enteric fever the carrier cook, diph- 
theria the carrier school-teacher. 

References. The most important of the epidemiological writings 
of Hippocrates are the Epidemics (Books I and 3) and the treatise on 
Airs, Waters and Places, both included in the Sydenham Society's 
translation (by Francis Adams) and in Littre's text (with French 
translation). Galen's most important works are De Febrium 
Differentiis and his comments on the Hippocratic Epidemics (both 
in Kuehn's edition with Latin translation). The best edition of 
Sydenham is that edited for the Sydenham Society by Greenhill. 
An excellent general account of the progress of knowledge is con- 
tained in Haeser's Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Medizin und der 
epidemischen Krankheiten, 3 vols. 3d ed. (1882). English epidemi- 
ological history is fully related in Dr. Charles Creighton's History of 
Epidemics in Britain, 2 vols. (1894). 

Two papers by Greenwood on the " Epidemiology of Plague in 
India," Journal of Hygiene, vol. x. p. 349 and vol. xi. p. 62, give 
examples of modern epidemiological method, while his Report " On 
the Rise, Spread, etc., of Epidemic Diseases," Internal. Congress of 
Medicine, Sec. xviii., London 1913, gives a full study with literature. 
Two papers by John Brownlee discussing " Theory of Epidemiology 
in Relation to Plague " (Proc. Roy. Soc. Med. 1918, vol. xi., p. 86) 
and the " Periodicities of Epidemics of Measles " (Proc. Roy. Soc. 
Med. 1919, vol. xii., p. 77) give an account of the statistical and 
mathematical methods which may be used. Ross's Prevention of 
Malaria and Boyce's Yellow Fever and its Prevention discuss theory 
and practice in all their forms. (J. BRO. ; M. G.*) 

EPSTEIN, JACOB (1880- ), Anglo-Russian sculptor, was 
born at New York Nov. 10 1880, of Russian- Polish parents. He 
was educated in Paris and settled in England in 1904. He first 
came prominently into public notice in 1907, when he received 
a commission for executing 18 figures to decorate the new build- 
ings of the British Medical Association in the Strand. His work 
was violently attacked, and led to a prolonged newspaper con- 
troversy, and in 1909 he produced designs for the tomb of Oscar 
Wilde at Pere Lachaise, Paris, which considerably shocked 
French taste. His other work includes the decoration of Church 
Square, Pretoria, and a number of portrait busts, amongst 
others those of Lady Gregory and Miss Iris Tree. 


ERITREA (see 9.745). Surveys made since the settlement 
of the Danakil frontier with Abyssinia in 1908 gave the colony 
an area of about 45,800 sq. miles. Proposals made in 1915 that 
Kassala should be transferred to Eritrea from the Anglo-Egyp- 
tian Sudan and Jubuti ceded to the colony by France were not 
entertained (see AFRICA, History). 

No complete census had been taken up to 1921, when the pop. 
was roughly estimated at 350,000, including 115,000 Abyssinians. 
Europeans, apart from soldiers, numbered about 4,000, mostly 
Italians; next in importance came the Greek community. 
Asmara (pop. 15,000 including 2,000 Europeans), rebuilt since 
the Italian occupation, possesses several fine buildings and is the 
seat of Government; Massawa, the chief port, had some 4,000 
inhabitants, including about 400 Europeans and 500 Asiatics 
(Arabs and Indians). Massawa is in wireless telegraphic com- 
munication with the Italian station at Coltano, near Pisa, and 
with Mukdishu, Italian Somaliland. For local Government pur- 
poses Eritrea is divided into eight " commissariats," but certain 
regions, such as the sultanate of Raheita and other parts of the 
Danakil country, are not directly controlled by Italy. At the 
head of the administration is a civil governor, responsible to 
the Minister for the Colonies. 

The chief concern of the authorities in the period 1910-21 was 
the development of the resources of the country and of the 
transit trade with northern and central Abyssinia and with the 
Sudan. Efforts to settle large numbers of Italians in the high- 
lands were abandoned. That region, the only part of Eritrea 
where Europeans could live permanently, was already largely 
occupied by Abyssinian agriculturists. While development was 
hindered by lack of adequate means of transport and the dis- 
inclination of Italian capitalists to invest money in the colony 
(foreign capital was not sought), progress was made. The rail- 
way, State owned, from Massawa to Asmara, 75 m. long, was 
completed in 1912; it rises to 7,700 ft., the altitude of Asmara. 
A further section of the railway was opened in Dec. 1914, and 
in 1915 a loan of 800,000 to be spread over five years was 
authorized by the Italian Treasury to complete the line via 
Keren to Agordat 184 m. from Massawa and on the main 
caravan route to Kassala. The route to Adowa (Adua) , N. Abys- 
sinia, was improved, and from the port of Assab, on the Danakil 
coast, a good road was built to the frontier at Ela, whence a 
caravan route goes to central Abyssinia. 

The Asmara-Agordat railway opened up the Khor Baraka dis- 
trict, where the cultivation of cotton was successfully undertaken 
by an Italian company. Cotton was also grown in the river Gash 
(Mareb) area and irrigation work began in 1915. It was estimated 
that 140,000 ac. were suitable for cotton-growing. Ginning mills 
were erected at Agordat and Massawa. 

An industry which made considerable progress was that in vege- 
table ivory the collection of nuts from the dum palm, which grows 
on the banks of the Baraka, the lower Mareb and other regions. 
The exports rose in 1917 to 10,000 tons, valued at over 1,000,000 lire. 
Salt deposits were worked in the neighbourhood of Massawa and 
in the Danakil country. In 1917-8 a Decauville line was built from 
Fatima harbour, 76 m. S. of Massawa, to serve the Dalol potash 
mine, which lies 10 m. within the Abyssinian border. The Decau- 
ville line, 46 m. long, stopped at the frontier. Stock-raising remained, 
however, the principal occupation of the people, and skins and hides 
the most valuable export. Salt, dum nuts and mother-of-pearl are 
the chief other exports. Cotton goods and dura (Indian millet) 
are the chief imports. The value of imports at Massawa rose from 
17,160,000 lire in 1911 to 47,591,000 in 1917, and was 103,811,000 
lire in 1918 (the result of inflated prices). Exports increased from 
8,818,000 lire in 1911 to 21,660,000 in 1917 and were valued at 
85,254,000 in 1918. The value of transit trade was returned at 
3,351,000 lire in 191 1, 5,845,000 lire in 1915, 2,498,000 lire in 1917 
and 5,415,000 lire in 1918. Many of the goods classed as exports of 
the colony were however reexports from Abyssinia or the Sudan. 
The value of the internal trade with Abyssinia was unascertained, 
that with the Sudan reached a value of about 100,000 in 1918^-9. 
Oversea trade is mainly with Italy, Aden and India. The shipping 
which entered Massawa in 1911 had a total tonnage of 206,000, in 
1915 the tonnage was 356,000, in 1918 it had fallen to 103,000 tons. 

There was (1919) a military force 12,000 strong (3,000 Europeans, 
9,000 Abyssinians). Eritrea also supplied battalions for Tripoli, 
Cyrenaica, and Italian Somaliland. Eritrean troops served with dis- 
tinction in the hostilities in Tripoli, 1911-4, and in the World War. 

Up to 1921 Eritrea had not become self-supporting, though be- 
tween 1915 and 1920 revenue raised in the colony doubled. For 

1920-1 ordinary revenue was estimated at 10,132,000 lire, civil 
expenditure at 12,049,000 lire and military expenditure at 3,857,000 
lire. The Italian Treasury made a grant of 6,650,000 lire. Signer' 
(afterwards Marquis) G. Cerrina Feroni, who had served in the 
colony for several years, was in 1919 appointed governor. 

See Tommaso Tittoni, Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy (Eng- 
lish trans. 1914) ; Eritrea, a British official handbook, with bibli- 
ography (1920) ; the Rivista Coloniale and the Bollettino of the Ital- 
ian Geographical Society. (F. R. C.) 

), British agriculturist and politician, was born at Clifton- 
on-Teme Sept. 6 1852, the third son of the Rev. Canon Prothero, 
rector of Whippingham, Isle of Wight. He was educated at 
Marlborough and Balliol College, Oxford, where he took his 
degree in 1875, subsequently being elected to an All Souls fellow- 
ship. He remained at Oxford for some years as a fellow and tutor, 
and became well known as an authority upon agriculture. From 
1883 to 1884 he was university proctor, and in 1894 became editor 
of the Quarterly Review, retaining this post till 1899. In 1898 
Mr. Prothero became chief agent to the Duke of Bedford, and 
in this capacity his experience on agricultural questions was much 
extended. In 1910 he unsuccessfully contested the Biggies- 
wade division of Beds, as a Unionist. In 1913 he was a member 
of the royal commission on railways, and in 1914 was elected 
member for Oxford University. He sat on the departmental com- 
mittees on the home production of food (1914) and the increased 
price of commodities (1915), and in 1916, on the formation of 
Mr. Lloyd George's Government, became president of the Board 
of Agriculture. He resigned his office in 1919 and was raised to 
the peerage. Lord Ernie published Pioneers and Progress of 
English Farming (1887), and English Farming, Past and Present 
(1912); besides the Life and Correspondence of Dean Stanley 
(1893); Letters of Edward Gibbon (1896); a Memoir of Prince 
Henry of Battenberg (privately printed, 1897); Letters and 
Journals of Lord Byron (1898-1901) and Letters of Richard Ford 
(1905). His Psalms in Human Life (1903; enlarged 1913), 
tracing the influence of the Psalter on the notable men of suc- 
ceeding generations, had a great popular success. 

ERZBERGER, MATTHIAS (1875-1921), German politician, 
was born Sept. 20 1875 at Buttenhausen in Wurttemberg. He 
began life as a national school-teacher and in 1896 became a 
member of the staff of the Deutsches Volksblatt at Stuttgart. 
In 1903 he was elected as a representative of the Catholic Centre 
party in the Reichstag, and soon, by virtue of his unusually varied 
activities, took a leading position in the parliamentary party. 
He occupied himself in particular with colonial questions. During 
the World War, although he had at first put forward in letters to 
leading military authorities, since published, extravagant plans 
for the German annexations, he soon became a most active agent 
in attempts to draw the Allies into negotiations for peace. He was 
the real author of the so-called Peace Resolutions adopted by the 
Reichstag July 17 1917. He likewise employed his relations with 
the Austrian Imperial Court in order to work for an early con- 
clusion of peace. In Oct. 1918 he entered the Government as a 
Secretary of State after he had contributed to bring about the 
fall of Bethmann-Hollweg. Entrusted with the task of conducting 
the negotiations for the conclusion of the Armistice, he signed 
(Nov. 1918) the Armistice agreement in the saloon railway 
carriage of Marshal Foch in the Forest of Compiegne. After 
the elections for the National Assembly he entered the new 
Government of the German Republic in Aug. 1919 and was 
appointed Finance Minister of the Reich. In the National 
Assembly he succeeded in forcing through the new measures of 
taxation, notwithstanding the vigorous attacks made upon him 
by the Right. He set himself in particularly sharp opposition 
to the German National party (the old Conservatives), on 
whom he laid the responsibility for the World War; the result 
was a personal dispute with the leader of the Nationalists, the 
former Secretary of State for the Treasury, Dr. Helfferich, 
and Erzberger was ultimately compelled to bring an action 
against Dr. Helfferich for slander. The action resulted in 
Helfferich's being condemned to pay a small fine (the German, 
law does not admit of any damages or penalties for slander); 



the court, however, 5n its judgment took the line that Helfferich's 
.allegations regarding Erzberger's corrupt business practices 
and untruthful statements on the part of Erzberger were justified. 
Erzberger was consequently compelled by his party to resign 
his ministerial office. During the case an attempt was made 
upon his life as he was leaving the court by a youth who had been 
brought up under reactionary influences. He was rather serious- 
ly wounded by the bullet from the assassin's pistol. Erzberger 
was once more returned to the Reichstag at the general election 
of Jan. 1 020, but in accordance with the wish of his party ab- 
stained from immediate participation in politics, as proceedings 
had been instituted against him on a charge of evading taxation. 
In 1920 he published a memorandum endeavouring to justify his 
policy during the war, and he followed it with interesting 
disclosures regarding the attitude of the Vatican in 1917 and the 
mission of the papal legate in Munich, Pacelli, to Berlin. Erz- 
berger's power in German politics was based upon his great in- 
fluence with the Catholic working classes in the Rhineland and 
Westphalia, in central Germany and in Silesia. In the industrial 
regions of these districts the Catholic workmen were organized 
in their own trade unions on lines of very advanced social policy, 
and Erzberger became the leading exponent of their views in the 
Reichstag and on public platforms. On the other hand, he in- 
curred the strong opposition of the conservative and landed sec- 
tion of the Catholics, of some of the higher clergy like Cardinal 
Archbishop Hartmann of Cologne (d. 1919) and of the Bavarian 
agricultural interest as represented by the Bavarian Catholic 
People's party in the Diet at Munich and in the Reichstag in 
Berlin. Erzberger continued to be pursued by the relentless 
animosity of the reactionary parties, the Conservatives (now 
called Deutsch-N ationalen) and the National Liberals (now 
styling themselves the Deutsche Volksparlci). This hostility, 
which amounted to a real vendetta, was based, not so much 
upon the foreign policy of its victim, his negotiation of the 
Armistice terms and the decisive influence which he exercised 
in securing the acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles, as upon 
his financial policy both as Finance Minister in 1919 and as 
the Democratic Catholic supporter and, it is said, the political 
adviser of the Catholic Chancellor of the Reich, Dr. Wirth, in 
the preparation in the summer of 1921 of a fresh scheme of 
taxation designed to impose new burdens upon capital and upon 
the prosperous landed interest. The denunciations of the Con- 
servative and National Liberal press undoubtedly went beyond 
the ordinary limits of party polemics. Thus the Tdgliche Rund- 
schau observed, in allusion to Erzberger's personal appearance, 
" he 'may be as round as a bullet, but he is not bullet-proof." 
The climax of these attacks was that Erzberger was assassinated 
on Aug. 26 1921 while taking a walk with. a parliamentary 
colleague in a lonely part of the Black Forest near Griesbach. 
The assassins, two well-dressed young men, were very generally 
believed to have been at least voluntary agents of the reaction- 
ary and military cliques. The assassination caused great 
political excitement, and exacerbated existing party feuds. 

(C. K.*; G. S.) 

), English politician and writer, eldest son of the ist Vis- 
count Esher (see 9.768), was born in London June 30 1852. He 
was educated at Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge, and after- 
wards entered politics, becoming private secretary to the Mar- 
quess of Harrington in 1878. From 1880 to 1885 he sat as Liberal 
member for Penrhyn and Falmouth, and in the latter year un- 
successfully contested Plymouth. From 1895 to 1902 he was 
secretary to the Office of Works. He succeeded his father in 1899 
and in 1901 was appointed deputy constable and lieutenant- 
governor of Windsor Castle. In 1902 he was appointed one of the 
commissioners who inquired into the conduct of the S. African 
War, in 1903 he was chairman of the War Office Reconstitution 
Committee, and in 1905 became a permanent member of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence. From 1909 to 1913 he was 
chairman of the Territorial Force Association of the county of 
London. Lord Esher was selected by King Edward VII. as one 
of the editors of the Letters of Queen Victoria, which appeared in 

1907, and he produced The Girlhood of Queen Victoria (1912). 
His other works include Footprints of Statesmen (1892); To-day 
and To-morrow (1910); The Influence of King Edward (1914); 
After the War (1918); and The Tragedy of Kitchener (1921). 

(1848-1913), French jurist, was born at Tourverac, Charente, 
Feb. i 1848, In 1888 he became professor of law in the univer- 
sity of Paris, and in 1904 member of the Institute of France. 
His best-known works are Cours elemeniaire d'hisloire du droil 
franfais (1895) and Elements de droit constitutionnel fran&is el 
compare. (1903). He died July 22 1913. 

ESSAD (c. 1875-1920), Turkish pasha and Albanian leader, 
sprang from the rich Albanian family of the Toptani, and was 
born at Elbasan. In his youth he sought and obtained the favour 
of "Abdul Hamid. He entered the political service of the Sultan. 
enriched himself therein, and, as was then usual, became a pasha 
while still a young man. In Elbasan he played the leading politi- 
cal part. When the Turkish Revolution broke out, Essad quickly 
bent his steps to the new path, which seemed to him the most 
promising, and was deputy for Albania in the first Turkish 
Parliament. His influence over the somewhat uncertain Albanian 
population, and the de'sire of the Constantinople Government 
not to have so exceedingly cunning and skilful a man for their 
enemy, led to his being in 1912 given the high command at 
Scutari, then under siege by the Montenegrins, though he knew 
almost nothing of military matters. Indeed, he never showed 
himself to the troops except once, in March 1913, when he had 
50 men shot for an insignificant revolt. Political antagonisms 
and personal motives combined to make the town commandant, 
Hasan Riza, the target of his hatred. This honourable Old 
Turk was the soul of the defence of Scutari; and, in order to have 
a free hand for his own secret dealings with the Montenegrins, 
Essad had him assassinated on Jan. 13 1913. On April 25 Essad 
took the lead in the unreal and theatrical ceremony of handing 
over the fortress to Montenegro, but when the princedom of 
Albania was constituted after the Balkan War, Essad became 
Minister of War and also Minister of the Interior to William of 
Wied, and brought his policy into close touch with that of Italy. 
During the World War he was president of the Albanian dele- 
gation in Paris but appeared at frequent intervals at Salonika 
and on the Albanian front as a guerrilla leader. He succeeded in 
bringing about the overthrow, by a so-called National Assembly 
in Cusonio, of the " Provisional Government of Durazzo " which 
was under Italian influence, and this National Assembly pur- 
posed to proclaim Essad King of Albania. But on June 13 1920 
he was killed in front of the Hotel Continental in Paris by 
Aveni Rustam, an Albanian. (F. C. E.) 

ESTHONIA (Eesti) was declared an independent republic on 
May 19 1919. The former Russian province of Esthonia (see 
9.797) was extended by the Russian law of April 12 1917 over 
the four northern districts of Livonia, inhabited by Esthonians, 
namely Pernau (Parnu), Fellin (Viljandi), Dorpat (Tartu, russ. 
Youriev) and Verro, and the island of Osel or Ezel (Saaremaa). 
The Russo-Esthonian peace treaty of Feb. 2 1920 added Narva, 
parts of the Yamburg and Gdov districts of the province of 
Petrograd and of the district of Pechori (Petserimaa) of the 
province of Pskov. This new strategic frontier runs from 10 m. 
E. of the Narova river across the Peipus lake towards Isborsk. 
The western frontier bordering Latvia includes the town of Valk 
ceded to Esthonia by arbitration on ethnographical grounds, 
and runs in the same direction towards the Baltic Sea. Thus 
Esthonia's political boundaries coincide almost completely with 
the linguistic extension of the race. The area, 18,300 sq. m., 
is larger than Switzerland, Denmark or Holland. . 

The population of the former province of Esthonia was esti- 
mated in Jan. 1913 at 492,000; United Esthonia, as the republic 
is called, has a pop. of 1,500,000 (according to Martna 1,750,000). 
About 90% of the pop. belong to the Esthonian race, 4% to the 
Russian and 2-4% to the German Balto-Saxons (called Baits, 
Germano-Balts, in Esthonia " Saksa," who formerly numbered 
21,800, 4,700 forming the nobility, 300 the clergy). There were 
in Dec. 1920 about 40,000 resident foreigners, chiefly Russians. 



Until 1918 the Baits were economically preponderant both 
in town and country. To this class belonged most of the owners 
of the big estates (" Baltic barons "), the commercial magnates 
and the chief traders and merchants in the larger towns, but 
great changes have since taken place. During 1897-1900 the 
average annual rate of increase showed a slow growth of pop., 
9-3 per 1,000 in Esthonia and 8-0 in Livonia. About 300,000 
Esthonians are colonists in Russia and Siberia, having emigrated 
chiefly because of the economic dependence of the landless agri- 
cultural population. Before the war the birth-rate averaged 28, 
the death-rate 20 per 1,000. The predominant religion is Prot- 
estant, with a small number of Greek Orthodox Christians. 

About 74 % of the pop. is rural, 60 % being engaged in agriculture. 
This rural pop. was formerly divided into three main groups of which 
the first has been suppressed, (a) large landowners with 829 estates, 
(b) peasant-proprietors, a middle class (nicknamed the " grey 
barons ") owning 50,961 holdings, and (c) the tenants of small allot- 
ments and agricultural labourers forming about three-quarters of 
the rural pop., whom it was proposed to settle partly on the estates 
nationalized by the State. The economic consequences of this social 
dislocation were in 1921 the problem of the day, but the race and 
class hatred were so strong that these difficulties were disregarded. 

The figures for 1919 supplied by the Ministry of Labour showed a 
decrease of workers engaged in industry; 271 private concerns em- 
ployed 15,417 workers (printing works and large business concerns 
are included); the Government employed 21,006 persons (on rail- 
ways, post and telegraphs, harbour works, timber industry). Of 
the private industries the more important were: cotton, 3,007 
workers; yarn and wool, 2,000; flax, hemp and rope, 1,200; paper, 
1,232; metal and shipbuilding, 3,700; cement and bricks, 625; 
tanneries, refineries and soap, 345; food production in steam mills, 
starch, etc. 612; chemical (matches, gas), 820. Before the war the 
cotton mill at Kraenholm near Narva with 600,000 spindles had 
12,000 workers, in 1920 only 2,700; of capital invested, 45% was 
Russian, 30% English and 25% German. Want of fuel and raw 
material stopped work in flax spinneries, cloth works and leather 
factories. In 1921 the Russo-Bntish shipyard was trying to sell its 
floating dock; a new company was initiating the sugar industry and 
an English firm was promoting the mechanical treatment of flax. 
Foreign capital was wanted for industry as well as for the revival of 
agriculture. The cooperative system takes a large share in public 
educational work (theatres, libraries, museum, literary society). 
The figures for 1917 were: 99 societies of mutual credit with 42,606 
shareholders; 98 cooperative supply stores with 15,052 members; 
12 agricultural cooperative societies with 2,018 members; 138 
cooperative milk societies. A wholesale cooperative society is 
preparing for large activities in timber, flax, fish, vegetables and 
manufactured goods. Before the war Esthonia and northern Livonia 
were almost self-supporting in regard to foodstuffs. Wheat for the 
towns and sugar were supplied from Russia, while dairy products, 
pigs, potatoes (spirits) were exported. It is impossible to estimate 
separately the losses from war, revolution, military occupation and 
the suppression of the large estates. The figures available are 
conflicting. Statistics published by the Ministry of Agriculture 
showed that the area of arable land and agricultural production in 
1920 were approximately the same as in 1916, while critics advanced 
totally different figures, and professional circles and influential 
parties like the Maaliit, formerly led by K. Paetz, complained of the 
ruinous influence of socialistic doctrines on economic policy. As in 
the other border-states, the large number of government officials 
and their corrupt methods were subjects of frequent discussion in 
the daily press. There seemed no doubt that the productive capacity 
of the country had been at least temporarily reduced. 

Natural Resource}. The republic in 1921 owned 1,170,000 ac. of 
coniferous woods and 650,000 ac. of leafy or mixed woods. Over 90 % 
of this area, forming 79-2 % of the large estates, was nationalized 
with the latter and is managed by the State., Together with the 
concessions in Russia granted by the Peace Treaty these are expected 
to rank as assets. Extensive deforesting in the course of the war for 
fuel and for military purposes made serious inroads upon the forest 
area. The local need of fuel has rendered exportation on a large 
scale impossible. Concessions of combustible shale to a British- 
Belgian company were in prospect in 1921. There is a cement 
factory at Port Kunda. Near Izborsk are concessions of plaster of 
Paris and at Suurup of limestone. Peat occurs in the Yupre district. 
The Narova rapids are expected to develop 600,000 H.P. By Art. 33 
of the Land Act of Oct. 10 1919 all natural resources of the soil are 
property of the republic. 

Except Baltic Port, which is to be declared a free port, all Estho- 
nian seaports are icebound for some time of the year. The port of 
Revel (Tallinn) depth 23-30 ft., length of quay 10,904 ft., capacity 
of tonnage 55,000, warehouse area 1,333,005 sq. ft. is the most 
important. The total quay length of the Esthonian harbours 
(Revel, Pernau, Narva, Port Baltic, Hapsal, Arensburg, Kunda, 
Loksa, Rohukula) is about 30,000 ft., and shipping of a total ton- 
nage of 145,000 can be berthed. Special harbour dues, 4d. per each 

gross registered ton. For the first half of 1920 the shipping which 
entered Revel was 709 Esthonian ships, net tonnage 27,886; 29 
German, net tonnage 18,653; 107 Finnish, 16,860 tons; 47 Swedish, 
10,001 tons; Danish, 6,882 tons; 2 American, 5,055 tons; I French, 
1,190 tons; British none. Total shipping 948 with 91,524 net ton- 
nage. In 1913 590 steamships entered Revel with a tonnage of 
477.154- Of these 192 were German, 149,362 tons; 132 Russian, 
91,361 tons; 70 British, 78,138 tons. 

Imports and exports for 1920 amounted, according to the Govern- 
ment returns, 103,912,394 and 7,675,508 tons respectively; the total 
value for the second half of 1920 in Esthonian marks (based upon the 
rate of exchange i = 270) was 703 millions for the imports, 738 
millions for the exports and 961 millions for goods in transit. Never- 
theless Esthonia suffered from an adverse exchange. In March 1920 
i =350, in May 1920 = 240, in May 1921 =1,075.. Imported 
goods were beyond the purchasing power of the population. The 
prosperity of the Baltic states is based chiefly on internal trade and 
foreign trade with Russia. For 1920 Esthonia received from Great 
Britain coal, petroleum, cotton and sugar, 1,142,759 tons, exporting 
to her 3,531,362 tons of timber, paper, pulp, etc. Germany exported 
to Esthonia 1,298,670 tons of salt, iron goods, and fertilizers, and re- 
ceived 275,905 tons of potatoes. Imports from other countries were 
miscellaneous and of minor importance. Esthonia exported in 1920 
potatoes, spirits, timber, pulp, paper, flax, bricks and cement, and 
imported flour, sugar, herrings, salted fish, salt, leather, wool, cotton, 
iron, agricultural machinery, coal, petrol, fertilizers. 

After the German occupation, when the Russian frontier was 
closed, the factories worked with a minimum production, having no 
markets ; stocks of raw material became short and all factories were 
cut off from their financial bases because the Revel banks, which 
were obliged to keep nearly all their deposits in Russia, were prac- 
tically bankrupt. With the financial help of the German military 
authorities, the factories worked for Germany and the Ukraine, but 
most goods were put into stock. The first provisional Government 
did much to promote industry; later, however, the Central Profes- 
sional Union of Workers exercised a deleterious influence. 

Origin of the Esthonian Republic. The declaration of inde- 
pendence of May 19 1919 stated that " no material improve- 
ment had been effected by the Russian revolution in 1917," 
that later " Esthonia was sacrificed to Germany under the 
Brest-Litovsk Treaty"; that in Nov. 1918 "the Soviet ar- 
mies attacked her, bringing in their train more suffering and 
misery"; and that "in consideration of this the Esthonian 
nation was under no obligation to respect the union with Russia." 
After the fall of Tsardom the Esthonians feared anarchy more 
than Russification, but after the defeat of Russia it was German 
preponderance which they chiefly dreaded. They were thus 
Virtually compelled to declare for independence. On April 12 
1917 the Russian provisional Government accorded the enlarged 
Esthonian province a representative body (Diet, " Maapaen " 
or " Maanoukogu ") and the right to recall all their nationals 
from the Russian colours with a view to the formation of a na- 
tional defence force. On July i and Nov. 1 5 1 9 1 8 the Diet declared 
its independence and rejected the proffered aid of Germany. 
With the exception of their Bolshevik section, all Esthonian 
political parties under the leadership of K. Paetz and others 
based their policy on the defeat of Germany, although that coun- 
try's power was still unbroken. The Balto-Saxons, on the con- 
trary, especially the majority of the gentry, released from the 
allegiance to the throne, which to most of them meant the 
Russian State, decided to turn to Germany for help. Their disbelief 
in the creative power of the Esthonian people at that moment 
was all the more to be excused, seeing that the capital was under 
the rule of Esthonian Bolsheviks, whose leader, Anwelt, was openly 
preparing a reign of red terror. The marshal of the nobility, 
Baron Dellingshausen, oa Jan. 28 1918 invited the Germans to 
occupy Esthonia; they took Revel on Feb. 25. Over a hundred 
hostages were taken by the retiring Bolsheviks; of these Dellings- 
hausen was to be tried in Petrograd, whilst the majority were 
transported under ghastly conditions to Siberia; through the 
intervention of Germany they were, however, repatriated. On 
Feb. 24 an Esthonian provisional Government was formed 
(Paetz, Wilms, Poska, Larko, Kukk and others) and an indepen- 
dent republic proclaimed. Germany did not recognize tliis 
Government, but established a regime of military occupation 
under which the Baits were made dominant; this lasted over 
eight months. The German occupation widened the gulf be- 
tween class and race and postponed the formation of an Estho- 
nian force hostile to Germany. Still the power of the local Bol- 



sheviks was broken, many lives were saved and thousands of 
Esthonians effected their escape from Soviet Russia. England, 
France and Italy, informed of the views of Esthonia, expressed 
in May their readiness to grant provisional recognition to the 
Esthonian National Council as a de facto independent body 
(Prize case of the ss. " Kayak," Admiralty Court of Appeal, 
Jan.-Feb. 1919), while the German Emperor was considering 
the request initiated by the Baltic nobility (April 13) for 
annexation by Germany. There could hardly have been a greater 
contrast between the two sections of the Esthonian population. 
The Nov. Armistice contained a clause compelling the Germans 
to maintain order and law in the occupied territories of Russia, 
while neither the Allies nor the local governments which came 
into being had sufficient forces available to resist the advance 
of the Russian red forces and the rising of the local pro-Bolshe- 
viks. Even then the Esthonian National Council insisted upon 
taking over all responsibility; on Nov. 14 the German representa- 
tive, the Social-Democrat deputy Winnig, resigned in their favour. 
On Nov. 19 an evacuation agreement was signed, which, however, 
had not the expected effect of leaving the Esthonians in posses- 
sion of the military stores, etc. All that was available for the 
defence of the country were two units, some 600 men strong, under 
Col. Weiss, of Baltic volunteers (the Baltic regiment), including 
18 barons, Stackelberg in the ranks, prepared to assist in com- 
bating Bolshevism. At first Gen. Laidoner, later knighted by the 
King, had at his disposal this intrepid corps, besides 3, coo volun- 
teers from Finland under Gen. Wetzer, enlisted by means of a 
loan of 20 million mks. guaranteed by the Revel banks. The 
Esthonian units in process of formation were at that moment 
keener against the retiring Germans than against the Bolsheviks. 
The War against Soviet Russia (Nov. 1919 to Feb. 2 1920). The 
Russian red army nominally Esthonian Communists invaded 
Esthonia as the German troops retired. For some weeks three- 
fourths of Esthonia experienced the full measure of Bolshevik 
methods. The cruelties and massacres at Dorpat (liberated 
Jan. 14 1919), Narva, Vesenberg, etc., produced an anti-Bolshe- 
vik feeling among the Esthonian soldiery. A Finnish loan and 
war material from Great Britain helped to arrest the enemy's 
advance 30 m. from Revel, and the Bolsheviks were driven out of 
the country in the course of a month. But fresh forces were 
threatened Latvia having become Bolshevik all along the 
300 m. of land frontier. With the help of the British navy, which 
in Dec. prevented the Bolshevik fleet from taking Revel, it again 
became possible in May to land forces in the rear of the enemy 
(Luga river) in cooperation with Russian anti-Bolshevik forces, 
a cooperation which tended to grow less close towards the autumn . 
The commanding town of Pskov was taken when an unexpected 
incident threatening a new German danger necessitated military 
operations in the direction of Riga. This town (see LATVIA) had 
on May 22 been liberated by a daring raid in which a decisive 
part was played by the Baltic Landeswehr under the command of 
a German, Major Fletcher, one-third of which consisted of 
volunteers from Germany. The advance of this force north- 
wards conflicted with the views of the Entente powers. The 
Esthonians detached troops and armoured trains to this new 
front. Fighting began near Venden (June 2), an armistice 
declared on June n was broken, and fighting continued near 
Rup (June 13), followed by a victorious advance towards Riga. 
According to the terms of the armistice of July 3, drawn up by 
Gen. Sir H. Gough, while the Baltic section obtained an English 
commander, Col. A. R. Alexander, the purely German section of 
the opponents had to evacuate Riga, where the Latvian Govern- 
ment of Ulmanis was reestablished. Esthonia received the thanks 
of the Lettish National Assembly for the liberation of northern 
Latvia, and an agreementfor mutual help the nucleus of a Baltic 
federation was signed on July 20. Another incident described 
as " a German conspiracy against Latvia " diverted the Estho- 
nian forces from the Bolshevik front the Bermondt affair; an 
arrangement made by Gen. Marsh in July for a combined ad- 
vance in Sept., with the help of Bermondt's Russo-German 
volunteer force, was cancelled at the instance of Latvia, and the 
Esthonians had again to assist Latvia. Meanwhile, in order to 

divide their enemies, the Soviet Government offered peace to 
Esthonia. The North-Western Government retorted by recog- 
nizing Esthonia's independence (Aug. u). A sum of $50,000,000 
was advanced by the United States (Aug. 15), Russian vessels 
were sunk by the English in the Kronstadt harbour, and the Estho- 
nians continued to assist though half-heartedly the ineffective 
offensive against Petrograd in Oct. After Sept. 12, in accordance 
with a vote of the Constituent Assembly, the Esthonians pre- 
pared the ground in Latvia, Lithuania and Finland for peace 
negotiations with Russia. (The Dorpat Conferences, Sept. 29- 
Oct. i, and Nov. 9, further developed the idea of a Baltic federa- 
tion.) On Nov. 20 Gen. Yudenich handed over the command to 
Gen. Laidoner, and on Nov. 26 terminated his military operations. 
The Soviet army was stopped at Narva (Nov. 22) and the 
Russian white army sought refuge in Esthonia. On Dec. i peace 
pourparlers were resumed. On Dec. 4 hostages were exchanged 
as provided in the armistice signed at Dorpat (Dec. 3). After 
extensive negotiations (Krassin, later Joffe, for the Soviet Power, 
J. Poska for Esthonia) a treaty of peace was signed on Feb. 2 
1920, and approved by the London declaration of Feb. 24. The 
chief stipulations of this treaty provided for the suppression of 
all armed vessels on the Peipus lake; Russia declared herself pre- 
pared to join in any future recognition of the international 
neutrality of Esthonia; foreign troops were to be demobilized 
(Russian white army); Russian State property devolved to 
Esthonia, Russia to pay 15,000,000 gold rubles (about 1,500,- 
ooo) while Esthonia was not to be held responsible for Russia's 
debts (this was counter to the French point of view) ; Russia was 
to return all property removed from Esthonia; Esthonia to have 
the preferential right to build a railway from Revel to Moscow; 
a timber concession for 2,600,000 ac.; a favoured-nation clause 
and the fixing of a strategic frontier and ethnographic boundaries 
in the Pechora district were included. Russia obtained the con- 
cession that transit freights should in no case exceed the local 
charges and that no import and transit duties should be levied 
by Esthonia; further she obtained preferential rights' to the 
electric power from the Narova waterfalls. Russia, anxious to 
extend her outlet towards the West, offered similar advantages to 
Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, the Ukraine, Georgia and Poland, 
thus creating a new situation in Eastern Europe. Esthonia was 
the first to become the continental market of exchange for the 
trade between Western Europe and Russia (under Gukovsky, 
chief of the Soviet trade delegation at Revel, which became a 
centre of speculation). 

Esthonian policy before and after the peace was in close touch 
with Great Britain (missions of Gen. Gough, Gen. Talent, Col. 
Percy Gordon) and the United States (Col. Green, Prof. Morri- 
son) . Esthonia received from these countries respectively military, 
financial and medical aid (e.g. against typhoid imported by 
Russian refugees), as well as moral support in consolidating her 
independence and in coping with the preponderance of the gentry, 
the pro-German or pro-Russian reactionary barons. The prob- 
lem involved in the land question deserves special attention, 
being typical of the changes initiated in all the border states 
(Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumanian Bessarabia and Georgia), 
which adopted the system of appropriation by the State of all 
large agricultural estates without adequate compensation, the 
management of forests by the State, and the sub-division of 
arable land into small holdings (decrees of Dec. 17 and Feb. 28 
1918, the Land Act of Oct. 10 1919). A Constituent Assembly 
was convened after the liberation of the territory on April 28. 

The 120 members were divided into three leading parties: (a) 
Democrats or Peasant party, a bourgeois party leader Paetz; 
(i) Labour party, socialists leader Strandmann, later prime 
minister, promoter of the agrarian reform; (c) Moderate Social 
Democrats and Social Revolutionaries. A provisional constitutional 
charter was framed on June 6 1919 and definitely adopted in an 
amended form on June 15 1920 (translated into English, Baltic 
Review, L., vol. i., Nos. 2 and 3). The power of the State was declared 
to be "in the hands of the people" ; Esthonian was to be the official 
language. Every Esthonian citizen was given the right to determine 
his own nationality, the members of minority nationalities being 
entitled to form corresponding autonomous institutions; where the 
majority of the inhabitants were not Esthonians the local language was 


recognized as the official language (this applied chiefly to Swedish, 
Russian and German). The people exercise their political rights 
(a) by plebiscite, (b) by their initiative in legislation, and (c) by elec- 
tion to the State Assembly (Riigikogu). No law passed by this 
Assembly can come into force if opposed by one-third of the legal 
number of members pending a plebiscite. The State Assembly is 
composed of 100 members elected for three years by universal 
suffrage. The governor, i.e. the head of the State (Riigiwanem 
or State Elder), acts as prime minister. The other ministers are 
elected by the Assembly. They must resign on failure to obtain a 
vote of confidence. The State Court of Justice is elected in the 
same way, and selects the local judges for life. 

The Church is separated from the State, all glebe land and 
incomes based upon former public law being abolished without 
compensation by the Land Act. The Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, J. Poska (d. 1920), supported by the Constituent Assem- 
bly, negotiated the peace with Soviet Russia and prepared the 
de jure recognition of Esthonia. The decision of the Supreme 
Council at Paris on this matter (Jan. 21 1921) was not adopted 
by the United States. Admission to the League of Nations was 
refused on Dec. 17 1920 owing to the attitude of the French 
and British delegates. 

The Constituent Assembly dissolved itself on Dec. 21 1920. The 
State Assembly began its functions on Jan. 4 1921. Labour (22 seats) 
and Social Democrats including Communists (34) formed the 
majority; the remainder (44 seats) belonged to the Peasants' party, 
Christian, popular party and national minorities. The Cabinet was a 
Coalition ; premier, K. Paetz. Its programme reflected the problems 
and tendencies of the day: (i) Estates to be divided into small hold- 
ings; (2) enforcement of Land Act to harmonize with the food 
problem; (3) estates managed by State officials to be either let or 
divided ; (4) suitable buildings on estates to be arranged for indus- 
try I (5) consolidation of internal peace; (6) de-control; (7) organiza- 
tion of minorities; (8) religion to be taught in the schools if so 
desired; (9) emigres to be repatriated; (10) compensation for 
nationalized land to be reexamined. 

At the municipal elections the Social Democrats lost a number 
of seats, but on the other hand Communistic plots were sporadi- 
cally referred to in the press. 

The Land Problem. The division of property before the Land 
Act of Oct. 1919, according to official figures for United Esthonia, 
with the exclusion of the Pechori district, was as follows: 

(A) Large Estates 
(a) belonging to individual owners 

734 manorial estates (knights' estates) 
95 entailed estates (no) . 

6 1 small estates 


Total Av. incl'd'g 
acreage, wasteland. 
3,791,718 5-165 



(b) belonging to corporations 

8 to the nobility corporations 
101 to the Russian State 
19 to the Peasant Land Bank . 
3 charitable endowments 
108 Church estates (glebe land) . 
1 8 to townships (corporations) 

(B) Small Holdings 
23,023 leased farms on large estates 
50,961 farms owned by the occupiers 


109,712 13-714 

851,945 8-534 

168,575 8-872 

20,477 6-825 

133,796 1-239 

. 102,376 5-688 

Total 6,251,188 

1,375,329 59-73 

4.349,614 84-76 


Of the large estates 79% (84%) was forest and 1.386,881 ac. 
agricultural land. Hardly I % of the small holdings is under forest, 
while 4,927,763 ac. are agricultural land. 

This division of property, large and small farming being con- 
ducted in independent self-contained units, proved economically 
progressive. (Only some 12,000 leasehold farms in North Esthonia 
were too small.) But social and political conditions as well as racial 
antagonism produced a change tantamount to a social revolution, 
accomplished by a coalition of the petty bourgeoisie and the prole- 
tariat with a speed attributed to the danger of a spontaneous 
Bolshevik move. The beginning was made by the decree of Dec. 17 
1918 empowering the State to take possession of " badly managed " 
estates. This was not a corn production act, nor a means of enforcing 
proper cultivation ; no notice was served, no directions given to the 
landlord, no default established, no arbitration admitted, no com- 
pensations. The economic result was negative (as shown by the 
Agricultural Conference Nov. 1918), but the measure satisfied some 
aspirations, seeing that in the course of a year some 300 landlords 
were dispossessed. On Feb. 28 1919 another decree promised the 
division of the large estates among the soldiers and the landless 
agricultural workers, and on Oct. 10 of the same year an agrarian 
reform was passed by the Constituent Assembly. It was based on 


the assumptions that the rights of the landlord were non-existent 
in the cases (a) of entails, (b) of glebe land, (c) of estates seized by 
Sweden after 1680 and restored to their owners by Russia according 
to Art. XI. of the Nystad Treaty of 1731 (this applied to % of the 
manorial estates) and (d) with regard to former waste land (peasant 
land) reunited to the demesne according to the Statutes of 1849 and 
1856 (about Vf, of this category of land). No compensation was 
therefore to be granted in these cases. The fact that during the 
German occupation the landlords were prepared to cede % of their 
land for German colonization, and the desire to prevent confiscation 
without order and programme as in Russia, were also of moment. 

According to the Act of Oct. 10 the nationalized land fund had to 
be redivided on the following lines: (a) Leased farms remained the 
property of the occupier; (b) forests were to be managed by the 
State (Art. XXVI.) ; (c)the manorial houses, gardens and parks became 
the property of the State (Art. XXVII.) ; (d) glebe land must either be 
let to church parishes or distributed to neighbouring boroughs; 
(e) arable land was to be allotted in small holdings to soldiers, their 
relatives and landless workers, with hereditary tenure. The former 
owners were to move from their homes, only foreigners to remain in 
occupation of their lands and homes, until a definite compensation 
Act could be passed and the indemnity paid. The principles on 
which compensation was to be calculated were laid down in the Act 
(Art. XII.-XIV.) and, unless alterations should be introduced, would 
lead'to the following consequences. 

The valuation of the land for the former land tax was to be the 
limit of the indemnity. Therefore (a) many mortgagees, banks as 
well as private persons, would lose their security, although since 
1864 all such charges had been duly registered. In Northern Estho- 
nia mortgages of 34,352,400 rubles would be deprived of security 
to the mortgagees, (b) The value of the buildings alone was insured 
against fire in 449 estates for a sum of 42,544,264 rubles, while the 
proposed amount of compensation for 468 estates amounted to 
11,981,450 rubles. (c) In numerous estates the value of drainages 
effected for the last 25 years is higher than the promised compensa- 
tion for the land, (d) The rate of indemnity for live stock and imple- 
ments was from 15 to 150 times lower than their market value. 
Even Esthonian politicians (Toennison) appeared doubtful whether 
the ruin of the landlords would prove ultimately of economic benefit 
to the country, and amendments were being discussed in order to 
restore confidence and improve the money market. The Ministry of 
Agriculture reports concluded: " In spite of all difficulties 20,000 
farms were established by spring 1920. The lack of inventory is one 
great obstacle. Many of the agricultural workmen due to this have 
not succeeded in becoming tenants and therefore oppose the dis- 
tribution of land. A certain percentage of the new landholders will 
fall out of the ranks; but the production problem is not considered 
to be insolvable." An Esthonian critic (A. Busch) in a monograph 
insisted that live stock and implements were deteriorating and that 
not a single building had been erected since the law was passed. The 
transformation of large holdings into small holdings required a new 
investment of capital, which was totally lacking. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Apart from the official publications of the Estho- 
nian Government quoted at length in the non-official periodicals 
published in Paris and London, sources of information were scanty in 
1921. The proceedings of the Paris Peace Conference were not yet 
accessible. The literature on the subject is either panegyric, prop- 
agandistic or detractory. Memoire sur VRsthonie presentee par la 
Delegation esthonienne a la Conference de la Paix, 1919; Martna, 
Memorie della Delegazione estone (Rome, 1919); in German, Die 
Esten und die Estnische Frage; in French, L'Esthonie et les Esthoniens 
(Paris, 1919); Revue Baltique (Paris, Sept. 1918. in progress): Estho- 
nian Review^ (London, July igig-June 1920) ; Baltic Review (London, 
Aug. 1920, in progress) ; Oskar Bernmann, Die Agrarfrage in Estland 
(1920); Courland, Livonia and Eslhonia (handbooks prepared under 
the direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office, 50, 
London, 1920) ; Gaston Gaillard, L Allemagne et le Baltikum (1919) ; 
Baron Alfons Heyking, The Baltic Probleiti (1919) ; Russian Libera- 
tion Committee, The Baltic Provinces (anonym, by Baron Korff, 
1919); Alexis Engelhardt, Die deutschen Ostseeprovinzen Russlands 
(3rd ed., 1916). All such publications represent various points of 
view. (A. M.) 

EUCKEN, RUDOLF CHRISTOPH (1846- ), German philos- 
opher and religious teacher (see 9.878). During the World War 
Eucken, like many of his academic colleagues, took a strong line 
in favour of the causes with which his country had associated 
itself. After the war he became the chief leader of the new ideal- 
ist movement in Germany, which obtained many adherents 
among politicians as well as among sections of the general public 
hitherto averse to the tendencies it represents. The representa- 
tives of the main current of this movement regarded Christianity 
as the culminating point of religious aspirations, but based no 
hopes upon the Christian churches ever deepening the religious 
consciousness. Other currents continued to identify themselves 
more or less with the churches, and a common ground was found 
in great assemblies of men and women of the younger generation, 


generally in the open air, where plans were discussed for strength- 
ening the moral fibre of the nation in view of the overwhelming 
problems arising out of Germany's political and military collapse. 

After 1910 Eucken published the following works and pamphlets: 
Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung (2nd ed. 1913); 
Konnen wir noch Christen sein? (1911); Erkennen und Leben (1912); 
Die Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker (ioth>ed. 1912); Die 
Trdger des deutschen Idealismus (1915); Mcnsch und Welt: eine 
Philosophic des Lebens (1918; 2nd ed. 1920); Deutsche Freiheit: ein 
Weckruf (1919); Einfuhrung in die Hauptfragen der Philosophie 
(2nd ed. 1920). 

EUGENE, ARCHDUKE (1863- ), Austro-Hungarian field- 
marshal, was born May 21 1863 at Gross-Seelowitz in Moravia. 
In his military career he had become commander of the XIV. 
(Innsbruck) Corps and army inspector when, before the out- 
break of the World War, considerations of health compelled 
his retirement. It was only after the retreat of the Austro- 
Hungarian troops from Serbia in Dec. 1914 that the Emperor 
handed over to him the command of the army holding the 
Danube-Save line. After the Italian declaration of war the 
Archduke took over the command on the south-western front. 
At the time of its greatest extension his constantly changing 
area of command stretched from the Ortler to the sea. The 
battles fought under his directions on the Isonzo and on the 
Tirol front formed a series of successes. As a staff commander the 
Archduke was associated with Gen. Alfred Krauss (born 1862 
at Zara), who was also known as a writer on military subjects. 
Under the new regulations concerning army commands in Jan. 
1918 the Archduke received no further active command. As 
Grand Master of the Teutonic Order he remained unmarried. 
His unaffected character made him very popular. 

EUGENICS (see 9.885*), the name coined by the late Sir Francis 
Gallon (from Gk., eiryecifa, well-born), and first used by him- 
in his work on Human Faculty (1883), for what he defined as the 
" science of improving stock, which is by no means confined to 
questions of judicious mating, but which, especially in the case 
of man, takes cognizance of all influences that tend, in however 
remote a degree, to giving more suitable races or strains of blood 
a better chance of prevailing over the less suitable than they 
otherwise would have had." The word " science " used in this 
connexion is apt to be a little misleading. " Science " is used 
to denote two different things; it may mean the knowledge of a 
particular group of the laws of nature, or it may be used to denote 
the art of applying this knowledge in order to effect a desired 
object. It is clear from the context that it was in the second 
sense that Galto'n intended to use the word " science, " and 
therefore a shorter and perhaps less ambiguous definition of 
eugenics would be " the application of our knowledge of the 
laws of heredity to improving the quah'ty of the human race." 

The aim of eugenics is therefore not primarily the collection 
of facts, but the construction and advocacy of practical pro- 
posals. The character of these proposals will of course depend 
on our conception of the laws of heredity, but the study of these 
kws forms the subject matter of the science of genetics. Genetics 
is a department of biology; and the last word in all controversies 
connected with heredity must rest with the biologist. 

Like all the other laws of nature, the laws of heredity can only 
be ascertained by the carrying out of carefully thought-out 
experiments under standard- conditions. It thus follows that 
these laws must be investigated by dealing with animals and 
plants since we are not allowed to subject our fellow-beings to 
experiments or to control their mating. When we deal with 
human statistics we must therefore interpret them according to 
the laws which we have deduced, from our standardized ex- 
periments on the lower organisms, and in working with these 
statistics, the help and criticism of skilled mathematicians con- 
stitute invaluable aids to research, but mathematics applied to 
data unsifted by the biologist are valueless. 

The popular conception of the best method to improve our 

race is to improve the environment, and for measures of this kind 

the American investigators have adopted the term euthenics. 

" All men are born free and equal, " stands in the fore-front 

of the American constitution; and it is assumed that the differ- 

ences between them are due to differences in up-bringing, to 
their mental and material circumstances in fact. If this supposi- 
tion were justified it followed that the great remedy for many 
of our social ills was the extension of education, and on this 
supposition the social reformers of the loth century have pro- 
ceeded. Now it may be conceded that in order to bring out 
the full potentialities of any organism a favourable environment 
is necessary; if the soil be too dry the seed will either not germi- 
nate at all or if it does germinate it will produce but a poor and 
sickly plant; but all gardeners know that no amount of moisture 
or manure will ever produce from seed of inferior stock the plants 
which can be raised from fine varieties. If the poultry-keeper 
wishes for a large egg supply he must choose the breeds of fowl 
which he will keep; no matter how he feeds the inferior breeds he 
will not obtain from them a good yield of eggs. 

One of the first questions therefore which presents itself to the 
eugenist for solution is whether the mental and moral qualities 
of men are inherited according to the same laws as govern the 
production of eggs by fowls. Gallon endeavoured to find an 
answer to this question, but the means which he adopted were 
decidedly crude. For inslance, he obtained records of what he 
termed the good tempers and bad tempers of married people l 
and tried to find out whal proportion of ihe children were good- 
tempered or bad-tempered; and again he went through old lisls 
of Ihe resulls of examinalions al Cambridge, 2 and Iried to show 
that a large proportion of the sons of those who had attained 
distinction in these examinations later rose to occupy imporlant 
positions Ihemselves. These methods certainly did give indica- 
lions that character and ability were inheriled, but they were 
open to grave objections. Thus it might be said that estimates of 
good temper and bad temper on the part of observers were un- 
analyzed haphazard impressions incapable of accurate measure- 
ment; and again, so far as the inheritance of mental ability was 
concerned, it was pointed out that a boy could inherit from his 
mother as strongly as from his father, and that in the case of 
Cambridge scholars there were no means of ascertaining the 
mental capacities of the mothers. 

Since Gallon's time, however, enormous slrides have been made 
in altacking the problem of accurately measuring mental ability. 
The extension of compulsory educalion to all the children of the 
leading nations of Europe and the standardization of the cur- 
ricula of education have provided investigators of mental ability 
wjlh a very large amount of material. After many years' work 
and thousands of trials on the children of the elementary schools 
of Paris, Drs. Simon and Binet succeeded in elaboraling a series 
of tests 3 by means of which they could measure the degree 
of intelligence attained by growing children. The distinclive 
feature of these tests was their independence of any special lype 
of inslruclion. They were so framed that, for example, a child 
on atlaining ihe age of three could be reasonably expected to do 
the things prescribed for a child of three, and fail to do Ihose 
allolled lo a child of four. For instance : 

At I year a child should recognize food. 

At 2 years (i) walk; (2) obey a simple direction. 

At 3 years (i) point out nose, eye and mouth; (2) repeat two 
digits; (3) enumerate the objects in an engraving; (4) tell his sur- 
name ; (5) repeat a sentence with six syllables. 

At 4 years (i) tell whether it is a boy or a girl; (2) name a key, 
knife and a penny; (3) repeat three numerals; (4) point out the 
longer of two lines. 

At 5 years (i) discriminate the heavier of two boxes; (2) copy a 
square; (3) repeat a phrase with 10 syllables; (4) count four pennies; 
(5) reconstruct a card cut diagonally into two pieces. 

Similar tests were devised suitable lo the inlelligence of chil- 
dren of every age up lo fifleen. Al Ihis age Ihe growth of men- 
tal capacily as dislinct from attainment seems to be complete. 
If a child of three could perform the tests arranged for a child 
of four he was said to be advanced; if he could only perform Ihose 
suilable for a child of two he was said to be backward. 

1 Natural Inheritance (1889). 

1 Hereditary Genius (ist ed. 1869, 2nd ed. 1892). 

8 For a full account of these tests see " The Measurement of 
Intelligence," by Dr. T. Simon (trans, by Dr. W. C. Sullivan), The 
Eugenics Review, vol. vi., No. 4, Jan. 1915. 

* These figures indicate the volume and page number of the previous article. 


This scale devised for the school children of France has been 
tested in the elementary schools of Italy and of the United 
States. It has been found to be right in principle, although tests 
and ages require some slight adjustment when applied to children 
of other races than the French. 

Now when we apply these tests to the unfortunate people 
denominated imbeciles and feeble-minded, we make the sur- 
prising discovery that some of them, although they may live 
td an advanced age, are never able to perform the tasks allotted 
to a child of three and that none of them can do more than pass 
the tests suitable to a child of ten. Here then is the explanation 
of mental defect; it is the failure of the mind to develop further 
than to a certain 'stage. The next step was to ascertain whether 
or not this unfortunate character was hereditary, and the merit 
of solving this, perhaps the most important of eugenic prob- 
lems, must be accorded to Dr. Goddard, 1 a doctor attached to 
the staff of the Vineland Institution for insane and mentally 
defective children in the state of New Jersey. This institution is 
a charitable one, which takes in defective children and gives them 
the best education which they are capable of receiving. All the 
inmates are tested on admission, and at suitable intervals after- 
wards, by the Simon-Binet scales. 

Now Dr. Goddard secured the services of a certain number of 
educated investigators, who received a special course of training 
in the institution itself and were then sent forth to investigate 
the ancestry of the inmates so far as this could be accomplished. 
This they did by gaining the confidence of the relatives of the 
inmates, to whom the acceptance of the care of their afflicted 
children by the Vineland Institution was a great boon, and who 
were naturally anxious to learn about their progress and quite 
ready to talk about the first appearance of what to them was an 
ordinary malady. In this way the investigator was enabled to 
find out whether any of the brothers or sisters of a particular 
child were mentally defective, whether his parents or his grand- 
parents had been similarly affected, or whether there were cir- 
cumstances.pointing to some accident as the cause of the trouble. 
By proceeding along these lines it was possible to draw up an 
ancestral chart for each inmate of the institution. In this chart 
a square indicated a male relative, a circle a female; if it appeared 
that the relative was mentally defective the square or circle was 
blackened if on the other hand the relative was clearly normal 
a square (or circle as the case might be) with the letter N in- 
scribed was placed on the chart. Where definite information 
was lacking a blank square or circle was added. 

The chart was revised at intervals, a fresh investigator being 
employed for the research on which the revision was based. 
In practically no case did renewed inquiry lead to the conclusion 
that relatives formerly regarded as defective were really normal; 
on the contrary, at every fresh examination more doubtful cases 
resolved themselves into definitely feeble-minded ones and the 
child's chart was correspondingly blackened. 

The net results of Dr. Goddard's investigations were as follows. 
In the case of 6,000 children a mentally defective ancestor 
was ascertained; and about one-fourth of these children were 
definitely feeble-minded and about one-fourth definitely normal; 
the mental condition of the remainder could not be ascertained. 
In the case of 1,500 children there was a definite history of an 
accident which might be regarded as the cause of the mental 
condition, and 804 children are classified as of " neuropathic " 
ancestry, i.e. the descendants of epileptic or hysterical parents, 
a condition which seems akin to feeble-mindedness. It should 
be remarked that these numbers included not only the inmates 
of the institution but their brothers and sisters and cousins who 
were outside and many of whom were quite normal mentally. 
Where both parents were mentally defective practically all the 
children were feeble-minded: out of 750 such children investigated 
only six were reported as normal; and considering the low grade 
of sexual morality maintained by such people the parentage of 
these children must be the subject of considerable doubt. In 
the case of one such family, where both parents were mentally 

1 H. H. Goddard, Feeble-mindedness (1914). 

defective, two children out of a large number were normal but 
these two were black and therefore of obvious illegitimate origin. 
Where one parent was defective and the other, though normal, 
had a defective ancestor, then as a rule some of the children in 
the family were defective and others normal. The same results 
were obtained where both parents themselves were normal 
but where one of them was descended from a defective ancestor. 

Now these results are in accord with the newest and best- 
attested results of researches into the inheritance of certain 
characters in the lower animals and in plants; the laws governing 
this kind of inheritance are termed Mendelian because they 
were first ascertained by Gregor Mendel, an Augustinian monk 
in the middle of the igth century. Mendel's work was unnoticed 
by most of his contemporaries and was only rediscovered and 
confirmed by further research in 1900. Briefly the laws which 
he discovered may be summarized thus: 

(i) In different breeds or strains of the same species characters often 
appear in pairs so that only one of the pair appears in one strain : 
such characters are termed allelomorphs. (2) When two such 
strains are crossed, in the first generation of hybrids only one of the 
allelomorphs appears: this is termed the dominant character; the 
allelomorph which fails to appear is termed the recessive character. 
(3) If the first generation of hybrids be used as parents of a second 
generation of hybrids, one-fourth of these will exhibit the recessive 
character, and these if used to propagate a further generation will 
give rise to nothing but recessives for however many generations 
propagation may be carried on. (4) In cases (such as plants) where 
self-fertilization is possible the three-fourths of the second hybrid 
generation which exhibit the dominant character can be individually 
tested as to their hereditary potentialities. It is then found that 
one-third of them (i. e. one-fourth of the whole generation) give 
rise to nothing but dominants, but the remainder (i.e. one-half of the 
whole generation) behave as did the first generation of hybrids, i.e. 
each gives rise to progeny three-fourths of which exhibit the 
dominant character and one-fourth the recessive character. 

These results were interpreted by Mendel as proving that the 
first generation of hybrids produced two kinds of germ cells in 
equal numbers, each kind bearing one of the allelomorphic 
characters, and that these two kinds were mixed at random in 
fertilization. Bateson and Punnett 2 later gave reasons for be- 
lieving that the recessive quality of a character was due to 
the fact that it was caused by the absence of something which 
was present in the dominant, and that when two germ cells 
united in fertilization, if one of them bore the dominant character, 
that was sufficient to ensure the appearance of that character 
in the resulting organism. 

Menfal defect is therefore a recessive character due to the 
want of something in the fertilized egg which gives rise to the 
mentally defective child, something which is present in the germ 
from which the healthy child originates. We now understand 
why two defective parents can give rise only to defective children 
and why a normal child can spring from the union of a normal 
and a defective parent, and further why such a child may in turn 
give rise to defective children as well as to normal ones. 

The social implications of this discovery are fundamental and 
far-reaching. We see at once and this is in accordance with the 
experience of the Vineland authorities why all efforts to raise 
the mentally defective above a certain level by education are 
bound to fail. Further, we see that unless such defectives are 
segregated for life and prevented from breeding they constitute 
a constant source of potential poison to the race. 

If we regard all children who fail to attain a greater mental age 
than nine as defective, they can be conveniently arranged in 
three groups, viz. (a) those who never attain a mental age of more 
than three years, who are termed idiots; (V) those who never 
attain a mental age of more than six years, who are termed im- 
beciles ; whilst (c) those reaching mental ages of seven, eight and 
nine years are termed in English law " feeble-minded," but by 
the American authorities " morons " (Gk., fiupos, foolish). 
Neither idiots nor imbeciles constitute a social danger since their 
incapacity is so great that they are unable to support themselves 
in the ordinary battle of life and must therefore be maintained 

2 W. Bateson and R. C. Punnett, " A Suggestion as to the Nature 
of Walnut Comb in Fowls," Proc. Camb. Phil. Soc., vol. xiii , 165. See 
Mendel's Principles of Heredity, by W. Bateson (1919). 



in institutions, but morons possess sufficient intelligence to 
struggle along in the lowest social grade and in the poorest-paid 
employments, and just these grades of society which produce 
an enormous crowd of children which in former times died out 
but which our philanthropists now endeavour to keep alive at 
the expense of taxes levied on the better grades of society. 

The gradual lowering of the grade of mental capacity in the 
whole population which must result from these conditions is not 
the full extent of the evil. Not only are the morons defective in 
intelligence, they are also defective in self-control which is the 
basis of all morality. American investigators have applied the 
Simon-Binet tests in certain large American cities to the delin- 
quents who appear before police-courts: and their results point 
to the conclusion that a large proportion of the thieves, prostitutes 
and habitual drunkards are mental defectives. In one case, to 
give one example, it was found that 50% of prostitutes were 
indubitably feeble-minded and this proportion was arrived at 
when a large number of doubtful cases had been put down as 
normal. 1 There seems to be no tendency such as Lombroso 
postulated in these unfortunates to commit crime for its own 
sake; their crimes are simply due to an inability to control the 
tendency to the gratification of their own desires and passions, 
irrespective of the consequences to others and to themselves. 

Dr. Goddard points out that there are two totally different 
kinds of inebriates to be met with, viz. (i) ordinary people who 
have lapsed into drinking habits but who are quite capable, 
if they become sufficiently frightened, of being completely cured, 
and (2) morons, ready to repent with tears and to sign any pledge, 
but certain within a week to plunge again into intemperance. 

These conclusions which run counter to so many popular pre- 
judices have naturally awakened much criticism and opposition. 
It should be stated that Dr. Goddard's work has been repeated 
at various places in the United States, and that similar results 
have been obtained, but it is to be feared that in many cases 
his extreme care and the constant repetition of his investigations 
which he practised have been omitted. Hence Dr. Heron 2 
and Prof. Pearson 3 have pointed out that the methods of 
ascertaining the degree of mental defect were often extremely 
unsatisfactory and unconvincing and Goddard's methods of 
ascertaining the feeble-mindedness of the parents and other 
relatives of feeble-minded children have been criticized as being 
based on impressions which the investigators derived from mere 
gossip. On the face of it there is much in this objection, but on 
the whole Goddard's answer to it is satisfactory. He says first 
that the investigators were carefully trained so that their judg- 
ment could be relied on, and secondly that when different in- 
vestigators examined the same case, at considerable intervals, 
they arrived at concordant results. From the point of view of 
students of heredity it is of far greater importance that the 
inheritability of mental defect should have been established in 
the carefully standardized investigations of Dr. Goddard than 
that obvious blunders should have been demonstrated in many 
of the parallel investigations carried out elsewhere. 

A school of English social reformers of which Dr. Saleeby 
has been a prominent member have endeavoured to account for 
most of these cases of mental defect by the action of what they 
term racial poisons. They maintain that alcohol, when drunk 
in immoderate amounts, and the toxins of the venereal disease 
syphilis both attack the germ cells carried in the parents' bodies 
and not only tend to cause the production of diseased and de- 
fective children but that these children if they survive and re- 
produce likewise give rise to imperfect offspring. Now it is 
conceded on all hands that the toxins of syphilis do in certain 
cases penetrate the placenta, and interfere with the growth of the 

1 Report of the Massachusetts Commission for the Investigation of 
the White Slave Traffic so-called. 

* David Heron, Mendelism and the Problem of Mental Defect: 
I. A Criticism of Recent American Work, Biometric Laboratory Pub- 
lications (Questions of the Day), No. 7. 

* Karl Pearson and Gustav Jaederholm, Mendelism and the Prob- 
lem of Mental Defect: II. The Continuity of Mental Defect, ibid., 
No. 8. Mendelism and the Problem of Mental Defect: HI. The Grad- 
uated Character of Mental Defect, etc., ibid., No. 9. 

embryo; nay more, that the embryo itself may become infected. 
As a result horribly malformed and diseased infants are born, 
but when these survive they appear to get rid of the syphilitic 
infection before the completion of adolescence, and there is no 
reliable evidence that their germ cells are defective or diseased. 

With regard to alcohol it seems clear that immoderate in- 
dulgence in alcohol about the time of conception and during 
pregnancy tends to produce children with weakened constitu- 
tions, but again there is little or no evidence that their germ cells 
are weakened. It is true that one investigator (Stockard) 4>6 
claims to have proved that by making guinea-pigs inhale the 
vapour of absolute alcohol for several hours daily he succeeded 
in causing them to produce weakened offspring. In these young 
guinea-pigs injuries to the eyes and nervous system were promi- 
nent, and these weaknesses were transmitted in increased degree 
to subsequent generations without further exposure to the 
influence of alcohol. The stock died out in the fourth or fifth 
generation. It would, however, be exceedingly rash to general- 
ize from these experiments. Pearl 6 repeated them, using the 
domestic fowl instead of the guinea-pig, and found that the 
chicks produced by alcoholized parents were on the whole hardier 
than those whose parents were left untouched. The present 
writer has repeatedly introduced large quantities of absolute 
alcohol by subcutaneous injection into the bodies of white mice, 
so that they passed into a state of complete insensibility, yet 
even after repeated treatment of this kind they recovered and 
became the parents of offspring which were apparently quite 
healthy. Finally, considering the enormous extent to which 
alcohol has been consumed by the British nation during the last 
300 years it is obvious that if any permanent injury had been 
done to the germ cells, it should be now a diseased and crippled 
nation instead of a virile people such as it sufficiently proved it- 
self to be in the World War of 1914-8. That the causes of mental 
defect cannot be found in the alcoholism of the parents was 
definitely proved by Goddard. Of 300 children born of defective 
parents not alcoholic 99% were mentally defective; and of 130 
children born of alcoholic defectives 985% were defective. 

Mental defect must be assigned to the same cause as that 
which produces other types of Mendelian recessive. It is the 
common experience of all who have bred large numbers of animals 
or cultivated large numbers of plants, that from time to time 
Mendelian recessives turn up, and no more definite cause for 
their appearance has ever been suggested than that of " accidents 
of division " in the ripening germ cells. These recessives in many 
cases show varying degrees of defect which closely recall the 
grades of mental defect met with amongst the feeble-minded. 
For instance, in the cultures of the fruit-fly Drosophila ampe- 
lophila made by Prof. Morgan and his pupils various grades of 
blindness have appeared. The normal pigment necessary to the 
function of vision is of a dark red colour: complete albinos in which 
the eyes are white frequently occur, and also various imperfect 
grades of red classified by Morgan as cherry, eosin, etc. The 
occurrence of these defectives in the fruit -fly is certainly not 
attributable either to syphilis or to alcohol, and there is no more 
reason to attribute the occurrence of mental defectives in the 
human race to these causes than there is to assign these " race- 
poisons " as causes of the defectives in the fruit-fly. 

As the results of the inquiry into the nature of human heredity 
are so startling and seem to involve such grave consequences it 
is obviously the first step in eugenic endeavour to make them as 
widely known as possible, so as to prepare public opinion for the 
practical steps which sooner or later must be taken. With this 
object the Eugenics Record Office was established in America 
by the Carnegie trustees and placed under the able presidency 
of Dr. Davenport. In England Sir Francis Gallon by a bequest 
in his will founded a chair of Eugenic Research in University 

4 C. R. Stockard and Dorothy Craig, " An Experimental Study 
of the Influence of Alcohol on the Germ-Cells," Archiv fur Entwick- 
lungsmechanik, vol. xxxv. (1913). 

6 C. R. Stockard and George N. Papamcolaou, " Further Studies 
of the Modification of Germ-Cells," Jour.Exp. Zoo/., vol. xxvi. (1918). 

R. Pearl, " The Experimental Modification of Germ-cells," 
pt. .i., Jour. Exp. Zool., vol. xxii. (1917). 


College, London, to which his friend Prof. Karl Pearson was ap- 
pointed. Prof. Pearson has established a biometrical laboratory 
in which a large amount of valuable statistical work has been 
accomplished and much evidence adduced bearing on such ques- 
tions as the inheritability of consumption, etc. The Eugenics 
Education Society, the object of which was not research but an 
endeavour to make the results of research widely known, was 
founded in London under the honorary presidency of Sir Francis 
Gallon. Its first president was Sir James Crichton-Browne, its 
second president Mr. Montagu Crackanthorpe, to whom suc- 
ceeded Maj. Leonard Darwin in 1911. 

The cause of eugenics owes a great debt to Maj. Darwin for 
having pointed out clearly wherein fitness to survive in the 
eugenic sense really consists. On this subject much confusion 
has reigned not only in the minds of the general public but also 
in the minds of the first enthusiasts for eugenic reform. Attention 
was at first concentrated on physical health and muscular 
development, and it was an easy task for opponents to point out 
that the " big blonde beast " of Nietzsche was not the most de- 
sirable type of man, and that men of great talent and initiative 
often were so in spite of the handicaps of physical disease or 
infirmity, that Caesar and Mahomet both suffered from epilepsy 
and that Robert Louis Stevenson died of consumption. 

As Bateson 1 has well put it: "We animals live not only 
on account of but in spite of what we are." Maj. Darwin 2 has 
emphasized the fact that the decisive factor in the human 
struggle for existence is general ability and that, broadly speaking, 
when we compare together members of the same profession the 
greater the ability the greater the pay. 

It is an easy task for the critic to point to individuals who 
though able and virtuous have become poor, and to others who 
though rich are idle and vicious, but these exceptional cases do 
not detract from the generalization insisted on by Maj. Leonard 
Darwin that on the whole the poor deserve to be poor and that 
their ranks are continually swollen by the descent of the unfit 
from the superior strata of society. It may be added that if the 
rich persist in being idle and vicious then riches have a strong 
tendency to disappear a fact borne witness to by the Lancashire 
proverb, " It takes three generations to pass from clogs to clogs "; 
further, that if the able and. virtuous poor persist in well-doing 
they invariably rise to affluence in one or two generations, so 
that these apparent exceptions to Maj. Darwin's generalization 
have a way of righting themselves. 


The Dean of St. Paul's (the Rev. Dr. Inge), 3 a prominent 
member of the Eugenics Education Society, has pointed out that 
during the first half of the ipth century, when no free education 
was provided, there were far more emergences of men of talent 
and ability from the masses than during the second half when 
every effort had been made to " raise the poor " by education, 
sanitation and doles. Maj. Darwin has called attention to the 
discovery of harmless and painless means of sterilization Ly 
X-rays: so that limitation of the birth'-rate by preventing con- 
ception is now easily accomplished. 

Formerly the natural fecundity of all classes of society was 
allowed to flow on unchecked: even under these circumstances 
larger families were born to the poor than to the rich because 
the poor marry early and im'providently, which is one of the 
main causes of their poverty, but the greater death-rate amongst 
their children prevented the poorer strata of society from in- 
creasing relatively to the rich. Now, however, the rich limit their 
families to a number which they can easily support, and this 
number tends to become smaller and smaller as heavier taxation 
is levied to provide for the survival and education of large fami- 
lies of the poor. Eugenists contend that the State is in this way 
deliberately cutting off its best stocks which raised it to greatness 
in the past, and on the continuance of which its whole future 

1 Materials for the Study of Variation (1894). 

" Presidential Address to the Eugenics Education Society," 
Eugenics Review, Oct. 1914. 
3 Outspoken Essays (1920). 

depends. Against this whole policy the Eugenics Education 
Society has raised a continuous protest and the Eugenics 
Record Office of America has published a valuable series of 
bulletins 4 showing the awful progeny of criminals, paupers and 
lunatics that have sprung from a single worthless family during 
the last ioo years, and some American states have passed some- 
what hastily conceived laws designed to cause criminals and 
idiots confined in state prisons to be sterilized. 6 

It is indeed obvious that mere restraint of marriage will avail 
little since it by no means prevents illegitimate union, and 
amongst the lowest strata of society the marriage ceremony is 
frequently dispensed with. The only way in which the cruel 
methods of natural selection can ultimately be avoided is by the 
sterilization of the unfit ; in a word, by preventing parents who 
are unable properly to support the offspring which they have 
already produced from producing any more. A first feeble step 
in this direction may be found in the regulation which until 
recently was enforced in English poorhouses, forbidding husbands 
and wives to live together, but public opinion would now be 
opposed to any extension of this principle: people generally 
are so obsessed with the liberty of the subject that the liberty 
of the depraved and worthless to pollute society by a stream of 
worthless progeny has not been seriously challenged. 

The reckless reproduction of the poor in England is sometimes 
defended on the ground that it contributes to the population 
of the British overseas dominions and so to the up-building of 
the British Empire. But on closer analysis we find that this 
defence will not hold. The great British dominions have very 
clear conceptions about the type of immigrant whom they desire 
and whom alone they will admit. They desire people of initiative 
and adaptability and these are just the qualities which are 
lacking in our submerged tenth. Incidentally the submerged 
tenth are without the means of emigration, and the dominions 
have wisely refused to accept immigrants who come to them on 
" assisted passages." As things were in 1921 England was being 
threatened more and more with the fate of becoming a reservoir 
of the unfit, since it is the fit who both emigrate and limit their 
families in accordance with their means. The Dean of St. Paul's 
has pointed out that between the years 1700 and 1800 the popula- 
tion of Great Britain increased by 30% but that between 1800 
and 1900 it increased by no less than 300%. Statistically, there- 
fore, it appears that the' British Isles are rapidly approaching a 
condition of over-population, even if they have not already 
attained it. What is needed is not an increase in the birth-rate 
but a rigorous selection of those who are to be the parents of the 
future generation. In former ages this selection was accomplished 
by famine and pestilence. Ireland in 1846 had eight millions of 
starving peasantry living a life little better than that of the pigs 
which they housed in their cabins. The famine and emigration 
in 40 years reduced the population to four millions who might 
be described as thriving farmers. The Black Death in the i4th 
century wiped out two-thirds of the population of England: 
the following century was the most prosperous and happy time 
for the agricultural labourers of England of which there is any 
record. Well has it been said: " In the good old days people 
died in the country as fast as they now die in the slums of cities, 
and they died in the cities as fast as white people die on the coast 
of Guinea." If things go on as they are such a selection will again 
sooner or later be accomplished by nature; the whole purpose 
of eugenic propaganda is to make clear that we are approaching 
such a catastrophe; and to endeavour by humane and wise 
methods to avert it; to so arrange matters by legislation that the 
enterprising and provident shall be the parents of the future race 
and that drunkards, wastrels and reckless shall be debarred 
from handing on their vices to posterity. 

See Francis Galton, Hereditary Genius (1869; 2nd ed. 1882); 
Human Faculty (1883); Essays in Eugencis (Eugenics Education 

4 A. H. Estabrook and C. B. Davenport, The Nam Family, 
Eugenics Record Office (1912). 

5 Indiana, Washington, California, Connecticut, Nevada, Iowa, 
New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Michigan, Kansas, Wis- 
consin. For details see Popenoe, Applied Eugenics, pp. 191-4.. 



Society, 1909); Edward Schuster, Eugenics (1913); W. C. D. Whet- 
ham and C. D. Whetham, Introduction to' Eugenics (1912), Heredity 
and Society (1912), The Family and the Nation (1909); C. B. Daven- 
port, Heredity in Relation to Eugenics (191 1) ; H. H. Goddard, Feeble- 
mindedness: its Causes and Consequences (1914); The Kallikak 
Family: a Study in the Heredity of Feeble-mindedness (1912); A. F. 
Tredgold, Mental Deficiency (Amentia) (2nd ed. 1914) ; Alfred 
Binet and Th. Simon, translated by Clara Town Harrison, A 
Method of Measuring the Development of the Intelligence of Young 
Children (1912); Paul Popenoe and Roswell Hill Johnson, Applied 
Eugenics (1920). (E. W. MACB.) 

(1826-1920), ex-Empress of the French (see 9.885). During the 
World War she turned her home at Farnborough into a military 
hospital. She followed with intense sympathy the fluctuating 
fortunes of France, and lived to see the injustice of 1871 corrected 
by the Treaty of Versailles. She died on July n 1920 at Madrid, 
while on a visit to her nephew, the Duke of Alva. A few days 
previously she had undergone an operation for cataract, and 
succumbed to an attack of uraemia. 

EUROPE (see 9.922). In deab'ng with the general European 
situation during the years which intervened between 1909 and 
the outbreak of the World War, the historian is faced with the 
fact that the importance of this period lies in the conclusion. 
Always there is before us the problem: was the war with which it 
terminated the inevitable outcome of deep-seated causes, or was 
it an avoidable result of demonstrable blunders and crimes? A 
consideration of this problem makes it necessary to revert 
briefly to previous events. Much which in 1910 was obscure has 
been elucidated by later publications; much which was then a 
conjecture or hypothesis has been verified; and much which could 
then only be tentatively suggested can now be frankly said. 

The Triple Alliance. The chief characteristic of the first 
years of the 2oth century is the rivalry of the two political groups 
into which Europe was divided. As we can now see, the establish- 
ment of the Triple Entente (England, France, Russia) was a 
necessary and inevitable counterweight to the Triple Alliance 
(Germany, Austria and Italy) ; for this latter alliance, so long as it 
stood alone, gave to Germany a preponderance upon the con- 
tinent of Europe so great as to be a permanent check on the free 
diplomatic activities of other states, and possibly a danger to 
their independence. It is true that the original alliance between 
Germany and Austria in 1879 had been a method of maintaining 
peace and securing the status quo. At that time Germany under 
Bismarck was, as he said, a satiated state; all that it required was 
time and peace for the development of its internal resources. In 
order to secure this he had built up an extraordinarily com- 
plicated system of alliances and agreements. We have first the 
original Austro-German Alliance of 1879, which was repeatedly re- 
newed and remained in force until the outbreak of the World War. 
This treaty, which was published in 1881 in an incomplete 
form, bound the two empires to help each other in case it was 
attacked by Russia; if either was attacked by a third Power, the 
other was to observe at least a benevolent neutrality, and if 
the attacking Power was supported by Russia, then to come 
to the assistance of its ally. Side by side with this treaty of 
mutual defence against Russia, in 1881 Germany and Austria 
entered into an alliance with Russia, the chief point of which 
was a mutual engagement to act together in all Balkan matters. 
This treaty was renewed in 1884 for three years. It lapsed in 
1887, and for it was substituted the " Reinsurance Treaty " 
between Germany and Russia alone, by which each party agreed 
to maintain benevolent neutrality towards the other in case of a 
war with a third Power. This was not to apply in the case of a 
war against Austria or France if this resulted from an attack 
against one of these latter Powers by one of the parties to the 
treaty. In addition, Germany recognized the rights historically 
acquired by Russia in the Balkan Peninsula, and particularly the 
legitimacy of her preponderant and decisive influence in Bulgaria 
and in Eastern Rumelia. There was to be no modification of the 
territorial status quo in the Balkans without previous agreement 
and the principle of the closing of the Straits was reaffirmed. 
This lapsed in 1891; Caprivi is reported to have said that it was 
too complicated for him. Meanwhile, in 1882, the Triple Alliance 

was arranged between Austria, Germany and Italy, the essential 
point of which was that Germany and Austria were bound to 
come to the assistance of Italy if she was attacked by France, 
and similarly, Italy to come to the assistance of her allies if 
either of them was attacked or engaged in a war with two or 
more Great Powers; a special protocol stated that this treaty 
could not in any case be regarded as being directed against Eng- 
land. In 1883 Rumania, by a separate treaty with Austria, to 
which afterwards Germany and Italy adhered, became attached 
to the group, the allies binding themselves to defend Rumania if 
she was attacked. The text of this'treaty was kept strictly secret; 
it was a personal act of the King of Rumania, and was communi- 
cated to no one except the prime minister. In 1887 the Triple 
Alliance was renewed and extended, the two German Powers now 
undertaking to support Italian interests in North Africa, both in 
Tripoli and Morocco; these clauses included an undertaking to 
support Italy in any action that she might take to safeguard her 
position, even to war with France. In 1891 the third treaty of the 
Triple Alliance reasserted in a strengthened form the Mediterra- 
nean obligations to Italy; a very important clause (VII.) deter- 
mined that every advantage, territorial or other, obtained either 
by Austria or by Italy in the Balkans should be based on the 
principle of reciprocal compensations. 

These four Powers formed a coherent group, but to it other 
states were more loosely attached. In 1887, when there were 
cordial relations between the British and the German Govern- 
ments, Lord Salisbury, by an exchange of notes, came to an 
agreement with Italy and Austria to maintain the status quo in 
all the eastern waters of the Mediterranean, while Italy under- 
took to support Great Britain in Egypt; Great Britain on her 
side expressing her intention to support the action of Italy in 
North Africa. There was also an agreement between Italy and 
Spain as to Morocco, and at this time Serbia also was attached 
by a separate treaty to Austria. 

We see that this very elaborate structure of treaties and 
agreements was really approximating to a general European 
system into which in one form or another there were brought 
Austria, Italy, Rumania, Spain, Serbia, Great Britain, and even 
Russia; the whole object was the isolation of France, and it 
served its purpose of securing to -Germany full and peaceful 
enjoyment of all that she had gained by the war of 1870-1. The 
extension of this system to the Mediterranean was advantageous 
to Great Britain in so far as it tended to strengthen her positipn 
in Egypt. The pivot was Germany and the centre of gravity was 
the German army; this it was which held the whole together. It 
was a system in which Europe could acquiesce only so long as 
the policy of Germany was passive; a reaction must inevitably 
arise if Germany began a policy of active expansion. With the 
accession of a new emperor and the resignation of Bismarck, the 
Triple Alliance, while unchanged in form, acquired a new mean- 
ing. The period of rest and recuperation in Germany was over, 
and the new empire, conscious of its strength, began to stretch 
out with great ambitions towards the other quarters of the globe. 
The immense growth of German wealth, the skill with which the 
mineral and agricultural resources were developed, and the 
expansion of manufactures naturally led to an extension of 
foreign trade. German agents, supported by German bankers, 
were to be found in every part of the world; there was a great 
development of maritime shipping, and this naturally led to the 
acquisition of extra-European dependencies and the extension 
of political interests. The first years of the new Emperor's reign 
appear a tentative experiment; with the appointment of Herr 
(afterwards Count and then Prince) von Billow, first as Foreign 
Secretary and afterwards as Chancellor, the new tendencies 
became the deliberate and conscious policy of the German 
Government. It was inevitable, even with the best possible 
intentions, that numerous causes of friction should arise with 
other nations, and especially with Great Britain, for there was no 
part of the world (except perhaps South America) in which the 
expansion of German influence did not touch British interests. 

Franco-Russian Alliance. Germany could embark with full 
confidence on this great policy of expansion just because her 


essential security at home was so well guarded; hers was the 
only alliance on the continent. But ever since 1870 acute ob- 
servers had foreseen that, some day or another, France and 
Russia would join together in order to redress the balance of the 
continent. This event took place in Aug. 1891. The agreement 
(which was formulated in an exchange of notes) was based 
on " the renewal of the Triple Alliance and the more or less 
probable adhesion of Great Britain to the political views of this 
alliance." It contained two clauses: one that the two Govern- 
ments would agree together on any question of such a kind as to 
endanger the general peace; and the other that, in case either 
party was menaced by an attack, they would agree together on 
the measures to be taken. Two years later, however, after long 
negotiations in which many difficulties were encountered, this 
was supplemented by a military convention (Dec. i8p3-Jan. 
1894): if either France or Russia were attacked by Germany, 
France or Russia respectively would apply all her forces to attack 
Germany. If the forces of the Triple Alliance, or one of the 
Powers of which it consisted, were mobilized, France and Russia 
would immediately mobilize. The number of troops to be 
employed was specified, and it was agreed that there should be 
joint action between the general staffs and interchange of all 
information relative to the armies:;pf the Triple Alliance. 

But even after this there wafc little real cordiality in the 
relations between Russia and France. Russia, moreover, was 
occupied with Asiatic affairs, and had come to a friendly agree- 
ment with Austria as to the Balkans which was confirmed by an 
exchange of notes on May 8 1898. The internal dissensions 
of France (it was the time of the Dreyfus trial) weakened the 
influence of that country abroad. France indeed was protected 
against the danger of a new attack from Germany, but received 
little support from Russia in the normal discussion of diplomatic 
matters. The essential change took place at the turn of the 
century. Up to this period Great Britain had held aloof from 
the continental system. The British occupation of Egypt had 
resulted in a continued estrangement from France, and on the 
whole there was a tendency towards a close understanding with 
Germany and the other members of the Triple Alliance. This 
understanding was now broken. The first serious differences 
arose out of South African affairs. The Kriiger telegram of 1896 
was a flash of lightning; no storm followed, but this and the 
intense animosity against Great Britain shown during the Boer 
War were symptoms that could not be neglected. By a large 
party in Germany the consolidation of British power in South 
Africa was regarded as the loss of a sphere which they had marked 
out for German expansion. Though the matter is still extremely ob- 
scure, there is no doubt that during 1898, 1899, and 1900 proposals 
were discussed in every chancellery in Europe for a European 
coalition against England, and the impression produced in other 
countries was that such a coalition would be welcomed by 
Germany. Equally important was the altered attitude of Ger- 
many towards the Near East. The great and legitimate expan- 
sion of German commercial and economic interests was accom- 
panied by a growing cordiality with the Porte, and during his 
visit to Damascus, in 1897 the German Emperor proclaimed 
himself the protector of all Mahommedans throughout the 
world an utterance which from anyone but him would have been 
justly regarded by France and Great Britain as an unparalleled 
provocation. There was also a serious conflict of interests in the 
Far East. The evidence which came from many sources was 
sufficient to make it obvious to every British statesman that a 
continued political isolation was dangerous. England must 
have friends, and friends on whom she could rely. 

From 1898 to 1901 advances were repeatedly made to Germany 
by Great Britain, and the project of a definite diplomatic under- 
standing, nay even of a defensive alliance, was ventilated. The 
suggestions were accompanied by warnings that if an arrange- 
ment with Germany was not reached, then recourse would be 
had to the opposed alliance. The offers were rejected; the warn- 
ings disregarded. To the German Foreign Office, to Prince Billow 
and to the Emperor, it was an axiom that there could be no real 
friendship, as they said, " between the whale and the bear." 

They feared, or professed to fear, that an alliance with England 
would only mean that they would be used as a military advance 
post against Russia; in the case of war the brunt of the fighting 
would fall upon them, while Great Britain would gather up the 
spoils in Asia. " The danger was imminent that if Germany 
allied herself with England she would have to undertake the role 
against Russia that Japan assumed later single-handed." They 
believed that they could do better business by playing off the 
rival empires against one another, by refusing to commit them- 
selves either to Russia or to England, and by using the rivalry 
to extend their own influence and possessions. 

The German Navy. But there was another influence at work. 
One of the chief tasks which the German Government had set 
itself was the building of a great war fleet. It was the considered 
opinion of German statesmen that, if they were to come to a 
friendly diplomatic arrangement with England, this would 
inevitably compel them to limit their naval development; they 
affected to think that a fleet built by a Germany friendly to 
England would be a fleet built under patronage and limited by 
the British insistence on superiority at sea. This they did not 
desire; they preferred, therefore, full freedom to build against 
England, trusting that it might be possible to avoid a serious 
conflict during what Prince Biilow calls the " danger period of 
construction." It was indeed the new naval ambitions, more 
even than the rejection of the British offer of an alliance, that 
conditioned the whole European situation. After all, in 1887 
Bismarck had offered an alliance to Lord Salisbury, and the 
rejection of this offer did not mean any serious misunderstanding. 
The building of the German fleet was an action of a very different 
character. It could only be compared to the similar work by 
which from 1857 onwards the Prussian army, after a period of 
comparative stagnation and inefficiency, was brought up to the 
highest point of perfection, and we know how this great instru- 
ment of war, when perfected, was used to further Prussian 
policy. There could be no doubt that the navy, when completed, 
would also be used for the same object, and in fact the responsible 
spokesmen of Germany took care to leave no doubt on this point. 
They wanted the fleet to support their diplomacy. In the memo- 
randum which accompanied the great Navy bill of 1900 this was 
clearly stated. The navy must be such that, " even for the 
greatest sea Power, a war with it would involve such risks as to 
jeopardize its own supremacy." 

It would be an error to suppose that the German Government 
were deliberately looking forward to forcing a war with England. 
Still more misleading to assume, as so many did in England, that 
the object was an invasion. There has never been forthcoming 
any evidence of any kind to justify the belief that the German 
military and naval programme included the landing of a hostile 
force upon England's shores. The danger was of quite a different 
character, but it was none the less serious. The calculation was 
that if there was a fundamental difference between British and 
German policy, the possession of a great fleet would enable Ger- 
many to get her way, because England might be put in such a 
position that she would not dare to risk war. And what was the 
kind of point on which such a difference of policy might arise? 
Had the German fleet been in existence during the Boer War, 
there can be no shadow of a doubt that it would have been used 
to support European intervention. And again, it had become 
the avowed policy of the German Emperor to use his friendship 
with the Sultan as a means of winning the confidence of the 
Mahommedan world, and this we have his own words for it 
was an instrument which might in necessity be used to render 
impossible the position of England in Egypt or to arouse difficul- 
ties in Mesopotamia, in Persia, in India itself. It was the calcula- 
tion that if any such controversy arose, Germany would not be 
alone; if she were allied to some other Great Power which pos- 
sessed a formidable navy Russia, France, Japan, or the United 
States the predominance at sea, on which the very existence of 
the British Empire depended, would be imperilled. 

It is not necessary to enter into details of the German 
fleet, nor to discuss the very complicated controversies which 
constantly recurred. It is sufficient to point out the main out- 



standing facts which are beyond dispute. The building of the 
German fleet was governed by the Law of 1900 (that of 1898 was 
purely preliminary), which was amended in 1906, 1908 and 1912. 
The original Law determined that the permanent establishment 
of the fleet should be 38 battleships and 20 armoured cruisers; 
each ship was to be replaced once every 25 years. By this the 
standard of building was finally set down. The Act of 1908 
determined that battleships and cruisers were to be replaced 
once every 20 years instead of 25. That of 1912 increased the 
number of battleships and cruisers to 6 1 . The effect of this would 
be that, when the programme was completed, Germany would 
have five squadrons of battleships, of which three were to form 
the active fleet, two the reserve. In order to understand the full 
effect it must be remembered that the Law, though it deter- 
mined the number of vessels, did not deal with their character, 
size, or fighting power. When dreadnoughts and super-dread- 
noughts were introduced, an old ship of (say) 10,000 tons would 
be replaced by one of 25,000 to 27,000 tons with a corresponding 
increase in speed and armament. Moreover, especially by the 
last Law of 1912, arrangements were made for a very great 
addition of smaller vessels, destroyers and submarines, and above 
all for keeping the personnel of the navy at such a standard that 
the whole of the fleet would be available at any time of the year. 
The total effect was that there was stationed in the Baltic and in 
the North Sea a fleet stronger than any other except that of 
Great Britain, and larger and more powerful than the whole of 
the British fleet had been 20 years before. 

This menace was one which had to be met. No child could 
suppose that it would not affect the whole trend of British policy. 
The Germans themselves knew this well. What they feared was 
that England would attack while she still enjoyed her previous 
naval supremacy and before the German fleet had grown large 
enough to be dangerous. But this policy of a " preventive " war 
was never even seriously considered by responsible British states- 
men. Their answer was the only possible one. In the first place 
the British fleet must be strengthened and its whole organization 
altered. A fleet, like an army, must be found in the place where it 
is wanted. In the old days the North Sea had been empty of 
ships; it was in the Channel, in the Mediterranean, in the 
Atlantic, that the British fleet was placed. The centre of gravity 
was the Straits of Gibraltar. Circumstances were now changed, 
and so a great reorganization was effected by which outlying 
stations were denuded of ships and the bulk of the fleet was 
stationed in the North Sea. 

The Mediterranean had also, however, to be guarded. Austria 
was increasing her fleet, and Italy was an ally of Germany. As 
early as 1900 a naval agreement (this has not been published) 
had been made between the three Powers of the Triple Alliance. 
To meet this danger in 1912 it was agreed by England that 
France should concentrate the greater portion of her fleet in the 
Mediterranean; in the event of a common war with Germany it 
'would fall to the British fleet to defend the northern and western 
coasts of France. In the same year a naval convention was 
concluded between France and Russia; with the building of the 
Kiel Canal the importance of the Baltic in naval strategy had 
increased. In 1913 a further naval convention between the three 
Powers of the Triple Alliance was made, and in May 1914 
proposals were made for naval conversations between Russia and 
Great Britain; it is to be noted that at the end of June in the same 
year the enlargement of the Kiel Canal, by which the biggest 
ships could pass through it, was completed. 

All this was not enough. The German plan was based on the 
assumption that Germany would be able to gain further allies 
in addition to those she already had. England also must have 
allies. Now that Germany was becoming the second naval Power, 
England could no longer afford to regard with equanimity Ger- 
man military predominance upon the continent of Europe, for 
this might eventually mean the further weakening of France 
and, whether by war or by diplomacy, German control over the 
Low Countries. It might also mean the pressing down of Ger- 
man influence through the Balkans into the Mediterranean. It 
must never be forgotten that the acts of the Triple Alliance dealt 

not only with the continent of Europe, but with the Mediter- 
ranean and the shores of Africa. The success of the German 
schemes required one of two things, either an alliance with other 
states against England, or such increase of German preponder- 
ance that they would become, for political purposes, subject to 
German will. It was necessary, therefore, for England to guard 
against either contingency, and she could only do so by enter- 
ing into a firm understanding to join with them in resistance to 
any unprovoked act of German aggression. 

These considerations were so weighty that alone they are 
sufficient to explain and justify the action of the British Govern- 
ment. The further information which has now become available 
completely substantiates them. We now know from the letters 
of the Kaiser to the Tsar, which were published after the Russian 
Revolution, that throughout the whole of the reign of Nicholas II. 
the German Emperor had been using the strongest personal 
pressure upon him to bring about an alliance between Germany 
and Russia, the point of which was avowedly directed against 
Great Britain, an alliance into which France would be forced to 
come. This had been his policy long before the establishment of 
the Entente with France; whatever the subject of the diplomatic 
negotiations at the moment might be whether it was Armenia 
or Crete or South Africa or Egypt, neutrality during the Russo- 
Japanese War, or Morocco always we see the same ambition. 
He hoped to create trouble for India by encouraging a Russian 
move on Afghanistan, and for this purpose to arouse the slumber- 
ing passions of Islam: " Remember what you and I agreed upon 
at Peterhof, never to forget that Mahommedans were a tremen- 
dous card in our game in caSe you or I were suddenly confronted 
by a war with the certain meddlesome Power." He encouraged 
Russia to give support to Turkey as against Great Britain in 
the Persian Gulf: 

" Last but not least, an excellent expedient to kill British inso- 
lence and overbearing would be to make some military demonstra- 
tions on the Perso- Afghan frontier. . . . Even should the forces 
at your disposal not suffice for a real attack on India itself, they 
would do for Persia." 

All this culminated when on July 24 1905 he persuaded the 
Tsar to sign the Treaty of Bjorko, a secret alliance against 
England which it was his hope would afterwards be joined by 
France. This is the kind of method by which he professed to be 
guarding the peace of Europe. The judgment of King Edward 
made to a Danish diplomatist may be recalled: " I will admit 
this, that with a man of so impulsive a temperament as the 
German Emperor at the head of the greatest Power in Europe, 
anything may happen." This correspondence was secret, but 
in diplomacy there is no absolute secrecy, and the rumours 
of it must be taken into account if we are to understand the 
profound distrust which was felt for Germany during these years. 

Franco- British Entente. These were the circumstances in 
which a great change of policy took place. The first step was the 
British alliance with Japan. In this it had originally been 
contemplated that Germany should be a partner. But Germany 
did not accept the opportunity offered her, and, in addition, 
German action over the Manchurian agreement showed that no 
confidence could be placed in any German engagement. The 
alliance therefore was one between Japan and Great Britain alone. 
In 1904 a colonial agreement was reached between England and 
France, by which the numerous points of friction between the 
two countries were settled. The essence was that France recog- 
nized the British position in Egypt. To do so was a bitter blow 
to most cherished French traditions and ambitions. In return 
for this Great Britain recognized the special position of France 
in Morocco and gave up to France her claims and interests. 
This agreement in its original inception had, at any rate in 
England, no special point directed against Germany. It was 
probably due chiefly to Lord Cromer, but his efforts were sup- 
ported by Lord Lansdowne and King Edward VII. The object 
was merely to clear away the outstanding causes of contro- 
versy with France, but it was to have far-reaching results. 

This agreement was quite unexpected and very unwelcome 
in Berlin. The whole basis of German diplomacy was cut away. 



Europe ac once took on a new aspect. In the ordinary diplomatic 
negotiations Germany must look forward to a situation in which 
she was confronted no longer by disunited and antagonistic 
States, but by great Powers, acting in union and cooperation. 
Even the Triple Alliance itself was shaken, for it was obvious that 
Italy could not be depended upon in any serious conflict with 
both France and England. It must therefore be the chief object 
of German diplomacy to drive a wedge between England and 
France. For this reason, from this time onwards, every diplo- 
matic incident, even of minor importance, at once reverberated 
throughout the whole of Europe. This is illustrated by the Moroc- 
co affair. Morocco was of great importance to France; it was 
essential to England that no hostile Power should be established 
on the north-western coast of Africa; apart from this, Morocco 
was merely of trivial importance to the rest of the world, includ- 
ing Germany. But Morocco was made the test of the Entente. 
Germany, taking advantage of the temporary crippling of Russia 
by her military and naval defeat in the Far East and the internal 
disturbances which followed, brought the full weight of her mili- 
tary superiority to bear upon France, and thereby forced her 
into a conference and brought about the resignation of Delcasse. 
This action defeated its own object. It cemented the union 
between France and Great Britain, and as soon as it became ob- 
vious that France, by entering into this union, exposed herself to 
the threat of war, it was inevitable that England should take steps, 
if necessary, to protect her new friend. It was the threats by 
Germany which gave a military side to what had at first been 
merely a diplomatic arrangement. 

No doubt the French handling of the whole matter was open 
to criticism, but there was a peculiarity about the arrangement 
of 1904 which placed Great Britain in a delicate position. As was 
pointed out at the time in France, England, while she gained 
definite and defined rights which France surrendered to her in 
Egypt, gave in exchange only eventual rights in Morocco; 
France, in return for a definite surrender, got nothing but hopes; 
England acquired Egypt, France merely the prospect of acquiring 
Morocco. In these circumstances there was obviously an absolute 
obligation on Great Britain to see to it that her support of 
France in Morocco should not be half-hearted; had this support 
been withdrawn simply because some of the subsequent details of 
French action were open to criticism, then the worst possible 
construction might have been placed on the good faith of the 
British Government; it would have appeared that, after having 
secured themselves in Egypt, they had seized on a subterfuge 
so as to avoid carrying out their side of the agreement. 

Anglo-Russian Entente. Not only did the German attempt to 
separate Russia from France fail, but in 1907 an arrangement was 
made by which the outstanding points of difference between 
Great Britain and Russia in Tibet, Afghanistan and Persia were 
settled. The approximation between the two empires, which had 
for so long been in a state of complete rivalry, was cemented 
by a meeting between King Edward VII. and the Tsar, which 
took place at Revel in June 1908. The chief and almost only 
subject of discussion was the state of affairs in the Balkans, and 
it was agreed that there should be common action for bringing 
about a reform in Macedonia. Very misleading statements with 
regard to these conversations have been constantly repeated by 
high authorities in Germany, as, for instance, that the definite 
understanding was arrived at that the two Powers should attack 
Germany together in the year 1916. There is no truth of any 
kind in this. The meeting was followed shortly (Aug. 12) by one 
between King Edward and the Austrian Emperor at Ischl. This 
also has been the subject of equally erroneous statements, as, for 
instance, that King Edward tried to persuade the Emperor to 
secede from the alliance with Germany. This is quite untrue, and 
was not in accordance with the principles of British policy. The 
subjects of discussion were very different. The Austrian Em- 
peror gave an undertaking that his Government would not take 
any isolated action in the Balkans without informing and con- 
sulting the other Powers, and the King tried to induce him to use 
his influence to dissuade Germany from continuing the increase 
of the German fleet. The whole object was the maintenance of 

peace, and much would have been done to secure this if a stoppage 
could be put to the rivalry in shipbuilding between England and 
Germany, and if no surprise action was taken in the Balkans. 

The Annexation Crisis, 1908. It was the contrast between 
the language used by the Emperor Francis Joseph on this 
occasion and the action of Austria in the sudden annexation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina eight weeks later which explains the 
intensity of feeling shown by the British Government and Sir 
Edward Grey as to the latter point. Apart from this and the 
general principle of the sanctity of treaties, they foresaw how 
dangerous would be the effect of the joint Bulgarian and Austro- 
Hungarian action upon public opinion in Turkey. It was the 
annexation which more than anything else brought to a head the 
passionate national feeling among Christians and Moslems to 
which all the wars which followed were due, and the conclusion 
of the crisis was reached in such a way as to leave the most intense 
animosity in Serbia against Austria, and to insure that the full 
support of Russia would be given to Serbia and that hence- 
forward the Balkans would once more become' the field for the 
activities of Russian diplomacy, which had never been scrupulous 
in the methods which it used. 

The episode is important, for in it is to be found the explana- 
tion of much which happened in 1914. Just when it seemed as 
though the very prolonged and acrimonious controversy might 
be reaching a conclusion, Count Pourtales, the German am- 
bassador, delivered to M. Isvolsky " a peremptory demand " 
that Russia should without conditions agree to the abrogation of 
Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin, that is, should recognize the 
annexation. It would no doubt be wrong to speak of this as an 
ultimatum; there was no threat of war; it may be described 
rather as a diplomatic ultimatum; an immediate decision was 
asked for, and it was intimated that, if the answer was un- 
favourable, Germany would " Idcher I'Autriche sur la Serbie." 
It is important to understand what this threat for it was a 
threat implied. A war between Austria and Serbia would have 
placed Russia in a most disadvantageous position; weakened as 
she was, she could not have come to the help of Serbia, because 
under the system of alliances Germany would, if necessary, come 
to the help of Austria. It was in fact a threat that, if the demand 
was not complied with, Austria, depending upon the ultimate 
support of the German army, should be given carle blanche to 
free herself of Serbian opposition. It may be added that Ger- 
many showed some disposition to use a similar threat to England. 
Before this, Russian resistance collapsed; they agreed to the 
German demand without even consulting France and Great 
Britain. The success was a notable one, but it was dangerous. 
It was one which could not be repeated. Russia had given way to 
threats once; she could not afford to do so a second time. It 
left an intense feeling of indignation in St. Petersburg, which 
persisted, and became one of the most dangerous factors in the 
European situation. Personally M. Isvolsky, who soon resigned 
the post of Foreign Minister, henceforward became the active 
partisan of an anti-Austrian policy, and was only anxious to 
revenge himself for the humiliation which had been placed upon 
him first by Count Aehrenthal and secondly by Germany. The 
German Government, it is true, did their best to smooth away the 
impression caused by the harshness of their action, and, after 
having shown Russia how little the Entente was able to defend 
her against the Triple Alliance, attempted to win Russian 
friendship. But the effect of these efforts was obliterated by the 
German Emperor, who, in a visit to Vienna in the autumn of 
1910, took occasion to recall how he had come to the help of his 
ally " in shining armour." 

Agadir. The annexation crisis had occurred at a moment 
when the relations between France and Germany were com- 
paratively friendly; an attempt had been made at establishing 
economic and financial cooperation in Morocco. An awkward 
episode (the German consul at Casablanca was inducing soldiers 
of the Foreign Legion to desert and was arrested) was settled by 
arbitration. But this cooperation did not last long. The ambi- 
tions of the Colonial party in Germany could not be reconciled 
with the complete political control which France aimed at. A 



new and very serious crisis arose in 1911. The French, in con- 
sequence of a civil war in Morocco, followed by the abdication of 
the Sultan, advanced to Fez. This appeared to show a desire to 
disregard obligations of the Convention of Algeciras. Germany, 
in order to support her claim to be consulted, took a step which, 
as so often happened, could be interpreted as a threat. She sent a 
small ship-of-war to Agadir. It was of course assumed, not only 
abroad but in Germany itself, that this action meant that the 
German Government proposed to claim part of the western coast 
of Morocco and were even intending to land troops in order to en- 
force this claim. It seems probable that the German Government 
themselves had not at the moment really made up their minds 
precisely what they wanted. The obvious answer to this German 
move would have been the dispatch of a French or British war- 
ship a policy which was strongly pressed by some of the French. 
The combined wisdom and moderation of the British and French 
Governments prevented them answering a threat by a threat, but 
the renewal of the old methods, the clear intention of once more 
forcing France into separate conversations without England and 
thereby extorting unwelcome concessions, could not be over- 
looked. A final understanding between France and Germany 
would have been welcomed by the British Government, but they 
could not stand aside and see France forced under the threat of 
war to cede to Germany either a position in Morocco itself or 
quite excessive cessions elsewhere. In a speech at the Mansion 
House on July 21, Mr. Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, said: 

" I conceive that nothing would justify a disturbance of inter- 
national good-will except questions of the gravest national moment. 
But if a situation were to be forced upon us in which peace could 
only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent posi- 
tion Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievement 
by allowing Britain to be treated, where her interests are vitally 
affected, as if she were of no account in the cabinet of nations then 
I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation 
intolerable for a great country like ours to endure." 

Shortly afterwards separate conversations were begun between 
Germany and France on the basis that Germany would agree to 
disinterest herself in Morocco completely, receiving in return 
territorial concessions in other parts of Africa. There were many 
anxious moments, for some of the German demands were ex- 
cessive, but eventually an agreement was reached by which 
France surrendered to Germany important parts of her posses- 
sions on the Congo. As in the previous Morocco discussions, the 
importance of the episode lay not so much in the immediate 
question at issue as in the attempt of Germany to separate Eng- 
land and France and to intimidate France. As before, this had 
the natural result of strengthening the union between France and 
England, and taking a stage further the military and naval 
accompaniments of this agreement. 

Great Britain and Germany, 1909-14. The final settlement 
of the Moroccan question led to an improvement in the relations 
between Great Britain and Germany. One of the first acts of 
Bethmann Hollweg, who on the resignation of Prince Billow 
became Chancellor in 1909, had been to make proposals which 
might bring about an amelioration of the relations between Ger- 
many and England, and for the next four years conversations 
with this object continued. The negotiations turned on two 
points: (i) a naval arrangement, the object of which would be to 
prevent the two countries continuing on an unlimited rivalry of 
armaments; (2) a general political understanding by which each 
country should be assured that the other would not join in 
attacking it in case of war. From 1909 to 1911 the discussions 
took the form of conversations of the ordinary diplomatic nature, 
interspersed with public speeches in the two Parliaments. They 
were broken off in the summer of 1911 owing to the Agadir diffi- 
culty, but after that had been surmounted, were resumed at the 
beginning of 1912, when on Feb. 9 Lord Haldane was, in con- 
sequence of a suggestion from Germany, sent on a special mission 
to Berlin. On neither point did these negotiations lead to any 
definite result. As to the naval agreement it seems clear that 
Bethmann Hollweg would have welcomed it, but that his support 
was not strong enough against the opposition of Tirpitz and the 

Emperor. The proposals for a general political agreement broke 
down because, as soon as a precise formula was put forward, it 
appeared that Germany would not be satisfied with any arrange- 
ments except one which would be so worded as to imply that 
Great Britain would be debarred from coming to the assistance of 
France if she were attacked. Anything of this nature was of 
course out of the question, for, as Sir Edward Grey said on Nov. 
27 1911, " one does not make new friendships worth having by 
deserting old ones." What Lord Haldane suggested was a state- 
ment that: " England declares that she will neither make nor 
join in any unprovoked attack upon Germany. Aggression upon 
Germany is not the subject and forms no part of any treaty, 
understanding or convention to which England is now a party, 
nor will she become a party to anything which has such an 
object." What Germany asked for was a statement that: " If 
either of the high contracting parties becomes entangled in war 
with one or more Powers, the other party will at least observe 
toward the Power so entangled benevolent neutrality, and will 
use its utmost endeavour for the localization of the conflict." 
This, of course, could not be accepted. None the less, the very 
fact that this attempt had been made, though it failed, left the 
relations between the two Governments more cordial; even more 
important was the practical illustration afforded by the sub- 
sequent Balkan troubles as to the importance of cooperation 
between them. Everything tended to show that the peace of 
Europe could be maintained if Germany and Great Britain, while 
each maintaining full loyalty to its own associates, were willing, 
when any difficulty arose, to communicate frankly and freely 
with one another and to discuss the best method of settlement. 
By this means the two alliances might cease from their rivalry and 
gradually be merged in a general concert. This was a system 
which Sir Edward Grey deliberately adopted; the whole han- 
dling of political difficulties was based upon this, and so long as 
Germany acted in a similar spirit things went well. When the 
World War ultimately broke out, it was because Germany, in 
a very grave crisis, ceased this cooperation and in profound 
secrecy made herself the associate of schemes the success of 
which would have been most detrimental to one of the partners 
in the Triple Entente. Meanwhile, during 1913 and the first 
half of 1914, negotiations were begun and carried through to a 
successful issue by which the two chief outstanding points of 
controversy were in fact removed. A settlement was at last 
brought about with regard to the Bagdad railway and the 
reversion of the Portuguese colonies in Africa. 

The situation in Germany was, of course, the subject of the 
most careful study by those who were responsible for directing 
British policy. Opinions were much divided in England; there 
was even a belief, which was probably well founded, that neither 
Herr von Bethmann Hollweg nor Herr von Jagow desired any- 
thing but the best relations. On the other hand, it must remain 
a matter of comparative indifference whether in any particular 
year the German administration then in office was well disposed. 
Their position was at the best very precarious. All information, 
both from public and confidential sources, showed that a very 
large section of educated German public opinion was animated by 
feelings of intense animosity against England, and although this 
party was at the moment in opposition to the Government, at any 
time they might come into office, all the more because of the very 
unreliable character of the Emperor, of whom the only thing that 
could be said with certainty was that no one could foresee what he 
would do. Moreover, there was another factor to be kept in mind. 
Good relations between Great Britain and Germany might be 
valued, not for their own sake, but merely as a device for separat- 
ing Great Britain from her associates. It was an obvious policy to 
encourage a spirit of conciliation, so that if there was a serious 
conflict with Russia, English public opinion would refuse support 
to Russia. To put it brutally, Germany had no reasons to fear a 
war if England stood out; according to all instructed German 
expectations the crisis of any great European war would be over 
in the first two months. All that was necessary then was to secure 
that England should remain neutral during the first stage; if once 
the essential victory in France were secured, then nothing else 


really mattered. Germany would quite well be able to acquiesce 
in an interference of Great Britain at a later stage, for, though 
this might be used to moderate the claims of the victors, it would 
not eliminate the fact of the victory. It was the consciousness of 
this which made it absolutely necessary that every advance to 
Germany should be accompanied by the clearest and most public 
intimation that the union of the Entente was not thereby weak- 
ened. So we get the key to British policy: the maintenance of the 
two alliances, but the frank and friendly discussion between Great 
Britain and Germany on each point of difference as it arose. 

This was a policy which required great skill, firmness and a 
cool head. For this reason, in the very critical circumstances, the 
direction of British policy was kept to a large extent in the hands 
of a small group Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Asquith and Lord 
Haldane; just as it had been recognized that foreign policy should 
be kept out of the ordinary party conflict, so it became necessary 
not to allow vacillation to arise from the conflict of opposed 
groups in the Cabinet. It was, as subsequent events were to 
show, a misfortune that some of the other countries concerned 
were not guided with equal skill and firmness. 

Austria and the Balkans. It is not in the stronger but in the 
weaker states that the occasions for war arise not in Germany, 
France and England, but in Russia, Turkey and Austria-Hun- 
gary; for when a Government is weak, popular passions have 
.their way, and the best plans of the wisest statesmen may be 
frustrated. As the long reign of the aged Emperor Francis 
Joseph of Austria was nearing its end, the whole internal fabric 
of his empire was growing out of joint, and there was neither 
purpose, skill, nor foresight to remedy this. As will often happen 
in such circumstances, there were many who hoped to find in 
a spirited foreign policy an escape from internal difficulties, 
One party, reverting to the older Austrian traditions, looked to a 
war with Italy, for it was a peculiarity of the situation that, while 
Italy and Austria were allies, they were always arming and in- 
triguing against one another, and the Government of Trieste, by 
its strongly anti-Italian acts, fomented the spirit of irredentism 
which had only for a time been suppressed during the first years 
of the Triple Alliance. But it was the Slav problem which 
presented the greatest difficulty, and this had both its internal 
and its external aspect. At home the settlement of 1868 had 
given to Germans and Magyars constitutional predominance in 
the Dual Monarchy which was not justified by their numerical 
proportion. The strong Slav spirit found expression in the grow- 
ing ambitions of the Czechs, while the southern Slavs, Croats and 
Serbs alike were in open opposition to the misgovernment of 
Budapest. At the same time the Magyars, with singular blind- 
ness, refused to take any steps to remedy the just grievances of 
the Rumans of Transylvania. This national discontent when 
suppressed at home naturally turned for help abroad, and the 
internal dislocation of the Habsburg Monarchy became involved 
in the Balkan troubles. From 1804 there had been a cessation of 
the secular rivalry of Austria and Russia; Russia was occupied 
with her Far Eastern schemes, and the two empires had agreed 
on the maintenance of the status quo, an agreement which was 
cemented and continued at Miirzteg in 1897. The Austrian 
position in the Balkans depended upon the alliance with Rumania 
and an important understanding with Serbia, which had become 
almost a client state of Austria. The mutual hostility between 
Serbia and Bulgaria, Bulgaria and Greece, ensured the continued 
equilibrium. In order to maintain this state of things, the Aus- 
trian Government did not scruple to condone, if it did not ac- 
tually encourage, the assassination of King Alexander of Serbia. 
But .this instrument they lost by the foolish attack upon Ser- 
bian commercial prosperity, the beginning of a definite and final 
rupture, which, as we have seen, led to and was aggravated by 
the annexations. From this time it was the one object of the 
Serbian nation to achieve its expansion at the expense of Austria. 
To Russia the discontent of the southern Slavs of the monarchy 
was a welcome weapon. In the rivalry of the two empires a new 
stage had been introduced. Russia, by fomenting Serbian 
intrigues, might hope to strike a blow at the very existence of the 
Habsburg Monarchy itself. There was only one method of 

meeting this, and that was internal reconstruction. This was 
said to be the object of the heir to the throne, but, in view of the 
obstinate resistance to be expected from Hungary, nothing could 
be done during the lifetime of the old Emperor. 

This was the state of things when a new and quite unforeseen 
evolution began in the Balkans. 

The Balkan Wars. It had long been agreed that to Italy 
should fall the reversion of Tripoli. The increasing disorder of 
the Turkish Empire, the obvious failure of the Young Turks to 
establish an orderly and civilized government, made it appear 
that the time for action had come. In Sept. 1911, at the very 
crisis of the Agadir incident, without previous warning the 
Italian Government presented an ultimatum to Turkey, and 
three days later, on Sept. 29, declared war. On Oct. 4 an Italian 
force landed in Tripoli, which, during the next months, was 
occupied with the very difficult task of subduing the resistance 
both of the Arab population and of the Turkish troops. A full 
year was in fact to pass before, by the victory of Sidi Bibal, the 
kernel of the resistance was overcome. Meanwhile, in order to 
force the Turkish Government to agree to a cession of the 
province, the Italian fleet in Feb. 1912 appeared before Beirut, 
and in May occupied Rhodes and the islands of the Dodecanese. 
It was clear that an Italian attack on Turkey in the Aegean would 
arouse the hopes and ambitions of the Balkan States themselves. 
There were abundant causes of trouble. The Young Turks had 
no more succeeded in bringing peace and order into Thrace and 
Macedonia than had the Government of 'Abdul Hamid; the 
religious rivalry, the exploits of the Comitadji, the massacres and 
ravages by the Turks, continued in this unhappy country, and it 
seemed as though it were becoming the declared policy of the 
Turkish Government to remove the Macedonian difficulty by 
the extermination of the inhabitants. Experience had shown 
them that no serious help would come from the Great Powers, 
who, fearful of the consequences of Balkan troubles, adhered with 
what we may call unintelligent obstinacy to the doctrine of the 
status quo. If anything was to be done, the Christian States must 
do it themselves. In Feb. 1912 negotiations were begun under 
the deepest secrecy between Serbia and Bulgaria, and on March 
13 there was signed a treaty of friendship and alliance, by which 
the two kingdoms mutually guaranteed to one another their 
political independence and the integrity of their territory, and 
a:greed to support one another with all their forces if either were 
attacked by one or more states. More than this, they agreed to 
support one another if any of the Great Powers attempted to 
occupy any part of the Balkans which was at present under 
Turkish dominion, a clause which was obviously directed against 
Austria. This treaty was accompanied by a secret additional 
treaty and a military convention; the first of these was in fact in 
the nature of an offensive alliance against Turkey and was 
followed by detailed arrangements as to the disposal of any 
Turkish territory which might be acquired. The treaty was to be 
communicated to Russia, and all matters undetermined in the 
treaty were to be settled by the arbitrament of Russia. The 
military convention determined precisely the nature and charac- 
ter of the help to be given in the case of a war with Turkey or with 
Austria or Rumania. This treaty was in accordance with the 
agreement submitted to the Russian Government, but they did 
not communicate it to their allies. It was followed in May by a 
similar treaty between Greece and Bulgaria, the initiative to 
which was to a large extent given by Mr. J. D. Bourchier, the 
well-known correspondent of The Times. The whole scheme was 
one unparalleled in recent years; the Balkan States, so long the 
clients and the playthings of the Great Powers, had at last agreed 
on that which no one who knew their mutual animosities had 
believed possible: they had joined together to free their co- 
religionists from the Turks and if necessary to protect the 
Balkans against the external aggression of any Great Power. 

The action prefigured in the treaties was hastened by the con- 
clusion of the war between Turkey- and Italy; negotiations were 
entered into during the month of August and were brought to a 
conclusion by the Treaty of Lausanne signed on Oct. 18, by which 
Turkey surrendered Tripoli to Italy, the future of the Aegean 


Is. being reserved for later arbitration. It was necessary, if 
the attack on Turkey were to be made, that it should take place 
at once so as not to leave time for preparation. On Oct. 8 Monte- 
negro declared war; on the I3th the three other allied states 
presented an ultimatum demanding the immediate grant of 
autonomy to Macedonia; on the i4th the population of Crete 
declared themselves independent of Turkey, and formally joined 
Greece ; and on the 1 7th the declaration of war was sent. 

These events seem to have been carried out without the privity 
of any of the Powers except Russia, and were equally unwelcome 
to all to the Entente as much as to the Triple Alliance. At the 
last moment a hasty and ill-advised scheme was put forward by 
the joint action of Austria and France for localizing, if not pre- 
venting, the impending hostilities; the united Great Powers of 
Europe declared that in the event of hostilities they would not 
permit any alteration of the territorial status. At least German 
opinion seems to have anticipated rapid success for the Turks, a 
success which would have been welcome to them; they were 
speedily disappointed and disillusioned. Before the end of the 
month the Turkish army had been defeated and routed by the 
Bulgarians in the two great battles of Kirk-Kilisse and Lule- 
Burgas; the Serbians had overrun the whole of Macedonia, the 
Turkish force opposed to them fleeing in panic and disorder. The 
Greeks, advancing from the south, occupied southern Albania 
and also quickly made their way to Salonika. Within a month 
the Turkish rule in the Balkans had come to an end; there was 
left to them only Constantinople and parts of Thrace. The 
Bulgarians advanced rapidly towards the capital; it was for the 
moment their dream that it would be a Bulgarian army which 
would rescue San Sofia from the Moslems, and Ferdinand hoped 
that the day was approaching when he would ride as a con- 
queror into the streets of Constantinople. They were disap- 
pointed. In a series of battles, Nov. 17-22, the Bulgarian 
assault on the lines of Chatalja failed; cholera made its appear- 
ance in the army and on Dec. 3 an armistice was concluded. 

It remained for Europe to determine its attitude towards these 
unexpected events. The danger was extreme that the Balkan 
might become a European war. 

The Austrian Government was determined to put a barrier to 
Serbian ambition. The arrangements with Bulgaria were based 
on the assumption that Serbia should gain her reward by the 
annexation of the northern part of Albania and should thereby 
obtain access to the Adriatic. This Austria would not permit. 
She did not wish to see a Slavonic State having access to a sea 
which she looked upon as her own. In this matter she could 
depend upon Italian support. Austrian troops were mobilized; 
garrisons in Herzegovina were placed upon a war footing, and the 
situation was aggravated by numerous personal incidents, as for 
instance by stories which were put about that the Serbians had 
imprisoned and ill-treated an Austrian consul. War between 
Austria and Serbia was imminent, but if it broke out Serbia would 
be supported by Russia, and in answer to Austrian military 
preparations, Russian troops on the south-western frontier were 
placed on a war footing. A war between Austria and Russia 
would, in consequence of the complicated system of alliances, 
inevitably bring in Germany and France, and thereby bring 
about the great struggle which everyone wished to avoid. The 
danger was averted by France, Great Britain and Germany, who 
worked together to bring about conciliation. It had been ar- 
ranged that, side by side with the peace negotiations which were 
taking place in St. James's Palace, the ambassadors of the Great 
Powers in London should sit in conference under the presidency 
of Sir Edward Grey. It was agreed that France and Great 
Britain should give their support to Austria, and that Albania 
should be set up as an independent state. This removed the 
essential point of controversy, and in February the Austrian 
Emperor sent Prince Hohenlohe on a special mission with a letter 
to the Tsar. It was agreed that the two Powers should de- 
mobilize, and from this time the extreme friction began to 
diminish. But the refusal of Serbian access to the Adriatic was 
to have unexpected results. It cut away the basis on which the 
division of the spoil had been arranged between the Balkan 

States. The Serbian Government therefore demanded a larger 
portion of Macedonia than had been originally assigned to her. 
They based this claim also on the point that Bulgaria had not 
provided her due share of forces to fight in the western area, while 
Serbia had contributed more than she was bound in the struggle 
for Adrianople. Under these circumstances an appeal to the Tsar 
to arbitrate was enjoined. But before he had even received the 
appeal, a catastrophe took place. The old animosity against 
Bulgaria, which had been for so many hundreds of years tradi- 
tional among the Greeks and Serbians, was again growing. The 
armies were in Macedonia still in closely adjacent quarters. The 
Bulgarian Government, under what influence we do not know, 
determined on a sudden blow, and on June 29 an attack in form 
was delivered by the Bulgarians against the Serbian forces. 
Immediately afterwards the Greeks in Salonika attacked the 
Bulgarians. This new fratricidal war had scarcely begun when 
two new champions entered the field. The Turks denounced the 
armistice and a fortnight later retook Adrianople. On July 18 
Rumania, with a fresh army, entered the field, declared war on 
Bulgaria, and occupied the Dobruja. Before this great superior- 
ity of force the Bulgarians, who had lost so heavily in the war 
the dead alone were 30,000 had no course open but to capitulate. 
On the demand of Rumania a conference was summoned to 
Bucharest, which on July 30 arranged an armistice, and on Aug. n 
the Peace of Bucharest was signed. By this Bulgaria had to 
surrender to Serbia the whole of Macedonia, to Greece a large 
part of the northern shore of the Aegean, while to Turkey she had 
to restore Adrianople and to Rumania to surrender the Dobruja. 
The situation left by the Treaty of Bucharest was very 
precarious. It was obvious that Bulgaria would not willingly 
acquiesce in the loss of territory and prestige. The mutual 
animosity between Serbia and Austria continued, and the Prince 
of Wied did not show himself capable of coping with the very 
serious difficulties in Albania. There were acute differences 
between Turkey and Greece, and the renewal of war seemed 
imminent. But these mere local complications could doubtless 
have been overcome so long as no one of the Great Powers 
intervened; separate action by any one of them must almost 
inevitably bring about the great trial of strength between the 
rival alliances. It was the object of every responsible statesman 
to prevent this arising. The immediate danger arose from 
Austria and Russia. Austrian policy was inclined towards 
Bulgaria and desired to see the Treaty of Bucharest overthrown. 
In the summer of 1913 they proposed an immediate attack on 
Serbia; in this they did not have the support of Berlin. The 
German Government was clearly dissatisfied with the Austrian 
handling of the Serbian difficulty, and also with the unneccesary 
harshness with which the Hungarians treated the Rumans. They 
rightly saw that an amelioration of the position must be found in 
an internal reform of the Dual Monarchy. On the other hand, 
German ambitions were becoming a serious danger. Count 
Wangenheim, who had succeeded Marschall von Bieberstein as 
ambassador to the Porte, was with great assurance strengthening 
the German control at Constantinople. This was a development 
which Russia could not regard with equanimity. A crisis was 
reached during the winter, when Gen. Liman von Sanders was 
not only appointed to reorganize the Turkish army, but was 
given actual control over the army corps stationed in Constanti- 
nople. This led to a strong protest from Russia, and was followed 
by very violent press polemics between Germany and Russia. 
It is clear that Russia was becoming impatient. It looked as 
though Germany, with the conclusion of the Bagdad agreement, 
and in other ways, would gain complete control over Turkey, 
military, political and economic. This, if achieved, would be a 
formidable impediment to the ultimate realization of what had 
for so long been the permanent object of Russian policy not 
only the opening of the Straits but the control of Constantinople. 
In February, as we now know, the situation was reviewed; it was 
agreed that these hopes could only be achieved as the result of a 
European war, and that'it was necessary to prepare the scheme 
for landing troops on the Bosporus if the contingency arose. Rus- 
sia did not take her allies into her confidence. The most serious 


element in the situation was that, more and more, the old rivalry 
between Austria and Russia, which had always been found 
manageable, was giving place to a direct conflict of interests 
between Russia and Germany herself. So long as Austria alone 
was concerned, it could be hoped that Germany, who had no 
desire to embark on a European war merely in defence of the local 
Austrian interests, would intervene in some way or another and 
join with England in keeping the peace. So soon as the direct 
ambitions of Germany herself were involved, this security was 
removed. Moreover, the commercial treaty made between 
Russia and Germany in 1892 was running out; Germany had 
succeeded in imposing upon Russia conditions whicji subordi- 
nated Russian interests to those of Germany. Any negotiations 
for the renewal of the treaty must certainly react on the political 
situation. Already the very anticipation of this had aroused all 
the strong national spirit in both empires. The Russians in 
particular were determined not to anticipate a renewal of the 
humiliating position in which they had so long been placed. 

The preceding narrative will have shown how complex was the 
diplomatic situation. But after all, this was nothing new in the 
history of Europe, and the points at issue in almost every case 
concerned not the vital security of any one of the Great Powers, 
but rather the external extension of their power and influence. 
It might therefore well have been hoped that, with prudence and 
self-restraint on the part of the leading statesmen, peace might be 
kept. Experience showed that a solution could be found for 
each particular problem as it came up, either by separate 
negotiations between the interested Powers, or by substituting 
for the mutual rivalry of two hostile groups common action of 
the Concert of Europe. This was the principle by which Sir 
Edward Grey was always guided, and it was his hope that in 
it he might have the support of the German Government. 
It was a policy which could only be successful if it was accom- 
panied by a frank recognition of the existing facts, with the 
avoidance of subterranean intrigues. 

The Rivalry in Armaments. So long then as England could 
depend on German cooperation, war might well have been 
avoided had the trouble been merely diplomatic. There were, 
however, other elements. Diplomatic controversy was accom- 
panied by the rivalry in armaments. European Ministers of War 
were ceaselessly occupied in perfecting the armies. The con- 
tinued expansion of German population enabled this to be done 
within the limits of the Law of 1871, which determined that the 
strength of the army on its peace footing should be i % of the 
population. In 1893, by reducing the term of service from three 
to two years, the number of trained men was increased by nearly 
50% without any increase in the peace establishment. Further 
increases in the peace establishment were made in 1899, in 1905 
and in 1911. In 1912, after Agadir, the establishment was raised 
to 723,000. The Balkan wars, ending as they did in the collapse 
of Turkey and the increased power of Serbia, were made the 
reason for a still further addition. The peace strength was 
raised to 870,000 men, and to meet the extraordinary charges 
involved in this the Government had recourse to the dangerous 
expedient of a capital levy of 50,000,000. Each of these laws 
was of course answered in France and in Russia, and in 1913 
France, always confronted by the fundamental disadvantage of 
her smaller population, had no resource except to raise the period 
of compulsory service with the colours from two to three years. 
It was obvious that this state of things could not continue. The 
strain on the finances and on the manhood of the nations was 
becoming overwhelming. But when it was proposed that the 
limitation of armaments should be discussed at the Hague Con- 
ference in 1907, it was Germany who answered that she could 
take no part in any conference where this matter was on the 
agenda. At the same time the general staffs were planning in 
detail every step in the campaign. To Germany the " war on two 
fronts " had become a household conception. All the details 
were worked out by Schlieffen the instantaneous blow on 
France which must be delivered and carried through before the 
more slow-moving Russian battalions were on their way. But if 
this blow was to be successful it must be delivered not on the 

guarded frontier to the east, but across Belgium. And so all the 
preparations were made, the lines were built, military camps 
established, the dislocation plans worked out. This could not be 
hidden. France had to devise her counter-moves to the opening 
gambit. If the war began with an unprovoked attack by Ger- 
many, then the French hoped they would not be alone; they 
could depend on the cooperation of Great Britain and Russia. 
But this cooperation would be futile unless it had been planned 
in advance. The safety of France would depend upon the 
promptitude of her allies. The mobilization of Germany would 
be almost instantaneous. That of Russia must be accelerated, 
and every detail be prepared for placing the army on the frontier 
at the earliest moment. Hence we get the building of strategic 
railways in Poland and a great reorganization of the army. But 
this again was represented in Germany as a menace, which was 
made a reason for further increases in the German army. The 
effect was felt even in the most unmilitary of nations. Belgium, 
whose security was once more threatened, had to introduce com- 
pulsory military service, and Great Britain could not stand out. 
The war when it came would not move with the deliberation of 
the great collisions of earlier days when it was sufficient for Great 
Britain to begin to collect an army after the first shot had been 
fired. Whatever the course of events might be, one thing was 
clear to everyone the result would be determined to a large 
extent during the first six weeks. If, as seemed probable, the war 
began with the German invasion of Belgium, then British troops 
must be there to protect the soil of Belgium and of France. 
Therefore, as early as 1906, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman 
approved the conception of conversations between the general 
staffs to discuss the forms of cooperation in the event of war. 
But if this cooperation was to be effective, the British army must 
be ready. And so a great reorganization took place, carried 
through by Lord Haldane as Minister of War, the result of which 
was that, for the first time in her history, England would at the 
outbreak of the war be able, if necessity required and the occasion 
justified it, to place some 150,000 men in the north of France 
before the first contact took jUlace; in 1912 the agreement as to 
military conventions was embodied in an interchange of notes 
between England and France. 

German Militarism. The rivalry in armaments and the 
inordinate growth of the armies had a double effect. It directly 
influenced the diplomatic discussions. Neither side could avoid 
the apprehension that their opponents might be deliberately 
intending to force the issue; as soon as this apprehension arose, 
then military preparations must begin, even while diplomatic 
discussion was continuing; but the very suggestion of this would 
at once bring the general staffs into the discussion. They, intent 
only on ensuring that, if there was to be war, nothing should be 
left undone which would secure victory, might easily divert the 
negotiations which normally had as their object the avoidance of 
war, and substitute the object of bringing about war at a favour- 
able moment and under favourable auspices. Much therefore 
depended on the submission of the military to the political 
element. This was completely secured in those western demo- 
cratic states in which the control over the Government lay in the 
hands of Parliament; the situation was less favourable in the 
three eastern monarchies in Russia, where a weak ruler and 
an incompetent and dishonest bureaucracy were struggling against 
the rising forces of revolution; in Austria, where conflict of 
nationalities threatened the very existence of the state; in 
Germany, where it was the official doctrine taught by Bismarck, 
the theme of every speech of the Kaiser, that the power, the 
influence and the existence of the nation were based upon the 
army. The world was never allowed to forget that if Germany 
was now the greatest Power in Europe, it was because the 
German army had marched to Paris in 1870, and, if necessity 
arose, could do so again; and the German people were never 
allowed to forget that it was the Prussian army by which German 
unity had been achieved, and it was on the army, carried out 
with the spirit of and trained by Prussian officers, that the exist- 
ing constitution depended. The influence of the German Em- 
peror ultimately depended on the prestige which he had inherited, 



and, if the crisis came, he could only maintain his power by the 
same methods by which it had been attained. 

It was in Germany and Germany alone that organized and 
official opinion put forward, as the very basis of political life, 
frank and unabashed, the power of the sword. Historically this 
could easily be explained, and no nation can free itself from its 
own past. English opinion, just because it required the main- 
tenance of sea-power, on which the existence of the Empire and 
the security of the nation depended, was always prompt to 
recognize the equal necessity to Germany of a strong army. 
But it could not be obscured that, while in other nations the 
maintenance of great armaments was regarded as a burden of 
which they would gladly be freed, in Germany the increase of 
military power was welcomed as an end in itself. It was not mere- 
ly a weapon of security, an instrument of Government it wasthe 
basis of the state; the efforts of the pacific writers were not merely 
criticised on their merits, but condemned as heresy. And this 
was no mere academic principle it was made the corner-stone of 
German diplomacy. Whatever the question at issue might be, 
always there was heard from Germany the ultimate appeal to the 
German army. This bred a habit of impatience. Whenever 
Germany was worsted in diplomacy and this often happened 
there were many who would cry out that after all there were 
other means by which she could secure the victory. 

Every increase in German armaments required an appeal to 
the patriotism of the people. These appeals could not be made 
without arousing a dangerous spirit. The German Government 
had been glad to secure the support of the newly formed Flotten- 
verein for their great naval programme; its emissaries found their 
way into every town and village in the country, and the literature 
they disseminated necessarily encouraged hostility to Great 
Britain. The Pan-German League openly advocated a policy 
which would have involved Germany in war with every country 
in the world, but the rising spirit of Chauvinism had spread far 
more widely, and the very fact that it was criticised by the 
Socialists tended to make sympathy with it the hallmark of a 
" good German." The Government, which depended for the 
naval and military votes on the spirit of militant patriotism, 
found that they had aroused a force which they could not, even 
if they would, control. During the year 1913 the centenary 
celebrations of the great events by which Germany freed herself 
from the Napoleonic yoke added fuel to the flame. Inspired by 
the intense consciousness of Germanic superiority, the Ger- 
mans were ready, when the time came, to emulate in war, 
as they had surpassed in peace, the deeds of their forefathers. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Official documents and publications: The texts 
of the treaties will be found in British and foreign state papers. 
The most important special collection of treaties is: Dr. Pribram, 
The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary 1879-1914 (1920). The text 
of the Franco-Russian agreement is published in Documents diplo- 
matiques: L' Alliance Franco-Russe, issued by Ministere des Affaires 
fetrangeres (Paris, 1918). The treaties between the Balkan States 
in 1912 were published by Guechoff in L' Alliance Balkanique (1918); 
see also BALKAN PENINSULA: Balkanicus, The Aspirations of Bul- 
garia; Report of the International Commission to inquire into the 
Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars (Carnegie Endowment, 
1914) ; Le Traitc de Bukarest (Bukarest: Imprime'rie de I'Etat, 1913). 
The official statement of the German case on the responsibility for 
the war, Das deutsche Weissbuch ilber die Schuld am Kriege (1919), 
contains a good deal of material, especially on the relations with 
Russia and Balkan affairs. Siebert, Diplomatische Aktenstiicke zur 
Geschichte der Ententepolitik der Vorkriegsjahre (1921), appeared 
too late to be used in this article. The fullest general treatment of 
the period is that by Reventlow, Deutschlands Auswartige Politik 
1888-1913 (1914). The second edition, 1915, differs materially 
from the first. Egelhaaf, Geschichte der neuesten Zeit (1918), is a well- 
arranged textbook, but the treatment of the events connected with 
the war is very partisan. The fullest treatment in English is that 
of Bernadotte Schmitt, England and Germany 1740-1014. Zur 
Europiiischen Politik 1897-1914: Unveroffentlichte Dokumente in 
amtlichem Auftrage herausgegeben unter Leitung von Bernhard 
Schwertfeger, 5 vols., contains selections from the despatches of Bel- 
gian diplomatists during the years before the war, which were taken 
from Brussels during the German occupation. 

For British policy before the war, see Lord Haldane, Before the 
War (1920) ; Lord Loreburn, How the War Came (1919) ; Sir E. Cook, 
How Britain Strove for Peace; Prof. Gilbert Murray, The Foreign 
Policy of Sir Edward Grey; Sir Geo. Prothero, German Policy before 

the War (1916). The correspondence between the German Emperor 
and the Tsar has been published in The Kaiser's Letters to the Tsar 
(The Willy-Nicky Correspondence), edited by N. F. Grant. 

Among the memoirs and reminiscences the more important are: 
Prince v. Billow, Imperial Germany (1914); Grand Admiral v. Tir- 
pitz, My Memoirs; Karl Helfferich, Die Vorgeschichte des Welt- 
krieges (1919) ; Bethmann Hollweg, Reflections on the World War 
(1920); von Jagow, Ursachen und Ausbruch des Weltkrieges (1919); 
Baron Beyens, L'AllemagneavantlaGuerre (1915) ; Dr. M. Boghitsche- 
witsch, Kriegsursachen ( 1919), (English translation, C. L.Van Langen- 
huyen, Causes of the War, 1919); Raymond Poincare, Les Origines 
de la Guerre (1921); Baron v. Eckardstein, Lebenserinnerungen und 
politische Denkwiirdigkeiten (1919). Of great importance are the 
four volumes by Otto Hammann: Der neue Kurs, Zur Vorgeschichte 
des Weltkrieges, Um den Kaiser and Der missverstandene Bismarck. 

For the growth of the German navy see Archibald Hurd, The 
Command of the Sea (1912); for Austria-Hungary: H. Wickham 
Steed, The Growth of the Habsburg Monarchy (4th ed., 1919); Dr. 
Seton-Watson, The Southern Slav Question and the Habsburg Mon- 
archy (1911); for Morocco: Caillaux, Agadir (1919); Tardieu, La 
Conference d'Algeciras (1907); E. D. Morel, Morocco in Diplomacy 
(1912, republished as Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy, 1920); Docu- 
ments Diplomatiques: Affaires du Maroc (1912). (J. W. H.-M.) 


The Murder of the Austrian Archduke. The preceding pages 
of this article describe the state of Europe when, on Sunday, 
June 28, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austrian 
throne, and his wife, while on an official tour of inspection in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, were murdered at Serajevo, the 
capital. The two assassins were young men of 20 years of age, 
natives of Bosnia and therefore Austrian subjects. Such evidence 
as is available seems to show that the motive for the crime must 
be traced to the intense racial animosity which had existed in 
Bosnia since the time of the annexation, increased as it was 
by the growing discontent in Croatia, and by the rising tide of 
aggressive nationalism in Serbia; no evidence has been forth- 
coming which would compromise any responsible Serbian officials, 
still less the Serbian Government itself. Among the accomplices 
were indeed two residents of Serbia, a major named Jankasitch 
and a Croatian exile, Tziganovitch, the first being a Comitadji 
chief, the second a temporary railway clerk. All the other accom- 
plices seem to have been Bosnians. The two assassins were 
eventually condemned to penal servitude; of the accomplices 
three were executed. This crime created a great sensation. It 
happened at the time of the German festivities at Kiel, associated 
with the completion of the enlargement of the canal, at which 
a British squadron was present. They were at once broken off. 
The German Emperor returned to Berlin. He intended to go to 
Vienna to attend the funeral of the Archduke, and at the same 
time to discuss the political situation with his ally; this project 
was abandoned, for the police had intelligence of a great plot; 
twelve assassins were on their way to Vienna. 

Elsewhere, except among the comparatively few who really 
understood how precarious was the position in the Balkans, it 
was the personal aspect of this event which attracted attention. 
The general feeling was one of deepest indignation, and of the 
warmest sympathy for Austria and for the aged Emperor, Francis 
Joseph, whose life had already been so full of tragedy. In 
Austria it was regarded as a grave political portent. The death 
of the Archduke seems to have been treated in the highest quar- 
ters with remarkable equanimity, but the crime which was no 
isolated act was looked on as a blow at the very existence of the 
monarchy. The relations with Serbia had for long been the cause 
of grave disquiet, internal as well as external. There had in fact 
just been drawn up a very important Austrian memorandum for 
communication to the German Government; in it the Balkan 
situation was discussed, and stress was laid on the scheme at- 
tributed to Russia of creating a new Balkan league, which was 
to include Rumania and be used as an offensive weapon against 
the Triple Alliance. In this scheme the disaffection in Bosnia 
and Croatia, which was fermented by the agitation from Serbia, 
would be a dangerous instrument. Against this it had been in- 
tended to propose a pro-Austrian anti-Serbian alliance with Bul- 
garia and Turkey, which could be used also to check the pro- 
Russian influences in Rumania. Count Berchtold and his col- 



leagues now determined immediately to use this new opportunity 
so as to rid themselves once and for all of the menace to the mon- 
archy caused by the Yugoslav propaganda; by doing so they 
would be bringing to an issue, on an occasion favourable to them- 
selves, the great rivalry in the Balkans with Russia. 

The policy of Count Berchtold was apparently influenced by 
three motives: (i) the quite justifiable determination for the 
punishment of the murderers and their accomplices, together 
with the prevention of similar acts in the future; (2) the desire 
to show that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was not effete, 
helpless and incapable of action; (3) to gain a great and perma- 
nent political advantage as against Russia. Of these the second 
seems to have been the most important. There was a general 
feeling throughout the empire that the Government must show 
its strength by some strong act, a feeling which was encouraged 
by the language used by the German ambassador in Vienna: 
" What Germany looked for was a firm and definite plan of 
action; if this was forthcoming she would be completely on the 
side of Austria." But Austria could not take action unless sure 
beforehand of German support. Count Hoyos was therefore 
despatched on a special mission to Berlin. He took with him both 
the memorandum written before the murder and also an auto- 
graph letter of the Emperor to the Kaiser of July 2, in which the 
dangers to Austria of the Serbian agitation for the union of all 
Southern Slavs under Serbia was pointed out. In view of this the 
policy of Austria must be the isolation and diminution of Serbia 
and the suppression of Serbia as a political factor in the Balkans; 
it was necessary for the peace of Europe that the criminal 
agitation in Belgrade should not continue with impunity. 

The Decision in Berlin. This letter was delivered personally 
by Count Szogyeny, the Austrian ambassador, on July 5 to the 
German Emperor, who was due to leave for his annual holiday 
in the North Sea on July 7. It was during these two days that 
the decision on which so much was to depend was made. The 
information available up to the end of 1921 as to the actual 
course of events in this respect still left much obscure. During 
the war it was circumstantially reported that a joint council was 
held between Austrian and German statesmen and soldiers at 
which a plan of political and military action was decided. It now 
seems clear, however, that no such formal meeting took place, an 
omission which has naturally been the subject of hostile criticism 
in Germany; the very serious diplomatic steps which were to 
follow ought undoubtedly to have been preceded by a thorough 
sifting of the whole situation political, military, naval and eco- 
nomic. The Kaiser, after receiving Count Szogyeny and Count 
Hoyos before he left for Norway, had, as he could not well avoid 
having, separate conversations with representatives of the army 
and navy. It is beyond doubt that the final decision was one for 
which he was immediately and personally responsible. While 
explaining that he must, of course, consult the Chancellor on a 
matter of serious European importance, the Count was author- 
ized to inform the Austrian Emperor that in this question he 
could " depend on the complete support of Germany." " This 
especially applied to Austrian action against Serbia." " In the 
Kaiser's opinion there must be no delay. Russia's attitude would 
certainly be hostile, but he had for years past been prepared for 
this; if it was to come to a war between Austria-Hungary and 
Russia she could be convinced that Germany would stand at her 
side with her usual fidelity. Moreover, Russia, as matters stood, 
was in no way ready for war, and would certainly consider before 
appealing to arms." This is confirmed by the diary of Herr 
Muhlon and the comments on it by Herr Helfferich, from which 
we can gather that those who had been brought into contact with 
the Kaiser understood that he was determined that on this 
occasion there should be no drawing back; his support would be 
given to Austria, and Austria would be sure that he would con- 
tinue it to the end; he was especially urgent that Austria should 
act quickly; delay would increase the risk of a European war. 

The Kaiser left Berlin for his visit to Norway, as arranged, 
on July 7. The official German answer, though more guarded, 
was in accordance with his language. In it the Chancellor 
explained that the view of the German Government was that the 

relations between Austria and Serbia were a matter within the 
competence of Austria alone ; Germany therefore did not propose 
to claim any right to interfere. What this, of course, meant was 
that Austria received a free hand to couch her demands on Serbia 
in such terms as she chose; Germany already knew that they 
would be such as to make war very probable. But Austria had 
already been assured that, if this action led to war with Russia, 
Germany would be at her side. It is noticeable that no advice or 
warning was given that the demands on Serbia should be so 
modified as to avoid this danger. On the other hand great 
attention was given to the diplomatic preparation; everything 
was to be done to secure for a war with Serbia the support or 
neutrality of the neighbouring states. With this object the 
Kaiser, though strongly against his own personal inclination, 
agreed that the King of Bulgaria should be asked to join the 
Triple Alliance, and, in view of the great German interests in 
Turkey, negotiations with the same object should be entered into 
with the Porte. What above all interested them was the position 
of Rumania and Italy. The situation in Rumania caused much 
anxiety, for King Charles let it be known that he would probably 
not be able to bring the country with him into a war with Russia 
on the side of the Germanic Powers ; all, however, was to be done to 
strengthen German influences in that country. As to Italy it was 
agreed that its Government should not be informed beforehand 
as to the blow which was impending against Serbia, but Germany 
pressed very strongly that Austria should be prepared to offer to 
Italy suitable compensation for any gain in territory or political 
influence in the Balkans which might accrue to her. 

Analysis of the objects and motives of the German Government 
is all the more difficult because, in its political composition, it had 
no powerful personality such as Bismarck had once been, and its 
actions were the result of many conflicting influences, while 
decisions were always liable to be deflected by the impulsive and 
vacillating character of the Kaiser himself. There was in the first 
place genuine indignation at the crime of Serajevo, an indignation 
which in the Kaiser's mind took the characteristic form that there 
must be cooperation between all monarchical States against ele- 
ments of disorder. This motive was one which, no doubt, it was 
hoped when the time came he would use with effect upon the Tsar. 
Politically there had long been dissatisfaction at Berlin with the 
conduct of affairs in Austria; the force and decision which were 
needed in an ally were wanting. It was hoped, therefore, that the 
opportunity would be used to remedy this defect. But there were 
further and greater objects which would follow automatically; if 
Russia could be persuaded to stand aside while Serbia was over- 
run by the Austrian army, it would become evident that Russian 
protection was of no avail to Serbia; Serbia would be pushed out 
of the way, and thereby the Germanic Powers would gain in fact 
the control of the Balkans and the road to the East. It was an 
essential part of the scheme that Great Britain and France should 
be urged to use their influence to keep Russia quiet; if they did 
not do so then the responsibility for any extension of the war which , 
ensued would seem to attach to them; if they did then the internal 
harmony of the Triple Entente would be weakened; Russia would 
feel that she had been deserted by her allies. It was possible that 
these results might be obtained without a European war. If, how- 
ever, Russia was determined to meet the challenge and war 
resulted, it was hoped that matters could be so arranged that 
the responsibility for the war should appear to fall on Russia 
and the Entente. The general condition of Europe was very 
threatening; it seemed probable that under any circumstances 
the " great war " must ensue shortly; it was believed that 
Russia would be ready in about two years. If there was to be a 
. war the summer of 1914 seemed on the whole to be favourable to 
Germany. The Kiel Canal had been enlarged; the army was at 
the height of efficiency; the diplomatic situation seemed favour- 
able; there were very serious labour troubles in Russia, serious 
parliamentary disputes in France, and it appeared as if there 
might soon be open rebellion in Ireland, with possibly something 
approaching mutiny in the British army. It was indeed impos- 
sible to depend on Italy; but if Bulgaria and Turkey could be won 
over this would counteract the uncertainty of Rumania's action. 



German support having been secured, the Austrian Govern- 
ment proceeded to prepare the text of the demands to be present- 
ed to Serbia. The great point was that they should be so drafted 
that they would be unacceptable; the object was not a mere 
diplomatic victory but war; it was held that nothing would meet 
the situation and restore the authority and prestige of the 
monarchy short of an effective display of military strength. It 
was agreed, however, in consequence of the strong pressure used 
by Count Tisza, who alone was in opposition to the policy pro- 
posed, that the annexation of any part of Serbia, apart from a 
rectification of the frontier, should be repudiated; on the other 
hand, it might well be that, as a result of a successful war, por- 
tions of Serbia should be assigned to Bulgaria and Albania. The 
actual drafting of the ultimatum was apparently entrusted to 
Count Forgach, formerly Austro-Hungarian minister at Belgrade, 
who had been closely concerned in the concoction and manipula- 
tion of the Friedjung forgeries. On July 17, the final draft, having 
passed the Council of State, received the approval of the Em- 
peror, Francis Joseph, but it was determined to postpone its 
presentation till July 23; it would be better to delay until M. 
Poincare, the French President, who was to visit the northern 
courts, had left St. Petersburg. 

These arrangements were conducted in the greatest secrecy. 
All that was known outside was that Austria was contemplating 
some serious action against Serbia; this was naturally sufficient to 
cause apprehension and anxiety, but, during the days of waiting, 
the Austrian Government used its influence to damp down the 
very violent denunciations of Serbia in the Viennese press, and in 
other ways tried to still the vigilance of the other Powers, As 
late as July 19 they assured the Russian ambassador in Vienna 
that nothing dangerous to the peace of Europe was being under- 
taken, and in consequence he went on a holiday. The British 
Government and nation, whose attention was preoccupied at the 
moment with the Irish problem, were inclined to regard the local 
dispute between Serbia and Austria as not being one in which 
they were vitally concerned; and Mr. Asquith's Cabinet, which 
was perhaps not very well informed as to Balkan matters, was 
late in realizing how imminent was the danger. On July 16, the 
British ambassador, Sir Maurice de Bunsen, was able to give Sir 
Edward Grey a warning which was corroborated from unofficial 
sources. None the less the belief that there would be a real 
danger of European war was slow in maturing in Great Britain, 
in spite of the anxiety felt in a few well-informed quarters. This 
attitude was based on a belief that, after all, the German Govern- 
ment would not support Austria in any reckless policy. 

The Austrian Nqle. The ultimatum was presented at 6 P.M. 
on Thursday, July 23, by Baron de Giesl to Dr. Patchou, as 
M. Pashitch, the Serbian prime minister, was absent from 
Belgrade. The note had been admirably drawn up to fulfil the 
avowed object that it should contain demands which could not 
possibly be complied with. It required that Serbia should first 
of all officially publish on the front page of the Official Journal 
a condemnation of the Serbian propaganda against Austria- 
Hungary, regret for the part taken by Serbian officers and officials 
in this propaganda, and a promise of amendment in the future. 
There were in addition ten requirements, which include, among 
others, the dissolution of " Narodna Obrana," the suppression of 
any publication which incited to hatred and contempt of the 
monarchy, the elimination from public instruction in Serbia 
(including the teaching body) of anything that served as propa- 
ganda against Austria-Hungary, the removal from the army 
and the administration of officers and officials guilty of such 
propaganda whose names might be communicated by the Austro- 
v Hungarian Government, the collaboration in Serbia of Austro- 
Hungarian representatives for the suppression of the movement 
against the territorial integrity of the monarchy, and that 
Austro-Hungarian representatives should take part in judicial 
proceedings against all the accessories to the plot of June 28 on 
Serbian territory. A reply was required by 6 o'clock on the 
evening of Saturday July 25. 

As was immediately pointed out by everyone who read this 
document it would be impossible for the Serbian Government to 

accept all these demands; no such requirements had ever been 
directed to a fully sovereign State in particular the requirement 
that unnamed officials should be dismissed on the request of 
the Austro-Hungarian Government, and that Austro-Hungarian 
officials should take part both in police and judicial proceedings 
on Serbian soil, was clearly one impossible to be granted. There 
could be only one conclusion, that Austria intended to force a war 
with Serbia and that in doing this she had deliberately prepared 
to meet the opposition of Russia. But it was clear that Austria 
could not have taken this step without the previous consent of 
Germany. It was therefore at once concluded that the two 
Germanic Powers had determined immediately to challenge 
Russia, and with Russia France, to a great trial of strength. 
This view was supported by a note which on the following day 
was delivered at St. Petersburg, Paris and London, in which the 
German Government announced that they considered the pro- 
cedure and demands of the Austrian Government to be both 
equitable and moderate. (It is now known that these words had 
been written at a time when the German Government did not 
precisely know what the demands of the Austrian Government 
would be. It did not occur to anyone outside that the Govern- 
ment of a great State could be guilty of such unparalleled levity; 
it was naturally assumed that they had seen and approved the 
text of the Austrian note beforehand, and all their disclaimers 
were received with incredulity.) The German Government also 
emphasized their opinion that the questions at issue between 
Austria and Serbia should be settled by these two States alone, 
and lastly, they intimated that interference by any other Power 
would be followed by incalculable consequences. This could 
obviously mean nothing except that Germany was backing up 
Austria, would support her even up to a war with Russia, and 
that a threat was intended to France and Great Britain that, 
unless they put themselves on the Austrian side and brought 
pressure to bear upon Russia to withdraw her support from 
Serbia, a European war would result. 

The news reached St. Petersburg just after M. Poincare 
had left. The secrecy with which the ultimatum had been 
engendered, the misleading assurances, the absence of any warn- 
ing to or consultation with other States, all seemed to point to a 
deep-laid plot. The reaction was precisely what was to be 
anticipated. The greatest indignation was expressed and the 
indignation was genuine. M. Sazonov at once asked for assur- 
ance that he should have the full support of France and Great 
Britain against this unparalleled act of aggression; the only 
method of avoiding war with Germany was, he said, that Ger- 
many should know that she would be confronted by the united 
forces of the Entente. At the same time Russian military prepa- 
rations were at once begun; it was decided at a meeting of the 
Russian Council of State on July 25 that all preliminary steps 
should be taken and that Sjizonov should be authorized to give 
the signal for mobilization as soon as it seemed to him necessary. 
Meanwhile a public communique was issued that Russia could 
not remain indifferent to the fate of Serbia. Similar language was 
used in private and official interviews. It was from the begin- 
ning perfectly clear that Russia intended to resist the Austrian 
scheme, by war if necessary. 

In these circumstances much depended on the action of Great 
Britain. During these days France could do little, for the Presi- 
dent and the Foreign Minister were at sea. Russia and France 
both pressed Sir Edward Grey to declare himself. The situation 
was a difficult one. He clearly could not, as' the Russians asked, 
give an unconditional promise to join with Russia if war ensued; 
by doing so he would incur the danger of increasing the influence 
of the war party which undoubtedly existed at St. Petersburg. 
Moreover, he would not have the full support of the Cabinet, 
nor apparently of the country. On the other hand he could not 
give the promise of neutrality which Germany asked for, nor 
could he even press Russia too strongly to suspend her military 
preparations, for, by so doing, he would in fact be giving his 
support to an act of aggression against a State with which he was 
in the closest diplomatic agreement. He therefore saw from the 
beginning that the only possible means of avoiding a European 






war was to bring about some form of mediation or conciliation 
by which time would be gained; then some means might be found 
of settling the crisis in a peaceful way. For the next five days^ 
supported by France, he pursued this path with energy and 
resource. In accordance with the practice of the last years he 
depended on the cooperation of Germany. To intervene directly 
between Austria and Serbia was out of the question; if Russia 
became involved the only remedy would be joint action of Great 
Britain and Germany. He knew that he had the support of 
Prince Lichnowsky, the German ambassador in London; he 
hoped for the cooperation of the German chancellor; he did not 
know how fundamental was the difference between the German 
ambassador and his Government. 

His first suggestion was that Austria should give Serbia more 
time, and not, as was threatened, break off diplomatic relations if 
Serbia did not accept all the requirements of the ultimatum by 
6 o'clock on Saturday, July 25. This proposal, which was sup- 
ported by Russia, received no support in Germany, and in fact 
reached Vienna almost too late. It was at once rejected there. 
The Serbian answer was actually delivered at the appointed hour 
on July 25. It was very conciliatory. It went to the furthest 
possible extreme in compliance; every demand was granted with 
the exception of two: the dismissal of unspecified officials and 
officers and the cooperation on Serbian soil of Austrian officials. 
The Austrian minister, however, at once, in accordance with his 
instructions, left Belgrade. Sir Edward Grey, however, now 
began to press for mediation, not between Austria and Serbia, 
but between Austria and Russia, by the four Powers, Great 
Britain, Germany, France and Italy. On July 27 he converted this 
into a firm proposal for submission of the points at issue between 
Austria and Russia to a conference of the ambassadors in London. 
This proposal was rejected by the Germans on the ground that 
they could not ask Austria to submit to what would in fact be an 
Areopagus of the Powers. They also would prefer separate 
conversations between Austria and Russia, which Sazonov had 
meanwhile suggested. One of the reasons for the rejection was, as 
has since been explained, that they would not trust their own 
ambassador in London. 

The text of the Serbian answer to the Austrian note was 
received in London on July 27. Sir Edward Grey at once pointed 
out that this reply could surely be made the basis of negotiations, 
and pressed that, if Austria continued her intransigeant attitude, 
it would appear that she was deliberately aiming at war. These 
representations were fully reported to Berlin by Prince Lichnow- 
sky, who warned the German Government that, if they continued 
their negative attitude, they would no longer be able to depend 
upon the neutrality of Great Britain. These representations 
were without effect. The German Government indeed on July 27 
forwarded Sir Edward Grey's proposals to Vienna, but at the 
same time they informed Count Szogyeny, the Austrian ambassa- 
dor, that they did so merely because they did not wish to alienate 
Great Britain, and in no way associated themselves with the 
proposals which they did not wish to see adopted. The negative 
attitude of Berlin, the apparent refusal to do anything to restrain 
Austria, inevitably produced the conviction that Germany was 
no longer working for peace. If this were so there then remained 
only one means of avoiding war, that Great Britain should give a 
formal warning that in the event of war she would be found on the 
side of Russia and France. This was from the beginning strong- 
ly urged both at Paris and St. Petersburg; a first step in this 
direction was the order given to the British fleet (which had been 
assembled for manoeuvres) not to demobilize; this order was made 
public on July 28. 

However, on the morning of July 28, some change became 
apparent in the German attitude. The Kaiser had returned to 
Potsdam from his North Sea cruise on the afternoon of July 27. 
There was at once laid before him the text of the Serbian answer, 
which, owing to very serious delay, for which the Austrians were 
responsible, had not reached Berlin until that day. He saw that 
it left to the Austrians no defensible ground for a declaration of 
war. " A brilliant achievement; this is more than could have 
been expected. A great moral success for Vienna, but with it 

every ground for war disappears, and Giesl ought to have re- 
mained quietly at Belgrade. / would never have ordered mo- 
bilization." He therefore, on the morning of July 28, caused to be 
sent to Vienna a proposal that Austria should be satisfied with the 
occupation of Belgrade and a defined limit of territory, and 
should issue her demands from there. This would give to the 
military feeling of Austria that satisfaction which they might 
reasonably demand. As was pointed out: " If Austria continues 
her refusal to all proposals for mediation or arbitration, the 
odium of being responsible for a world war will in the eyes of the 
German people fall on the German Government. On such a basis, 
however, a successful war on three fronts cannot be started and 
carried through." The weakness of this proposal was that it was 
based on the assumption that war with Serbia would have begun; 
but as soon as war began, clearly Russia must mobilize. No 
settlement could be successful unless it provided for a mutual 
understanding as to the military measures to be taken on both 
sides; such an understanding must be made at once and com- 
municated to Russia. The Emperor's proposal assumed that 
while Austria began a war with Serbia, Russia should cease all 
military measures. This clearly was impossible. 

Austrian Declaration of War against Serbia. Russian mobiliza- 
tion was in fact becoming imminent. The preliminary work had 
proceeded rapidly; reports came to Germany from all parts of the 
Russian Empire showing the activity of the preparations. The 
Russian position never changed. They would not proceed to 
the next stage until Austria took overt action either by a military 
advance or declaration of war. As soon as she took either of these 
steps, Russia would mobilize part of her forces. This con- 
tingency was realized on Tuesday, July 28. Austria had issued an 
order for the mobilization of eight army corps on July 26, and 
now sent a declaration of war against Serbia in an open telegram 
to Belgrade. The Austrian Government had informed Germany 
of their intention to do this the day before, but no warning or 
suggestion that some delay would be useful was given. Germany 
in fact was now beginning to experience the results of the very 
ill-considered language used three weeks before; the Kaiser had 
insisted then on the necessity for rapid and vigorous action; to 
press now for moderation and delay would have exposed him to 
the charge of vacillation which on other occasions his actions had 
appeared to justify, and from which he had boasted that on this 
occasion he would be free. 

As soon as the news of the declaration of war reached St. 
Petersburg it was decided that partial mobilization must follow; 
the German and other Governments were immediately informed. 
This decision was confirmed when on the same day the Austrians 
broke off the separate conversations with Russia which Sazonov 
had suggested, giving as a reason the declaration of war with 
Serbia, an act for which they themselves were entirely respon- 
sible. Even now, however, there was a delay of 24 hours. The next 
morning news came that the Austrians had begun to attack and 
were bombarding Belgrade. Further delay seemed impossible. 
Apparently the Tsar signed the ukase for the mobilization of 13 
army corps in the early afternoon of Wednesday, July 28. After 
doing so he caused Count Pourtales, the German representative 
in St. Petersburg, to be assured that it was not his intention to 
take any threatening measures against Germany, and that 
mobilization did not necessarily imply war even against Austria. 
About 7 o'clock that evening Cqunt Pourtales called on Sazonov, 
and under instructions from the German chancellor warned him 
that any further military preparations or mobilization would 
involve German mobilization, and that German mobilization 
meant war. This message was so worded that it seemed to 
prohibit even partial mobilization against Austria. The German 
explanation is that it was meant as a friendly warning, but it was 
taken, not unnaturally, as something in the nature of an ulti- 
matum. The effect was that the order for partial mobilization 
was that very evening changed into one for the general mobiliza- 
tion of the whole army. There were many reasons for this. 
Mobilization included also dislocation of the scheme for drawing 
up the Russian army on the frontier. The whole arrangements 
for the scheme would depend on whether it was to be merely a 


warning directed against Austria, or whether an immediate war 
against both empires was imminent. To change from partial 
mobilization to general mobilization would be an extremely 
difficult and complicated task. If partial mobilization would, as 
seemed to be the case, bring about war with Germany, Russia 
might find herself in an extremely dangerous situation. 

Meanwhile there was great anxiety in Berlin. The Govern- 
ment were not well informed as to the intentions of Austria, and 
answers to telegrams were long delayed. There was also a 
serious divergence between the political and military authorities. 
The general staff were becoming very nervous. If there was to 
be war it was essential that it must begin at once in order that 
they might gain the advantage which came from their higher 
stage of military preparation. Every day that elapsed would 
have the result of enabling Russia to enter the campaign sooner 
than had been anticipated. On the other hand, from the 
political point of view, especially having regard to the effect on 
public opinion in Germany and in Great Britain, it was most 
important to avoid action which might appear provocative. 
Matters must be so arranged that the appearance of aggression 
would fall upon Russia. The whole situation appears to have 
been discussed in a council which met at the palace at Potsdam 
that evening. There is no authentic record of the discussion, but 
from subsequent revelations it is clear that a demand was made 
by the general staff for immediate mobilization, and was refused. 
It was, however, determined to make a strong effort to avoid the 
danger, which was becoming more apparent, of active -British 
intervention in the war; with this object, that very evening 
between 9 and 10 o'clock, the German chancellor sent for Sir 
Edward Goschen, the British ambassador, and made him a 
strong offer for British neutrality. In return for this Germany 
would be prepared to promise that in the event of a successful 
war no part of France would be annexed by Germany. This 
suggestion was, of course, the next day indignantly refused. 
Scarcely, however, was the interview over when a fresh telegram 
from Prince Lichnowsky was received, containing a friendly 
warning from Sir Edward Grey that, if war resulted, England 
would probably not be able to keep out of it. This produced 
something like consternation. The negotiations with Austria as 
to Italy had not been proceeding favourably, and all the in- 
formation seemed to show that Italian support would not be 
forthcoming. The very same night three additional telegrams 
were dispatched to Vienna couched in the most pressing and 
urgent terms, exhorting the Austrian Government not to con- 
tinue their refusal against all projects of mediation; if they did so 
they would be dragging Germany into a European war, in which 
Italy would not be on the side of the Triple Alliance and in which 
Great Britain would be among the enemies, a war, therefore, 
which would be fought under the most unfavourable conditions. 
It was only by using the last measure, the threat of war, that 
British influence for peace began to be effective but too late. 

Russian and German Mobilization. Among the numerous 
other telegrams sent out from Berlin on this evening was one from 
the Kaiser to the Tsar, again impressing on him in the strongest 
terms the danger of mobilization. In consequence the Tsar, 
shortly before midnight, telephoned both to the chief of the 
Russian general staff and to the Minister for War, instructing 
them to alter the determination already arrived at; there is some 
conflict in the evidence as to whether he ordered the cessation of 
all measures of mobilization, or merely that partial mobilization 
should be substituted for general. However this may be, the 
Minister for War, General Sukhomlinov, who was much im- 
pressed by the dangerous position into which Russia was drifting, 
and by the inextricable confusion which would be created if the 
mobilization orders which had already been sent out were counter- 
manded, determined on his own responsibility to disobey the 
orders which he had received and to leave things as they were; 
and he told the chief of the staff, General Januskevitch, to 
ignore the Tsar's instructions. In consequence the order for 
general mobilization was maintained. M. Sazonov does not 
appear to have known this; anyhow he told the French ambassa- 
dor that the order for general mobilization had been issued, but 

subsequently revoked. At a meeting which took place the follow- 
ing morning, July 30, the situation was again discussed, and on 
this occasion Sukhomlinov, according to his own evidence 
given at his subsequent trial, " lied to the Tsar " and allowed 
him to believe that his orders had been exe'cuted. During the 
same morning a further interview between Sazonov and Pourtales 
had resulted in the drafting of a formula by which it was hoped 
that a way out of the difficulty would be found. This had been 
sent to Berlin. The answer to it came in the late afternoon and 
was an uncompromising refusal. During the day there was 
telegraphed from Berlin news of a false press announcement that 
German mobilization had been ordered; this was contradicted 
very shortly afterwards. As a result of these events and the 
information that the Austrian bombardment of Belgrade was 
continuing, the Tsar in the afternoon reconfirmed the decision of 
the previous evening that general mobilization should be pro- 
ceeded with. He seems never to have been informed of the 
disobedience to his orders. The notices were put up throughout 
the Russian Empire during the course of the night, and on the 
following morning the fact was public. There was, however, 
s"ome delay in communicating it abroad; the news does not seem 
to have reached either Paris or London until very late in the 
afternoon. It reached Berlin shortly after midday. The Kaiser 
at once left Potsdam for Berlin and ordered the proclamation of 
Kriegszustand, the first step before mobilization; a telegram was 
also sent to Pourtales that he should immediately call on Sazonov 
and! inform him that unless the order for general mobilization 
was recalled within 24 hours Germany would consider herself 
at war with Russia. No answer was given; German mobilization 
was proclaimed the next day, Saturday, Aug. i, and war was 
declared at 5 o'clock in the afternoon. 

The Russian order for general mobilization seems on all 
grounds to have been ill-advised; from the military point of 
view delay was advantageous to Russia. Politically it provided 
the German Government with the pretext which was essential to 
them: for the moment it appeared as if Germany was de- 
fending herself against a Russian invasion ; the solidarity of the 
nation was secured and even the Socialists ceased their criticism 
and opposition. It was this which made the Reichstag, which 
assembled on Aug. 3, almost unanimous in its support of the war 
measures laid before it. It also destroyed any slender possibility 
of still avoiding war. The decision seems to have been due not 
so much to any deliberate desire for war, as to the state'of nervous 
panic which prevailed in the sinister situation by which Russia 
was suddenly confronted; owing to the provocative and menacing 
action of Austria and Germany there was no cool and balanced 
judgment or strong hand to exercise control. All accounts agree 
that even Sukhomlinov was overwhelmed by the crisis, and the 
Tsar throughout was in a state of pitiable indecision. 

The extreme rapidity with which these events took place 
frustrated all the efforts at mediation which were in progress. 
Sir Edward Grey had put forward a new plan, very similar to the 
German Emperor's proposal that Austria should issue her terms 
from Belgrade, but he had accompanied it by conditions which, 
if accepted, would have got over the mobilization difficulty. This 
had been communicated by Berlin to Vienna, but no answer had 
been received when Germany, by her ultimatum, broke through 
all the negotiations. None the less, even as late as Saturday, Aug. 
i, this and other suggestions continued to be the subject of an 
interchange of telegrams. While they ceased to have any prac- 
tical importance it may be noted that, in a telegram of July 31, 
the Austrian Government so far deviated from their previous 
attitude as to accept the idea of mediation by the four Powers 
between Austria and Serbia. This was a considerable concession, 
ljut it was in fact superseded by a personal telegram from the 
Austrian Emperor sent almost at the same time, and its value was 
diminished because it was accompanied by the condition that 
Austrian military action against Serbia should continue, but 
that Russia should discontinue all her military preparations. It 
need not be said that on these lines no arrangement could have 
been made, for this would have implied that Russia should stand 
passively by, watching the defeat of the Serbian army and allow- 


Ing Austria to occupy the whole of Serbian territory. There is 
indeed no indication that, so far as Austria was concerned, the 
postponement of the Russian general mobilization would have 
had any effect upon the final issue. The order for general 
mobilization was determined on the afternoon of July 30, and 
issued on July 31, before Russian mobilization was known. 

France and Germany. In accordance with the terms of the 
Franco-Russian Alliance, an aggressive war declared by Ger- 
many against Russia inevitably entailed war with France. The 
French President, M. Poincare, and the premier, M. Viviani, 
reached Paris on the evening of July 29 ; they at once telegraphed to 
Russia that France would fulfil the obligations of her alliance, 
while continuing her efforts to preserve peace. From the begin- 
ning of the crisis France had, like all other nations on the con- 
tinent of Europe, immediately begun all the necessary military 
preparations. Even the smaller States, such as Holland, had 
from the beginning of the week been doing the same thing. 
It is not necessary to enter into the discussion which took place 
at the time as to the particular stage of military preparations 
reached in each country on each day. The Austrian ultimatum 
to Serbia was an act of such a nature that, followed as it was by 
the rupture of diplomatic relations and the declaration of war, no 
responsible Government could afford to lose a moment in carry- 
ing through every measure short of the final act of calling up the 
reserves, to which the name of " mobilization " is generally 
given. Suffice it to say that by July 31 the French and German 
covering troops on the frontier were both in position. The 
French, however, in order to avoid any untoward incident, took 
the precaution of keeping their troops 10 km. from the frontier. 
This was not imitated by the Germans, and in fact could not be, 
for the great fortress of Metz was actually on the frontier, and 
there seems no doubt that before July 31, on several occasions, 
German troops had crossed the French frontier. The Russian 
mobilization, the consequent German mobilization, and the 
declaration of war against Russia, made it imperatively necessary 
for the German Government without any delay to settle the 
issue with France. As has already been pointed out, the basis 
of their whole plan of operations was an instantaneous invasion 
of France. They therefore could not allow a day to pass unused; 
if there was to be war with France, it must come at once. Ac- 
cordingly at 7 o'clock on July 31, Herr von Schoen, the German 
ambassador in Paris, called on M. Viviani and announced that he 
would come again the next day to learn what the attitude of 
France would be in case of a war between Germany and Russia. 
He came in consequence on Aug. i, and was informed merely 
that " France would do that which her interest dictated." 
French general mobilization was ordered on Aug. i, at almost 
exactly the same time as that of Germany. It would have been, 
natural that the actual declaration of war by Germany should 
immediately have followed; it was, however, delayed for two 
days, partly in consequence apparently of a misunderstanding 
which arose in London. Lichnowsky telegraphed that he had 
received an inquiry whether Germany would stand out if England 
secured the neutrality of France. What seems to have been 
meant was an idea that both France and Germany should remain 
neutral, leaving Austria and Russia alone at war; this was 
misinterpreted as a suggestion that France should remain neutral 
in a war between Germany and Russia. Nothing could have 
been more favourable to Germany than this, but subsequent 
revelations have shown that even French neutrality alone would 
not have been accepted by Germany. Herr von Schoen was 
instructed, if France promised to remain neutral, to demand that 
she should hand over the fortified cities of Toul and Verdun to 
Germany as a guarantee. That such a proposal should ever have 
been seriously entertained shows how abnormal was the men- 
tality of Berlin. There was never the slightest doubt that France 
could not leave Russia unprotected against a combined attack 
from both Germany and Austria. 

The situation at the end of the week was a very anxious one in 
Paris. War with Germany was now certain, and France might 
anticipate that within a few days the whole force of the German 
army would be thrown against the frontier. The future of 

France seemed to depend upon the action of Great Britain. But 
in London all seemed uncertain. The strongest representations , 
were made by M. Cambon to Sir Edward Grey, and the President 
of the French Republic addressed an autograph letter to King 
George urging the vital necessity for help from England. No 
promise could be given. The British Cabinet were then divided. 
Neither they nor, as was thought, the country would have 
approved of the interference of Great Britain in a continental war 
in which her interests and honour were not immediately involved. 1 
Though Great Britain could not stand by and passively watch 
the defeat and dismemberment of France, this might be a reason 
for preparing to intervene if at any time it became necessary, 
but not for taking part as a principal from the beginning. There 
was indeed one point in which, admittedly, both British interests 
and British honour were closely concerned, viz.: the neutrality of 
Belgium. Great Britain was bound by the Treaties of 1839 to 
intervene if either party to a war violated that neutrality. Fol- 
lowing, therefore, the precedent of 1870 Sir Edward Grey, on 
July 30, addressed a message both to the French and the German 
Governments, drawing their attention to this point and asking 
for assurance that Belgian neutrality would be respected. The 
answer from France was quite satisfactory. The German 
Government, on the other hand, said that they were unable to 
give any answer to the question. On Sunday, Aug. 2, Sir Edward 
Grey, on his own responsibility, without obtaining the consent 
of the Cabinet, took another step. He informed the French 
that if a German fleet attacked France in the Channel or the 
Atlantic, Great Britain would immediately intervene with her 
fleet. Apart from the Belgian question, it would still have been 
possible for Germany to keep Great Britain neutral by limiting 
the war against France to land operations, and it would clearly 
have been in her interests to do so. 

All then seemed to depend on the Belgian question. On 
Monday, Aug. 3, the German Government formally declared war 
against France. The actual reasons given were statements that 
the French had violated German territory by dropping bombs 
from aeroplanes, and in other ways. The German Government 
has since acknowledged that these statements were untrue. 
Meanwhile it became known in London (Aug. 2) that German 
forces had crossed the Luxemburg frontier and occupied the 
Grand Duchy, the neutrality of which was guaranteed by the 
Great Powers, Germany herself included; and also that the Ger- 
man minister at Brussels (as Sir E. Grey told the House of Com- 
mons on Aug. 3) had delivered a note to the Belgian Government 
demanding free passage for their troops across Belgian territory; 
if this was granted they undertook to leave Belgium at the end of 
the war with her independence and territory unimpaired, and in 
fact held out hopes of increase of territory at the expense of 
France, either in Europe or in the colonies. If the request was 
refused, Belgium would be treated as an enemy. An answer was 
required within 12 hours. This action was excused by the 
statement that the German Government had reliable information 
that French forces intended to enter Belgium. But it is now known 
that the whole note, including this statement, had been drafted 
more than a week before by the general staff. After a midnight 
sitting of the Belgian Council of State, presided over by the King, 
a refusal was handed to Herr von Below. Before this happened 
German troops had already crossed the frontier, and in con- 
sequence Herr von Below receiyed his passport and was requested 
to leave the country immediately. 

These events were decisive for Great Britain. All the doubts by 
which the Cabinet and large sections of the country had been 
assailed during the previous week were at once swept aside. On 
the afternoon of Aug. 3, Sir Edward Grey explained the menacing 
nature of the situation to the House of Commons, and on the 
next day (after a further statement in Parliament by the Prime 
Minister) an ultimatum was dispatched to Berlin requiring the 
German Government to respect Belgian neutrality. This was 

1 Nevertheless, it was being vigorously contended by The Times 
during this juncture that British interests and honour were involved, 
though the " pacifist " section of the London Press as vigorously 
denied it. . (Ed. E.B.) 


presented by Sir E. Goschen to Herr von Jagow; as the request 
was refused, he demanded his passport, and war between Great 
Britain and Germany began at midnight (Aug. 4-5). 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. -The chief authority for the events dealt with 
above is the official correspondence published by the various Gov- 
ernments. A translation of the full text of all documents published at 
the beginning of the war will be found in Collected Diplomatic Docu- 
ments relating to the Outbreak of the European War, printed by the 
Stationery Office (1915); there are numerous other collections, as 
for instance The Times Documentary History of the War, vols. i. and 
ii. (1917); Mach's Official Diplomatic Documents relating to the 
Outbreak of the European War, containing both the originals and the 
translations (notes unreliable; 1916); useful selections are those by 
Reinach, Histoire de Douze Jours (1917), and Max Beer, Das Regen- 
bogenbuch. The original German White Book was very incom- 
plete and has been superseded by the later publication, Deutsche 
Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch, Vollstandige Sammlung der von 
Karl Kautsky zusammengestellten amtlichen Aktenstucke, mil einigen 
Erganzungen, edited by Graf Max Montgelas and Prof. Walter 
Schiicking, 4 vols. (1919). There has also been published the 
full text of the Austrian correspondence, Diplomatische Akten- 
stucke zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges 1914, 3 parts (1919); see also 
Dr. Roderich Gooss, Das Wiener Kabinett und die Entstehung des 
Weltkrieges (1919). The original British White Book, on the other 
hand, gives a faithful and practically complete account of the action 
of the British Government as recorded in the official papers and 
correspondence in the Foreign Office Archives. To these should 
be added the Rumanian and the Greek White Books (Le Livre 
Blanc Grec Les Pourparlers Diplomatiques 1913-7 (1918), Berger- 
Levrault), also the Austro-Hungarian Red Books on the relations 
to Italy and Rumania. 

Other Publications. The very numerous works which appeared 
during the war are to a great extent superseded owing to the further 
information which is now available. Of them the more important 
are: J. M. Beck, The Evidence in the Case (1914); J. W. Headlam, 
The History of Twelve Days (1915); J. W. Headlam, The German 
Chancellor and the Outbreak of War (1915); Wm. Archer, The Thir- 
teen Days (1915); C. Oman, The Outbreak of the War, 1914-8 (1919); 
J' Accuse, by a German (Dr. Richard Grelling: 1915); Dr. Richard 
Grelling, The Crime (1917). 

Of the later literature, special works and memoirs, the following 
are the most important : Report of the Commission of the Paris Con- 
ference on the Responsibilities for the War, published by Congress 
(Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 
66th Congress, Treaty of Peace with Germany, 1919) ; Das Deutsche 
Weissbuch uber die Schuld am Kriege (1919); Zur Vorgeschichte des 
Weltkrieges Beilage zu den stenographischen Berichten uber die 
offentlichen Verhandlungen des Untersuchungsausschusses (1921); 
Karl Kautsky, Wie der Weltkrieg entstand (1919); for criticism see 
Prof. Hans Delbriick, Kautsky und Harden (1920); Rene Puaux, 
Le Mensonge (1918); E. Waxweiler, La Belgique Neutre et Loyale 
(1915); Dr. Muhlon's Diary (1918); Prince Lichnowsky, My Mis- 
sion to London, 1912-4 (1918); Karl Helfferich, Die Vorgeschichte des 
Weltkrieges (1919); Bethmann Hollweg, Reflections on the World 
War (1920); Jagow, Ursachen und Ausbruch des Weltkrieges (1919); 
Baron Beyens, L'Allemagne avant la Guerre (1915); Dr. M. Boghit- 
schewitsch, Kriegsursachen (1919) -English translation, Causes of 
the War (1919, G. L. van Langenhuysen) ; Raymond Poincare, 
Les Origines de la Guerre (1921); Graf Pourtales, Am Scheidewege 
zwischen Krieg und Frieden (1919); Oberstleutnant von Eggeling, 
Die Russische Mobilmachung und der Kriegsausbruch (1919). 

G- W. H.-M.) 


Under the heading of WORLD WAR, the diplomatic history 
of the war period itself is separately dealt with. European 
history was mixed up in this period with world history. It 
remains here to speak of the new Europe resulting from the war. 

The changes produced in the political system of Europe by 
the war and the peace settlement were in their magnitude and 
importance comparable only to those embodied in the similar 
settlements made by the treaties of Westphalia, the Peace of 
Utrecht and the Congress of Vienna. The territorial settlement 
(see accompanying map) affected directly or indirectly every 
nation on the continent except Spain and Portugal. It was made 
partly by the treaties signed at Versailles, St. Germain, Trianon, 
Neuilly and Sevres, but these left several matters undecided 
which have been dealt with by subsequent agreements. In the 
summer of 1921 the principal districts left undetermined were 
Upper Silesia, East Galicia, the eastern frontiers of Poland and 
the boundaries of Albania. 

Western Europe. In western Europe the most important 
result has been the increase in the territory and influence of 

France, who has recovered the lost provinces of Alsace and Lor- 
raine, which are now again incorporated in France. Her hope 
was permanently to detach the left bank of the Rhine from Ger- 
many, and, by joining this territory with Belgium and Luxem- 
burg into a French sphere of influence, to secure herself against 
the danger of a fresh German invasion. This object was only 
partially attained. By a provisional arrangement, which normal- 
ly would not last more than 15 years, the principal Allied and 
Associated Powers, among whom in all matters of western Europe 
France naturally took the leading place, had the right to occupy 
the Rhine with the bridgeheads and virtually control all German 
territory on the left bank of the river; inter-Allied control was 
exercised by a civil commission which sat at Coblenz under 
French chairmanship. Clauses of the Treaty of Versailles gave the 
control and navigation of the Rhine to an international com- 
mission, and France had for a period of 15 years acquired certain 
rights over the port of Kehl on the right bank of the river. The 
territory of the Saar valley had also for a period of 15 years been 
separated from Germany and placed under the control of a com- 
mission appointed by and responsible to the League of Nations, 
the full ownership of the mines being given to France. The 
chairman of the commission was French, and French influence 
was dominant; French troops continued to be maintained there, 
a contingency not contemplated by the Treaty. The final de- 
cision as to the fate of this district was reserved for a plebiscite 
in 1935; under this the inhabitants would have the right to opt 
either for restoration to Germany, incorporation with France, or 
a continuance of the existing system. 

The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg retained its independence 
and status as a sovereign State, but the close connexion with 
Germany was severed, and in May 1921 a treaty for economic 
union with Belgium was signed, under which there would be a 
customs union between the two countries, and the railways 
would be jointly managed. In addition to this, Belgium, under 
the Treaty of Versailles, acquired a small increase of territory 
at the expense of Germany in Eupen and Malmedy, and was 
also freed from the limitations on her full sovereignty imposed 
by the settlement of 1839; she henceforward took her place 
among the other European States without the restrictions of 
permanent and guaranteed neutrality. This was the end of a 
system which in one form or another had played an important 
part in European politics for some 200 years. Belgium also 
entered into a military convention with France. 

Central Europe. It was in the centre and the east of Europe 
that the greatest changes took place. The three great monarchies, 
which since the days of Catherine, Frederick the Great and 
Maria Theresa had dominated so large a portion of the continent, 
disappeared. In Petrograd, Berlin and Vienna, the old centres 
of authority, the court made way for Republican Government, 
and the great armies by which Europe was overawed ceased to 
exist. But the character of the change in each case was very 
different. Germany came out of the war a united State; all 
projects for disruption, for instance, in the Rhine Provinces or 
Bavaria, failed, and she still was in population the largest coun- 
try, except Russia, on the continent of Europe, and in area 
second only to Russia and France. She had ceded Alsace-Lor- 
raine to France, to Denmark the northern portion of Schleswig, 
to Poland the greater part of the provinces of Posen and West 
Prussia; the city of Danzig, which commands the mouth of the 
Vistula, was created a sovereign State under the guarantee of 
the League of Nations, but by a treaty was incorporated within 
the Polish customs frontier, the control of railways, port and 
foreign relations being given to Poland. Memel and the surround- 
ing district were ceded to the principal Allied and Associated 
Powers, ultimately, no doubt, to be transferred to Lithuania. 
A large slice of Upper Silesia was transferred to Poland. In 
addition to this, for a maximum period of 15 years the left 
bank of the Rhine was subject to inter-Allied occupation and 
control, and Germany was forbidden to maintain any troops 
or fortifications within this area or within 50 m. of the right 
bank of the river, and for the same period was deprived of the 
Saar valley. 



Even more important than the loss of territory were the eco- 
nomic and financial disabilities imposed on Germany by the 
peace settlement, and the state of internal instability caused 
by the Revolution. The general effect was that, for the present, 
Germany was unable to .take any active part in European politics; 
she had become a passive element in the continental system and 
the utmost that she could do was to concentrate on the slow and 
arduous task of internal reconstruction, which at the best must 
take many years. The prime occupation of France was to secure 
the safeguards which would be necessary when the process of 
recovery had been completed. 

By far the most striking of the changes was the disappearance 
from the map of Europe of the great Habsburg Monarchy, which 
since the days of Charles V. had played so important a part. 
This is an event. to which there is no parallel in European history. 
It is the first time that one of the Great Powers of Europe has, 
not by slow and prolonged process, but by a sudden collapse, 
ceased to exist. As an immediate result there was added to the 
European system one new State (the new Austrian Republic), 
and three others were so changed that they might equally well 
be considered as new members of the family of nations. 

1. The ancient kingdom of Bohemia, which since 1526 had 
been merged in the Habsburg possessions, reappeared under the 
title of Czechoslovakia. To quote the preamble to one of the 
treaties signed at St. Germain: 

" The union which formerly existed between the old Kingdom of 
Bohemia, the Margravate of Moravia and the Duchy of Silesia 
on the one hand, and the other territories of the former Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy on the other, has definitely ceased to exist, 
and the peoples of Bohemia, of Moravia and of part of Silesia, as 
well as the peoples of Slovakia, have decided of their own free will 
to unite, and have in fact united, in a permanent union for the 
purpose of forming a single sovereign independent State under the 
title of the Czecho-Slovak Republic." 

What this means is that to the old territories of the Bohemian 
Crown was added a large portion of the ancient Hungarian 
kingdom, which was inhabited by the Slovaks, a race closely 
akin to the Czechs. It was strongly urged by some that the 
German-speaking portions of Bohemia and Moravia should be 
allowed, if they so desired, to unite themselves with the new 
Austria or with Germany. This was wisely and inevitably re- 
fused by the Peace Conference, but, on the other hand, by a 
special treaty signed at Paris on July 28 1920, that portion of the 
small duchy of Teschen, the population of which was predomi- 
nantly Polish, was separated from the rest and united with the 
new Poland. In addition to these territories, that portion of the 
kingdom of Hungary which was inhabited by the Ruthenians 
was also incorporated with Czechoslovakia, but the Treaty of 
St. Germain gave to it the right of autonomy. 

2. On the south there was achieved the union in one State 
of nearly all the South Slavs; the small kingdom of Serbia, 
which a few years before the war numbered only some three 
million inhabitants, was increased to an important State with 
a pop. of 14 millions, including Croatia, part of the Banat, and 
portions of the former Austrian provinces of Dalmatia, Carniola 
and Istria. As a symbol of the changed condition, the kingdom 
of Serbia took the title of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes, but it is often spoken of as Yugoslavia. 

3. The settlement of the frontiers between this State and 
the kingdom of Italy was the subject of long, arduous and often 
critical negotiations, which were settled finally by the Treaty of 
Rapallo of Nov. 1920. By this Italy acquired nearly the whole 
of Istria; the town of Fiume, which was the special subject of 
controversy, became a self-governing community, closely attached 
to Italy. Italy on the other hand surrendered the claims she 
had under the Treaty of London to other portions of the Dal- 
matian coast, retaining only Zara and a few islands. To the 
problems of Europe was added that of the Adriatic, which seems 
destined to become the object of rivalry between Italy, Yugo- 
slavia and Greece. In the north, Italy acquired the most gener- 
ous settlement of her claims to all Italian lands, not only Trieste 
and Gorizia and the Trentino, but also the whole of Tirol up 
to the Brenner Pass and the main chain of the Alps, and for the 

first time thereby extended to her natural geographical frontier; 
as a result of this, 700,000 German-speaking Tirolese and a large 
number of Slavonic race in Istria came under the Italian Crown. 

4. On the east, Rumania acquired part of the Banat and 
the whole of Transylvania, in addition to Bessarabia, her popula- 
tion thereby being about doubled. Here again it was impossible 
to draw a line by which all the Rumanians of Hungary should 
be assigned to Rumania without at the same time transferring 
the allegiance of a large non-Rumanian population, chiefly 
Magyars and Czechlers (a branch of Hungarians), who also 
include the German colony of Siebenburgen. 

The only portion of the old monarchy which in the summer of 
1921 had not been definitely assigned was the province of 
Galicia. It was a matter of course that the western part, purely 
Polish in population, should go to Poland, and in fact the incor- 
poration was effected immediately after the conclusion of the 
Armistice. On the other hand East Galicia, which comprises 
a pop. of over 4,500,000 and an area of some 17,000 sq. m., is 
inhabited by a population Russian in origin and speech, to 
which the name of Ruthenian or Ukrainian is generally applied. 
The Poles, however, claimed this, partly on historical grounds 
and partly because of the great interests in the country of the 
Polish aristocracy who owned large portions of the land. No 
decision was arrived at by the Peace Conference, but in July 
1919 the Polish army was permitted to occupy the territory; 
proposals for assigning it with guaranteed autonomy to Poland 
broke down, and the Polish Government was in 1910-21 in 
practically undisturbed control. In the Treaty of Sevres of 
Aug. 10 1920, in which many minor frontier questions were 
settled, clauses were included assigning West Galicia to Poland, 
but the Poles refused to sign this treaty, presumably on the 
ground that by doing so they would appear to acquiesce in a 
differentiation between eastern and western Galicia; no Polish 
Government could afford to give up its claim to East Galicia. 
The result was that technically the whole of the province still 
belonged, in the middle of 1921, to the principal Allied and As- 
sociated Powers, to whom it was ceded by the Treaty of St. 
Germain on Sept. 10 1919. West Galicia must, doubtless, remain 
an integral part of Poland. The future of East Galicia, however, 
remained a source of anxiety. Poland would be satisfied with 
nothing less than complete and unconditional sovereignty; the 
British Government was morally pledged by the support which 
it gave to the Ruthenians during 1919 not to surrender them, 
without stringent safeguards, to the rule of a nation whom they 
professed to regard as their hereditary enemy, and a restored 
Russia or an independent Ukraine would probably try to estab- 
lish a claim to this district. 

5. Of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy little remained 
when all these cessions had taken place. On the one hand we 
have the ancient crown lands of the Habsburgs, Upper and Lower 
Austria, Salzkammergut, Tirol and Vorarlberg. The Conference 
having refused to permit the union with Germany which was 
desired by large portions of the population, these were constituted 
as the Republic of Austria (the title of German Austria, which 
was at first taken, did not receive the approval of the Paris 
Conference), with a pop. of about 6,000,000. It is, except for the 
great city of Vienna and its suburbs, a predominantly mountain- 
ous and agricultural district. The problem of the future of 
Austria had a dual side, that of the country and that of Vienna. 
No city had suffered so much by the war and the peace; cut off 
from former trade connexions, left with a pop. of two millions 
of whom so many earned their livelihood from the presence of 
the court and the administration, the population would have 
been condemned to a slow process of starvation but for the 
assistance provided chiefly from America and Great Britain. 
The future of Austria remained one of the problems of Europe. 
France was unalterably opposed to the union of Austria with 
Germany, for this would, quite apart from the serious increase 
to German population, produce a Germany which extended from 
the Alps to the Baltic, and cut off western from eastern Europe. 
Such a Germany would be a grave menace to the other States 
and would compromise both Switzerland and Czechoslovakia. 



6. The proud and ancient Magyar Monarchy, which had 
existed for over 1,000 years, and which, by the sway it exercised 
over the subject Slavs and Rumans, and by the influence it 
wielded in the Dual Monarchy, had attained a position in 
Europe beyond what the numbers of the ruling race warranted, 
was now reduced to a small State of about seven millions. Sur- 
rounded by jealous neighbours which had grown by its fall, 
with frontiers equally unfavourable for defence or trade, and 
still suffering from the effects of the revolution, the Magyars 
could only watch and wait for an opportunity to retrieve some- 
thing of their lost power and territory. After the Bolshevik 
Revolution of 1919, power came into the hands of the reactionary 
parties, supported by the peasants; the State was still in theory 
a monarchy, but a monarchy without a king. The Emperor 
Charles was still the crowned king of Hungary; he made two 
visits to the country in a vain attempt to recover his crown, but 
the return of a Habsburg was vetoed both by the Allies and 
by the other successor States, for in view of the former history 
and great pretensions of the House this could not be regarded as 
a merely domestic Hungarian matter. 

The substitution of this complex of States, each with its own 
problems and ambitions, for the great military monarchy com- 
pletely altered the whole balance of the continent. During the 
period immediately succeeding the Peace, they were chiefly 
occupied with internal matters, especially the framing of new 
constitutions; Czechoslovakia and Rumania were confronted 
with the serious problem of incorporating in the new system large 
numbers of unwilling citizens. The severance of old-established 
commercial ties necessarily caused grave dislocation of trade; all 
suggestions for the reestablishment of some kind of commercial 
union broke down, chiefly owing to the very strong opposition 
to anything which might lead to the restoration of the financial 
and commercial supremacy of Vienna. On the other hand close 
relations were set up between Czechoslovakia, Rumania and 
Yugoslavia; these States entered into a system, to which the 
name of " Little Entente " was applied, which had for its first 
object their mutual protection against any proposal to restore the 
Habsburgs in Hungary, but showed also a tendency for common 
action even against the Western Powers. 

North- Eastern Europe. The Paris Conference was not in a 
position to determine the territorial settlement so far as it dealt 
with the former possessions of the Russian Empire, for the final 
decision on these matters required the assent of Russia, and 
there was at the time no recognized Russian Government and no 
official representative of Russia at Paris. The settlement, so far 
as it went, was therefore the result of local action for which the 
Allies had no direct responsibility. All that they could do was to 
insert in the Treaty of Versailles a clause that the determination 
of the eastern frontiers of Poland must be submitted to the prin- 
cipal Allied and Associated Powers. 

The governing factor was the terrible fate of Russia, which far 
surpassed the disasters that the war had brought upon central 
Europe. The defeats sustained by the Russian armies had 
during the war brought about the occupation by German forces 
of Poland and of the Baltic provinces. The overthrow of the 
autocracy in March 1917 was followed by a complete dissolution 
of the Russian army; in Oct. of the same year there was estab- 
lished the Communist Government under Lenin and Trotsky. 

By the treaties of Brest Litovsk the Bolshevik Government 
was forced to accept the separation from Russia not only of 
Poland but of the Baltic provinces and of the Ukraine, which 
was occupied by German forces, while at the same time the 
Allies supported the attempts which were being made by Kol- 
chak and Yudenitch to overthrow the Bolsheviks. Further 
calamities followed. In accordance with the avowed principles 
of their party the first step of the new Government was to 
eliminate those classes the court, the aristocracy, the bureau- 
cracy and the middle classes by whom hitherto the country 
had been administered. Large numbers, including the Tsar and 
Tsarina and their children, were put to death. Others fled the 
country, and those who remained were condemned to a life of 
obscurity and penury. Many doubtless succumbed to the 

hardships and starvation they had to endure. This action 
naturally brought about a state of civil war, for the representa- 
tives of the old regime desired to overthrow the Government 
which was being built up by their destruction. The condition of 
civil war continued for another two years. It was conducted 
with great ferocity on both sides, but after the failure of Denikin 
in South Russia in 1920 the Bolsheviks succeeded in establishing 
their rule over all those territories which were of Russian race 
and language. The long continuance of the civil war had, however, 
the effect for the time of preventing the Bolsheviks from a mili- 
tary advance towards the west, and it left the country greatly 
impoverished. Meanwhile, as could have been anticipated, the 
attempt to govern Russia in accordance with Communist doc- 
trines failed. In particular the peasants, who were now in oc- 
cupation of the land, refused to provide food for the inhabitants 
of the towns; the whole system of transport and production 
broke down, and to add to the other calamities there was a 
serious failure of crops both in 1920 and 1921. The Bolshevik 
Government was ostracized by the rest of Europe, and all at- 
tempts to extend their authority over the separated western 
provinces failed. After the Armistice, Poland within undefined 
limits was recognized by the Allies as a sovereign State, the 
nucleus of which was " Congress Poland"; to this were added 
the Polish territories taken from Germany and Austria. On 
the east, the new Polish State was at war with the Bolsheviks. 
The causes of enmity were, first, the avowed intention of the 
latter to impose their form of government upon Poland, and 
secondly the delimitation of the frontier. The Poles claimed 
almost the whole of the territories which had belonged to the 
ancient kingdom, including as they did large portions of White 
Russia and the Ukraine, the population of which was almost 
exclusively Russian. The Polish Government, however, who 
were also at variance with Denikin, refused to give him that 
assistance which might possibly have led to the success of his 
arms. After his collapse in the spring of 1920, the Poles, dis- 
regarding advice given them by the British Government, took 
the offensive, invaded the Ukraine and advanced as far as Kiev; 
they were unable to maintain their position; during the month 
of July they were rapidly driven back by the Bolshevik armies, 
who entered Congress Poland and nearly reached Warsaw. 
Negotiations for an armistice were begun at Minsk, but, owing 
to the excessive demands of the Bolsheviks, no agreement could 
be reached. Helped by French military advice and by supplies 
from western Europe, the Poles quickly recovered courage, and 
during the month of Aug., with little fighting, drove out the 
invading Bolshevik army and again advanced into White Russia 
and the Ukraine. As a result of these events negotiations were 
begun for an armistice, and in the early months of 1921 a series 
of treaties was arranged by which the whole of the western 
frontier of Russia was determined. This was followed by an 
agreement between Great Britain and Russia, by which trade 
relations were resumed (March 19 1921), a policy to which 
France was strongly opposed. 

The result of these events was that there were temporarily 
separated from Russia all those territories included in the empire, 
the population of which was of non-Russian race, and five new 
States were added to the European system. 

i . Finland had already severed herself from Russia before the 
end of the war, to a large extent owing to the support given to 
the White Government by Gen. von der Goltz and a small de- 
tachment of German troops. As soon as the war was over the 
Government was recognized by the Allies, and by the Treaty of 
Dorpat of Oct. 14 1920 the Bolsheviks also recognized the in- 
dependence of the country and the boundaries were fixed. By 
this the connexion between Finland and Russia, which had 
existed since it was conquered from Sweden in 1809, ceased. 
Reminiscences of the older Swedish connexion were revived by a 
dispute which arose as to the Aland Is., which stretch across 
the mouth of the Gulf of Finland; the population was entirely 
Swedish and had expressed a desire for union with Sweden. 
Owing to the intervention of the Allies, this matter, which 
threatened to lead to war, was referred for settlement to the 



League of Nations, who in May 1921 issued their award: they 
were to remain a part of Finland, with local autonomy. 

2. The former Baltic provinces, after their separation from 
Russia during the war, organized themselves into three States, 
Latvia, Esthonia and Lithuania, with republican institutions; 
with the help first of the Germans and afterwards of the Allies, 
they succeeded after severe fighting in repelling several Bol- 
shevik attacks, and at the beginning of 1921 Latvia and Esthonia 
were formally recognized by the Allies. The relations to Russia 
were determined by treaties signed at Reval in April 1921. 
Formal recognition of the Government of Lithuania by the 
Allies was still delayed during 1921, chiefly owing to the fact 
that the Poles were desirous of bringing about some kind of 
union between Lithuania and Poland. The boundaries of the 
two States remained at issue, both of them claiming the city of 
Vilna. After the repulse of the Bolsheviks in 1920, it was in 
Oct. of the same year seized by a lawless act of force on the part 
of the Polish Gen. Zeligowski, with the scarcely veiled connivance 
of the Polish Government. It was agreed that the dispute should 
be referred to the League of Nations. 

3. The most important change was the reconstitution of an 
independent Poland, a natural result of the fall of the three 
military monarchies responsible for the partitions. The frontiers 
of the State created great difficulties and serious differences be- 
tween the Allies, and it was only late in 1921 that, after ref- 
erence to the League of Nations, a decision was arrived at regard- 
ing Upper Silesia (see SILESIA). 

The future of this part of Europe depended on Russia and 
Poland. It had been the ambition of Poland, in which she was 
supported by France, to succeed to the position which in older 
days the Polish Monarchy had held, and with very extensive 
territory which, had all her claims been granted, would have 
contained a pop. of nearly 40 millions, to be a permanent barrier 
between Germany and Russia. But ambitions of this nature 
require great administrative capacity as well as extended posses- 
sions. The Poles, largely owing to the continuous warfare in 
which they were involved, found little time for dealing with the 
administrative problems; the finances fell into a state of disorder, 
the Polish mark being quoted in 1921 at 8,000 to the pound 
sterling. The amalgamation of Russian, Austrian and Prussian 
Poland presented grave difficulties, and there was danger lest 
Poland might become a source of weakness rather than of 
strength. The permanent peace of Europe in the east could not 
be secured until a friendly and pacific Government was estab- 
lished in Russia, and it was unlikely that any settled Russian Gov- 
ernment would acquiesce in the complete separation of the Baltic 
provinces, which intervene between Russia and the sea, or in 
the permanent cession of large portions of White Russia and the 
Ukraine to Poland, inhabited as they are by a population Russian 
in origin and speech. 

The Balkans. The result of the war in the Balkans was, 
first, the completion of the process by which the Turkish Empire 
in Europe ceased to exist, and secondly a continuation of the 
work of the Treaty of Bucharest by which Bulgarian ambitions 
were sacrificed to the rival States of Serbia and Greece. By the 
Treaty of Sevres the Sultan was deprived of all his European 
possessions except Constantinople, where he enjoyed only the 
shadow of authority, the Straits, so long the centre of inter- 
national rivalry, being transferred to international control. 
The decision of the Treaty of Bucharest, by which Macedonia 
was divided between Serbia and Greece, was maintained; but in 
addition, by the Treaty of Neuilly, Greece came into the posses- 
sion of the whole of the north coast of the Aegean (thereby 
cutting off Bulgaria from this sea) as well as Thrace, including 
the city of Adrianople. On the north the whole of the Dobrudja 
was assigned to Rumania; Bulgaria therefore came out of the 
war with a territory of about 71,000 sq. m. and pop. of five 
millions, much the smallest of the Balkan States a great 
disappointment in view of the high ambitions which had been 
entertained such a short time before. Another new State was 
permanently added to Europe in Albania, which at the As- 
sembly of 1920 was admitted as a member of the League of 

Nations. The final decision as to the frontiers had not yet been 
arrived at in 1921, 'owing to the difficulty of reconciling the 
rival ambitions of Greece and Italy. There were many other 
causes of unrest. The Balkan settlement had been markedly 
favourable to Greece, chiefly owing to the confidence given by 
the Allies to M. Venizelos. The Greek elections of 1920, which 
brought about the fall of that statesman and (after the early death 
of King Alexander) the restoration of Constantine, had therefore 
more than local importance. It seemed for the moment as though 
the whole basis of the settlement had been destroyed. The Treaty 
of Sevres was not ratified. The Turkish National party under 
Kemal Pasha, which had established itself in Anatolia, with 
its capital at Angora, claimed for Turkey not only the whole of 
Asia Minor, but large parts of Thrace, including Adrianople, 
while the extremists went so far as to demand the restoration 
of the whole Turkish Empire, including Mesopotamia and Pales- 
tine. There was some evidence of serious discord between the 
Allies; both Italy and France entered into separate negotiations 
with the Kemalists. At the Conference of London, March 1921, 
which was attended by representatives both of the recognized 
Government in Constantinople and of the Kemalists, an attempt 
was made to find some basis of agreement between the Greeks 
and the Turks; this failed; a state of war followed, and though 
the Greeks started their campaign in Asia Minor successfully, 
their effort was brought to a standstill in the autumn. 

Looking at Europe as a whole, it is seen that in 1921 the 
political system which had existed for so long, depending on the 
mutual rivalries and cooperation of some five or six great States, 
approximately equal in power, had for the time ceased to exist. 
Of them there remained only Great Britain, France and Italy; 
Germany, though she had retained her unity, was prevented 
from asserting her place as an independent European Power by 
the very stringent disarmament conditions which had been im- 
posed upon her, and also by the economic difficulties involved in 
the reparation clauses of the Treaty. The immediate result there- 
fore was the ascendancy of France, who had, at any rate for the 
time, regained the position as the leading continental State, 
which in earlier days had come to be regarded as her permanent 
prerogative. This position France was aiming at making per- 
manent, first by cementing her control over all countries on the 
left bank of the Rhine, and secondly by the establishment of a 
powerful Poland, the policy of which should be subservient to 
that of France. The interests of Italy were concentrated on the 
south-east of Europe, the Mediterranean and western Asia. 

As a result of the war and the peace, the immediate general 
control, at any rate over all matters springing out of the treaties, 
was vested in the " Principal Allied and Associated Powers "- 
Great Britain, France, Italy, the United States and Japan; as 
the United States did not ratify the treaties, and Japan took 
little part in European affairs, the group practically consisted, 
up to the autumn of 1921, of the three other Powers, with whom 
for certain purposes Belgium was associated. The organs through 
which they worked were the Ambassadorial Conference sitting 
at Paris, and the Council of Prime Ministers, which met from 
time to time to deal with larger political matters. It followed 
from this that the peace and order of the continent, which was so 
essential in order to give an opportunity to repair the ravages of 
the war and meet the grave economic difficulties under which 
Europe was labouring, ultimately depended upon the friendly 
cooperation of these three Powers. This cooperation was not 
maintained without difficulty. In particular there were serious 
differences between Great Britain and France with regard to the 
treatment of Germany, the execution of the reparation clauses 
of the Treaty, and as to Polish affairs. These reached a crisis 
when in March 1920 the French, without consulting their Allies, 
occupied Frankfurt and other towns on the right bank of the 
Rhine, and again in July-Aug. 1921, when there was a grave 
difference of opinion as to Upper Silesia. There were also open 
disagreements as to the Near East. The unity of aims which alone 
could give efficiency to their joint action was wanting. 

Side by side with the Supreme Council was the League of 
Nations, but the relation of the two organs had not been clearly 


differentiated. The League had not the power and resources to 
deal with matters in which larger political issues were involved, 
and its activities were chiefly confined to those specific matters 
referred to it by the treaties of peace, or to other matters of 
minor importance in which its help was invoked, as, for instance, 
the Aland Is. and Vilna. In 1921 it included all European States 
with the exception of Germany and Russia, but these two to- 
gether represented a potential force equal to that of almost the 
whole of the rest of the continent, and the League was not yet able 
to take the position, which its advocates anticipated, of a final 
Court of Appeal whose decisions would be, if necessary, en- 
forced. So far indeed the hopes of a new era in international 
relations had not been fulfilled. Disarmament had been im- 
posed upon Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria, and there 
had been a great reduction of armaments in Holland and Scandi- 
navia; but France and Italy maintained the older system, and 
the new States, intent on their independence and integrity, were 
determined to rely on their own strength. In particular, Poland, 
occupied as she had been in the war with Russia, and with the 
enforcement of her territorial claims on her other frontiers, 
maintained an army of some six or seven hundred thousand men, 
an army which was a heavy burden on the finances and the re- 
sources of the country. 

After the Napoleonic War, the Great Alliance, supported as it 
was by large armies, was in fact able to impose its will upon the 
continent. In. a not dissimilar situation France, Great Britain 
and Italy together had neither the resources nor the unity of will 
which would have been requisite even if they desired to imitate 
their predecessors; in particular, England, occupied with urgent 
difficulties of finance, and burdened with great responsibilities 
in other parts of the world, was intent, so far as possible, on 
avoiding new continental entanglements. The task of supervising 
the execution of the treaties of peace was in itself more than 
sufficient to occupy the Allies, and in consequence the smaller 
States were enabled to show an independence, the attainment 
of which was one of the avowed objects of the Allies in the war. 
Europe had been freed from the danger of one European predomi- 
nance; it showed no disposition to accept that of the victors in the 
war. In this state of affairs the smaller States were tending to 
associate themselves in local groups e.g. in Scandinavia, the 
Baltic States, the successor States of Austria-Hungary and 
the political problems by which the continent was still distracted 
more and more assumed a local rather than a general character. 
It might be hoped that, though slowly, the animosities excited by 
the war would subside, and that these local groups would be able 
to concentrate their attention on the very urgent economic prob- 
lems, the settlement of which was so essential to the future wel- 
fare of the continent. 

See A History nf the Peace Conference of Paris, edited by H. W. V. 
Temperley, 1920. 

EVANS, SIR ARTHUR JOHN (1851- ), English ar- 
chaeologist, was born at Nash Mills, Herts., July 8 1851, the eldest 
son of Sir John Evans, K.C.B. (see 10.2*). Educated at Harrow, 
Brasenose College, Oxford, and Gottingen, he was elected fellow 
of Brasenose and in 1884 keeper of the Ashmolean Museum at 
Oxford, holding this post till 1908. He travelled in Finland and 
Lapland in 1873-4, and in 1875 made a special study of ar- 
chaeology and ethnology in the Balkan States. In 1893 he began 
his investigations in Crete, which have resulted in discoveries of 
the utmost importance concerning the early history of Greece 
and the eastern Mediterranean (see 1.246, 7.421). A member 
of all the chief archaeological societies in Europe, he was given 
hon. degrees at Oxford, Edinburgh and Dublin, and was made a 
fellow of the Royal Society. In 1911 he was knighted. His chief 
publications are: Cretan Pictographs and Prae- Phoenician Script 
(1896); Further Discoveries of Cretan and Aegean Script (1898); 
The Mycenaean Tree and Pillar Cult (1901); Scripla Minoa 
(1909 et seq.); and reports on the excavations at Knossos. He 
also edited, with additions, Freeman's History of Sicily, vol. iv. 

EVANS, SIR SAMUEL THOMAS (1859-1918), British judge, 
was born at Skewen, near Neath, May 4 1859. He was educated 
at the local school and at London University, being afterwards 

admitted as a solicitor (1883). He practised for some years at 
Neath, but in 1891 was called to the bar, where he soon built 
up a large practice, his numerous Welsh connexions being of great 
value. In 1890 he was elected Liberal member for Mid-Glamor- 
ganshire, and held the seat until 1910. In 1901 he became a Q.C., 
in 1908 was elected a bencher of the Middle Temple, from 1906-8 
was recorder of Swansea, and in 1908 was knighted and appointed 
solicitor-general by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. In 1910 
he was raised to the bench, becoming president of the Probate, 
Divorce and Admiralty division. On the outbreak of the World 
War the Prize court was reestablished, and the work here done 
as president by Sir Samuel Evans was of the highest value, 
many of his judgments laying down principles of great importance. 
He was created G.C.B. in 1917, and died in London Sept. 13 1918. 

EVERT, ALEXEI (1857-1917), Russian general, was born in 
1857 and entered the army in 1876 after finishing his course at the 
infantry military school in Moscow and receiving a commission 
in the Volinsky Guard Regiment. He passed through the 
academy of the general staff, and was appointed on the general 
staff. Later, after commanding an infantry regiment, he was in 
1900 promoted to the rank of general. In the war with Japan 
1904-5, he served on the commander-in-chief 's " quartermaster " 
(i.e. general) staff and later as the chief of the staff of the I. Army. 
In 1906 he became chief of the general staff, but very soon 
afterwards he was appointed commander of the XIII. Corps. 
In 1912 he was commander of the troops of the Irkutsk military 
district. In Aug. 1914, while commanding the IV. Army, he 
participated in the victory of the Russians in the Galician battle, 
for which he was awarded the cross of St. George of the 4th 
degree. In Oct. his army was thrown on the W. bank of the river 
Vistula, where under his leadership it fought in the fierce battles 
of the winter of 1914-5 and the summer of 1915. In Aug. 1915 
he was appointed commander-in-chief of the north-western group 
of armies, and he extricated the armies under his charge from a 
very critical position during the Vilna-Molodechno operations. 
In 1916, in order to relieve pressure on the western front, several 
attempts to break through the German line were made on his 
front, causing great losses of men and ending unsuccessfully. 
In March 1917, at the beginning of the Revolution, he was 
relieved of his duties, and he was later reported to have been 
killed by the Bolsheviki. 

EXCESS PROFITS DUTY AND TAX The outbreak of the 
World War in 1914, and the consequent gigantic increase in the 
public expenditure of the belligerent nations, led inevitably, not 
only to an increase in the weight of existing taxes, but also to a 
search for fresh sources from which substantial amounts of rev- 
enue could be raised. It soon became clear. that, among the po- 
tential sources of additional revenue, the taxation of " excess 
profits " merited serious consideration, and the subject was ex- 
plored in many countries, with the result that, during the war, 
taxes of this character were imposed in the United Kingdom, Aus- 
tralia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, France, Italy, the 
United States of America and other countries. The characteristic 
features of these taxes were: (i.) that they were charged in re- 
spect of the profits of trading concerns as such rather than of 
individuals, and (ii.) that the amount payable was determined, 
not by reference to the total profits of a concern, but by reference 
to its profits in excess of a certain standard, ascertained separately 
in each case on a prescribed basis. It was in the basis adopted 
for the computation of the standard that the main difference in 
principle between the various taxes was found, and in this respect 
the taxes fell into two distinct classes. On one basis the tax may 
be described as essentially a tax upon war profits, inasmuch as 
it was levied upon profits arising during or after the war in 
excess of a standard representing the profits or average profits 
of a period prior to the war. On the other basis, the tax took 
the form of a tax on profits in excess of a prescribed return on 
capital, and the standard was generally calculated by reference 
to a percentage upon the capital employed in earning the profits. 
It was the former of these two principles which was adopted as 
the general basis of the tax in the United Kingdom (where a tax 
on excess profits was first imposed), although the latter principle 

* These figures indicate the volume and page number of the previous article. 



appeared as a secondary feature in the scheme. Both bases, 
either separately or in combination, appeared in the schemes 
adopted in other countries. 

UNITED KINGDOM. The taxation of excess profits in the United 
Kingdom was effected by means of two separate and distinct 
imposts, viz. the munitions exchequer payments (commonly 
known as the munitions levy) and the excess profits duty. The 
character and the causes which led to the introduction of these 
two imposts were essentially different. The munitions levy, 
which applied only to a restricted class of concerns, viz. those 
engaged on the production of munitions of war or work allied 
thereto, was not primarily designed for the purpose of raising 
revenue. Owing to the urgent need of producing munitions in 
enormous and ever-growing quantities, it became necessary in 
the early part of 1915 that the Government should control the 
operations of these concerns and lay down conditions as to the 
employment of labour therein, conditions which were regarded 
as prejudicial to labour interests, and it was ultimately arranged 
that, while on the one hand labour would accept the proposed 
conditions, the owners of such concerns would for their part 
agree to hand over to the Government any amount by which 
their profits exceeded a certain standard. The amount so handed 
over was the munitions levy, and this levy was thus imposed as 
part of what may be termed a bargain made between capital, 
labour and the State, in order to secure increased production of 
necessary war materials. 

The excess profits duty, on the other hand, was imposed 
purely for fiscal purposes, and, unlike the munitions levy, was a 
tax on trades and businesses in general. But while it was essen- 
tially a means of raising large amounts of revenue, the excess 
profits duty met a growing popular demand for a curtailment 
of the large profits made in many classes of trade owing to the 
war. Early in the war it had become obvious that, owing to 
restricted supplies of, and enormously increased demands for, 
various commodities, huge profits were being reaped by those 
who traded in those commodities (see PROFITEERING), and 
there was an ever-increasing volume of opinion, which became 
more and more insistent as the war continued, that those huge 
profits, due directly to war conditions, must not be allowed to 
remain in the possession of private traders, but should be ap- 
propriated by the State either in whole or in part, and applied to- 
wards meeting the cost of the war. It was this growth of public 
feeling, the feeling that the war must not become a means where- 
by certain citizens could enrich themselves at the expense of the 
community while others were dying on the battlefield, as well 
as the urgent financial needs of the State, which led in the middle 
of 1915 to the proposals for the taxation of excess profits, and 
then to the actual imposition of the excess profits duty. 

In the following outline the excess profits duty, although it was 
imposed at a later date than the munitions levy, is dealt with 
first, as the more important and more general. 

General Scheme of the Excess Profits Duty. The excess profits 
duty, which was first imposed by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1915, was 
charged on the excess profits of businesses which were either carried 
on in the United Kingdom or carried on abroad and owned by 
persons residing in the United Kingdom. The duty extended to all 
classes of business, including agency, with the following exceptions, 
viz.: (a) husbandry in the United Kingdom, (b) offices or employ- 
ments, (c) professions, and (d) commercial travellers. The duty was 
charged upon profits, in excess of a pre-war standard of profits, 
arising in an accounting period, i.e. a period, not exceeding 12 
months in length, which normally corresponded with the period for 
which the accounts of the business were made up. Although the 
Finance (No. 2) Act, 1915, was not passed until the end of 1915, the 
duty was imposed with retroactive effect and charged by that 
Act upon the excess profits arising in any accounting period which 
ended after Aug. 4 1914 (the date of the commencement of the war) 
and before July I 1915. The duty was regularly continued by each 
annual Finance Act to the year 1920 inclusive and in each case the 
period of charge was extended for what was practically another 
year. These later Acts, while introducing certain modifications of 
detail, did not materially affect the general scheme of the duty. 

Rate of Duty. The excess profits duty was originally imposed at 
the rate of 50%, but that rate was varied in succeeding Acts. The 
changes in the rate of duty at successive periods are set out in the 
following table. 

DUTY, 1915-21. 

Period of Incidence 

Rate of duty on 
excess profit 
per cent. 

For a year from the commencement of the first 
accounting period 
From the end of the first year to Dec. 31 1916 . 
From Jan. i 1917 to Dec. 31 1918 . 
From Jan. I 1919 to Dec. 31 1919 
From Jan. I 1920 to the termination of the duty, 
viz. the end of the final accounting period . 



In the case of a business which commenced after Aug. 4 1914, 
the rate of duty was 50 % in respect of any accounting period ending 
on or before Aug. 4 1915, and 60% for any other accounting period 
or part of an accounting period up to Dec. 31 1916. 

Pre-War Standard of Profits. As stated above, the duty was 
charged on profits in excess of a pre-war standard. This standard 
was based upon the pre-war profits of the business; but in order to 
avoid the imposition of too heavy a burden upon the taxpayer in 
cases where the pre-war profits were small in amount, alternative 
methods of measuring the pre-war standard were provided, the tax- 
payer being given the choice of adopting that standard which was 
most favourable to him. It must, however, be made clear that, 
whatever standard was adopted, it was a standard based upon 
actual facts and not upon hypothetical conditions. The normal 
standard was one based upon the average profits of the business in 
the best two out of the last three pre-war years. Where there had 
been only two years of pre-war trading, the standard was the 
average profits of those two years, or (at the option of the taxpayer) 
the profits of the second of those two years. Where there had been 
only one year of pre-war trading, the standard was for that year. 

Alternative methods of computing the standard, which could be 
adopted by the taxpayer, if he so desired, were as follows: (i.) A 
standard based on the average profits of four out of the last six pre- 
war years (restricted to cases in which the average profits of the last 
three pre-war years were 25 % less than those of the preceding three 
years), and (ii.) a percentage standard, i.e. a standard computed at 
the statutory percentage rate upon the capital employed in the 
business. (The basis on which capital was computed and par- 
ticulars of the statutory percentage rate are set out and explained 
in the section which follows.) 

In the case of a business which had less than one year of pre-war 
trading or was not commenced until after the outbreak of the war, 
the standard was normally a percentage standard ; but an alternative 
standard was provided, computed by reference to the pre-war 
earnings of the proprietor of the business, whether those earnings 
arose from a profession or employment or from some other business. 

As regards accounting periods ended after Dec. 1919, a further 
alternative standard was provided (by the Finance Act, 1920) 
applicable in general to businesses carried on by individual owners, 
partnerships and private companies, whether those businesses were 
commenced before or after the outbreak of war. This standard, 
known as the substituted standard, only took effect for accounting 
periods ended after Dec. 31 1919. The substituted standard was 
computed by adding to the percentage standard a sum of 500 in 
respect of each proprietor working full time in the business 
subject to the limitation that the standard was not to exceed 750 
for each working proprietor. 

Capital and the Statutory Percentage Rates. The capital taken into 
account for purposes of excess profits duty was broadly speaking the 
proprietor's capital actually employed in the business, and was 
computed by deducting the amount of the liabilities from the value 
of the business assets. In making that computation the following 
principles were followed: (i.) Investments outside the business 
were not taken into account (except in the case of investment, etc. 
companies), as the capital they represent was not capital employed 
in the business, (ii.) Debentures and other loan capital were treated 
as liabilities, and the amount thereof was consequently deducted in 
making the computation, (iii.) Assets in general (apart from cash or 
debts) were valued at cost (or, if pot acquired by purchase, at their 
value when they first became assets of the business), subject to any 
proper deduction for wear and tear, etc. The result of a computation 
on these lines was an amount which, though it might differ from the 
amount of capital shown in the balance sheet, was a measure of the 
proprietor's capital, including reserves, employed in the business. 

For ascertaining the percentage standard, the statutory percentage 
rates prescribed in the Acts relating to the excess profits duty were 
applied to the capital computed on the above basis. 

The percentage rates, some of which were varied from time to time 
during the lifetime of the duty, differentiated between companies 
on the one hand and private businesses on the other, a- lower rate 
being prescribed in the case of companies on the ground that in their 
case a deduction from profits was normally allowed in respect of 
remuneration paid to the directors and managers, whereas no deduc- 
tion was allowed for remuneration paid to the proprietor of, or part- 
ner in, a private business. ' 


The statutory percentage rates applicable for the purpose of 
determining the percentage standard were as follows: 

In the case 
of companies 
or other 

In the case 
of private 

(i.) In respect of accounting periods 
ended on or before Dec. 31 1916 . 
(ii.) In respect of accounting periods 
ended after Dec. 31 1916 (a) In the 
case of a business having one or more 
pre-war years 
(ft) In the case of a business having less 
than one pre-war year or a business 
commenced since the outbreak of war 



T / 

7 /o 

II %* 

* Increased by 2 % for accounting periods ended after Dec. 31 1919. 

Provision was made, however, for an increase of the statutory 
percentage rate in cases where a class of trade could prove an 
application that special risks attached to the employment of capital 
in that trade. Such applications, which could only; be made on 
behalf of a class of trade as a whole and not by individual concerns 
within a class, were dealt with by a board of referees specially 
appointed by the Treasury. 

Statutory Allowance. In computing excess profits, a deduction 
of 200 per annum was allowed in the case of every business. This 
amount was subsequently increased in the case of small businesses : 
(i.) In respect of accounting periods ended after Dec. 31 1916, by 
varying amounts up to a maximum addition of 400 per annum, and 
(ii.) in respect of accounting periods ended after Dec. 31 1919, by 
varying amounts up to a maximum addition of 800 per annum. 

Computation of Profits. Profits both in the accounting periods 
and in the pre-war years were computed by reference to the actual 
profits arising in those periods, and it was a general principle of the 
tax that a similar basis of computation should be adopted through- 
out. Subject to certain exceptions, the general basis of computation 
of profits was the same as that adopted for purposes of income tax. 
Income derived from investments (save in the exceptional case of 
investment concerns) was excluded from the computation of profits; 
but the income-tax method was departed from in allowing a deduc- 
tion in respect of interest on borrowed money. In three other 
directions in particular a departure was made from the general 
scheme of computing profits for purposes of the income tax. In the 
first place, the amount allowable as a deduction in respect of the 
remuneration of directors and managers of a business was expressly 
restricted to the amount so paid in the last pre-war trade year, unless 
the commissioners of Inland Revenue (the assessing authority) 
directed otherwise. In practice, the commissioners restricted the 
allowance to the amount paid in the last pre-war year in cases where 
the director or manager was in a proprietary position. In other 
cases, the increased remuneration paid was in general allowed as a 
deduction either in whole or in part. In the second place, a deduction 
from profits was expressly authorized by section XI. (3) of the 
Finance (No. 2) Act, 1915, in respect of special depreciation due to the 
war of capital assets employed in the business and of expenditure on 
repairs deferred in consequence of the war. In the third place, recog- 
nition was given in the excess profits duty to the principle that 
variations ofcapital imply variations of profit, and where the capital 
employed in the accounting period varied in amount from that 
employed in the standard period, an adjustment was made a 
deduction (at the statutory percentage rate) being allowed in respect 
of any increase in the amount of capital in the accounting period as 
compared with that in the standard period, and an addition being 
made in respect of any corresponding decrease. 

Apart from the general provisions for the computation of profits, 
special provisions were enacted with respect to investment com- 
panies, cooperative societies, the shipping industry and businesses 
carried on by municipal authorities; and the duty was extended by 
the Finance Act, 1918, to profits arising from certain sales of trading 
stock which were in the nature of capital transactions. 

Set-off in Respect of a Deficiency of Profits Below the Standard. At the 
time when the excess profits duty was first introduced, the view was 
taken that, having regard to the very high rate at which the duty 
was charged, it was necessary to take into consideration the general 
position of the trader over the whole lifetime of the duty. This view 
fed to the introduction into the Statute of a provision under which 
the taxpayer became entitled to set off, against the excess profits 
duty of one accounting period, a sum equivalent to the duty on the 
amount by which his profits in another were below the standard. 

Administration of the Duty. Unlike the income tax, many of the 
assessments to which are made by a number of local bodies, the 
administration of the excess profits duty was expressly placed by 
Statute in the hands of one central authority, the commissioners of 
Inland Revenue, by whom the assessments were made, the main 
part of the work being carried out under their direction by H.M. 
Inspectors of Taxes. By this means it was possible to secure a 
measure of uniformity of practice which was otherwise unattainable 
in the case of a tax of so novel and difficult a character. From the 

assessments made by the commissioners of Inland Revenue the 
trader had a statutory right of appeal to either the general com- 
missioners of Income Tax (local bodies appointed for the purposes of 
the income tax) or to the special commissioners of Income Tax. 
From the decisions of those commissioners, an appeal lay to the 
courts on a point of law at the instance of either the trader or the 
assessing authority (the commissioners of Inland Revenue). 

On certain specific points, the settlement of a matter in dispute 
between the trader and the commissioners of Inland Revenue was 
reserved for the board of referees appointed by the Treasury, from 
whose decision an appeal lay to the courts on a point of law. 

The duty was collected by the commissioners of Inland Revenue, 
and payment was required to be made two months after the notice 
of assessment was issued, though the commissioners of Inland Rev- 
enue were empowered to accept payment by instalments in suitable 
cases. Discount at varying rates was allowed on prepayment of 
duty, and certain Government securities issued during the war 
could be tendered in satisfaction of the duty. 

Termination of the Excess Profits Duty. In the early part of 1921, 
Mr. Chamberlain, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced 
that the Finance bill of that year would contain proposals for bring- 
ing the excess profits duty to an end. The decision to terminate the 
duty gave rise to almost as many difficult problems as did its imposi- 
tion, the most important being those connected with the restriction 
of the duty to a uniform aggregate period of charge for all businesses 
alike and with reliefs to compensate for the heavy drop in the values 
of trading stocks after the termination of the duty. 

The proposals embodied in the Finance bill of 1921 contemplated 
that, in the case of businesses which were in existence before Aug. 4 
1914, the liability to excess profits duty would terminate on such a 
date as would result in each business being subject to the duty for a 
period of seven years from the commencement of the first accounting 
period. As such businesses commenced liability at different dates 
they would terminate liability at different dates, but in no case 
would liability cease before Aug. 5 1920, or after Aug. 4 1921. 
Businesses which did not come into existence until after Aug. 4 1914, 
would, it was proposed, cease to be liable to the duty at a fixed date, 
Dec. 31 1920. As regards the valuation of trading stocks it had been 
recognized from 1917 onwards that traders holding stocks of com- 
modities might be involved in very heavy losses shortly after the 
termination of the excess profits duty and that some relief from 
excess profits duty in respect of such losses might fairly be given. 
Provisions of a highly technical character for granting this relief 
were included in the Finance bill of 1921. 

General Observations. In general, the administration of the duty 
proceeded smoothly and without any serious friction, and this was 
undoubtedly due in the main to the patriotic attitude adopted by 
taxpayers. Recognizing the necessity of the State to levy large 
sums by way of taxation, the taxpayer, notwithstanding the very 
high rates at which the duty was imposed, was not disposed during 
the war to raise issues affecting his liability, unless those issues were 
of a serious character involving very large sums. 

That the duty proved a great success from the point of view of the 
Exchequer is evidenced by the following figures of its yield. These 
figures include the yield of the munitions levy: 

Financial Year. 

Budget Estimate. 

Amount paid into the 




It was anticipated that in 19223 some further substantial 
amount would be yielded, approximating to 70,000,000 

The following figures giving the approximate excess profits arising 
in the undermentioned periods may be of interest : 



of excess 

Accounting periods ended profits 

Between Aug. 5 1914 and March 31 1917 . . . 600,000,000 
During the year ended March 31 1918 . . . 420,000,000 
During the year ended March 31 1919 . . . 460,000,000 
During the year ended March 31 1920 . . . 500,000,000 

Although the duty proved invaluable as a means of producing 
revenue, experience showed that a tax of this character (i.e. one 
which has regard to the profits of a particular period as a standard) 
is one which is only suitable for adoption as a temporary measure in 
times of emergency. Where the circumstances are such that in- 
creased profits are being made by any considerable section of the 
community, an excess profits duty is certainly a most useful expe- 
dient for raising money quickly from those who are able to pay. 
But it is perhaps not suitable for adoption in normal times and 
circumstances or as part of a permanent scheme of taxation. It is 
in some respects unequal in its incidence as between one taxpayer 



and another, and unless the rate of duty is kept low it tends to dis- 
courage enterprise and to lead to extravagance and evasion. 

Excess Mineral Rights Duty. This duty was imposed as a com- 
plementary duty to the excess profits duty and, broadly speaking, 
remained in force over the same periods. 

At the time when the excess profits duty was imposed upon 
traders on the ground that they were making excessive profits from 
the sale of general commodities, it was pointed out that, owing to 
the war, owners of mineral royalties were obtaining largely enhanced 
royalties. It was therefore decided to impose a duty on these 
enhanced royalties in so far as the increase was due to an increased 
rate of royalty and the duty so imposed was the excess mineral 
rights duty. The excess royalty on which duty was charged was 
computed by reference to the royalty paid in the pre-war years, 
and the rates of duty were the same as for excess profits. 

The duty applied to only a limited number of taxpayers, was easy 
to administer and presented very few difficulties in practice. The 
yield was approximately some 250,000 per annum. 

Munitions Levy. The munitions levy the official title of which 
was the munitions exchequer payments was imposed by the 
Munitions of War Acts, 1915 and 1916, and the rules made there- 
under. It applied only to businesses (mainly concerned in the 
manufacture of munitions and war material) which were subject to 
Government control under the Munitions of War Acts, and the 
period of liability commenced in each case from the date when the 
business was made a controlled establishment under those Acts. 
Different businesses consequently commenced to be liable to the 
levy at different dates according to their respective dates of control ; 
the earliest date at which any business was controlled being July 2 
1915. The levy was repealed by the Finance Act, 1917, as from 
Dec. 31 1916. The scheme was to allow the owner of the controlled 
establishment to retain a certain amount of profit (defined as the 
" divisible profit ") the whole of the balance of profit in-excess of that 
amount being taken by the State. The " divisible profit " was 
measured by a standard amount of profit plus one-fifth of that 
standard and the standard was normally the average profit of the 
controlled establishment in the two years before the war. 

Various allowances were prescribed in the rules (1915) relating to 
the levy, among the more important of which were allowances for 
increased output, increased capital, capital expended specially for 
purposes of munition work, and the rendering of special service. 

Although controlled establishments were subject to this special 
levy they were also subject, like all other businesses, to the general 
tax, the excess profits duty. Provision was, however, made that 
only the higher of the two charges should be payable. The result 
was, therefore, that while the two imposts ran concurrently, con- 
trolled establishments were liable like other trading concerns to 
excess profits duty and were also liable to a possible additional 
charge representing the excess (if any) of the munitions levy charge 
over the excess profits duty charge. 

When the rate of the excess profits duty was increased to 80 % as 
from Jan. I 1917, it became clear that in practically every case the 
excess profits duty would exceed the munitions levy charge. In 
these circumstances there was no object in continuing the munitions 
levy and that impost was repealed as from Dec. 31 1916. 

The levy was administered at first by the Minister of Munitions; 
but when the levy was repealed by the Finance Act of 1917, the 
administration was transferred to the commissioners of Inland 
Revenue, the body in whom the administration of the excess profits 
duty was vested. Appeals against assessments to the levy were 
referred to a board of referees under the Munitions Acts. 

In itself the munitions levy can hardly be regarded as a scheme of 
taxation ; rather it was a means of restricting the amount of profits 
which the State was prepared to allow owners of certain particular 
classes of business to retain. In this respect an analogy to the 
munitions levy may be found in the coal-mines excess payments 
imposed by the Coal Mines Control Agreement (Confirmation) Act 
of 1918, and the coal levy imposed by the Coal-Mines Emergency 
Acts of 1920 and 1921, which were applied to the coal-mining indus- 
try, and which had the effect as from March I 1917 to March 30 1921 
of restricting the amount of profit the owners of that industry might 
retain, the balance being taken by the State. (G. B. C.) 

UNITED STATES. In the United States the " excess-profits 
tax" (Act of March 3 1917), together with the "war excess- 
profits tax" (Act of Oct. 3 1917), and the "war-profits and 
excess-profits tax " (Act of Feb. 24 1919), was a natural product 
of the feeling that the abnormal expenses due to war should be 
borne so far as possible by taxes upon the increased profits of 
business which war usually brings. During the American Civil 
War the state of Georgia had adopted (1863) a tax on business 
profits in excess of 8% on the capital stock, varying from 5 to 
25% according to the amount of such excess profits. But this 
experiment had been forgotten when the World War broke out, 
and the demand for special taxation of war profits first found 
expression, following the example of England, in the munition- 
manufacturers tax of Sept. 8 1916. 

While the earlier plans for excess-profits taxation had attempted 
to confine it to profits directly attributable or traceable to the war, 
this limitation was soon abandoned and the net was spread for an 
increase or excess of profits during the war over normal profits 
earned prior to the war, allowance being made through a per- 
centage of capital for (a) new business concerns, (b) additional 
investment by old concerns, and (c) concerns whose profits were 
abnormally low during the pre-war period. When the United 
States on March 3 1917 adopted its first excess-profits tax for the 
purpose of creating a " Special Preparedness Fund," Canada's 
plan of disregarding pre-war profits was followed, and a tax of 8% 
imposed upon the net income of partnerships and corporations 
in excess of " the sum of (a) $5,000 and (b) 8% of the actual 
capital invested." 

The American decision to ignore pre-war profits was made 
deliberately by the framers of the law on the grounds that a 
deduction based upon invested capital is simpler, better designed 
to serve as the basis of a permanent tax, and more equitable in 
that it prevents taxpayers from securing immunity from taxation 
during the war on the ground that they had been unusually 
prosperous before the war. Eventually this decision precipitated 
an important controversy between the adherents of a " war- 
profits tax " (with the normal deduction based on pre-war 
earnings) and the advocates of an " excess-profits tax " (with the 
normal deduction computed as a percentage of invested capital) ; 
but the victory rested on the whole with the latter, although 
minor use of the pre-war profits was made in the tax finally 
collected for the year 1917, and for the one year 1918 a dual or 
alternative tax was imposed, the taxpayer paying in effect an 
80% war-profits tax, or an excess-profits tax at progressive rates 
of 30 and 65 %, whichever was the higher. For the year 1919 and 
thereafter, however, only the excess-profits tax was retained. 

Rates and Exemptions. Under the American tax the normal 
exemption or " excess-profits credit " consists of a specific exemption 
of $3,000 plus 8 % of the invested capital. Profits or income in excess 
of this credit but not in excess of 20% of the invested capital are 
taxed at the rate of 20% and the remaining or higher profits are 
taxed at the rate of 40%. Under the American Act of Oct. 3 1917 
the specific exemption to individuals and partnerships was $6,000 
but to corporations only $3,000. 

Taxpayers Subject. The American law of 1917 applied to all 
trades and businesses including professions and occupations, but in 
case the trade or business had no invested capital or not more than a 
nominal capital, the tax was virtually an additional income tax 
equal to 8 % of the income in excess of $3,000 for corporations and 
$6,000 for other taxpayers. Beginning with 1918, however, the 
tax was confined to corporations, excluding personal-service cor- 
porations (i.e. those " whose income is to be ascribed primarily to 
the activities of the personal owners or stockholders who are them- 
selves regularly engaged in the active conduct of the affairs of the 
corporation and in which capital, whether invested or borrowed, is 
not a material income-producing factor ") which are taxed sub- 
stantially as partnerships. This limitation was due to dissatisfaction 
with the attempt to tax professional men under the Act of 1917, and 
a recognition that the income-tax proper bears more lightly upon 
corporations than upon other taxpayers. Under the income tax 
the entire income or profit of an individual is subject to normal tax 
and surtaxes (the latter rising to 65%), whether the income is 
spent or reinvested; but the corporation does not pay income sur- 
taxes and its stockholders pay surtaxes only on the profits which are 
distributed. After 1917, therefore, the excess-profits tax became a 
compensatory or balancing tax upon the income of corporations 
similar to the 5 % corporation profits tax adopted in 1919 for the 
same purpose in the United Kingdom. 

Yield. Judged by the standard of productivity, the most im- 
portant quality of a war tax, the excess-profits tax was conspicuously 
successful during the war. The yield of the tax is shown herewith : 

Excess-Profits Tax Returned for Calendar Year 


Individuals, etc. 
Partnerships . 
Corporations . 

1918 . 

1919 . 

1920 . 

. $ 101,249,781 

. 1,638,747,740 
. . 1,843,885,505 

- 2,505,565,939 
. (est.) 1,315,000,000 
. (est.) 520,000,000 

The figures for 1918 represent possibly the largest annual amount 
ever produced in one country by a single tax. During the crucial 
years 1917-9 the excess-profits tax produced more than 25% of the 


total ordinary receipts (excluding receipts on account of public debt). 
Although the rates were severe, rising to 8p% for 1918, the tax was 
collected without crippling industries owing to the high level of 
profits and to the protective effect of the normal exemption, the 
relief provisions, and the large degree of administrative discretion 
authorized in practically all excess-profits tax laws. Indeed, after 
payment of the heavy war income and profits taxes combined, 
the corporations of the United States had left, in each of the years 
1917-9 inclusive, larger money profits than in any other year for 
which statistics exist, except the year 1916. 

Weakness of the Tax. Both political parties had promised the 
repeal of the excess-profits tax in the year 1921. This was partly 
explained by the sharp decline in its productivity under peace 
conditions, reflected in the statistics given above. But in the main the 
unpopularity of the tax was due to the effect of its high rates in 
stimulating extravagant expenditures by the taxpayers subject 
to it; the general belief (probably ill-founded in part) that it was 
passed on loaded with additions to the general body of consumers ; 
its limitation to a small proportion (in number) of the business 
concerns; its great complexity which left the taxpayer uncertain 
as to his liability and threatened to cause, in the words of the 
Secretary of the Treasury, an administrative breakdown; and most 
of all to its capricious inequalities. The essential object of the 
tax was to lay a heavy tax upon " supernormal " income or profits. 
But to determine what constituted " normal " profits was a task of 
great difficulty. Where this normal profit was determined on the 
basis of pre-war profits, to use the words of the British Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, " prosperous concerns with a large pre-war profit 
standard might escape liability for the tax because their present 
profits, though high, are not in excess of their standard, and, at any 
rate, they pay tax on what all of us think an unduly low scale. ' 
In the United States, where the normal exemption was computed as 
a percentage of invested capital, corporations which had been 
liberally capitalized gained an unfair advantage over those which 
had been conservatively financed. The American tax unquestionably 
bore more heavily upon hazardous industries than upon those with 
more stable earnings. Thus for 1918, among corporations liable for 
excess-profits tax, the average ratio of the tax to net income was 
30%. But construction companies paid 48%, manufacturing 
industries 38 %, mining 25 % and banks only 9 %. This tax, said the 
Secretary of the Treasury in 1919, " encourages wasteful expendi- 
ture, puts a premium on overcapitalization and a penalty on brains, 
energy and enterprise, discourages new ventures, and confirms old 
ventures in their monopolies." 

See Treasury Department, Regulation No. 41, relative to the 
War Excess-Profits Tax of 1917. (T. S. A.) 

EXCHANGES, FOREIGN (see 10.50). In no department of 
finance was there a greater upheaval as the result of the World 
War than in that of national currency-values as shown in the 
foreign exchanges. The theory of foreign exchange is sufficiently 
explained in the earlier article. It remains to deal here with the 
historical developments subsequent to 1910. 

For some years immediately preceding the World War there 
had been a gradual movement on the part of all important 
countries towards the establishment of their currencies on a gold 
basis. It is true that only in England, the United States and 
India was there an absolutely free and unrestricted gold market, 
yet all the other leading countries, with the exception of China 
and Brazil, may be considered to have achieved this object, for 
although, as regards most of them, difficulties were placed in the 
way of those who desired to withdraw gold from their respective 
State banks for the purpose of export, yet it was generally under- 
stood that, in the last resource, these banks would part with 
gold rather than permit their exchanges to depreciate below their 
gold parity. The result was that exporters and importers in all 
these countries could trade with each other without troubling 
themselves about possible fluctuations in exchange. Rates moved 
within very narrow limits and merchants could ignore them. 

Even in the case of such countries as Italy and Spain, which 
had not quite succeeded in stabilizing their exchanges (i.e. 
bringing their currency-values up to the gold par), the risk of 
loss through sudden and violent fluctuations in exchange rates 
was very slight. It was only when trading with China, Brazil, 
Portugal, and a few small South American and Central American 
states, that merchants felt it necessary to take exchange risks 
into account, and the more prudent were in the habit of avoid- 
ing such risk by buying or selling exchange for forward delivery. 

Most banks and banking houses in England and elsewhere 
bought and sold foreign exchange, but they did not do so prima- 
rily with the object of making large profits, for very little money 

could be made out of exchange operations when fluctuations were 
small and of rare occurrence. Their chief object was to meet the 
requirements of their customers. Indeed, foreign banks having 
branches in London regarded their foreign. exchange trading de- 
partments as the least expensive form of advertising. In fact, 
when one looks back to those times, one realizes that the cur- 
rencies of nine-tenths of the world were for all practical purposes 
identical. One felt just as certain of getting 25 francs or 20 marks 
for a pound sterling as of getting twelve pence for a shilling or 
100 centimes for a franc. 

War-time Conditions. In reviewing conditions that ruled 
during the early days of the war, one cannot but wonder at the 
remarkable adaptability of the London foreign exchange market, 
particularly when account is taken of the numerous obstacles and 
restrictions that the British Government considered necessary, 
for good reason, to put in the way of exchange transactions. 
When the British Treasury assumed complete control over the 
London exchange market at the outbreak of the war, they had 
three important objects in view: first, to prevent British capital 
from being sent abroad; secondly to close every avenue by which 
enemy nations might carry on their trade with direct or indirect 
assistance from England; and thirdly to enable every British or 
Allied trader to obtain or to dispose of all the " exchange " 
necessary to carry on his legitimate business. 

The following are some of the difficulties that had to be con- 
tended with. All communication between England and enemy 
countries was*strictly prohibited. All letters and telegrams to and 
from England were opened and read by official censors and were 
subject to indefinite delay, if indeed they ever reached their 
destination. No transactions of a " speculative " nature were 
permitted. No gold coin or bullion was allowed to be exported 
from Great Britain without a licence, which was almost always 
refused. Exchange dealers were not permitted to deal with 
neutral banks or firms unless they obtained from them their 
signatures to the following declaration: 

We undertake to the best of our ability that the account which 
you keep in our name on your books will not be utilized by us or by 
third parties for our account in any way which will, either directly 
or indirectly, assist, or be for the benefit of, any enemy of Great 
Britain, including any person, firm or company on any list published 
by His Britannic Majesty's Government and called the Statutory 
List; and, further, that any business whatsoever that we request 
you to undertake for our account will neither facilitate, nor com- 
pensate, nor clear transactions in any way or at any time connected 
with an enemy of Great Britain, including any person, firm or com- 
pany on any list published by His Britannic Majesty's Govern- 
ment and called the Statutory List. 

We understand this undertaking to apply to every kind of trans- 
action for which we utilize our account with you, including 
(but not excluding any other transactions which might directly or 
indirectly benefit any enemy of Great Britain or her Allies as above 
stated) : 

All sight or telegraphic payments to private individuals, firms, 
banks, etc., in Great Britain or other countries. 

The transfer of pounds sterling and/or foreign moneys to or from 
neutral countries on behalf of ourselves or third parties. 

The collection of remittances, coupons, drawn bonds, etc. 

The opening of documentary credit for the import and/or export 
of goods to or from our country or other countries. 

The collection and/or negotiation of cheques and bills on Great 
Britain and other countries. 

All cheques and bills drawn by us to the order of third parties. 

All payments, telegraphic and mail, that we make in sterling 
through your intermediary. 

All moneys that you receive in sterling from other parties for 
the credit of our account and/or moneys ordered to be held at the 
disposal of third parties. 

Bills domiciled payable with you. 

British banks and bankers, dealing with foreign countries, had 
to fill up once a week and send to the Ministry of Blockade, a 
printed form showing under four columns: 

(a). The approximate total of available cash sterling balances 
held for account of persons, firms and corporations domiciled in 
each country (less overdrafts) ; 

(b). The approximate total of British Treasury bills and other 
sterling bills, payable in Great Britain, held_ at their free disposal 
for persons, firms and corporations domiciled in each country; 

(c). The approximate sterling equivalent of foreign currency 
balances with banks in each country ; 


(d). The approximate sterling equivalent of currency over- 
drafts " Nostro " abroad at banks in each country. 

No British firm or institution was permitted to work in ex- 
change in joint account with a neutral firm or institution. It was 
not permissible to execute an order for a neutral to buy or sell 
foreign exchange unless it was stated for whose account the order 
was given. It was not permissible for exchange dealers to keep in 
foreign countries more than the minimum cash balances necessary 
for keeping their accounts open. An official list was sent period- 
ically to all exchange dealers from the finance section of the Minis- 
try of Blockade containing the names of persons and firms whose 
transactions it was undesirable to facilitate or finance. The last 
of these lists (colloquially known as "Black Lists"), which was 
circulated in Dec. 1918, contained no less than 10,000 names of 
persons or firms with whom it was not permitted to trade either 
directly or indirectly. It was not permissible to telegraph in 
cypher, though as a concession when ordering telegraphic trans- 
fers of money one private " check " word was permitted in each 
telegram, but this only to lessen the risk of fraud. (A few 
recognized codes in general use could, however, be employed, but 
the telegram had to commence with the name of the code and a 
small fee was charged by the censor.) 

Troublesome these restrictions undoubtedly were, but they 
were not unreasonable; and foreigners, both Allies and neutrals, 
recognized that they were necessary and were not intended in any 
way to hamper them in carrying out their own legitimate trade. 
A large and increasing volume of orders to buy and sell foreign 
exchange came to the London market from the continent of Eu- 
rope and also from America, with the result that London never 
lost its preeminent position as the world's centre for foreign 
exchange. Indeed, the great increase in the volume of exchange 
transactions that started very shortly after the declaration of 
peace, when exchanges were decontrolled and all restrictions 
were removed, found England better equipped than ever before 
for maintaining its leading position. 

In this connexion the three subjoined tables, A, B and C, for 
London business done on various foreign centres, are of interest. 
The first (A) shows the highest and lowest exchange quotations 
during a normal pre-war year, the second (B) gives similar quota- 
tions for a post-war year, and the third (C) is a record of the rates 
at which actual transactions took place on one day in 1921: 

TABLE A. Pre-war Rates 1912. 

Method of Quoting. 



New York. 

Dollars per pound 



Paris . 

Francs per pound 




Francs per pound 



Germany . 

Marks per pound 

20-41 i 



Guilders per pound 



Italy . 

Lire per pound . 




Pesetas per pound 




Crowns per pound 




11 11 11 


' 18-29 


11 11 11 
Pence per milreis 

4 6id. 



Crowns per pound 




Pence per rupee 

is. 3 Ud. 


Buenos Aires 

Pence per gold peso 

48 Ad. 

4 8Md. 

England was by no means the only country where foreign 
exchange transactions were subject to strict State control. In 
Germany, in fact, restrictions were far greater than in England. 
In that country dealings in foreign exchange were confined, 
officially, to certain firms and banks, numbering in all 28, who 
were granted licences by the German chancellor permitting them 
to do that kind of business. The offiqes where such transactions 
were authorized were known as Divisenstellen or " Foreign Ex- 
change Offices." Official rates governing exchange transactions 
were fixed by the State Bank. These varied from time to time. 
Table D (on p. 42) gives the highest and lowest official Berlin 
rates for the years 1916, 1917 and 1918. 

It will be noticed how very steady were the Austrian, Hun- 
garian and Bulgarian exchanges, especially during 1917. Even 
that on Constantinople varied only about 5 % during that year. 
If one compares these with the variations in the French, Italian 

and American rates of exchanges as quoted in London in 1917, one 
will find that the German control was, on the whole, rather more 
successful, for although the difference between the highest and 
lowest quotations for the " pegged " dollar was barely j of i %, 
that for the French franc was about 2 J % and that for Italy was 
as much as 31 per cent. 

TABLE B. Post-war Rates 1920. 

Percentage of Vari- 



Method of Quoting. 

2 5'75 Montreal 



Dollars per pound 

25-19 New York 



11 ii ti 

68-83 Pa"s 



Francs per pound 

32-90 Holland 



Guilders per pound 

112-00 Italy 



Lire per pound 

52-26 Spam 



Pesetas per pound 

247-82 Portugal 



Pence per milreis 

44-21 Norway 



Crowns per pound 

8-44 Sweden 



11 11 11 

32-20 Denmark 



11 11 it 

205-08 Finland 



Finnish marks per pound 

204-16 Germany 



Marks per pound 

20-26 Switzerland 



Francs per pound 

57-55 Belgium 



11 11 it 

96-85 Greece 



Drachmas per pound 

170-83 Bucharest 



Lei per pound 

233-33 Vienna 



Crowns per pound 

246-15 Prague 



11 11 11 

521-62 Warsaw 



Polish mks. per pound 

90-77 Rio de Jan- 




Pence per milreis 

44-68 Buenos 




Pence per gold peso 

100-00 India 


2s. 9|d. 

Sterling per rupee 

29-02 Japan 

2s. 4d. 

33. o\d. 

Sterling per yen 

145-16 Shanghai 

33. lod. 

93. 6d. 

Sterling per tael 

2-60 Singapore 

2s. 3d. 


Sterling per dollar 

TABLE C. Rates on Jan. 25 1921. 

Percentage of Variation. 



9-00 Paris. 



0-17 Amsterdam 



8-27 Belgium . 



0-80 Spain 



3-71 Italy. 



0-16 Switzerland 



0-91 Stockholm 



2-05 Christiania 



3-78 Copenhagen 



0-52 New York 



0-46 Canada . 



4-00 Portugal . 


0-50 Buenos Aires 



i-oo Greece 


I -80 Finland . 



9-35 Germany. 



8-33 Austria . 



Among the other difficulties that the German trader had to 
contend with were these: No German current coins or bank- 
notes were permitted to be sent abroad unless permission had 
been obtained previously from the State Bank. No German or 
foreign money could be sent abroad for the purpose of acquiring 
securities or merchandise of any description without the per- 
mission of the State Bank. This prohibition also extended to 
barter. No foreign credits of any description in German currency 
were permissible without the sanction of the State Bank. The 
Imperial chancellor had the power to authorize the State Bank to 
requisition from the possessor any foreign currencies, foreign 
balances or other " means of payment abroad," giving in exchange 
their full value in German marks at the official exchange then 
ruling. Persons or institutions acquiring or disposing of foreign 
exchange in any shape or form were obliged to give full in- 
formation as to the nature of the business in question to the State 
Bank, and the Divisenstellen were empowered to make it a 
condition that this information should be given before doing 
business with them. Persons infringing any of these regulations 
or found to be giving false information, rendered themselves 
liable to fines varying from 100 to 50,000 marks and to imprison- 
ment for periods not exceeding one year. In addition to this, the 
money or goods in question might be declared forfeit to the State!. 


Secrecy on the part of the Divisenstellen was ensured by an edict 
rendering anyone guilty of betraying any information obtained 
liable to a substantial fine or imprisonment. 

The business of German money changers was very much 
hampered and restricted by emergency legislation. Money 
changers were certainly permitted to buy and sell foreign 
currencies against their equivalent in German marks, but the 
total amount so exchanged for one and the same person or firm 
by one or more money changers on one single day could not 
exceed 1,000 marks, nor in one calendar month 3,000 marks, 
unless special permission had been granted by the State Bank. 
Certain exceptions were made. For instance, it was not necessary 
to obtain permission to send funds abroad for the purpose of 
providing for the necessary disbursement of ships, nor for the 
purchase abroad of German war bonds or exchequer bonds. 
That part of Belgium occupied by German troops was treated in 
an exceptional manner and its exchange could be purchased or 
sold to any extent. Still, even in Germany, a very large export 
and import business could be carried on with Holland, Switzer- 
land and Scandinavia. That trade was practically impossible 
with more distant countries was due to the blockade and not to 
foreign exchange restrictions. 

In order .to appreciate the effect produced by the war on the 
mechanism of dealings in foreign exchange, it is necessary to 
bear in mind the position previously occupied by the sterling bill 
throughout the world. Owing to the fact that London had been, 
for a far longer period than any other country, an absolutely free 
market for gold, and that the Bank of England had been willing 
to cash its notes on presentation, in gold to any extent, both for 
internal use and for export, the " exchange " of the whole world 
centred round the sterling bill, which had come to be regarded as 
actual interest-bearing gold. Nearly every foreign state bank was 
in the habit of keeping a certain portion of its reserve in sterling 
bills, which were renewed from time to time, as they became due, 
and only " melted " when and as these banks desired to replenish 
their stocks of gold. 

Another thing to be remembered is the facility with which the 
Government banks of England, France, Germany, Belgium, 
Holland and other countries, could, until the outbreak of war, 
control their exchanges by raising or lowering their official 
discount rates. If, for instance, the rate of exchange between 
London and Paris was such that gold was being sent in incon- 
venient quantities from England to France, the Bank of England 
would raise the bank rate (and thus the value of money) in London 
to a sufficient extent to make it profitable for French banks to 
leave their money in England, or English bankers would draw 
three-months bills on France, in order to meet the demand for 
remittances to that country. Such bills, being almost invariably 
of the highest quality, were eagerly sought for by French banks 
and readily discounted in Paris. 

The immediate effect of the outbreak of hostilities at the open- 
ing of Aug. 1914 was to break down the whole fabric of foreign 
exchange throughout the world. Credit, as regards foreign ex- 
change, for the time being ceased to exist, and in' every country 
there was a rush on the part of bankers and merchants to bring 
home their credit balance from abroad and to " melt " all their 
foreign bills. The movement of exchanges at the beginning 

of Aug. 1914 was most interesting. In America, for a short time, 
it was quite impossible to obtain exchange to meet indebtedness 
by remittances to London, and the value of the pound sterling in 
New York in consequence rose in one day as much as 30 per cent. 
On the other hand, in Paris the value of the pound depreciated 
4 per cent. And this was in spite of the fact that, contrary to what 
prevailed in other countries, no prohibition was then put on the 
export of gold from the Bank of England. 

In London, during the Aug. 1914 bank-holiday interval, which 
was prolonged by Royal Proclamation from Monday the -3rd 
until Friday the 6th, in order to avoid a panic, one of the most 
important problems before the British Treasury was the re- 
establishment of foreign exchange, since it was recognized that, 
until this was accomplished, it would be quite impossible to carry 
on the foreign trade of the country. It was necessary in the first 
instance to reestablish the position of the sterling bill. For this 
purpose two things were necessary: (i) to induce English 
accepting houses to continue to grant legitimate trade credits, 
and (2) to induce banks and discount houses to discount these 
acceptances when created. The accepting houses realized that an 
unknown but probably a large proportion of their acceptances 
would not be provided for by the drawers at due date, while the 
discount houses believed that many of the bills bearing their 
endorsements or guaranteed by them might not be met by the 
acceptors. Neither acceptors nor endorsers therefore felt them- 
selves justified in adding to their liabilities. 

These two apparently insuperable difficulties were overcome by 
the Treasury, with the assistance of the Bank of England. The 
Government, by a series of proclamations, relieved the endorsers 
of all approved sterling bills of their liability as endorsers, and 
authorized the Bank of England to advance at interest to all 
approved English acceptors, who, for reasons connected either 
directly or indirectly with the war, should not receive the money 
necessary to meet their acceptances at maturity, loans to meet 
these bills, repayable on or before one year after the termination 
of the war. Almost immediately these measures had the desired 
effect, and so far as the import trade of the United Kingdom was 
concerned exchange very soon resumed more or less its normal 
position. All trustworthy export houses abroad were sure of being 
able to finance their exports to Great Britain, and could rely on 
finding a ready market in London for their sterling bills. Cash 
payments, owing to the irregularity of the post, were usually 
made by telegraphic transfers. Exchange operations resulting 
from British export trade were not found so easy to carry out, 
and it was in this connexion that the mechanism of exchange 
underwent most change. No belligerent country other than 
England had been able in the early days of the war to maintain 
a free discount market; and throughout Europe, in those coun- 
tries where gold had hitherto been obtainable, its export was 
prohibited. The result was that, in continental rates of exchange 
on London, although there was a limit as to the extent of a fall, 
owing to there still being a free gold market in England, there was 
no limit as to a rise. As a result, no prudent bank or exchange 
dealer in London kept any substantial balance abroad, and 
portfolios of bills in foreign currency (formerly held to the value 
of tens of millions of pounds) were no longer maintained. Their 
place in the business was taken by Treasury bills. 

TABLE D. Official Rates of Exchange in Berlin. 










Parity : 
Fl. 100 

Parity : 
Kr. 100 


Kr. 100 


Parity : 
Kr. 100 


Parity : 
Fr. 100 

Kr. 100 
M.8 5 - 

Parity : 
Pts. too 

Parity : 
Leva. 100 

Parity : 
i (Turkish) 

Lowest . 
Lowest . 













I6 7i 
I 4 8J 





I5 fi 









7 6i 



2 1 '05 





The prohibition against selling stock-exchange securities owned 
by foreigners on the London market, and the difficulty in the way 
of selling securities held in England on any other market except 
that of New York, combined with the British Government having 
assumed practical control of all credit operations, resulted in the 
very early days of the war in foreign exchanges being swayed 
almost entirely by actual trade transactions. Thus, the American 
sterling exchange (London on New York) after the first month or 
so of the war remained at a rate then considered low, because 
Great Britain was importing vast quantities of food and muni- 
tions from the United States and a large adverse balance of trade 
was being created. On the other hand in countries like France 
and Italy, who made large purchases in England, the exchange 
rose (i.e. depreciated in value) to heights that had not hitherto 
been reached. The same thing occurred even to a greater extent 
with regard to the Russian exchange (rubles). Russia in pre- 
war days had met its large indebtedness to England to a con- 
siderable extent by the export of food-stuffs, but owing to the 
closing of the Black Sea and the Baltic ports it was unable to 
carry on its export trade to anything like the normal extent. 
Heavy as was the depreciation in these rates of exchange, it would 
have been much heavier were it not for the fact that the British 
Government assisted its Allies to obtain large credits in London 
and in other markets. 

In the case of countries like Brazil, Argentina and Chili, it had 
become almost impossible to obtain exchange on London. This 
was especially the case in Brazil where the export trade is seasonal. 
Before the war it had been the custom for South American banks 
to obtain financial credits in London during the periods when 
trade bills were not forthcoming, and by means of bills drawn 
against these credits their debts to Europe were tided over. 
These credits were eventually liquidated by means of trade bills 
created during the export season. In the early stages of the war 
European creditors either had to wait for their money or to 
accept very unfavourable rates. 

Nevertheless, chiefly owing to the action taken by the British 
Government, the mechanism of foreign exchange was less seri- 
ously affected on the whole than might reasonably have been 
expected. Only for a very short period and between very few 
countries was trade held up altogether on account of exchange 
difficulties, but the fluctuations of rates of exchange between most 
countries became so great that the cost of exchange soon became 
a very important factor and had to be reckoned with, even in 
transactions on which the margin of profit was considerable. 

During the first year of the war the pound sterling had main- 
tained its value fairly well in all neutral countries and particularly 
so in the United States, which was neutral until April 1917. 

At the end of 1915 the leading exchange rates with countries 
open to business on the London market were as follows: 

Montreal . 4'74j Christiania . I7' 2 5 

New York 4'74j Stockholm . 17-10 

Paris . 27-73 Copenhagen 17-35 

Amsterdam 10-83 Petrograd . 159 

Italy . 3I-45 Calcutta . 1/4 " 

Madrid . 25-05 Rio de Janeiro 12 

Lisbon . ' 34d. Buenos Aires 49 

Switzerland 2 4'9O 

England however had been pouring money into America in 
ever-increasing amounts, to pay not only for those commodities 
for the supply of which England in normal times depends to a 
large extent on America, such as cereals, cotton, etc. and these 
at very high prices but also for the vast quantities of war mate- 
rial of all kinds which were being manufactured at high pressure 
and even higher cost both for England and for its Allies. Ex- 
change to meet the payments for these articles as they became 
due was provided partly by the export of gold. Between Oct. i 
and Dec. 31 1915, gold to the value of over seventeen million 
pounds sterling was withdrawn from the Bank of England for 
export to New York alone partly by the proceeds of the sale 
through ordinary channels of the bulk of what may be described 
as the floating stock of American securities held in England, and 
partly by the calling in as they became due of all the short-term 
loans that had been made by English investors to America. In- 

deed, at the very beginning of the war, the city of New York was 
called upon to repay 13,500,000 that happened to fall due at that 
time; and as this large sum had to be found very quickly on a 
panicky and depleted exchange market, as high an exchange as 
$6.75 had to be paid per British pound for prompt cable payment. 
It must have been evident at the time that, owing to the fact 
that England had just become involved in a life and death 
struggle with a desperate and powerful antagonist, whereas 
America could not but profit through its neutrality, the pound 
must depreciate and the dollar appreciate. But the demand in 
New York had to be met regardless of cost. 

It is a curious and interesting fact that when the dollar was at 
its worst, i.e. $6.75 to the pound on Aug. 3 1914, the premium on 
the pound in New York was $1.79, whereas when the British 
pound was at its lowest value, about $3.19 in Feb. 1920, it was 
at a discount of only $1.64!. 

Very soon after the outbreak of the war, the principal foreign 
exchanges tended to group themselves into four divisions on the 
London market. These became known as the " Allied exchanges," 
the " Enemy exchanges," the " Neutral exchanges " and the 
" Eastern exchanges." Whether we take as a basis the pound 
sterling or the United States dollar (to which, in fact, the pound 
was steadily linked in value from the commencement of 1916 
till four months after the Armistice was declared), we find, 
speaking generally, that the Allied exchanges were at a discount, 
the Enemy exchanges at a greater discount, and the Neutral and 
Eastern exchanges at a premium. 

The reason is not far to seek. Of the Allies, only England and 
France could be described as wealthy; and partly because the 
war on the western front was waged mainly on French territory 
so that not only the most fertile part of France but also the chief 
centres of French industry were devastated, and also because 
the French were very inadequately taxed during the whole 
period of the war French international credit was not main- 
tained on the same level as that of England. The other Allies 
were lacking in accumulated wealth, and very soon became 
financially dependent, primarily on England and to a smaller 
extent on France. But the leading neutrals, who in Europe 
comprised Holland, Spain, Switzerland and the three Scandina- 
vian kingdoms and in S. America the Argentine Republic, were in 
a very favourable financial position. The European neutrals 
could trade to their great pecuniary advantage with both groups 
of belligerents, and could take full advantage of the great demand 
that sprang up for their produce. Spain could supply France 
with textiles and metals, Norway and Sweden could meet the 
demand for timber and paper (which was much increased by the 
closing of the Baltic ports), and Denmark and Switzerland were 
able to supply both sides with dairy produce. In addition to these 
advantages the important mercantile fleets of Holland, Scandi- 
navia and Spain were able to earn large profits because of the 
great rise that took place in freights. Indeed, throughout the war, 
preference was generally given by shippers to ships owned by 
neutrals, because the risk of their being sunk was considered 
somewhat less and the rates of insurance on their cargoes were 
therefore materially lower. 

The eastern countries, China, India and Japan, were, it is 
true, belligerents, but their financial burdens were but slight com- 
pared with those of their European colleagues; and since China 
and India were large exporters of raw materials, while Japan 
assumed gradually the position of Germany as the chief supplier 
of the less costly manufactured articles, all three countries 
profited greatly by the war. 

It may be asked why, although the United States was a free 
gold market and the pound was " pegged " (see below) to the 
dollar, both the sterling and dollar exchanges should have been 
for so long a period at a considerable discount in Spain and in 
Scandinavia. Indeed, on one day in Nov. 1917 the pound 
sterling was worth no more than Kr. 9-90 in Stockholm, and in 
April 1918 it was only saleable at Kr. 11-90 in Christiania 
and Copenhagen. The explanation is that, fearing the evils that 
might arise from " inflation," these four countries, one after 
another, announced that they would no longer purchase gold in 



any other form than that of their individual currencies, excepting 
on terms that would render such importation unprofitable. 
After the end of the war, when the demand for their produce 
slackened, these countries suffered from, this somewhat original 
form of legislation by which gold was refused in payment. The 
exchanges of all of them fell to a substantial discount hi New 
York, and three out of the four went to below their pre-war 
value as expressed in sterling. 

Control of Exchanges. Towards the end of 1915 the future out- 
look for sterling in New York began to assume a very serious 
aspect. The normal floating stock of American securities (as 
apart from regular investments) held in England was nearly 
exhausted, while the demands on America for war material were 
greater than ever. The British Government then decided that a 
supreme effort must be made to control foreign exchanges in 
general, and more particularly to ward off at all costs the threat- 
ened collapse in the gold (or in other words, the international) 
value of the pound sterling, as represented by its dollar exchange. 
Realizing, very wisely, that this task was too vast and too difficult 
to be dealt with in an adequate manner by any of the existing 
Government departments, they appointed a small committee 
which was known as the " London Exchange Committee " and 
gave them a free hand to deal with the situation as they thought 
best. The members of this Committee, which was under the chair- 
manship of the then governor of the Bank of England, Lord 
Cunliffc, included Sir Brien Cokayne (afterwards Lord Cullen), 
deputy-governor of the Bank of England; Sir Edward H.Holden; 
Sir Felix O. Schuster; Mr. Gaspard Farrer; Mr. Stanley Baldwin; 
the Hon. Sydney Peel. Later Mr. Baldwin retired and was 
replaced by Mr. H. G. Levick. The Committee were mainly men 
of international reputation, not only conversant with foreign ex- 
change but also accustomed to deal with vast sums of money, and 
whose capacity had been proved by the success of the institutions 
they controlled. The activities of this Committee were not con- 
fined to American exchange, although that was considered to be 
its principal task, for the maintenance of the American exchange 
in itself was a support to the exchanges of the Allied nations and a 
great help to neutrals, for whose commercial transactions it was 
the only element of steadiness. It also watched carefully other 
exchanges, especially that of Holland, the wealthiest and most 
important of European neutral states. 

Before starting their work the London Committee had to 
convince themselves that the means at their disposal were 
adequate for their task. What were these means? First came 
the stock of gold in the vaults of the Bank of England, over which 
they were given control, but this was none too large as a reserve 
against the Bank of England notes and the ever-increasing 
amount of Treasury notes that had taken the place of gold as the 
medium of circulation. Secondly, there was a considerable 
stock of gold held independently in the vaults of the London 
clearing banks, but this also was better left untouched if possible, 
as it formed a most valuable secret reserve that could be used to 
replenish the stock of gold held by the Bank of England should 
need arise, as indeed it did later on. Then there was the fresh gold 
coming in regularly from the gold-mines of the British Empire, 
averaging about 55,000,000 per annum or about 65% of the 
total world's production. This valuable " gold-income " was 
also placed at the disposal of the Committee to do with as they 
thought best. Finally, there was an unknown but certainly a 
very large quantity of foreign and colonial stocks and shares 
remaining in the hands of British investors and having an inter- 
national market on realization: owners of these securities (see 
DOLLAR SECURITIES MOBILIZATION) were invited to sell them or 
to lend them to the British Government on favourable terms, and 
power was taken to commandeer them at market price should it 
become advisable to do so, but the amount forthcoming volunta- 
rily was found to be ample. 1 

1 The value of the foreign securities actually deposited in this 
way at the British Treasury reached the high figure of 438,311,- 
ooo; this amount was considerably larger than had been expected. 
In addition to this, securities were sold to the Bank of England to 
the value of 46,000,000 and to the " Dollar Securities Committee " 

Having completed their exhaustive enquiries, the Committee 
decided that the means at their disposal were adequate and that 
the object in view was worth the cost. They embarked on their 
great task in Jan. 1916, and from that date until March 1919 the 
pound sterling was steadily maintained at a figure in New York 
equivalent to about par if allowance is made for the increased 
cost of freight and insurance for gold. It was not until March 
1919 that it was decided that, the object having been achieved, 
control or " pegging " might be removed and the exchange 
allowed gradually to take its own course without interference. 

It may be mentioned here that while financial authorities 
have been unanimously of opinion that this " pegging " of the 
American and English exchanges was the greatest, the most 
difficult, the most far-reaching in its effects, and the most 
successful of all the financial schemes embarked on during the 
war, there are some who think that the control was enforced for 
a longer period than was necessary, in view of the great expense 
entailed and the manifest fact that an exchange cannot be stabil- 
ized by artificial means for all time. 

The Anglo-American exchange was the only one that was 
actually " pegged " or fixed, but the other exchanges were 
watched with equal care, and where ordinary means did not 
suffice gold shipments were made to Holland as well as to 
America. Important negotiations were entered into with such 
Governments as Argentina, Uruguay, and especially Japan, and 
proved very useful in maintaining some sort of stability for the 
pound, while other understandings were effected with various 
banks in Scandinavia, Spain and Switzerland. 

The decontrol took place without any flourish of trumpets, 
and it was some little time before the world realized its full 
significance. It was not until July 1919 that the American ster- 
ling exchange fell below $4.50, nor till Dec. of that year that it 
broke below the $4.00 mark. In Feb. 1920 it fell below $3.50, 
when it touched $3.19, the lowest point recorded. In April 1920 
it temporarily rose once more to over $4.00, but subsequently 
declined again below that level. The fluctuations in exchange 
after decontrol gave rise to a vast amount of speculation. 

One of the chief causes contributing to the success of the 
task of the London Exchange Committee was the confidence 
inspired in the minds of neutrals, for it stands to reason that, 
great as were the resources placed at their disposal, the amount 
of the indebtedness of England to America soon became much 
larger, increased as it was by England assuming responsibility 

of 170,044,000. The following table gives fuller details of these 
operations : 



Securities . 


Dollar bonds 
Dollar shares 
Sterling bonds 
Sterling shares 
Registered stocks 
Home railways 
Franc bonds 
Krone bonds 
Florin bonds 
Florin shares 










These figures are exclusive of a special creation of $40,000,000 Can- 
adian Pacific Railway 4 per cent Dollar Debenture stock, depos- 
ited by the Canadian Pacific Railway Company. Of the total 
amount purchased, as given in the first column, i.e. 216,644,396, 
the Bank of England bought 48,600,000 and the Dollar Securities 
Committee 170,044,000. The deposits on loan on March 31 1919 
amounted, therefore, to 405,951,000, which, with the deposits on 
loan sold to the Treasury, 24,360,000, and the 8,000,000 special 
deposit of the Canadian Pacific Railway Company, made the bal- 
ance actually deposited 438,311,000. As will be seen from the 
above table, dollar securities constituted the major portion of those 
mobilized. Of the American securities, amounting to 250,543,000, 
which came into possession of the Treasury, 177,614,000 or more 
than 70 % were bought for resale in New York, and 72,928,000 or 
29 % were still held in Great Britain at the time this report was 
made. A good deal was subsequently disposed of, bringing the total 
amount redeemed by the United States to about 200,000,000. 



for debts contracted by its Allies for the purposes of the war. In 
fact, England may be said to have shouldered the entire burden 
until April 1917, when America joined the Allies. The neutrals 
believed in England's financial strength, and they also recognized 
that the pound sterling was interchangeable with the dollar on a 
basis which, with allowance for the increased cost of freight and 
insurance, was approximately equal to pre-war par value. In 
other words, since America remained on a real gold basis, and the 
English and American exchanges were linked together, England 
was for practical purposes also on a gold basis. They therefore 
were equally content to leave their rapidly accumulating foreign 
credit balances either in England or America, in whichever 
country a better rate of interest was obtainable. In order to offer 
an inducement for them to select England, the British Govern- 
ment authorized the Bank of England on their behalf to pay to 
British banks and bankers a specially high rate of interest on 
deposits emanating from customers in neutral states (see MONEY 
MARKET). Thus neutrals were able to get in England a rate 
of interest for their balances substantially higher than they could 
have got with equal security in America. They therefore ab- 
stained to a great extent from converting their sterling into 
dollars, which would have added greatly to the difficulties and 
expenses of the London Exchange Committee. 

Vast as this operation of " pegging " the sterling exchange in 
America was, it was only part of a still more ambitious scheme. 
The object in view was to stabilize at the same time the French, 
the Russian and the Italian exchanges. With France success 
might have been possible, although France lacked one of the 
great essentials for that purpose, i.e. a gold " income." None, 
or practically none, of the newly mined gold of the world was 
controlled by France. The Bank of France, however, possessed 
a very large stock of gold, amounting to 169,351,920 at the 
beginning of 1915, and the quantity of gold coin circulating in 
France was larger than in England. The French also had many 
investments abroad even apart from their holdings of Russian 
securities; but they were unwilling to make the great sacrifices 
that were necessary to ensure success. Their taxation was in- 
finitely lighter than that of England. The logical mind of the 
Frenchman argued thus: " If we lose the war we are ruined 
anyway. If we win, then we shall have power to force the defeated 
enemy to foot our bill down to the last franc. So why worry 
now?" They certainly did not over-estimate the power of the 
conqueror to dictate his own terms, but they omitted to take 
into their calculations the possibility that the defeated nations 
might be unable to pay what was demanded of them. At any rate 
they endeavoured to stabilize the French franc largely on money 
borrowed, first from the British Government and English invest- 
ors and accepting houses, and later from America. Such an at- 
tempt was foredoomed to failure, and the wonder is that they 
were able to keep their rate of exchange as favourable (or as far 
from unfavourable) as they did for so long a period. The move- 
ments of the French exchange as well as those of other countries 
will be seen in the annexed tables. 

With Italy it was still more difficult, and the various attempts 
that were made to prevent a breakdown in that exchange were 
not very successful; but then Italy was absolutely unable to 
rely on its own resources, much as it might wish to have done so, 
and it cannot justly be accused of backwardness in the im- 
position of taxes. As regards Russia, the attempt might well be 
described as farcical, since it resulted chiefly in enabling wealthy 
Russians to remove their money from their own country to 
places of safety abroad, at the expense of the British Government 
and the English accepting houses, who gave their unwilling as- 
sistance not with the object of making a profit, but because their 
patriotism was appealed to. 

Table E gives the rates of exchange on New York ruling in 
London at the beginning and the middle of each month from 
Jan. 1914 to Dec. 1920. 

Indian Exchange. In striking contrast to the success that 
crowned the efforts of the London Exchange Committee in deal- 
ing with the Anglo-American exchange, was the failure of the 
Indian Government to maintain the pre-war ratio between the 











































do. * 








4 - 7 6i 













British pound and the Indian rupee that had existed without a 
break since 1898. 

The Anglo-Indian exchange has always been a very difficult 
one to deal with, and it took five years' hard work (from 1893 to 
on the part of a particularly well-managed department 

of the Indian Government to establish the ratio of 15 rupees 
to the English sovereign, or is. 4d. per rupee. 'With great 
difficulty and at vast expense to the Indian taxpayer, this ratio 
was maintained during the war until Aug. 1917, when the Indian 
Council in London announced that they would no longer sell 
Indian exchange under is. sd. per rupee. In April 1918 the rate 
was raised to is. 6d.; in May 1919 to is. 8d. ; in Sept. of that 
year to 2s. od.; in Nov. to 2s. ad. and in Dec. 1919 to 25. 4d. 
In Jan. 1920 the rate was reduced to 23. od., at which rate it was 
hoped that the exchange might be maintained, but by this time 
the Indian Government had been forced to come to the con- 
clusion that the task of controlling the Anglo-Indian exchange 
was altogether beyond their power, and having spent on their 
attempts well over 20,000,000 and having caused losses far 
exceeding this amount to the Anglo-Indian trading community, 
while achieving no adequate result, they abandoned the attempt 
to interfere with the natural movements of their exchange. 

In the course of their operations they purchased from the United 
States practically the whole of their accumulated stock of silver, 
amounting to 200,000,000 ounces. They suspended their weekly 
offerings of rupee exchange in London, and for a considerable 
period offered sterling exchange on the Indian markets. But 
it was to no purpose. The phenomenal rise in prices of com- 
modities up to the early days of 1920, and their subsequent rapid 
fall, made their task too heavy for them, and after having 
reached 2s. gjd. on Feb. 14 1920, the value of the rupee fell 
away till it touched is. 3d. on March 7 1921. 

It must be borne in mind, however, that it is a far simpler 
task to " peg " an exchange to one which remains on a free gold 
basis as was that of England before the war, and as that of 
America still remained than to do so to that of a country whose 
currency is purely a fiduciary one and is subject to violent 
fluctuations in countries having a gold standard. In fact, during 
1920 the average gold value of the pound note was only 143. 6d. 
or 27^% discount, equivalent to 43 pence on a is. 4 d. rupee. 

Chinese Exchange. From time immemorial the Chinese ex- 
change has been based on the price of bar silver, and the rate 
of exchange between Shanghai and England still rises and falls 
with the market price in London of that metal. It is true that the 
fluctuations in this exchange have been extraordinarily violent in 
recent years, but so have the movements in the price of silver. 
In this connexion it may be said that a large proportion of the 
supplies of silver that came to the London market during 1919 

4 6 


and 1920 was in the form of the melted silver currencies of 
France, Belgium, Germany and Austria, which were withdrawn 
from circulation and melted into bars. So much of this silver 
came into that market during this period that, notwithstanding 
the fact that the U.S. Treasury made an agreement with the 
American producers to purchase an amount of silver sufficient to 
replace what they had sold to the Indian Government at the 
fixed rate of a dollar an ounce, it was obtainable in large quanti- 
ties at prices considerably below what it was costing to produce 
it in many of the most important mines. And yet the French, 
Belgian, German and Austrian Governments were making sub- 
stantial profits in terms of their own depreciated currencies. 

South African Exchange. Up to the time of the outbreak of 
war, there was almost a stereotyped London rate of exchange 
on S. Africa, never varying beyond the cost of sending gold either 
way usually, buying o- 5 % discount, selling o 5 % premium. Ow- 
ing to the difficulty in getting the natives to take and circulate 
notes, gold was the S. African currency in common use. In normal 
times there is a considerable leakage of gold from S. Africa. 
This rose to considerable proportions after the war had com- 
menced owing to the heavy premium on gold in other countries. 
Even after a law had been passed prohibiting the export of gold, 
a considerable amount of smuggling took place and continually 
reduced the amount of sovereigns held by the S. African banks. 
In order to replenish their stocks, the banks had to import 
sovereigns from England, resulting in the strange spectacle of the 

largest gold-producing country of the world importing gold. 
This was due to the fact that all the fresh gold produced by the 
mines was requisitioned by the British Government. 

Owing to the shortage of sovereigns, and the shipping of gold 
being a considerable expense to the banks, exchange facilities to 
exporters from England were somewhat restricted, and in May 
1920 a premium of 8% was charged for remittances to S. Africa. 
The scheme by which a Federal Reserve bank for S. Africa was 
authorized to issue inconvertible notes to take the place of the 
gold currency, caused the exchange to drop to par in Aug. 1920, 
and the swing of the pendulum, encouraged by a considerable 
increase in the import of goods, created a shortage of funds in 
London and sent the exchange in the other direction until 6 % 
was charged for remittances on London in S. Africa in Nov. 

1920. Hence the strange phenomenon of the currency of the 
greatest gold-producer in the world being at a discount as 
compared with the British Treasury note. 

Rates of Exchange. Table F gives the chief rates of exchange 
ruling in London on three typical days: the end of- July 1914; 
the day on which the Armistice was declared (Nov. n 1918); 
and the last working day of the year 1920. There are also given 
the pre-war parity rates; the highest and lowest rates touched 
during the war, and also the highest and lowest rates touched 
between Armistice day and Dec. 31 1920; and that of Aug. 10 

1921. The Austrian and German rates of exchange current 
during the war are those obtained from neutral countries. 

TABLE F. Comparative Rates on London. 


Method of 


Rate of 
July 30 1914 





Rate of 

Nov. ii 1918 

Rate of 
Dec 31 1920 

Rate of 
Aug. 10 1921 

New York 

Dollars to . 


4 . 90500 (cable) 

6 50 


4 -76S 

3 2lJ 

4.76! 4-76} 

3-53i 3-55 

3.64 3.67 


Dollars to . 


4.95 (cable) 

5 " 




4.86 4.86J 

4.09 4.12 

4.05 4.08 


Francs to . 

Frs.25. 207 

24-75 25.15 





25.80 25.86 

59-50 59.90 

46.65 46.87 


Francs to . 

Frs.25. 207 

25.00 25.25 




25. gs 

56.70 57-00 

48.10 48.30 

Italy . 

Lire to . . 

Lire 25.207 

25.60 27.oo(29th) 





30.25 30.37} 


83 84 


Francs to . 

Frs.25. 207 

25.124 25.25 





23.08 24.05 

23.14 23.18 

21.67 21.75 

Athens . 

Drachmas to 

Drs.25. 207 

25.12} 2S-i8i 



48 48* 

66 67 

Russia . 

Rubles to 10 


102 103 nom. 




I-mks. to 

Fmks. 25.207 





41 75 

11$ 118 

35 245 

Madrid . 

Pesetas to . 


25.92 26.o2(2gth) 


IS 95 



24.00 24.15 

26.43 26.53 

28.15 28.31 

Lisbon . 

Pence to escudos 

53! per esc. 

45jd 461d(29th) 


2 7 ;d. 



3old. 3i|d. 

6d. 7d. 

6}d. 7d. 


Florins to . 


12.15 12. i6(2gth) 





11.45 11.48 

11.25 11.27 

11.77 11.82 

Berlin . 

Marks to . 


20.55 20.70(291)1) 





257 259 

293 297 

Vienna . 

Kronen to . 


24. 40 24. 70(29 th) 





1500 I55O 

3150 3350 

Prague . 

Kronen to . 





305 310 

282 200 


Marks to . 






2200 23OO 

7200 74OO 


Lei to . . 

Lei 25. 207 




282 285 

280 285 


Dinar to . 

D. 25.207 




125 130 

145 155 

Chris tiania 

Kronor to . 


18.26 l8.36(2gth) 





17-5.5 17-58 

22.95 23.15 

28.50 28.70 


Kronor to . 


18.26 18.36(29111) 




17.10 17.20 

17.66 17.72 

17.45 17-55 


Kronor to . 







1 7 . 80 1 7 . 90 

23.05 23.20 

23-30 23.50 


Piastres to . 


97J 97l (29th) 




g? 1 

97i g?t 

97l 97\ 



Sterl. to rupee 
Sterl. to yen. 

2 4 Ad. 

is.3(d. is.4d. 
2s.oid. 2s.ojd- 






IS. 4 d. 

is.6d. is.6Ad. 
2s.3Jd. 2s.3jd. 

is.SJd- is.sJd. 
29.8d. 2S.8Jd. 

is-3|d. is.3fid. 
2s.7id. 2s.7fd. 


Sterl. to tael. 
Sterl. to dollars 


2s.3Jd. 25. 4 id. 
2s.3Hd. 2s.4Ad. 




2S. 4 !d. 


Ss.od. 5s. id. 
2s.3fjd. 2s.4Ad. 

43. id. 4S.2jd. 
2s.3ftd. 2s.33id. 

3S.6Jd. 3S.7Jd. 

Rio de Janeiro 


Pence to milreis 

2 7 d. 

isHd. (2gth) 


10 iV 






Buenoj Aires 

Pence to dollar. 


4 8i(Aug. 4) 




sort ' siH 


44i 44i 

Valparaiso (god.) 

Pence to gold 










Montevideo . 

Pence to dollar 




S8 59) 

49* So! 

43J 44 

Shanghai exchange being on a silver basis there was at no time a fixed parity between its currency and that of London. fTo Jan. 7 1918- 

TABLE G. Value of pound sterling, Dec. 31 1920. 





Dec. 31 1920 
Middle rate. 

with pre-war 
par value, 

power of i 
as com- 
pared with 

Dec. 31 1920 
Middle rate. 

with pre-war 
par value 

power of i 
as compared 
with pre- 


pre-war value. 

discount of. 

war value. 

France .... 


I36J % 

2 7 4 

New York 


27i % 

o 14 6 



125* % 

2 5 i 



I5l % 

o 16 10 

Italy .... 


3025 % 




6| % 

o 18 8 



27 % 

i 5 5 

Sweden .... 


-,i o/ 

2 2 /o 

o 19 6 



271 % 

i 5 6 

Switzerland . 

23 16 

8 % 

o 18 5 

Finland .... 


362 % 
1,163* % 

4 12 5 

12 12 8 

Japan .... 



61 % 

23* % 

o 18 8 
o 15 4 

Greece .... 


91 % 

i 18 2 

India .... 


9l % 

o 18 2 

Austria .... 


6,249 % 

63 99 


4/i rV 

43i % 

o ii 3 



I.024J % 

ii 411 



720 % 

8 4 o 

Spain .... 


5 % 

i i o 

Brazil .... 


63 % 

i 12 8 



10,920 % 

110 4 o 

Prague .... 


1,180 % 

12 16 o 



On Sept. i 1921 the London rates were as follows: New York, 
V73i: Montreal, 4-14!; Paris, 47-56; Belgium, 48-97; Italy, 84; 
Holland, 11-74; Spain, 28-61; Switzerland, 21-84; Stockholm, 17-16; 
Christiania, 27-55; Copenhagen, 21; Berlin, 319; Portugal, 6; 
Greece, 66i; Bucharest, 317; Finland, 258; Vienna, 3,100; Prague, 
312- Warsaw, 10,650; India, Is. 4jd. ; Yokohama, 2s. 7sd. ; Buenos 
Aires, 43!; Riode Janeiro, yl; Serbia, 168; Bulgaria, 450; Budapest, 

Table G shows the changes that took place in the value of the 
pound sterling in different countries as between pre-war basis 
(1914) and Dec. 31 1920, the left section showing where the pound 
had risen to a premium and the right section where it had fallen 
to a discount. 

In order to understand accurately the extent of the deprecia- 
tion of the various exchanges since they ceased to have a gold 
standard, it is better to take as a basis for comparison the 
American gold dollar rather than the British paper pound. 

Table H shows the rates of exchange ruling in New York (a) 
immediately before the declaration of war, (b) just after America 
joined the Allies, and (c) when the Armistice was declared. 
Table I gives the rates ruling on Dec. 31 1920, and includes 
those of several countries not previously quoted in America. 

Speculation. During the war speculation in foreign exchanges 
was almost entirely confined to the six neutral states of Europe 
Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Spain and Switzerland 
and to the United States, which was free to deal in all exchanges 
until it came into the war in 1917. These countries traded very 

extensively with both groups of belligerents, and quickly amassed 
very large profits through selling their produce and manufactures 
at high prices, and also through obtaining abnormally high 
freights with their steamers. Much of this money was paid in the 
currency of the purchasing countries and large foreign balances 
were thereby accumulated. The natural effect was to depreciate 
the value of the pound, the franc, the lira, the ruble, the mark 
and the Austrian crown, all considerably but in different 
degrees. Most of the neutral export merchants and shippers be- 
came large sellers of foreign credits, and had they not been able to 
do so they would have been obliged to cease exporting, but there 
are always people in every country willing to buy almost anything 
at a price, and it did not take long before the speculative habit 
which is the invariable result of sudden prosperity was turned in 
the direction of foreign exchange, and not only bankers and 
banks but also private individuals indulged in a perfect orgy 
of speculation. 

Many of these speculators bought sterling exchange, others 
bought marks. They frankly backed the side they thought would 
win, and gained or lost accordingly, but there were others who 
thought it more prudent to " hedge " that is, to divide their 
risks and turn part of their money into pounds and part into 
marks. These persons omitted one very important factor from 
their calculations, i.e. that the prospect of loss in the value of the 
currency of the losing side must of necessity be immeasurably 
greater than the prospect of gain in that of the winning side. 

TABLE H. New York Rates (in dollars). 


Method of Quoting. 


August 1914. 

May 1917. 

November 1918. 

Rate of 

Per cent 
of pre-war 

Rate of 

Per cent 
of pre-war 

Rate of 

Per cent 
of pre-war 

London .... 

Dollars per I . 








Paris .... 

Fes. 100. 








Milan .... 

Lire 100. 








Yokohama . 

Yen 100. 









Rbs. loo. 






Berlin .... 

' Mks. 400. 








Vienna .... 

' Krn. 100. 








Amsterdam . 

Fls. 100. 








Copenhagen . 

Kr. loo. 









Kr. 100. 







108-21 . 


Fes. 100. 









Pts. 100. 








Buenos Aires 

' Pap. Pes. 100 







Pes. 100. 








"Hong- Kong . 

' Rps. 100. 
'H.K. $100. 

3 2 -44 








' Taels 100. 




* Hong- Kong and Shanghai exchanges being on a silver basis 
New York. 

there was at no time a fixed parity between their currencies and that of 

TABLE I. New York Rates, Dec. 31 1920. 

Nominal Gold Value. 

Dec. 31 1920. 

Per cent of Dis- 

4-8665 dollars to 


3-525 dollars for . 


19-30. to I franc . 

France . 


5-89 cents for I franc . 


23-8c. to 

mark . 



1-38 cents for i mark . 


19-30. to 


Italy . 


3-46' cents for I lira 


4O-2C. to 


Holland . 

31-30 cents for i guilder 


19-30. to 



13-45 cents for I peseta. 


19-30. to 

franc . 

Switzerland . 

15-20 cents for i franc . 


I -08 dol 

ars to I escudo 


10-30 cents for i escudo 


19-30. to 

franc . 


6-17 cents for i franc . 


20-260. to 

crown . 

Austria . 

0-24 cents for I crown 


20-260. to 

crown . 




1-15 cents for I crown 


19-30. to 



1-28 cents for i leu 


19-30. to 

drachma . 

Greece . 

7-25 cents for i drachma 


26-80. to 

crown . 

Norway . 


15-65 cents for i crown . 


26-80. to 

crown . 

Sweden . 

19-85 cents for i crown . 


26-8c. to 

crown . 



15-65 cents for I crown. 


19-30. to 


Finland . 

2-90 cents for i finmark 


23-80. to 

mark . 

Poland . 

0-17 cents for i mark . 


51-460. to 

ruble . 

Russia . 

0-45 cents for i ruble . 


1000. to 

I ... . 

Canada . 

86-6 cents for $i . 


42-450. to 

peso . 


33-15 cents for i peso . 


32-440. to 


Brazil . 


14-00 cents for I milreis 


48-660. to 



26-00 cents for i rupee . 


49-850. to 

yen . 


48-37 cents for i yen 


4 8 


For instance, a Dutch speculator might have bought 10,000 for 
100,000 guilders and at the same time 300,000 marks for another 
100,000 guilders: this was in the early part of 1916 when it 
was doubtful which side would win the war. On Jan. i 1921, if 
he realized his holdings he would have gained about 10,000 
guilders on his sterling but lost 70,000 guilders on his marks. 
Should, however, this speculator have been tempted by the 
greater depreciation to have bought Austrian crowns and French 
francs, he would have lost half his money on the realization of 
his francs and practically the whole when he sold his crowns. 
It was, however, chiefly in their mark investments that neutral 
states lost a large proportion of their war profits. 

Another very favourite speculation was the Russian ruble. 
Speculation in this currency started very early in the war and 
continued long after the establishment of the Soviet Government. 
To a great extent it took the form of buying actual ruble notes, 
and large masses of these came to Europe partly via Scandinavia 
and partly through Siberia. Many of them found a home in 
America, but large quantities remained in Sweden and in 
England. It was somewhat strange that this buying of ruble 
notes should have continued notwithstanding frequent announce- 
ments made by the Bolshevik leaders that it was their intention 
to issue fresh notes in sufficient quantities to destroy effectually 
their value as a purchasing instrument. It was only when it was 
realized that the Soviet Government were printing so-called 
" Imperial " notes in limitless quantities, using for that purpose 
the original plates and producing a spurious article quite un- 
distinguishable from the original, that the speculators at last 
realized that their rubles were not only absolutely worthless at 
the moment but that there was but slight prospect of their 
having any value even in the distant future. 

It was not however until the Anglo-American exchange was 
decontrolled, and restrictions as to dealing in certain exchanges 
were definitely removed in the belligerent countries, that specula- 
tion became general. Decontrolled exchange without a gold 
basis presented all the elements dear to the speculator an un- 
limited supply of the article, violent and frequent fluctuations, 
ease in buying or in selling to any extent, no fear of being 
" cornered," and an international market. The volume of spec- 
ulative business soon became much larger than that of transac- 
tions done for legitimate trade purposes. But foreign trade could 
still be carried on without the merchant running exchange risks 
unless he decided to do so. A system was elaborated by which 
for any bona-fide trade transaction a merchant enjoying good 
credit could purchase or sell his foreign exchange at a rate 
based on that of the day on which he did his transaction, for 
future delivery at dates that synchronized with his requirements. 
It was only when trading with countries whose exchange 
could not be sold in the ordinary way for immediate delivery, 
that he was unable to arrange for his future deliveries. 

The Ter Meulen Plan. To avoid this difficulty, a scheme 
was drawn up in the autumn of 1920, known as the " Ter 
Meulen Scheme " (from the name of its originator, a partner 
in the firm of Messrs. Hope & Co. of Amsterdam). It was 
accepted by the League of Nations and was intended to assist 
impoverished nations which under existing circumstances were 
unable to attract funds for the financing of essential imports. 
Up to the end of 1921 this scheme was not in actual opera- 
tion, but the plan proposed was recognized as one which would 
have an important bearing, if adopted, on the business of 
foreign exchange. 

The Ter Meulen Scheme was as follows, the text of the League 
of Nations articles (Nov. 1920) being here slightly abbreviated: 


An International Commission shall be constituted under the 
auspices of the League of Nations. 

The Commission shall be appointed by the Council of the League 
of Nations and shall have discretion to appoint agents and sub- 

The Governments of countries desiring to participate shall notify 
to the Commission what specific assets they are prepared to assign 
as security for commercial credits to be granted by the nationals 
of exporting countries. 

The Commission, after examination of the assets, shall deter- 
mine the gold value of the credits which it would approve against 
the security "of these assets. 

The participating Governments shall then be authorized to issue 
bonds to the gold value approved by the Commission. The bonds 
shall be in such form, with such date of maturity and rate of inter- 
est, as the Commission may decide and shall, in particular, enumer- 
ate the assets pledged against the bonds. The denomination of 
each bond and the specific currency in which it is to be issued shall 
be determined by the participating Government in agreement with 
the Commission, in accordance with the conditions applicable to 
the particular transactions in respect of which they are issued. 

The service of these bonds which will be obligations of the issuing 
Government shall be specifically secured out of the revenue of the 
assigned assets. 

The assigned assets shall be administered by the participating 
Government or by the International Commission as a majority of 
the Council of the League of Nations may determine on the pro- 
posal of the International Commission. 

Out of the revenues from the assigned assets there shall be pur- 
chased foreign currencies sufficient to provide (a) cover for the 
coupons falling due in the next year, (b) a sinking fund calculated 
to redeem at maturity 10% of the bonds outstanding, (c) a reserve 
in such foreign currency or currencies as the International Commis- 
sion may determine for the redemption of any bonds sold as a conse- 
quence of failure by the importer to fulfil his contract. Any surplus 
remaining after the provision of these services shall be at the free 
disposal of the participating Government. 

The participating Government will be free either to pledge its 
own bonds as collateral for credits for approved imports on its own 
account or to lend the bonds to its nationals as collateral for credits 
for approved imports on private account. 

Each bond shall before issue be countersigned by the Commis- 
sion in proof of registration. 

The fundamental purposes of the scheme being to facilitate and 
expedite the import of such raw materials and primary necessaries 
as will enable the borrowing countries to reestablish production 
especially for export, bonds secured on the assigned assets shall 
not be utilized as collateral for credits for the import of other 

For each borrowing country the Commission will draw up, in 
consultation with the participating Government, a schedule of 
approved imports which will be regarded as falling within the defini- 
tion of raw materials and primary necessaries. 

Particulars of each transaction must be registered with the Com- 
mission, which, before countersigning a registered bond will satisfy 
itself that the credit is for an approved import and that the period 
for which it is proposed to be granted is a reasonable one. 

The same conditions as govern the pledge of the bonds as the 
collateral for credits for imports on private account shall apply in 
cases where the participating Government pledges its own bonds 
as collateral for imports on Government account. 

After having received bonds duly countersigned the importer 
will pledge them with the exporter. 

Pledged bonds shall be dealt with as follows: (a) In the absence 
of any failure by the importer to fulfil his contract with the exporter, 
the coupons on their due date and the bonds as they are released 
shall be returned to the importer who shall return them to his Gov- 
ernment forthwith, (b) In the event of the importer not fulfilling 
the terms of his contract, the exporter (or his assigns) may either 
hold the bonds until maturity, or if he prefers he may at any time 
sell them in accordance with the laws and customs of his country, 
providing that before the bonds are sold a reasonable opportunity 
shall be given to the issuing Government to repurchase them 
by paying to the exporter the amount of his claim. The pro- 
ceeds of such sale shall be applied by the exporter towards cover- 
ing his claims against the importer. Any surplus not required for 
this purpose shall be accounted for by the exporter to the partici- 
pating Government, (c) Any coupons or bonds returned to the par- 
ticipating Government or purchased by such Government shall 
be forthwith cancelled in accordance with the regulations to be pre- 
scribed by the International Commission; cancelled bonds may sub- 
sequently with the approval of the Commission be replaced by 
other bonds either in the same or in a different currency in accord- 
ance with the conditions governing the original issue of bonds. 

Bank Notes. An unusual form of speculation sprang up dur- 
ing 1918-9. Orders were received in England, France and the 
United States from neutral countries for the purchase of English, 
French and American bank-notes at rates of exchange very much 
more favourable to the sellers than those current for ordinary 
bank credits. The French and the American Governments very 
soon forbade the export of their bank-notes but the British 
Government, after giving the matter mature consideration, 
decided that more advantages than disadvantages were to be 
gained by permitting the export of Bank of England notes, even 
if the ultimate destination of these notes were found to be the 



enemy countries. It was afterwards ascertained that these bank- 
notes were actually bought for enemy account, and many of 
them are believed to have found their way to Turkey and 
Bulgaria. Subsequent events proved that the action of the 
purchasers, though perhaps not patriotic, was from a financial 
point of view a prudent one, as it was evident in 1918 that 
in the very probable event of the Allies winning the war, the 
value of the pound sterling in terms of their own currency was 
certain to increase to a far greater extent than the 10 or 15% 
beyond the then current rate of exchange on London that they 
were willing to pay to convert their currency into sterling in the 
only way they could do it, while at the same time circumventing 
the vigilance of the British Ministry of Blockade. 

Business Developments. One interesting and important re- 
sult of the enormous increase of the volume of foreign-exchange 
transactions carried out in London, which, after the Armistice, 
established itself more firmly that ever as the world's clearing- 
house for that class of trade, has been a remarkable development 
in the business of the London foreign-exchange brokers. 

Exchange brokers have existed in London for centuries, but 
their business was generally confined to buying and selling foreign 
exchange for merchants and for those bankers who had no 
direct relations with foreign countries. They were in the habit 
of meeting twice a week on the Royal Exchange, where the ex- 
change dealers also attended, and foreign bills of exchange and 
cheques were then sold to the best buyers, and official rates of 
exchange were fixed. It is true that with the advent of the 
telephone it became more and more the custom to carry through 
the more important transactions, especially those between 
exchange dealers themselves, by means of telephonic com- 
munication, but such transactions were far from numerous, and, 
such as they were, they were generally done in a leisurely manner. 
Now all this is changed. The leading exchange brokers confine 
themselves entirely to working between the various exchange 
dealers. From ten in the morning until six in the evening their 
offices are a regular pandemonium. Some of them employ as 
many as 40 or 50 private telephones in addition to several general 
ones, and the largest of them carry through on an average about 
two-hundred transactions a day, mostly for very large sums. 
They make it their business to keep their clients posted in 
all the various and quick movements that occur almost from 
minute to minute in exchange rates, and carry out their trans- 
actions with the rapidity and accuracy without which business 
of that class would be impossible.. They assume no financial 
liability, for when their contracts are passed their responsibility 
ceases. To succeed and their business is a very lucrative one 
though their scale of commission is infinitesimal they need 
discretion, integrity and intelligence. They must never discuss 
one client's business with another client, nor divulge the name of 
a buyer to a seller or vice versa, until the transaction is completed. 
The service the broker renders to the dealer is an extremely 
valuable one, and the result is that there is practically no business 
done between dealers without the intermediary of a broker. An 
interesting fact in this connexion is that, at the end of 1920, 
the biweekly meetings that had been held between dealers for 
generations "on 'Change" were abolished. 

Partly because this system of employing exchange brokers 
enables large and numerous transactions to be carried out with 
great rapidity, partly because the temperament of the chief 
London dealers in foreign exchange is such that they are easily 
able to resist the temptation to speculate to any great extent 
on their own account, partly because those who deal in foreign 
exchange in London are banks and bankers of the highest stand- 
ing, but more particularly because the sterling bill has by no 
means lost its prestige throughout the world, London has 
established herself more firmly than ever as the central foreign 
exchange market of the world, and all day and every day there is 
a constant flow of cables and telegrams from all quarters bringing 
orders to buy and sell every possible kind of exchange in amounts 
that were never imagined possible in pre-war days. 

Lessons of the War. Many lessons have been taught by the 
new conditions brought about by the war. One of the most 

important of these is that State interference with the natural 
movements of exchange, excepting for a limited period and with 
success practically assured, is a mistake and likely to lead to 
disastrous results. The " pegging " of. the pound sterling to the 
American dollar certainly so long as America was a neutral 
Power proved nevertheless to be wise and legitimate. The 
attempts of other countries to stabilize their exchanges at that 
time were for the most part unsuccessful. 

Another fact that has been brought to light is that, to a credi- 
tor country, especially one which depends for its prosperity to a 
large extent on its export trade, a favourable exchange is a dis- 
tinct disadvantage, which can only be overcome if the nationals 
of that country are willing to invest a substantial proportion of 
the value of their exports in those foreign countries which buy 
their goods. An outstanding example of such a country is Amer- 
ica, for up till the spring of 1921 Americans were only just begin- 
ning to acquire the habit of investing their money outside their 
own country; this rendered it extremely difficult for their export 
merchants to finance their business, as the majority of foreign 
importers were only able to pay for their goods by means of their 
own currencies. 

It does not follow, however, that an American merchant would 
be absolutely precluded from selling goods (say) to Poland 
against payment in Polish marks merely because no one in 
America would be willing to invest his money in that country. So 
long as exchange dealers or speculators in another country whose 
own currency is in fair repute would be willing to purchase Polish 
marks either directly or indirectly against dollars that is to 
say, either paying for the Polish marks in American dollars or in 
some currency that could be converted into dollars if the 
American exchange dealer so desired so long could the American 
merchant continue to sell his goods to Poland against payment 
in that country's currency. 

On the other hand, manufacturing countries whose exchanges 
have depreciated heavily and rapidly are in a very favourable 
position to compete in foreign markets. They can buy their raw 
materials abroad just as cheaply as any other country, while, as 
has been proved, the rise in the cost of manufacture particularly 
as regards wages lags far behind any rapid rise that may take 
place in exchange rates. Such a country would be able to under- 
sell its competitors to a considerable extent while still making 
very large paper profits. As an example: the first serious set-back 
in trade that occurred in Germany after the declaration of peace, 
was when the German rate of exchange fell temporarily from 
365 to 120 marks to the pound, in the early part of 1920. Had the 
internal value of the mark, that is to say its purchasing power 
within the boundaries of Germany, depreciated to anything 
approaching its external value, it would not have been possible 
for German trade to revive as rapidly as it did. 

It is safe to predict that in a highly civilized country, well 
organized for trade purposes, such as Germany, the internal and 
external value of its currency must equalize itself approximately 
sooner or later, but the process is slow and gradual, and during 
the years that intervene it may be possible for that country to 
build up an export trade on so firm a basis that it would be 
difficult for other countries to oust it from its position, even when 
it is no longer helped by favourable exchange conditions. In fact, 
it is a mistake to suppose that any country derives advantage 
from the greater depreciation of another country's currency. The 
latter cannot afford to import from the former anything beyond 
its merest necessaries, and on the other hand it is able to under- 
sell it in all competitive markets. (E. L. F.) 

EXPLOSIVES (see 10.81-4). In the World War of 1914-8 the 
use of high explosives went beyond anything previously known. 
Economic considerations played a large part in determining the 
types used, and their methods of manufacture. Many improve- 
ments were introduced to save labour and eliminate waste in 
production, but it became evident very early in the struggle 
that to meet the demand with existing types was a sheer im- 
possibility, and this led to the adoption of others, hitherto un- 
tried and unproved. Apart from military uses, explosives also 
play an essential part in industrial work, the necessary supply 


for which had also to be maintained during the war period. The 
main types of these had been standardized for years, but the 
experiences of the war have had some effect in influencing the 
uses of industrial explosives. The conditions which have to be 
met by commercial explosives are not so stringent as in the case 
of military explosives. Thus the latter are liable at any time to 
be subjected to hostile fire, and must therefore be very insensi- 
tive to shock; this precludes many of the explosives which are in 
use for commercial mining, etc. 

Military Uses. High explosives for military purposes are 
required for the bursting charges of artillery shells, air and trench - 
mortar bombs, grenades, naval mines, torpedoes, depth charges, 
as well as for land mines and demolitions in the field. For the 
two last-mentioned purposes ordinary commercial blasting ex- 
plosives may on emergency be used, but a serious danger will be 
involved to the user if the explosive is of such sensitiveness as 
to be " set off " by the impact of hostile fire. On this account it 
is generally undesirable to use explosives containing nitro- 
glycerine, which form such a large part of the blasting explosives 
produced for industrial purposes. 

The choice of explosives for shells requires special care, as the 
shock of discharge is so great in modern ordnance that only 
explosives which are very insensitive to shock can be safely used. 
For this reason gunpowder was regarded for many years as the 
only safe explosive for the bursting charges of common shell. 
The premature explosion to which guncotton gave rise had 
tended to confirm this view; so that gunpowder, in spite of the 
comparative mildness of its explosion, remained in universal use 
until the introduction of picric acid by the French in 1885. 

Picric Acid. This was discovered by Woulffe in 1771, but 
its explosive properties remained for a long time unrecognized. 
Sprengel had demonstrated its capability of detonation in 1871. 
In 1885 Turpin, a French chemist, applied it to the filling of 
shell, for which, by reason of its stability and insensitiveness to 
shock, as well as its extremely violent action when properly 
detonated, it proved eminently suitable. Shortly after this, pic- 
ric acid under various names, either with or without the addition 
of other substances such as collodion or paraffin wax to reduce its 
sensitiveness, was universally adopted by the Great Powers as a 
high explosive for shell-filling. Picric acid can be melted and 
poured into the shell, where it sets into a compact mass the 
method adopted in the British service. It was first used in actual 
warfare by the British army in the S. African War of 1899-1902 
under the name of " lyddite." Picric acid is also the main or sole 
constituent of the French melinite, the Japanese shimose powder, 
and the Austrian ekrasit. Lyddite can hardly be said to have 
fulfilled in the S. African War the somewhat exaggerated claims 
made for it, as the shells, especially of the smaller sizes, were 
uncertain in their detonation, but this was due to the fear still 
prevailing of premature explosion in the bore, which prevented 
the use of a sufficiently powerful detonating impulse in the per- 
cussion fuze being employed. In the World War of 1914-8, 
after this disability had been removed, through the employment 
of a fulminate detonator and a suitable exploder system, shells 
filled with lyddite were amongst the most certain and violent in 
their action. When completely detonated, these shells give a 
dense black smoke due to unconsumed particles of carbon through 
lack of sufficient oxygen for complete combustion. This smoke is 
of great assistance to the gunner in enabling him to locate their 
explosion and so to adjust the range as required. 

The manufacture of picric acid has been carried out for many 
years by the so-called " pot process," and this was retained essential- 
ly unchanged throughout the war. In this process, phenol (carbolic 
acid) is first heated with sulphuric acid, whereby phenol-sulphonic 
acids are formed, as for instance in the following equation : 
C.HsOH+aH^O, = C, H S (SO,H) 2 OH+2H 2 O 
Phenol. Sulphuric Phenol disulphonic acid, 


This on cooling forms a buttery mass, which is then transferred 
to earthenware pots and diluted. Nitric acid is allowed to trickle in 
slowly through glass syphons, and thus converts the sulphonic acids 
to tn-mtro-phenol or picric acid, which has the formula CeH 2 (NO 2 ) 3 - 
OH. The residual acid is drained off and the crystals of picric acid 
are thoroughly washed and then carefully dried on glass plates in a 
warm chamber. The last operation is the most dangerous part of 

the manufacture and is carried out at a distance from the nitration 
process. The main recent developments have been directed towards 
increasing the yield of picric acid and economizing acids, on the 
one hand by recovering the residual sulphuric acid, and on the other 
hand by collecting the large volumes of nitrous fumes evolved 
during the nitration process, which were formerly allowed to go to 
waste, thereby causing a serious contamination of the atmosphere. 

At a later stage of the war a continuous process was patented for 
the manufacture of picric acid. In this process the phenol sulphonic 
acids were caused to traverse a long trough constructed of acid- 
proof bricks, and nitric acid was injected through a series of al- 
uminium jets at intervals along the trough. This method saves a 
great deal of handling, and is claimed to give very good yields of 
picric acid. Under ordinary circumstances the yield of picric acid 
is about 1 80 Ib. from each loo Ib. of phenol. 

An alternative process, which was introduced and used with 
success during the war, was based on the intermediate formation 
of di-nitro-phenol. This process started out from benzene and passed 
through the following stages : 

C 6 H 6 C 6 H S C1 C 6 H 3 (NO 2 ) 2 C1. 

Benzene. Mono-chloro-benzene. Di-nitro-chloro-benzene. 
CeH 3 (NO 2 ) 2 OH C 6 H 2 (NO 2 ) 3 OH. 

Di-nitro-phenol. Picric acid. 

The final nitration was effected with concentrated nitric and 
sujphuric acids; the picric acid being washed free from acid and 
dried in stoves as in the phenol process. 

Trinitrotoluene (T N T), which is known officially as Trotyl, 
is a high explosive very similar in its action to picric acid and had 
been discovered by Wilbrand in 1863. Its manufacture in small 
quantities in Great Britain had been taken up some 15 years 
before the outbreak of the World War, mainly for export or as 
ingredient of certain blasting explosives, and about 1893-4 it 
was made on a more considerable scale in Germany, where its 
value as a shell-filling became recognized some ten years later. 
T N T has the advantage of melting at a lower temperature than 
picric acid, and of not forming sensitive salts (picrates) with 
metals; added to which it is even less sensitive to shock and 
consequently less liable to give rise to premature explosions in 
the bore of the gun. The lower melting point of T N T (81 C.) 
enables it to be melted in steam-jacketed pans, whereas picric 
acid (121-6 C.) needs hot-air chambers or oil baths. 

The manufacture of T N T in Great Britain prior to the war 
was very small, and the best methods had to be worked out 
from first principles after the outbreak of war. The existing 
processes were slow and wasteful, and it was necessary to find 
the best conditions for expediting the process and obtaining the 
highest possible yield of T N T with the greatest economy of 
sulphuric and nitric acids. 

T N T is made from toluene (CH 3 C 6 H 6 ) by the action of nitric 
acid (HNO 3 ) as indicated in the following equations: 

CH 5 C 6 H 6 -|-HNO3 = H 2 O-f-CH 3 C6H 4 (NO 2 ) (mono-nitro-toluene) 

CH 3 C 6 H 4 (NO 2 ) +HNO 3 = H 2 O+CH 3 C 6 H 5 (NO 2 ) 2 (di-nitro-toluene) 

CH,C,H 3 (N0 2 ) 2 +HNO S = H 2 O+C H, C H 2 (N O 2 ) 3 (tri-nitro-tolu- 

A continuous process was introduced during the war, and proved 
very successful. In this process, mono-nitro-toluene entered at one 
end of the plant and strong sulphuric acid at the other, the nitric 
acid being introduced at intermediate points. 

In all of these processes the product is a crude T N T of melting 
point 74 to 77 C. In general this is good enough for explosive 
purposes, but for special uses it has to be purified by crystallization 
or by washing with alcohol. 

A more recent purification process consists of a treatment with 
sodium sulphite, which destroys the chief impurities the isomeric 
tri-nitro-toluenes. There are six possible tri-nitro-toluenes, which 
differ according to the relative positions of the nitro groups in the 
molecule. These are all known, but only three of them are formed 
by direct nitration. The first stage of the nitration gives mainly 
ortho- and para-nitro-tpluene with about 3 to 4% of meta-nitro- 
toluene. On further nitration, ortho- and para-nitro-toluene can 
give the normal symmetrical tri-nitro-toluene ; the meta compound 
cannot do so and consequently gives other isomers as shown below : 



CH, CH, 

o _tr 

NO, NO, 

Para Symmetrical TNT. 




N o, 


NO, NO, 

Isomers of T N T. 


Other Nitro Compounds. Picric acid and TNT are nitro 
derivatives of phenol and toluene respectively. In fact practi- 
cally all military high explosives are nitro derivatives of aromatic 
compounds, which latter are produced from the distillation of 
coal tar. This source of toluene was supplemented by the use of 
certain natural petroleums which contain benzene and toluene, 
and the supplies of phenol were augmented by synthetic pro- 
duction from benzene, another derivative of coal tar. Neverthe- 
less, these sources of supply were not equal to the demand, and 
other means of supplementing them had to be found in the war. 

Thus tri-nitro-cresol, which is closely allied to picric acid, was 
much used by the French, as well as di-nitro-naphthalene and 
di-nitro-phenol, to supplement picric acid. Tri-nitro-anisol, hexa- 
nitro-diphenylamine, hexa-nitro-diphcnyl sulphide and others 
were largely used by the Germans. All of these are derived from 
coal tar and are consequently limited to the available supply of 
this raw material. Only by finding some material available in 
larger quantity, with which these nitro compounds could be 
mixed, was it possible to cope with the demands. The above 
nitro compounds have the feature in common that they contain 
insufficient oxygen for their complete combustion: hence the 
most suitable admixture is a salt rich in oxygen. 

Ammonium Nitrate. Of all the available salts, the one which 
stands out by reason of its accessibility and suitability for the 
purpose is ammonium nitrate, a substance known as early as the 
1 7th century and yet destined to play a most important part in 
the development of high explosives in the 2oth century. 

Mixtures of nitro derivatives of the aromatic compounds with 
ammonium nitrate, of which Roburite, Ammonal, and Dread- 
nought powder are amongst the best known, had long been used 
commercially for blasting purposes, particularly in fiery mines, 
where the high temperature of explosion of those containing 
nitro-glycerine is liable to cause explosion of the fire-damp. 

Ammonium nitrate explosives are also cheap and safe both to 
make and to handle, owing to their great stability and insensi- 
tiveness. They are useful for many purposes where the greater 
brisance or shattering power given by nitro-glycerine is not re- 
quired. One of their main disadvantages is the hygroscopicity or 
moisture-absorbing power of ammonium nitrate, which necessi- 
tates suitable protection or " waterproofing " from the air in 
order to prevent the explosive becoming so damp as to fail to 
respond to the detonating impulse. Although this protection can 
be readily given in shells and other articles of ammunition, it was 
probably their characteristic of deliquescence together with 
the difficulty of detonating such explosives effectively which was 
responsible for the delay in their adoption for military purposes, 
except possibly in Austria, where ammonal was to some extent 
in vogue. Moreover, the peace-time requirements before the war 
could be amply met in England from lyddite, of which the 
properties were well known. When, however, other sources of 
supply of high explosives in gigantic quantities had to be found, 
ammonium nitrate opened up the best, if not the only, solution, 
as far as the resources of Great Britain permitted. Yet ammonium 
nitrate by itself is hardly an explosive at all. By means of a 
very powerful detonator it is possible to cause a mild explosion 
and the disruption of the ammonium nitrate molecule, but 
under ordinary circumstances no " explosive " precautions need 
be taken in its manufacture or transport a matter of consid- 
erable advantage in providing the quantities of several thousand 
tons a week which were required. 

Prior to the World War, ammonium nitrate was made by neu- 
tralizing nitric acid with ammonia 

HNO 3 + NH 3 = NH,NO, 
Nitric acid. Ammonia. Ammonium nitrate. 

but the war demands were such that it was necessary to circumvent 
the necessity of erecting nitric acid plants on such a large scale. This 
led to the introduction of methods depending on double decomposi- 
tion of salts. 

(l) A modification of the ammonia soda process, as indicated in 
the equation: 

NaNO 3 + NH 4 -HCO 3 = NaHCOs + NH 4 NO 3 
Sodium Ammonium Sodium Ammonium 

nitrate. bicarbonate. bicarbonate. nitrate. 

(2) From calcium nitrate, made either by the arc process or by the 
action of calcium chloride on sodium nitrate: 

2 NaNO, + CaCI 2 = Ca(NO,) s + 2 NaCl. 

Sodium Calcium Calcium Sodium 

nitrate. chloride. nitrate. chloride. 

Ca(NO,) 2 + (NH 4 ) 2 C0 3 = CaCO 3 + 2 NH 4 NO 3 

Calcium Ammonium Calcium Ammonium 

nitrate. carbonate. carbonate. nitrate. 

(3) From sodium nitrate and ammonium sulphate: 

2 NaNO, + (NH 4 ) 2 S0 4 = Na 2 SO 4 +2 ,NH 4 NO 3 
Sodium Ammonium Sodium Ammonium 

nitrate. sulphate. sulphate. nitrate. 

In view of its extreme solubility in water, it is difficult to purify 
the ammonium nitrate completely from the salts which accompany it. 
The dry salt is very deliquescent and precautions must be taken after 
drying to avoid the introduction of moisture. A peculiarity of 
ammonium nitrate is that it undergoes transitions to different 
crystalline forms at certain temperatures, for instance at about 32 
C. and 85 C. the crystalline form changes and also the specific 
gravity. This point is of considerable importance in shell-filling. 

Amatol. The high explosive which was used in the largest 
quantities by Great Britain during the war was " Amatol," 
under which name various mixtures of ammonium nitrate with 
TNT are comprised. These form powerful high explosives capa- 
ble of detonation with a considerable velocity. " Amatol 40/60 " 
contains 40% of ammonium nitrate to 60 of T N T and is 
sufficiently fluid when heated to permit of its being poured in the 
molten condition. "Amatol 80/20 " contains 80% of ammonium 
nitrate, which is approximately the proportion necessary for 
complete combustion of the TNT. This can be compressed into 
shells, or forced in in a plastic condition above the melting point 
of the TNT. Either of these methods is much more expedi- 
tious than the operation of pouring the molten explosive into 
the shell and allowing it to solidify. 

Apart from amatol, mention should also be made of certain 
other ammonium nitrate explosives which were used during the 
war. Ammonal had been used in Austria before the war and con- 
tained ammonium nitrate, TNT, aluminium powder, and charcoal. 
At a later stage the aluminium was reduced to 3%, as this metal 
was in great demand for air-craft purposes, and the charcoal was 
omitted, the resultant mixture being termed alumatol. Sabulite 
contained ammonium nitrate, TNT, and calcium silicide. 

War Requirements. The extent to which the three main high 
explosives were employed is well illustrated from the table on 
the following page of quantities manufactured in Great Britain 
during successive years of the war (see also MUNITIONS OF WAR). 
For the purpose of comparison, a table of industrial require- 
ments is added, showing the amount of explosives used in 
mines and quarries. 

So far as Great Britain was concerned, the war was practically 
fought on the three high explosives, picric acid (lyddite), TNT, 
and amatol. These necessitated enormous importations of so- 
dium nitrate from S. America for the manufacture of nitric acid 
and ammonium nitrate, as well as the importation of sulphur 
and pyrites for the equally necessary sulphuric acid. Nitric and 
sulphuric acids are the life-blood of the explosives manufacture, 
whether it be high explosives or propellant explosives. Without 
the command of the sea this would have been impossible. 

Perchlorate Explosives are analogous to the ammonium nitrate 
explosives. The perchlorates were discovered by Stadion in 1815. 
Sodium perchlorate is obtainable by electrolytic methods from 
common salt, and is readily converted to ammonium perchlorate. 
Ammonium perchlorate has the advantage of not being hygro- 
scopic like ammonium nitrate, but on the other hand explosives 
made from it are generally more sensitive to shock and friction 
than those containing ammonium nitrate, and are consequently 
liable to be exploded by the penetration of a rifle bullet or the 
shock of discharge in a gun. An example of the ammonium 
perchlorate type of explosives is blastine, which was used in 
considerable quantities during the war. It contains ammonium 
perchlorate, sodium nitrate, di-nitro-toluene and paraffin wax. 

Industrial Explosives. Industrial explosives are not liable 
to be exposed to such severe conditions of mechanical shock as 
military explosives (shock of discharge of a shell from a gun, 
hostile enemy fire, etc.). This permits of the application of types 


British Military Requirements, 1914-8. 







Picric acid (Lyddite), tons (2,000 Ib.) 
TNT, tons (2,000 Ib.) 
Ammonium nitrate, tons (2,000 Ib.) 








Toted, short tons 







British Industrial Requirements, 1915-8. 





short tons 

Gunpowder, tons (2,000 Ib.) 
Permitted explosives, tons (2,000 Ib.) 
Other explosives, tons (2,000 Ib.) 






Total, short tons 






of high explosives containing nitro-glycerine (dynamites, etc.), 
and potassium chlorate (cheddites), which are of great utility. 
Moreover, in industrial work great violence is not always re- 
quired; in many cases it is desired to dislodge the material with 
as little shattering as possible, and this leads to a range of explo- 
sives differing widely in their velocities of internal combustion. 

For individual classes of work special requirements have to 
be met; thus for blasting in enclosed spaces it is important to 
avoid the formation of poisonous gases such as carbon monoxide; 
for work in coal-mines, where inflammable dust and gases may be 
present, it is important to avoid explosives which give a powerful 
flame, and might thus ignite the coal-dust or gases. 

As examples of the types of industrial explosives in use we 
have (i) explosives in which liquid nitro-glycerine is absorbed in 
wood-pulp, kieselguhr, etc., with the addition of nitrates and 
other salts; (2) blasting gelatine, gelatine dynamite and gilegnite, 
in which the nitro-glycerine is gelatinized with nitro-cotton; (3) 
ammonium nitrate mixtures; (4) gunpowder and various allied 
mixtures; (5) cheddites containing potassium chlorate mixed 
with castor oil and nitro compounds; (6) mixtures containing 
potassium and ammonium perchlorates. 

In recent years the methods of liquefying air have undergone 
great advances, and this has led to the use of liquid oxygen for 
explosive purposes. A cartridge of carbonaceous material is 
dipped into liquid oxygen and is then inserted into the bore-hole 
and detonated. This forms a very direct means of supplying 
the oxygen necessary for the combustion of the carbon, but, as 
the liquid oxygen evaporates quickly, the mixture must be ex- 
ploded within a few minutes, or it loses its explosive properties. 

Powerful explosives may also be made by mixing liquefied 
nitric peroxide with combustible materials. Nitric peroxide is 
readily liquefied, and as its boiling point lies at 2iC., there is no 
difficulty in keeping it in the liquid condition. On explosion, 
the oxygen passes from the nitric peroxide to the combustible 
substances. Since, however, nitric peroxide* is very poisonous, 
precautions must be taken in its manufacture and handling. 

An interesting development in industrial explosives is their 
application to agricultural purposes. Useful results have been 
obtained, especially in America and South Africa, in breaking 
up hard ground and in removing tree stumps. 

Action of High Explosives. The destructive effect of high ex- 
plosives in munitions and in the blasting of rocks is due to the very 
sudden pressure of gases developed, and also in the case of shells to 
the projection of fragments of the envelope itself. 

An explosive may be denned as a substance containing potential 
energy which can be suddenly released through its rapid decom- 
positions into hot gaseous products. These tend to occupy a far 
greater volume than the original substance from which they sprang, 
and in doing so exert great pressure on the containing vessel or 
any material with which they are in contact. 

Explosives may be solids, liquids or gases, but those used for 
industrial or military purposes are for the most part solid, for the 
sake of convenience in handling, and almost invariably contain 
oxygen. The transformation into gas is usually due to a process of 
internal oxidation or burning, and the heat evolved tends further to 

expand the gases. Under ordinary circumstances, combustion can 
only take place slowly, being limited by the rate at which fresh air 
or oxygen can be supplied to the burning material. In explosives, on 
the other hand, oxygen in a loosely combined form is present in 
intimate contact with the combustible materials. This proximity 
may be merely mechanical as in the case of gunpowder, or " inter- 
atomic "as for example inT NT. Gunpowder is a purely mechanical 
mixture of three ingredients, potassium nitrate (saltpetre), charcoal 
and sulphur, each of which is in itself non-explosive. The oxygen in 
the potassium nitrate is striving to attach itself to the charcoal and 
sulphur, which form the combustible materials, and is enabled to do 
so as soon as external energy, usually in the form of a flame, is 
applied sufficient to break down the link or bond between the nitro- 
gen or oxygen in the molecule of nitrate. Combustion can then only 
proceed at the points where the particles of charcoal and sulphur 
come into contact with the oxygen supplied to them. This explains 
the ad vantage of good incorporation and the greater rapidity of fine 
grain powders, but at best the proximity of the three ingredients to 
one another cannot be closer than is obtainable by purely mechanical 
means. In a high explosive such as T N T, which is a definite chem- 
ical compound (Cer^NCyjCHs), the oxygen, loosely linked to the 
nitrogen, is available to unite with the carbon and hydrogen in the 
same molecule. The elements are therefore in atomic proximity and, 
consequently, the disruption of the molecule of T N T into hot gases 
can proceed at a rate which, in comparison with that of gunpowder, 
is almost instantaneous. The greater the volume of gases produced 
the greater will be the pressure formed. The rapidity with which 
the transformation takes place determines the disruptive effect or 
brisance of the explosion a very high rate of explosion corre- 
sponding to a sudden blow and a low rate to a prolonged push. In 
high explosives the explosion wave is propagated with an accelera- 
tion until it reaches its maximum, or " velocity of detonation." 

In order that the velocity may reach its maximum, it is necessary 
that a sufficiently powerful initiating impulse be given. In general 
the explosive must be confined in a metal tube in order to detonate 
with its maximum velocity; and since the communication of the 
explosion from particle to particle is retarded by many air-gaps in the 
mass of the explosive, some compression is usually necessary in order 
to enable the maximum rate of detonation, which is a definite 
physical constant for each explosive, to be attained. 

The effect of physical condition on the mode of explosion is seen 
;n modern smokeless propellants. Nitro-cellulose in its ungelatinized 
condition is a high explosive, but when gelatinized by solvents so as 
to form a horny compact mass (with or without nitro-glycerine) it 
burns relatively slowly from the exterior surface, instead of being 
resolved en masse into gas. 

There is no definite line of demarcation between a " high " and 
what may for the want of a better term be called a " low " explosive, 
such as gunpowder. No intensity of initial impulse can cause the 
latter to explode at a greater velocity than about 300 metres per 
second. In the recognized high explosives the velocity of detonation 
may reach to about 8,000 metres per second and is never less than 
two or three thousand. In a slow explosive, such as gunpowder, 
good tamping is requisite to obtain the best results, as the gases 
nave time to find the line of least resistance, but with a high explo- 
sive the inertia of the explosive itself and of the super-imposed 
atmosphere offers almost as much resistance to the intensely sudden 
evolution of gases as does a solid body. In consequence high ex- 
plosives are sometimes said to " strike downwards." This of course 
is an erroneous expression, as at the moment of detonation the force 
of the explosion must be equal in all directions, but the tangible 
result of a crater blown in the ground is visible to the senses, whilst 
the considerably larger hole blown in the air is not. It is this un- 
tamped effect of high explosives which makes them so much more 
effective for most military purposes than gunpowder. 



Thus we have in explosives a store of molecular energy in a 
condition of unstable equilibrium, requiring some form of external 
energy to release it. This may consist of ignition, friction, percus- 
sion or the action of a detonator, which imparts a violent shock to 
the explosive and at the same time emits a flash of flame. 
- Mercury Fulminate. For stable high explosives a detonator 
is almost invariably used. Indeed, it is almost impossible to cause 
an insensitive explosive such as amatol to detonate without such an 
initial impulse. The discovery of fulminate of mercury by Howard 
about the year 1800 had a far-reaching effect on military and 
industrial explosives. This sensitive chemical compound is readily 
caused to detonate by heat, friction, or percussion. 

It is consequently manufactured only under the greatest pre- 
cautions in small quantities at a time. It is made by first dissolving 
mercury in nitric acid, and then pouring the solution into alcohol. 
A vigorous reaction takes place, and after a time the mercury 
fulminate separates out. It has then to be washed and finally dried 
very carefully at a low temperature. 

Mercury fulminate revolutionized the methods of bringing about 
explosion, being first used in percussion caps for igniting gunpowder, 
and thereby displacing the cumbersome and uncertain method of 
flint and steel. At a considerably later date its value as a detonator 
or igniting agent for more stable high explosives became recognized, 
for which purpose it is now mainly used. When required simply for 
ignitory purposes a mixture with potassium chlorate, which causes 
a larger and hotter flame, is generally employed. 

In order to appreciate the function of the detonator it is necessary 
to consider that in an explosive substance each molecule in its 
decomposition gives out a surplus of energy, and so provides the 
initial impulse required to decompose the neighbouring molecules. 
When, however, a high explosive such as T N T is merely ignited, 
the decomposition propagates itself slowly at first, and may cease 
altogether owing to external cooling; in any case, the velocity of 
decomposition increases but gradually, and it is only after a con- 
siderable quantity has decomposed that detonation ensues. As 
much as five tons of T N T have been known to burn off without 
explosive violence, though this is by no means always the case. 

The particular value of fulminate of mercury as a detonating 
agent is due to the fact that the explosion wave is in the first place 
very easily initiated in it by heat or friction, and in the second place 
is accelerated to its maximum almost instantaneously, so that com- 
plete detonation of the bulk immediately ensues, and the detonation 
is similarly imparted to any high explosive, with which the fulminate 
is in contact. Owing to the sensitiveness of the fulminate, not 
more than about 10 grains of the detonating substance is em- 
ployed in artillery shell. In order to communicate the detonation 
to the stable high explosive in a shell, it is usual to " step up " the 
detonation wave. Thus the fulminate detonates a core of an ex- 
plosive of intermediate sensitiveness such as tetryl (tri-nitro-phenyl- 
methyl nitro-amine), and this detonates the main high explosive. 
Similarly, when it is desired to detonate a slab of wet guncotton, it is 
necessary to insert a " primer " of dry guncotton between the de- 
tonator and the wet guncotton. 

Detonators of standard sizes are made for commercial blasting 
purposes; thus the size known as No. 8, containing 30-9 grains of 
fulminate, is in common use for blasting, and was used during the 
war in Mills grenades and trench-mortar bombs, where the shock 
of discharge is very much less than in a gun. 

Another compound which has come into use to a considerable 
extent as a detonating substance is lead azide (PbNe). This is an 
example of an explosive containing no oxygen or combustible 
matter its explosion is due to a simple disruption of the molecule 
into lead and nitrogen. 

Properties of High Explosives. The investigation of the be- 
haviour of explosives on detonation is attended by considerable 
difficulties. Some account of recent methods is given by Sir R. 
Robertson in the Journal of the Chemical Society, 1921, vol. cxix, 
p. I, from which the appended data are taken. 

Important advances have been made in methods of measure- 
ment of the time-pressure curve of high explosives. The explosive 
is detonated at one end of a suspended steel bar and causes a wave 

of compression to travel along the bar. This is reflected at the far 
end as a wave of tension which causes a disc lightly attached to be 
projected into a ballistic pendulum, whereby the momentum de- 
veloped overa very small time interval, usually about five millionths 
of a second, is obtained. 

Explosives in the Future. It is natural to inquire what are 
likely to be the future developments of explosives. If the history 
of the application of explosives be broadly reviewed, it is some- 
what striking that the materials used for explosive purposes in 
the World War of 1914-8 were practically all chemical compounds 
which have been known for at least 50 years. Indeed, the history 
of the last century has been much more concerned with dis- 
coveries relating to the methods of application of explosives than 
the discovery of new explosive compounds. The popular im- 
agination readily accepts stories of new explosives of fabulous 
violence, but experience shows that it is not in such directions 
that research has met with its greatest successes. Until about the 
middle of last century gunpowder held the field, although gun- 
cotton, nitro-glycerine, picric acid,mercury fulminate, ammonium 
nitrate, and the chlorates and perchlorates were all known com- 
pounds. Only one of these namely, mercury fulminate was 
used at all, and this only in its capacity as a simple igniter. The 
successive steps which led to the utilization of one after another 
of the modern explosives were first directed towards the nitric 
esters nitro-glycerine and nitro-cellulose. Nitro-glycerine was 
brought into a form in which it could be practically used, by 
absorbing it into the pores of kieselguhr and later by incorpo- 
rating it into gelatinized explosives, thus giving rise to extremely 
powerful combinations. In the utilization of nitro-cellulose, 
the initial problem was to bring it into a sufficiently stable 
condition to render it safe against spontaneous explosion. The 
discovery of the conversion of nitro-cellulose to a gelatinous 
condition by treatment with solvents led to valuable blasting 
explosives such as gelatine dynamite, and, more important still, 
formed the basis of the modern smokeless propellants. 

The method of initiating the detonation of high explosives by 
mercury fulminate dates from 1867, and opened the way to the 
ultimate utilization of very insensitive explosives for blasting 
and military purposes. The importance of this discovery will be 
realized when it is considered that it rendered possible the use of 
a wide range of ammonium nitrate and other mixtures for indus- 
trial purposes, and the use of T N T and amatol for military 
purposes in the World War. Many more steps in the investigation 
of detonation were, however, necessary before the mechanism of 
gun-shells was so perfected as to give efficient detonation com- 
bined with perfect safety; and although the use of aromatic 
nitro compounds, as represented by picric acid, for shell purposes 
was introduced about 1886, it is only in the present century that 
the methods of detonation have been so perfected as to render 
these high explosives an outstanding factor in warfare. 

The number of new explosives which have been patented is 
enormous, but these consist almost entirely of different mixtures 
of known ingredients, nor is it likely that any spectacular dis- 
covery will be made in the nature of a new compound of unprece- 
dented power. In the first place, granted that the oxygen is 
correctly balanced against the carbon and hydrogen, the chemical 
energy can only be increased by lowering the heat of formation. 
This might be done to some extent, and compounds of somewhat 

Behaviour of Explosives on Detonation. 


CO r* 




Heat evolved 
(cal. pergrm.) 

Stability test c.c. per hr. per kilo, 
after 40 hrs. in a vacuum. 

ness to impact 
(Picric Acid 
= 100). 

Velocity of Detonation. 


per sec. 

80 C. 120 C. 140 C. 

Tri-nitro-phenol (Picric Acid) 
Tetryl . 
Nitro-cellulose (13% I. N) .... 
Mercurv Fulminate 




















greater power are, in fact, known, but the increase of power 
is almost invariably accompanied by chemical instability and 
mechanical sensitiveness to shock and friction, which make it 
difficult to apply such explosives in a practical way. Advances 
have been made in the discovery and application of useful in- 
termediary explosives of the tetryl type, and there is room for 
further advances in this direction, but these are limited in scope. 
In the sphere of propellants, it appears likely that advances may 
be made in the direction of improvements on the present methods 
of gelatinizing by volatile solvents, the introduction of compounds 
of greater stability, and the attainment of greater power without 
the erosion which has hitherto limited it. 

All investigations must naturally be subservient to a great 
extent to economic considerations. In the World War the availa- 
bility of raw materials was a factor of decisive importance, and 
this limited the choice of compounds which could be made in 
large quantities. The necessity of importing the materials 

necessary for the manufacture of explosives is bound to direct 
attention to materials which can be obtained from home sources. 
This lends a special significance to the fixation of atmospheric 
nitrogen in the form of ammonia and nitric acid. It points also 
to the further development of perchlorates, which can be manu- 
factured electrolytically from materials obtainable in most coun- 
tries; and further investigations may overcome the present difficul- 
ties in the use of liquid oxygen. 

In the future, as in the past, the advances will probably lie 
mainly in the direction of improvements in the methods of appli- 
cation of explosives, unless some method should be discovered 
whereby the enormous energy of disintegration of the atoms 
could be released at will; this cannot however be said to be within 
sight, and it is perhaps well that such stupendous forces should 
be withheld from human control until a greater sense of interna- 
tional responsibility is developed in mankind. 




FABRE, JEAN HENRI (1823-1915), French entomologist, 
was born at St. Leons in Avcyron Dec. 21 1823. At ten 
years old he went to Rodez as a choir boy and there received 
the elements of a classical education, continuing it further 
at the normal school of Vaucluse. But his whole bent was for 
science, and, after he had become a teacher at Carpentras, he 
worked in his spare hours at physics and mathematics and be- 
came interested in insects, the study of whose habits was to 
form his life-work (see 3.626, 6.672, 14.180). Later he became 
a teacher of physics, first at Ajaccio and afterwards at Avignon. 
His first observations were published in Annales des Sciences 
Naturelles (1855-8), followed a good deal later by Souvenirs 
Entomologiqucs (1879-1907). He was a Chevalier of the Legion 
of Honour. He died at Serignan, Provence, Oct. n 1915. 

FAGUET, EMILE (1847-1916), French critic and man of 
letters (see 10.125*), continued up to 1914 to publish several 
volumes annually of critical and literary studies, more especially 
concerning Rousseau (Rousseau pciiseur, 1910; Vie de Rousseau, 
}gi i ; Les Amies de Rousseau; Rousseau artiste, etc., 1912). 
Amongst others may be noted a volume on Madame de Sevigni 
(1910); a study of Rostand (1911); En lisant Moliere (1914) and 
Msgr. Dupanloup (1914). He died in Paris June 7 1916. 

FAIRBAIRN, ANDREW MARTIN (1838-1912), British non- 
conformist divine (see 10.129), died in London Feb. 9 1912. 

FAIRBANKS, CHARLES WARREN (1852-1918), American 
politician, was born near Unionville, O., May n 1852. On 
graduating from Ohio Wesleyan University (1872) he became a 
newspaper reporter in Pittsburgh. He was admitted to the bar 
in 1874, and began practice at Indianapolis, Ind., where he was 
made solicitor for the receiver of the Indianapolis, Bloomington 
and Western railway. Henceforth he had much to do with rail- 
way affairs and became a railway financier. He attained a 
prominent place in state politics, being chairman of the Republican 
State Convention in 1892, 1898, and 1914. He was in charge of 
McKinley's campaign in Indiana, preceding the National Con- 
vention in 1896; and the following year he was elected to the 
U.S. Senate, having been nominated by the Republicans over 
several prominent candidates, including Gen. Lew Wallace. 
He was chairman of the U.S. representatives on the British- 
American Joint High Commission for dealing with Canadian 
questions in 1898 and 1903, being reelected to the Senate in the 
latter year. At the Republican National Convention in 1904 he 
was unanimously nominated for Vice-President with Theodore 
Roosevelt and was elected. In 1912 he had a large part in the 
making of the Republican platform. In 1916 he was again 
nominated by the Republicans for Vice-President but was de- 
feated. He died at Indianapolis June 4 1918. 

FAISAL (1885- ), Arab Emir, third surviving son of Hus- 
ein, King of the Hejaz, was born at Taif in 1885. He spent his 
infancy at Rihab in accordance with the tradition of the Qoreish. 
At the age of eight he was brought to Mecca, where he began 
his early studies, but was afterwards sent to Constantinople to 
join his father and here he received a good modern education. 
On attaining manhood he held official appointments under the 
Turkish Government. With his brothers, he took an active part 
in the constitutional movement which led to the deposition of 
'Abdul Hamid, as a part consequence of which the emirate of 
Mecca was restored to his father Husein ibn 'Ali in 1908, Faisal 
returning to Mecca with him. He followed a military career, 
and commanded the Arab contingent in the Turkish operations 
against the Idrisi in 1911-3. In 1914 he was elected deputy for 
Jidda in the Turkish Parliament. Up to that time he was not 
markedly prominent among his brothers, but from 1915 he 
favoured Arab Nationalist aspirations, and (with his brother 
'Abdulla) furthered his father's anti-Ottoman designs. At the 
outbreak of the Arab revolt in 1916 he commanded the rebels 
at Medina, and, in the crisis which followed the failure to capture 
the city, he came much to the front. He organized the revolting 

tribes each under its tribal leader, devised a scheme for the 
formation of an Arab regular army, and developed a particular 
school of irregular warfare. He commanded the Arab northern 
forces which, after the taking of Akaba (July 1917), constituted a 
friendly army of the right wing of the Egyptian Expeditionary 
Force. He led the Arab troops at their entry into Damascus 
1918, and to him, subsequently, was entrusted the task of setting 
up, in the eastern area of Syria, a provisional military adminis- 
tration to exercise control until peace was signed. Faisal pre- 
sented the case of the Arabs before the Peace Conference in 
Paris on Feb. 6 1919. His administration maintained compara- 
tive security throughout 1919. In March 1920 he was proclaimed 
King of Syria at Damascus by the Syrian National Congress, 
but this proceeding received no official sanction from the Allied 
Powers, and the regime was overturned by the entry of French 
troops into Damascus in July of the same year, Kerak then be- 
coming the headquarters of Faisal's administrative district. He 
spent some time in London in 1919 and again in 1920-21. On 
Aug. 23 1921 with the support of the Arab notables, ascer- 
tained by a referendum he was crowned King of Iraq (see 
MESOPOTAMIA) and became ruler of the new State set up under 
the mandate accepted by the British Government. 

FALKENHAYN, ERICH VON (1861- ), Prussian general, 
was born Sept. n 1861 at Burg Belchau in the district of Thorn. 
He took part in the China expedition of 1900 and remained in 
China with a brigade of occupation till 1903. In 1906 he was 
appointed chief-of-staff of the XVI. and afterwards of the IV. 
Army Corps; in 1913 he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant- 
general and was appointed Prussian Minister of War. He suc- 
ceeded Gen. von Moltke in Dec. 1914 as chief of the general 
staff of the army and was advanced to the rank of general of the 
infantry. It was on his initiative that the Russian lines were 
broken through at Gorlice-Tarnow on May 2 and 3 1915, and he 
likewise helped to plan the summer offensive of that year 
against Russia and the operations by which in the winter of 
1915-6 Serbia was overrun. He was made responsible, however, 
for the ill-success of the German attacks of 1916 at Verdun, and 
was replaced as chief of the general staff by Hindenburg in Aug- 
ust of that year. He was then assigned the leadership of the 
IX. Army against Rumania and commanded in the fighting at 
Hermannstadt and on the Targu Jin. In 1917 he took command 
of the so-called Asiatic Corps, for operations in the Caucasus, etc., 
and in 1918 and 1919 was at the head of the X. Army. He wrote 
an interesting account of the German conduct of the war during 
its first two years entitled Die obersle Heeresleitung in ihren 
wichtigsten Entschliessungen 1914-16 (1919). 

FALKLAND ISLANDS BATTLE. The battle of the Falklands, 
one of the principal naval actions of the World War, was fought 
on Dec. 8 1914 to the S.E. of the Falkland Is., between a Brit- 
ish battle-cruiser squadron under Vice-Adml. Sir F. Doveton 
Sturdee and the German East Asiatic Squadron under Adml. 
Graf von Spee. The British ships were: 

" Invincible " (flag.), Capt. Percy Beamish, b. c., 1908, 8 12-in., 

25j knots. 
" Inflexible," Capt. R. F. Phillemore, b. c., 1908, 8 12-in., 25! 

" Carnarvon" (Rear-Adml. A. P. Stoddart), Capt. H. L. Skip- 

with, a. c., 1904, 4 7'5-in., 6 6-in., 20 knots. 

' Cornwall," Capt. W. M. Ellerton, a. c., 1904, 14 6-in., 22 knots. 
' Kent," Capt. J. D. Allen, a. c., 1903, 14 6-in., 22 knots. 
' Glasgow," Capt. John Luce, I.e., 191 1,2 6-in., 10 4-111. ,25^ knots. 
' Bristol," Capt. B. H. Fanshawe, 1911,2 6-in., 10 4-in., 25^ knots. 
' Macedonia, Capt. B. S. Evans, a. m. s. 

The following composed the German squadron: 

' Scharnhorst," a. c., 1907, 8 8-2-in., 6 5-9-in., 2o| knots. 
' Gneisenau," a. c., 1908, 8 8-2-in., 6 5-9-in., 205 knots. 
' Leipzig," 1. c., 1906, 10 4-i-in., 2Oj knots. 
' Niirnberg," 1. c., 1908, 10 4-i-in., 22 knots. 
' Dresden," 1. c., 1908, 10 4-i-in., 25^ knots. 
Also three supply ships, " Seydlitz," " Baden," " St. Isabel." 

* These figures indicate the volume and page number of the previous article. 


Adml. Sturdee had arrived at Stanley Harbour, in the Falk- 
lands, only the day before, in the forenoon of Monday, Dec. 7. 
The " Canopus," an old battleship, was already there, moored 
in Port Stanley waiting in conjunction with a body of sturdy 
volunteers to resist von Spec's expected attack. It was Adml. 
Sturdee's intention to coal at once and continue the pursuit of 
von Spee on the pth, but his own colliers had not arrived and 
there were only three in harbour. It was arranged that the 
" Carnarvon," " Bristol " and " Glasgow " should coal first, the 
battle cruisers next, and the " Kent " and " Cornwall " last. 
The squadron was ordered to keep steam for 12 knots at two 
hours' notice, and the " Macedonia," an armed merchant ship, 


S.ISABEL 7 $3 pm , 
t.SO p m. 


,'SCHARNHORST 4.17 p m. 
GNEISENAU 6 02 p.m. 



' lY 

,' ff ".'TW NURNBERG 

\<. "^ 7.27pm. 

V-.+ LEIPZIG 9.23 p m. 


FIG. I. Battle of Falklands. 

took the guard for the night. No sooner had coaling started 
than it was found that the coal in one collier had deteriorated, 
and at first only two colliers were available. The " Carnarvon " 
and " Glasgow " had finished by 6 A.M., and at first flush of 
dawn the " Bristol " and " Invincible " started to coal. By this 
time another collier had arrived, and the "Inflexible" began 
coaling about the same time. The " Kent," " Bristol " and 
" Cornwall " had not begun. The " Bristol " had her fires 
drawn to remedy defects, and the " Cornwall " an engine opened 
up at six hours' notice. This was the situation when, at eight 
o'clock, the " Glasgow " fired a gun. This was to call attention 
to a signal which had been flying for some minutes at the look- 
out station on Sapper Hill. It reported two strange ships in 
sight. A scene of bustle and commotion ensued. Colliers were 
cast off and great clouds of smoke began to pour from the 
funnels as the ships raised steam. At 8:14 A.M. the signal 
went up to prepare to weigh. The " Kent " by this time had 
taken over guard from the " Macedonia " and had passed down 
the harbour towards the entrance. The ships which had 
appeared so unexpectedly on the scene were the " Gneisenau " 
and " Nurnberg," which von Spee had sent on in advance. They 
approached from the south-west to within about 14,500 yd. 
and the men could be seen fallen-in on their decks ready to effect 
a landing. They were not in sight from the " Canopus," but a 
fire control station had been set up on the hill, and at 9 A.M. she 
opened fire with her i2-in. guns over the sand dunes. The shots 
fell short, but they made the " Gneisenau " turn away for a time 
to increase the range. The " Scharnhorst " was still some 15 m. 
from the entrance, but the clouds of smoke rising over the 
hills had aroused von Spec's suspicions and he ordered the 
supply ships to keep away. From the " Gneisenau " there came 
a report of six men-of-war in the harbour, and the Admiral 

ordered steam in all boilers, directing the " Gneisenau " at the 
same time to steer east and not to accept battle. By 10 A.M. 
the "Invincible," "Inflexible" and "Cornwall," which by 
dint of strenuous exertions on the part of her engine-room staff 
had got steam up, were under weigh and leaving harbour. They 
were vomiting out huge clouds of smoke which concealed them 
for a time, but it cleared away for a few minutes, revealing the 
tripod masts of battle cruisers, and von Spee knew that his hour 
of trial had come. 

By 10:20 Sturdee was clear of the harbour; the enemy was 
well down to the south-east about n m. off and the British 
Admiral hoisted the " General Chase," a signal for each ship to 
steam as hard as she could after the enemy. It was a perfect 
summer day with a blue cloudless sky and calm sea. A light 
wind was blowing from the north-west. Masses of black smoke 
were pouring from the battle cruisers' funnels and a great white 
wake was growing at their stern. 

The engagement resolves itself into two phases. A chase from 
10:20 A.M. to 1:28 P.M. and the action from 1:28 P.M. to 6:ic. 
P.M. (see figs, i and 2). By n A.M. the enemy were showing 
above the horizon and the battle cruisers had eased to 24 knots. 
The " Glasgow " was on the " Invincible " port bow, the " Kent " 
on her quarter. The " Carnarvon " and " Cornwall " were 
five m. astern, and to give Rear-Adml. Stoddart in the former a 
chance to get up the Admiral reduced to 20 knots. The " Bristol " 
by extraordinary exertions on the part of her engine-room staff 
had managed to raise steam. Some ladies off Port Darwin 





,,. 1 ,,, 

'I'l' 1 !!) .|.',it.'> S< GNEISENAU 


'-''> I 




'3 rs 


<>*7, ', / '.^INFLEXIBLE 



^..>...430 '*>\^\ 

'.10 ^ ..|NFLEXIBL ( E 1 ,r>,\3.J7 



'V'.'yv* 4.17p.m. 


6 02 pm. 

FIG. 2. The Main Action. 

had seen von Spec's colliers, and the information was passed to 
Port Stanley and then to Adml. Sturdee, who dispatched the 
"Bristol" and "Macedonia" to deal with them. By 11:30 
A.M. the chase was gradually coming round to south-east by east. 
The " Carnarvon's " efforts to get up were unavailing and 
Sturdee increased speed. By 12:50 P.M. the battle cruisers 
were going 25 knots, overhauling the enemy fast. 

The " Leipzig " was beginning to feel the pace and was drop- 
ping behind. At 12:55 P.M. her range had dropped to 16,000 
yd. and the " Inflexible " opened fire. Von Spee seeing his light 
cruisers in danger ordered them to scatter, and they broke off 
to the southward, but Adml. Sturdee was ready for the con- 



tingency, and the " Glasgow," " Cornwall " and " Kent " went 
after them in hot pursuit. Von Spec turned to E.N.E. to ac- 
cept action and took station ahead of the " Gneisenau," while 
Sturdee's battle cruisers to the northward of him turned into 
line ahead on an easterly course. At 1 125 P.M. they opened 
fire, the " Invincible " on the " Gneisenau " and the " Inflexi- 
ble " on the " Scharnhorst," at first, shifting target later when 
the " Scharnhorst " passed ahead. 

The action which followed may be divided into three phases; an 
opening encounter from 1 125 P.M. to 2 P.M., then a pause from 
2 P.M. to 2:45 P.M. in which the chase was resumed, and the 
final engagement. The opening shots were fired at about 14,000 
yd., and von Spee led round to the north-east for a few minutes 
to close, continuing at 13,000 yd. on a north-easterly course, 
which gave the " Carnarvon " a chance of coming up. About 
1:40 P.M. the "Invincible" was hit, and Sturdee turned to 
port to open the range and take advantage of his heavier guns. 

Dense clouds of smoke were pouring from the battle-cruisers' 
funnels, and the north-easterly course and north-westerly wind 
carried it southward towards the enemy, smothering the range. 
By 2 P.M. the range had increased to 16,000 yd. and fire was 
checked. The " Invincible " led round to the south-east at 
2:05 P.M. to close, but the enemy was lost to sight for a few 
minutes in the smoke, and when he reappeared he was found 
to have turned right away to the southward in the direction of 
his light cruisers. Sturdee in reply turned to the southward 
and increased speed, and the chase began again. It continued 
for nearly 40 minutes. By 2:45 the range was down again to 
15,000 yd. and turning two points to port Sturdee opened fire. 
Von Spee did not reply for some minutes, then deciding to accept 
action he turned to the east again and opened fire at 2:55 P.M. 
The action ran to the eastward till 3:15 P.M. with the range 
falling from 12,000 to 10,000 yards. 

The British guns were now establishing their mastery. A fire 
had broken out in the " Scharnhorst " and the " Gneisenau " 
was listing and showing signs of severe damage. But again the 
smother of smoke down the range made spotting difficult, and 
at 3:15 P.M. Adml. Sturdee to escape from it turned the battle 
cruisers to port together. The " Inflexible " was now leading to 
the westward and found herself for the first time free from 
smoke. Von Spee might have continued his course to the 
eastward which would have opened the range again to something 
like 17,000 yd. at the expense of a concentration of fire on the 
" Gneisenau " in rear, but he preferred to continue the battle 
on a parallel course, and led round to starboard in succession 
bringing his starboard guns into action. The " Scharnhorst " 
shifted fire to the " Inflexible " and was engaged by her. The 
action now ran to the south-westward with the British battle 
cruisers circling widely round the enemy, maintaining a range 
of about 14,000 yards. By 4:5 P.M. the " Scharnhorst " was 
bearing east on a south-westerly course; she had been hit 
several times and was listing heavily to port ; her superstructure 
was a mass of ruins, and her speed had been reduced to 1 2 knots. 
The smoke was again driving down the range, and at 4:10 P.M. 
the " Inflexible " to get rid of it turned to starboard and engaged 
the " Gneisenau " on a north-easterly and opposite course. 
The " Invincible " did not follow her but ran on to the 
south-eastward. The end was now near. At 4:17 P.M. the 
" Scharnhorst " heeled completely over to port; her stern rose 
steeply in the air and she went down. As she disappeared the 
"Invincible" turned to starboard and ran to the northward for 
ten minutes, then ordering the " Inflexible " to take station 
astern, and turning to port at 4:30 P.M. shaped course to the 
westward. The " Gneisenau " was some 13,000 yd. to the 
south-eastward, still struggling along on a south-westerly course. 
No sooner had the " Inflexible " formed astern of the flagship 
than the range was again obscured by smoke, and finding it 
impossible to see the enemy she turned 14 points to port at 
4:45 P.M., and leaving the flagship ran to the eastward towards 
the enemy, opening on him with her starboard guns before the 
beam and turning to the south-westward at 4:55 on his starboard 
quarter at 10,000 yards. The " Invincible " meanwhile held on, 

and turning to the south-westward at 4:52 kept the " Gneisenau " 
on her port beam at about 12,000 yards. The " Gneisenau " 
was now under a heavy concentrated fire. By 5:15 she was in a 
sorry plight. The after turret was out of action, the foremost 
funnel gone and the ship was barely making headway. A drizz- 
ling rain had commenced to fall. At 5:30 P.M. the " Inflexible " 
ceased fire under the impression that she had struck, but the 
enemy's fore turret still maintained the contest. At 5:45 P.M. 
she fired her last shot. She had received some 50 hits and was 
sinking slowly. At 6 P.M. she went down, stern first. The 
British battle cruisers rescued 188 survivors from the icy water. 

The German light cruisers when they left the squadron had 
headed south at full speed with the " Kent," " Cornwall " and 
" Glasgow " in pursuit. When the chase began, the " Niirn- 
berg " was the centre ship, with the " Leipzig " about a mile on 
her starboard beam, and the " Dresden " ahead about four m. 
on the port bow. The speeds attained by various ships are diffi- 
cult to ascertain with absolute certainty. The " Leipzig " was 
the slowest ship and was probably unable to go more than 205 
knots; the "Dresden" was the fastest and was able to go about 25 j 
knots, and possibly something over, while the " Niirnberg " 
could probably go 22. All the German ships had been cruising 
continuously for four months with no facilities for repair, and 
probably found it difficult to maintain their speeds. On the 
British side, the " Glasgow " could go 25^ knots, and the " Corn- 
wall " and " Kent " can be credited with 22-j and 22 knots 
respectively. There could be no doubt as to the sequel once the 
British armoured cruisers got within range. The Germans had 
nothing heavier than the 4-i-in., good guns for their size but 
no match for the 14 6-in. carried by the armoured cruisers. 
When the German light cruisers broke off at 1:25 P.M. and the 
chase began the British cruisers were some 10 to n miles behind 
them. The " Glasgow " did not turn after them till 1:33 P.M., 
then going 24 knots she overhauled the " Kent " and " Corn- 
wall " and crossed their bows. 

According to German accounts Capt. Luce was overhauling 
the " Dresden " slowly for a time, but at 2:53 P.M. when some 
four m. ahead of the armoured cruisers he yawed and opened fire 
with his 6-in. guns on the " Leipzig," damaging one of her 
ventilating fans, which brought the steam pressure down. The 
armoured cruisers were now gradually creeping up, and about 

4 P.M. the enemy cruisers began to scatter, the " Dresden " 
going off to the south-west, the " Niirnberg " to the south-east, 
and the " Leipzig " continuing to the southward. Capt. W. M. 
Ellerton of the " Cornwall " immediately arranged with Capt. 
J. D. Allen of the " Kent " that he would take the " Leipzig," 
leaving the " Nurnberg " to the " Kent." This left the " Dres- 
den " to the " Glasgow," but Capt. Luce thought her speed 
too great and preferred to remain with the armoured cruisers. 

About 4:15 P.M. the " Kent " opened fire on the " Nurnberg " 
and the " Cornwall " on the " Leipzig," and by 4:30 the latter 
was being straddled. The " Glasgow " now definitely abandoned 
all attempt to follow the " Dresden," which disappeared about 

5 P.M. in a squall of rain. Turning to the eastward at 4:27 
P.M. she passed astern of the " Cornwall," bringing her broad- 
side to bear on the " Leipzig." The chase continued to the south- 
eastward, for half an hour the " Cornwall " keeping the enemy on 
the starboard bow, and steering a more easterly course to keep 
her guns bearing. About 4:50 the "Leipzig" turned to the 
south-west, and the " Cornwall " following suit had her now 
on the port bow and brought her port guns into action. The 
" Leipzig " was now beginning to suffer from the effects of the 
combined fire, and the " Cornwall " and " Glasgow " had no 
difficulty in keeping her at ranges of 9,000 to 10,000 yards. 
By 6 P.M. rain was falling, and as the target was becoming 
indistinct Capt. Luce made a signal to close. The " Corn- 
wall " now began to fire lyddite with immediate effect. By 6:35 
P.M. the " Leipzig " was blazing fore and aft, though still firing 
fitfully and going some 15 knots. At 7 P.M. her mainmast and 
her funnels had gone and she was practically only a burning 
wreck, though her flag still flew defiantly at the foremast. After 
opening the seacocks about 150 of her crew mustered amidship 


hoping to be saved. But as she made no sign of surrender the 
" Glasgow," after waiting half an hour, closed and opened fire 
again with terrible effect on the men gathered on her decks. 
Two green lights went up which were read as a signal of surrender 
and boats were lowered to perform the work of rescue, but she 
was heeling heavily to port, and at 9:23, while the boats were 
approaching, turned over and disappeared, some 80 m. south of 
the spot where her flagship had sunk five hours before. Only 
five officers and thirteen men were saved. The British cruisers 
had suffered little. The " Cornwall " had been hit 18 times, and 
had a list to port, but had suffered no casualties. The " Glas- 
gow " had been hit twice with one man killed and four wounded. 
The " Kent " all this time had been vigorously pursuing the 
" Niirnberg " to the south-east. She had started some seven 
miles behind her, but the engine-room staff performed prodigies, 
and by feeding the fires with all the spare wood in the ship the 
range was brought down to 12,000 yd. by 5 P.M. The " Niirn- 
berg " now opened fire with her stern guns. The " Kent's " 
shots were falling short, and mist and rain were seriously reduc- 
ing the visibility. Within the next quarter of an hour however, 
the " Kent " scored a couple of hits, one of which penetrated the 
" Leipzig " below the waterline aft and did serious damage. 
Then came a dramatic change. Two of the " Nurnberg's " boilers 
gave out, her speed dropped to 19 knots and the " Kent " com- 
menced to overhaul her rapidly. At 5:45 the " Kent " was on 
her port quarter some 6,000 yd. off, and the " Niirnberg " 
turned to port to engage her. There was no time to lose in the 
failing light and Capt. Allen forced the pace. Keeping the 
enemy well abaft the beam to avoid torpedo fire he closed in to 
3,000 yards. The pace was too hot for the "Niirnberg" and 
she turned right away at 6:02. But the " Kent " followed her 
close. By 6:10 the enemy was on fire with only two guns in 
action; the " Kent " continued to hit, and circling right round 
her bows raked her at 3,500 yards. By 6:25 she was a burning 
wreck, listing heavily and down by the stern, but with her flag 
still flying. The " Kent " opened fire again and the flag came 
down. Just before 7:30 she turned over and sank, but though 
a search was kept up till 9 P.M. only seven survivors were found. 
The " Kent " had been hit 40 times, but suffered little structural 
damage and lost only four killed and 12 wounded. 

Meanwhile the colliers " Santa Isabel " and " Baden " had 
been found by the " Bristol," who had chased them to the 
southward and eastward and captured them about 4 P.M. 
They were valuable ships, but Adml. Sturdee had given orders 
to sink all transports, and though they were not transports but 
ships full of valuable coal they were sunk. The supply ship 
" Seydlitz " got off to the southward and found safety amongst 
the icebergs. The " Dresden " reached Magellan Straits on 
Dec. 10 and anchored in Cockburn Channel with only 130 tons 
of coal left. Thence she made for Punta Arenas, where news 
came of her on the i2th, though three long months elapsed 
before our cruisers could hunt her down. 

This was the end of the chase and the encounter known as the 
battle of the Falklands. It was the one decisive naval battle of 
the war the end of von Spee's squadron, of von Spec, and of 
both his sons. It marked the termination of a definite phase of 
the struggle at sea. Cruiser warfare collapsed. Germany could 
no longer challenge the control of the outer seas, and outside the 
North Sea and Baltic the command of the sea was won. 

(A. C. D.) 

FARNELL, LEWIS RICHARD (1856- ), English classical 
scholar and archaeologist, was born at Salisbury Jan. 10 1856. 
Educated at the City of London school and Exeter College, 
Oxford, he was elected fellow of his college in 1880 and subse- 
quently rector in 1913. In 1920 he became vice-chancellor of the 
university. After graduating he studied classical archaeology 
at the universities of Berlin and Munich, and travelled much in 
Greece and Asia Minor. In 1909 he was elected the first Wilde 
lecturer in comparative religion, and he was Hibbert lecturer 
in 1911. He published Cults of the Greek States (5 vols., 1896); 
The Evolution of Religion (1905); Greece and Babylon (1911); 
The Higher Aspects of Greek Religion (1912). 

FARRAND, LIVINGSTON (1867- ), American education- 
ist, was born at Newark, N.J., June 14 1867. After graduation 
from Princeton in 1888, he studied medicine at the College of 
Physicians and Surgeons, New York, and received the degree of 
M.D. in 1891. During the next two years he studied at Cam- 
bridge (England) and at Berlin. From 1893 to 1903 he taught 
psychology at Columbia University as instructor, and, after 1901, 
adjunct professor; from 1903 to 1914 he was professor of anthro- 
pology. In 1897 he accompanied the Jesup North Pacific Ex- 
pedition, which visited the Indians of British Columbia, and 
published two monographs as results of his own investigations. 
From 1905 to 1914 he was executive secretary of the National 
Association for the Study and Prevention of Tuberculosis; and 
from 1912 to 1914 was treasurer of the American Health Associa- 
tion, during the same period editing the American Journal of 
Public Health. From 1914 to 1919 he was president of the 
university of Colorado, but in 1917 was granted leave of absence, 
following his appointment by the International Health Board of 
the Rockefeller Foundation to direct the work against tuberculosis 
in France. In 1919 he was made chairman of the Central Com- 
mittee of the American Red Cross. In 1921 he was elected to 
succeed Jacob Gould Schurman as president of Cornell Uni- 
versity. He was the author of Basis of American History (1904) 
and various articles on psychology and anthropology. 

FARWELL, SIR GEORGE (1845-1915), English judge, was 
born at Codsall, Staffs., Dec. 22 1845. He was educated at 
Rugby and Balliol College, Oxford, where he took his degree in 
1866. He was called to the bar in 1871. In 1891 he became a 
Q.C. and in 1895 a bencher of Lincoln's Inn, while in 1899 he was 
raised to the bench. In 1900 he came into prominence over the 
case known as the Taff Vale judgment (see 27.142), since his 
decision, though reversed by the court of appeal, was upheld in 
1901 by the House of Lords, and ultimately led to the passing 
of the Trade Disputes Act (1906). In 1906 Farwell was made a 
lord of appeal, but resigned this position in 1913. He died at 
Dunster, Som., Dec. 30 1915. He published Concise Treatise 
on the Law of Powers (1874). 

FASTING (see 10.193). The adoption of "hunger-striking" 
in prison by some of the militant suffragettes in England, just 
before the World War, and by Irish Sinn Feiners subsequently, 
has served to call attention to the physiological fact that the 
human body is capable of more prolonged fasting (abstinence 
from food) than had generally been realized. Before they gave 
these demonstrations of endurance, fasts of 40 or 50 days had 
been regarded as extreme cases. In 1920, however, the Lord 
Mayor of Cork, Terence McSwiney, maintained his hunger 
strike in Brixton prison during 74 days, and, though subject to 
fits of delirium, he was stated to have been conscious until within 
a few days of his death. 

From a purely scientific point of view it is regrettable that no 
definite medical record of this and other long " hunger strikes " 
was officially published, in such a way as to provide positive evi- 
dence that no " food " (apart from water and medicines) was taken, 
since there were naturally suspicions to the contrary in spite of all 
questions in Parliament on that point being answered in the neg- 
ative. It can only be assumed that such allegations were unfounded. 
It has been shown therefore that, if the hygiene of fasting is carefully 
carried out, the mere lack of food becomes of small moment to the 
preservation of life for several weeks. The beginning of a fast is its 
most painful period, for during the first 48 or 36 hours hunger pains, 
occasioned by peristaltic contractions of the stomach, persist. These 
pains at first increase in severity during some hours, then, if no food 
is taken, they begin to pass away. Once they have disappeared they 
do not, as a rule, return. The fasting individual passes into a condi- 
tion of comparative ease and comfort. The future now depends 
on the care with which the debris, collecting in the alimentary canal, 
is evacuated for the bowel goes on producing waste matter in 
spite of the absence of food. Purgation'is therefore necessary, and 
enemata are usually administered. The skin tends to exude an oily 
detritus, and unless this is removed constantly a faecal odour will 
be experienced. Here again, however, the beginning is the worst 
period. After some days the problem of maintaining health is 
much simplified, and the patient, though increasing in weakness, 
experiences small inconvenience. This period is, however, often 
characterized by hallucinations, the mind being dissociated from its 
material surroundings. Visions are frequently described and strange 
manifestations announced. The patient is now approaching the 



time when he must break his fast or die. Recent investigation sug- 
gests that death will be due to acid poisoning, and it is stated that 
the administration of what are called " buffer salts," for example the 
acid phosphate of sodium, is instrumental in postponing the fatal 
issue. In any case the end is apt to occur suddenly, the patient be- 
coming collapsed without warning. If the fast is broken with a 
little fruit juice and then milk given for a day or two no untoward 
results seem to follow. Indeed, many people derive benefit and prac- 
tise occasional fasting for a short period as a therapeutic measure. 
The Allan treatment of diabetes is an instance in point. There are 
many cases on record of men walking considerable distances on the 
4Oth day of a fast, and shorter fasts have been fairly common. It 
need scarcely be added that water is taken throughout the period of 
abstinence in all instances. (R. M. Wi.) 

FAWCETT, MILLICENT GARRETT (1847- ), British writer 
and political worker, was born at Aldeburgh, Suffolk, June n 
1847, the seventh child of Mr. Newson Garrett. In 1867 she 
married the economist Henry Fawcett, subsequently Postmaster- 
General (see 10.215), and during her husband's life was closely 
associated with him in all his work, his blindness making him in 
many ways extremely dependent upon her/ She herself produced 
various works on economics, including Political Economy for 
Beginners (1870), Tales in Political Economy (1875), and, with 
her husband, a volume of Essays and Lectures (1872). Mrs. 
Fawcett had for many years been interested in the higher educa- 
tion of women and in their economic and political future, and 
was one of the early workers for women's suffrage, becoming more 
prominent in the cause after her husband's death (1884). By 
about 1870 various small societies had grown up with the purpose 
of advancing the cause of women's suffrage, and in 1896 these 
were amalgamated under the name of the National Union of 
Women's Suffrage Societies, Mrs. Fawcett in 1907 becoming the 
president of this movement. The body was for some years the 
only important suffrage society, and most of the pioneers of the 
movement belonged to it; but in 1906 the Women's Social and 
Political Union was formed, pledged to work by militant, as 
opposed to constitutional methods. Mrs. Fawcett was strongly 
opposed to the tactics of the militant suffragists, and expressly dis- 
sociated the N.U.W.S.S. from any sympathy with such methods. 
The constitutional methods adopted by the body of which she 
was president included an alliance formed with the Labour party 
(1912) by which the society agreed to support Labour candidates 
in preference to Liberal when the latter proved unsatisfactory on 
the suffrage question. Mrs. Fawcett in 1912 produced her work 
Women's Suffrage, and her other books include Lives of Queen 
Victoria (1895) and Sir William Molesworth (1901), and Five 
Famous French Women (1906). 

Mrs. Fawcett's only child, Miss Philippa Garrett Fawcett, 
had a distinguished career at Newnham College, Cambridge, 
where in 1890 she was bracketed equal to senior wrangler. She 
became in 1905 principal assistant in the Education Officer's 
department of the L.C.C. 

FAYOLLE, MARIE-EMILE (1852- ), French marshal, was 
born at Puy (Haute Loire) May 14 1852. He entered the 
Ecole Polytechnique in, 1873, and on leaving in 1875 was posted 
to the 1 6th Regt. of artillery. As a subaltern he saw service in 
Tunis. He was promoted captain in 1882. In 1889 he passed 
through the Ecole de Guerre, to which, in Nov. 1889, he returned 
as assistant to Col. Ruffey, who was then artillery lecturer. At 
this time Foch was lecturer in tactics, and Maud'huy and Petain 
joint lecturers in infantry. In 1900 Fayolle succeeded Ruffey as 
artillery lecturer and held the appointment for seven years. He 
was promoted lieutenant-colonel in 1902 and colonel five years 
later. In Nov. 1908 he took over command of a regiment of ar- 
tillery, and in 1910 he was made a general of brigade; but as on 
May 14 1914 he had passed the age limit and had not received 
further promotion he was placed on the retired list. On the 
outbreak of the World War he was recalled and given command 
first of a reserve brigade and then of the 7oth (Reserve) 
Division. This division took part in the abortive Lorraine 
offensive of Aug. 1914. It distinguished itself in the defence 
of Nancy and was made the subject of a special order of the 
day by de Castelnau. In Oct. 1914 the division again received 
special notice this time for the part it played in the fighting 

on the line Gavrelle-Bailleul. On Oct. n Fayolle was made a 
Commander of the Legion of Honour. In June 1915 the division 
was again -made the subject of a special army order by Gen. 
d'Urbal who commanded the X. Army. On May 13 1915 Gen. 
Fayolle had been, contrary to the custom in the case of retired 
officers and in face of considerable opposition, promoted a 
temporary general of division. In June of the same year he 
succeeded Gen. Petain in the command of the XXXIII. Corps. 
On Feb. 26 1916 he was promoted to the command of the VI. 
Army, and on March 25 following was confirmed in his rank 
as general of division. In command of the VI. Army, he carried 
out the French portion of the Somme offensive (July 191 6-Nov. 
1916). On Oct. 8 1916 Fayolle was made a Grand Officer of the 
Legion of Honour. In May 1917 he again succeeded Petain, this 
time in the command of the centre group of armies. In Nov. he 
went to the Italian theatre in command of the French forces that 
were sent thither after the disaster of Caporetto. He returned in 
Feb. 1918 and took an important part in repelling the German 
offensives of March-June 1918, and in the Allied counter-offen- 
sive from July 18 onwards as commander of the northern group 
of armies. On July 10 he was given the Grand Cross of the Le- 
gion of Honour. Somewhat tardily he was, in Oct. 1919, awarded 
the Medaille Militaire. But not long afterwards he was, with 
Lyautey and Franchet d'Esperey, given the highest grade of all, 
that of Marshal of France. 

FAZY, HENRI (1842-1920), Swiss statesman and historian, 
was a member of a family which at the date of the Revocation 
of the Edict of Nantes (1685) came from Dauphine to Geneva to 
seek protection for religious reasons. Its most prominent member 
was his great-uncle, the Radical statesman, James Fazy (see 
11.591), whose biography (1887) was written by him. He was 
born at Berne on Jan. 31 1842. He studied at Geneva for his 
doctorate in philosophy and law, became a member of the Gen- 
evese cantonal parliament in 1868, and was member of the 
cantonal executive from 1897 till his death. He was a Radical in 
politics, but of a more moderate type than his great-uncle, and 
founded a Radical " group," opposed to the more extreme 
section. Carteret, the successor of James Fazy as leader of the 
latter, died in 1889, and henceforward Henri Fazy played a more 
and more prominent part in Radical Genevese politics. As a 
member of the cantonal executive he had charge of the Depart- 
ment of Finances, and was much criticised by Gustave Ador, the 
leader of the Democrats or Whigs. In 1880 his proposal to 
separate Church and State in Geneva was rejected by the people, 
but was finally accepted by them in 1907. He was a member of 
the Swiss Conseil National from 1896 to 1899, and from 1902 on- 
wards. After the Radical defeat of 1918 he was the only member 
of his party who was not turned out of office, but he became more 
and more conservative as time went on. In 1914, as the senior 
member of the Swiss Conseil National, he protested solemnly 
against the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. 

For many years he was the archivist of Geneva, and also pro- 
fessor of Swiss history at the university of Geneva (1896-9 and 
from 1902). In the latter capacity he wrote much on Genevese 
history. In 1887 appeared the Life of James Fazy, in 1890 the 
Constitutions de Geneve, in 1891 L' Alliance de 1584 entre Berne, 
Zurich et Geneve, in 1895 Les Suisses et la Neutrality de Savoie, 
in 1897 La Guerre du Pays de Gex et I'Occupation genevoise, 
1589-1601, in 1902 Histoire de Geneve a I'Epoque de I' Escalade, 
1580-1601, in 1909 Geneve el Charles Emmanuel and countless 
papers in the Proceedings of the Institut National Genevois. He 
died at Geneva Dec. 22 1920. 

actor (see 10.231). He retired from the Paris stage in 1893, 
and made a final tour of certain European capitals the following 
year. He died in Paris Dec. 14 1916. 

Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916 was adopted in the United 
States for the following reasons. Increasing use of costly equip- 
ment and the rising price of farm land had combined to make the 
problem of financing the American farmer a difficult one. His 
need for short-time credit, generally, had been met in various 



ways. Country merchants frequently advanced supplies to a 
farmer and received their pay after his crop was marketed. 
Manufacturers of farm machinery and of fertilizers also did a 
large credit business. A great many small country banks had 
sprung up since 1890 whose chief function was to supply short- 
time credit to farmers. The chief difficulty, however, was to 
supply long-time or mortgage credit. When the farmer must 
make a heavy investment, he needs a long loan. The only 
satisfactory security he can offer is a mortgage, and the market 
for farm mortgages is limited, because comparatively few persons 
with money to lend are experts in farm values or otherwise in a 
position to deal safely in farm mortgages. This difficulty was 
accentuated in new communities by the lack of local lenders with 
sufficient expertness. It had in the past been partly, but only 
partly, overcome in various ways. Local mortgage brokers or 
banks having the necessary expertness, could lend on a limited 
number of mortgages, and after adding their own endorsements, 
discount the loans with eastern investors. In other cases, some 
of the large insurance companies sent their own experts into 
selected regions to place loans secured by mortgages. Again, a 
number of large corporations, commonly called mortgage banks, 
were organized to lend on mortgage security and to sell their 
own bonds to the investing public. Such a corporation, having 
bought a number of mortgage notes aggregating $100,000, would 
deposit them with a trustee as security for its own bonds to the 
same amount. These bonds were then sold to the general invest- 
ing public, but sold on the general reputation of the corporation 
issuing them, and not on the buyer's expert knowledge of the 
individual mortgages. 

In order to extend this principle and enable it to meet the need 
for mortgage credit throughout the country, the Federal Farm 
Loan Act of 1916 was passed. This Act created a Federal Farm 
Loan Board, to consist of the Secretary of the Treasury and four 
others to be appointed by the President, and to have general 
administrative control of the system. Under this Board there 
were created 1 2 farm land banks, located in the 1 2 different dis- 
tricts into which the country was divided, each bank to be the 
centre of the farm loan system for its own district. In each 
district there were to be organized, under its farm land bank, an 
indefinite number of farm loan associations, composed wholly of 
farmers desiring to borrow money on mortgage; and they 
borrow from the farm land bank of their district. 

The 12 Federal farm land banks are located in the following 
cities: Springfield, Mass., Baltimore, Md., Columbia, S.C., 
Louisville, Ky., New Orleans, La., St. Louis, Mo., St. Paul, Minn., 
Omaha, Neb., Wichita, Kan., Houston, Tex., Berkeley, Cal., 
Spokane, Wash. There was also a provision in the Federal Farm 
Loan Act permitting joint stock mortgage banks, such as those 
already described, to come in under the Federal farm loan system. 
Twenty-five had done so before Feb. 15 1921, with capital stock 
of $7,966,000, with bond issues aggregating over $76,000,000, 
and with loans to farmers aggregating almost $78,000,000. 
Every Federal farm land bank was required to have, before be- 
ginning business, a subscribed capital stock of not less than 
$750,000. This provided the initial fund from which to purchase 
the first batch of mortgages from the farm loan associations. 
Additional funds were to be raised through the sale of bonds 
to the investing public. Each issue of bonds was to be based 
upon a batch of mortgages previously purchased and deposited 
as security under the direction of the farm loan board. In order 
to assure a sufficient amount of capital stock, it was provided 
that in case the total $750,000 of capital stock of any Federal 
farm land bank was not subscribed within 30 days after the open- 
ing of the books, it was made the duty of the Secretary of the 
Treasury " to subscribe the balance thereof on behalf of the 
United States." In order still further to assure the farm land 
banks a working capital, in case the public was slow to invest in 
the farm loan bonds, amendments were passed (Jan. 18 1918 and 
May 26 1920) authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to pur- 
chase $200,000,000 of such bonds during 1918-21. 

On Dec. 31 1920 the U.S. Government held $6,832,680 of the 
capital stock of the farm land banks and their bonds to the amount 

of $182,235,000. The total bonds authorized and issued by them was 
$333.784,500. The total capital stock of the 12 farm banks amounted 
to $24,591,515 held as follows: 

By the U.S. Government $6,832,680 

By National Farm Loan Ass'ns 17,663,725 

By borrowers through agents . . . . . 79,230 

By individual subscribers 

The total amounts loaned by the 12 Federal land 
Nov. 30 1920 were as follows: 





New Orleans 

St. Louis . 

banks up to 

St. Paul 







Total $368,621,314 

Under the operation of this Act and its amendments, such moneys 
as are secured from the sale of bonds, either to the Secretary of the 
Treasury or to the investing public, are loaned by the farm land bank 
to farm loan associations within its district in return for mortgages 
given by individual farmers to these farm loan associations. The 
course of the money is, therefore, as follows: first, from the investor 
to the farm land bank in exchange for bonds; second, from the farm 
land bank to the farm loan association in exchange for a batch of 
mortgages; third, from the farm loan association to the individual 
farmer in exchange for an individual mortgage. The securities, 
however, proceed in the opposite direction; first, a mortgage is 
given by the individual to his local farm loan association in exchange 
for money; second, this and other similar mortgages are transferred 
from the farm loan association to the farm land bank in exchange 
for money; third, the farm land bank deposits these mortgages 
under the direction of the Federal farm loan board and, on that 
security, issues its own bonds and sells them to investors. 

It was provided in the Farm Loan Act that the bonds of the 
farm land banks were to be exempt from taxation. The purpose of 
this exemption was to make such bonds so attractive to the general 
investor as to compensate for a low rate of interest. This low rate of 
interest on the bonds would then enable the farm land banks to 
accept farm mortgage notes paying a low rate of interest, and thus 
the farmer would be able to borrow at a lower rate than would be 
necessary if the farm loan bonds were subject to taxation. Those 
issued prior to May I 1920 paid 42%. Subsequent issues pay 5%. 
This provision was bitterly attacked on the ground that it was class 
legislation, or discrimination in favour of farmers as against other 
classes. The matter was under litigation for many months, but 
finally in Feb. 1921 the Supreme Court decided in favour of the 
constitutionality of the Act. (T. N. C.) 

serve Banking System of the United States is the outgrowth of a 
movement for what was called " banking reform, " which had 
been in progress for about 20 years prior to the enactment of the 
Federal Reserve Act on Dec. 23 1913. 

The National Banking System, which in 1913 contained a 
total of about 7,500 members, had been organized during the 
Civil War, the constituent Act being passed in 1863 and modified 
in the following year. It provided for the creation of independent 
institutions operating under the general requirements of the 
National Banking Law, but organized directly at the will of 
prospective stockholders. The fundamental basis of the law 
was " free banking," as reflected in general authority to organize 
banks provided that the capitalization of each institution should 
not be less than a specified sum varying with the population of 
the place in which the proposed bank was to be situated. The 
minimum of capitalization was $50,000 (changed in 1900 to 
$25,000). Currency issued by the national banks was based upon 
and protected by Government bonds which each bank was re- 
quired to purchase in a specified amount, not exceeding, however, 
a sum equal to the capital of the bank. Bond purchase provisions 
were later modified, but the essential principle remained. When 
these bonds had been purchased they were deposited with the 
Treasurer of the United States who thereupon issued circulating 
notes to the bank. Each bank was required to maintain a specified 
reserve which amounted to 25% in the case of banks located in 
three central reserve cities (New York, Chicago and St. Louis), 



while in reserve cities (eventually nearly 50 in number) the 
requirement was 12^% cash in vault and 125% in the form of 
balances in banks in the central reserve cities. All other banks 
were required to keep 15% reserve, of which 6% had to be cash 
in vault and 9% might be in the form of balances in the banks 
of central reserve cities. 

This system had proved inadequate because in time of stress 
or panic there was no recognized means for relieving hard-pressed 
banks; also the currency was inelastic, being limited by the 
amount of bonds available, and being slow in its issue and 
even slower in redemption. During and shortly after the panic 
of 1893, an agitation was started in favour of some plan for the 
issue of " emergency currency " as a means of preventing the 
development of acute panics; this ultimately grew into a demand 
for a currency not purely of emergency nature but elastic as 
required by business needs, and therefore including issues of 
ordinary bank-notes protected by the joint guarantee of the 
banks. The only practical outcome of this agitation was seen in 
certain sections of the Gold Standard Act of 1900. These pro- 
vided for refunding the outstanding U.S. bonds at a rate (2%) 
which precluded the growth of a premium while it authorized 
banks of $25,000 capital in places with less than 3,000 people. 
Both provisions tended to make the issue of notes easier. Al- 
though numerous bills were urged, especially after 1907, the 
proposed plan for a really elastic note issue was never seriously 
considered by Congress because of the unwillingness of the 
larger banks to guarantee notes issued by a great many small 
institutions. After the panic of 1907 the so-called Aldrich- 
Vreeland Act was adopted (May 30 1908). This made provision 
for the organization of " national currency associations " which 
would have been allowed to issue notes based upon commercial 
paper or other securities deposited by constituent banks with 
the associations in question. At the time, however, the plan did 
not get into practical operation, partly because the difficulties 
attendant upon the panic of 1907 had been overcome before the 
Act was enacted. Contemporaneously with the Aldrich-Vree- 
land Act, provision was made for the creation of a body called 
the National Monetary Commission, which continued investiga- 
tions for several years and eventually proposed a bill for general 
banking reform, ordinarily described as the Aldrich bill. This 
measure contemplated the creation of a central banking organ- 
ization with branches. The plan still retained the fundamental 
concept of an emergency currency, but the proposed institution 
was not equipped with the ordinary powers, duties and respon- 
sibilities which had been found necessary in central banking 
experience abroad. It has been supposed that the Aldrich bill 
would have been adopted in its original or a modified form if the 
Republican party, under whose auspices it had been developed, 
had not been defeated in Nov. 1912. The Democratic party having 
come into office in the spring of 1913, the duty of enacting bank- 
ing legislation was necessarily assumed by it and in June of that 
year a bill embodying what afterward became the Federal Reserve 
Act was introduced into congress. The measure had been under 
construction and preparation from about March 1912 onward, 
and a first draft of it had been presented to President-elect 
Wilson soon after the election of 1912. It was then approved by 
the President-elect, and the process of perfecting and improving 
it went on during the winter of 1912-3 under direction of a House 
of Representatives Committee. This bill when introduced had 
thus been under consideration at the hands of the special com- 
mittee of the House Banking and Currency Committee for about 
15 months prior to the date of its introduction, while preliminary 
studies had been undertaken even earlier. The bill consequently 
was quickly completed, went through Congress during the 
middle of 1913 and became law on Dec. 23 of that year. 

Theory of Federal Reserve System. The theory of the Federal 
Reserve Act was the separation of the central banking functions 
of the past from practical bank operation, the latter being carried 
on through distinct reserve banks under the general direction of a 
board vested with the banking functions of the past. To carry 
out this idea, the Federal Reserve Act provided for the creation of 
a number of central institutions whose membership was to con- 

sist of national banks, while institutions organized under state 
law (banks and trust companies) might at will also become mem- 
bers. Each such bank was obliged to contribute a sum equal 
to 3% of its capital and surplus and to become liable for an 
additional 3 % which might be called in case of necessity. The 
central directing mechanism of the system was the Federal 
Reserve Board, which consisted of five members chosen by the 
President of the United States with the Secretary of the Treasury 
and the Comptroller of the Currency as members exofficio. 
No two of these five selected members were to be chosen from the 
same Federal Reserve district. An essential and fundamental 
requirement of the Act was the compulsory transfer of the re- 
serves of member banks to the Federal Reserve banks, the 
reserve provisions requiring a minimum of vault cash and a 
minimum of balances on the books of the Federal Reserve 
bank, while a certain percentage of the required reserve might be 
either in vault or in the Federal Reserve bank. This was the 
so-called " divided reserve. " The maximum required reserve 
(in central reserve cities) was 18%, of which 5% was to be in 
vault, 6% with the Federal Reserve bank, and 7% either in 
vault or with the reserve bank at the discretion of the member. 
Each reserve bank was authorized to issue currency protected 
by notes and bills growing out of commercial, industrial or agri- 
cultural operations. These notes and bills were to have a maxi- 
mum maturity of 90 days, except where they were the product of 
agricultural transactions, in which case the maturity was raised 
to 1 80 days. Deposits of these notes were to be made with an 
officer known as the Federal Reserve Agent, there being one 
such officer at every Federal Reserve bank. Each Federal Re- 
serve bank was governed by a board of directors, six of whose 
members (three bankers and three business men) were chosen 
by constituent member banks voting in three separate groups 
according to size of capital, while three (including the Federal 
Reserve Agent who was also the chairman) were chosen by the 
Federal Reserve Board. The Federal Reserve Board was given 
the function of passing on and establishing rates of discount, 
such rates, however, being originally named by the boards of 
directors of the several Federal Reserve banks. The task of 
dividing the country into districts was placed in the hands of an 
organization committee with instructions to establish not less 
than eight nor more than twelve such districts. This committee 
eventually divided the country into 12 districts with a Federal 
Reserve bank in each, and the President of the United States 
named the Federal Reserve Board in accordance with the new 
law, the new organization taking office Aug. 12 1914. On coming 
into existence, the board proceeded to organize a Federal Re- 
serve bank in each district; the member banks paid in their stock 
subscriptions Nov. 2, and the Federal Reserve banks opened for 
business Nov. 16 1914. As thus organized the initial paid-in 
capital of the system at opening was about $18,000,000, while 
the gross reserve balances were $256,000,000. These balances 
at the outset were obtained chiefly through actual transfers of 
specie and legal tender money ($205,000,000), although in some 
cases rediscount credits were granted to aid members in estab- 
lishing the necessary legal balance. Each bank was at the outset 
equipped with a small staff of officers and employees and a uni- 
form accounting system. The beginning of the year 1915 found 
the system in operation, but with its transactions upon a small 
scale. Its first duty was to aid in the retirement of the emergency 
currency which had been issued shortly after the opening of the 
World War under the terms of the Aldrich- Vreeland Act as 
modified by Congress just after the outbreak of the war in such 
a way as to render the working of its provisions rather more 
flexible than was possible under the original legislation. At the 
outset, however, the system was of considerable service in con- 
trolling the outflow of gold which had proved to be an embarrass- 
ing feature of the economic changes that immediately succeeded 
the opening of the war, while it also aided in other emergency 
measures. Various measures were adopted with this end in view 
the best known being the so-called hundred-million-dollar " gold 
pool " formed after the outbreak of the war to provide exchange 
and to check gold losses. 



Operation of the System. The operation of the Federal Re- 
serve System may be divided into three distinct periods, the 
first from Nov. 2 1914 to the declaration of war by the United 
States April 6 1917; the second extending from the latter date 
to a period some time after the conclusion of the Armistice of 
Nov. ii 1918 (the date most aptly chosen for the close of this pe- 
riod probably being Nov. 4 1919); while the third period extended 
from the latter date to the close of the year 1920. During the 
first or pre-war period the functions of the system were con- 
cerned largely with the organization of its own constituent units 
and the modification of banking practice in the United States 
and with the establishment of methods suited to the initiation of 
the new plan. These functions naturally fell into two main 
groups: (i) in the internal organization of the Federal Reserve 
banks, and (2) in theestablishmentof satisfactory relationships be- 
tween them and their members. In the latter category should be 
placed the work done in perfecting cooperation between the banks 
and the clearing housesof thedifferent communities and in develop- 
ing methods of collection, in working out plans for rediscounting 
with the least possible delay and friction, and other matters of 
equal importance. In the same group of functions must also be 
placed the work done by the Federal Reserve System in develop- 
ing a new standard for commercial paper. The Federal Reserve 
Act had given to the Federal Reserve Board the duty of defining 
commercial paper. Consequently, one of the first undertakings 
of the board was the establishment of regulations designed to 
cover the different classes of commercial paper and the processes 
to be pursued by reserve banks in discounting such paper. 
These regulations did not have the force of law since they merely 
amounted to a statement of the standards with which commercial 
paper must comply in order to be " eligible," that is to say, to be 
rediscountable at the Fedcrable Reserve banks. Nevertheless, 
the growing power of the Federal Reserve banks was such that 
these standards of eligibility rapidly came to be recognized 
through the whole of the banking community. Progress was 
made in the matter of securing nearly identical methods of pre- 
paring financial statements to be used for the purpose of testing 
the credit position of firms who were presenting paper for dis- 
count. An outstanding element in the work of the Federal Reserve 
Board during this first period was the national and district 
clearance and collection system. The Federal Reserve Act had 
authorized the board to act as a clearing house for the several 
reserve banks, and early in 1915 the board took action by estab- 
lishing the so-called Gold Settlement Fund at Washington. 
Each bank contributed originally a sum of $1,000,000 in gold, 
the entire amount being stored in the Treasury or the sub-treas- 
uries. Claims accumulated by reserve banks upon one another 
were each week telegraphed as an aggregate to the board at 
Washington and offset against one another, the net debit or 
credit balances in the fund being registered in a set of books 
created for that purpose. The size of the fund grew rapidly and 
eventually reached a maximum of about $500,000,000. A second 
section of the fund was established to provide for clearances 
growing out of the accounts of Federal Reserve Agents as distinct 
from the bank to which they were accredited. The Gold Settle- 
ment Fund probably would not have been successful alone had it 
not been supported by some plan for the collection of items orig- 
inating within the several districts. Such a plan was, however, 
worked out and put into effect in practically final form begin- 
ning about July i 1916. This was the so-called " intradistrict " 
collection system. It provided for the depositing of cheques 
(at first only on member banks but finally on any other bank or 
any banker) by members or holders of clearing accounts with 
Federal Reserve banks. These cheques were sent to the banks 
upon which they were drawn, the latter being required to remit 
the proceeds in cash or acceptable exchange or to authorize the 
charging off of these remittances upon the books of the reserve 
banks. Member banks, of course, habitually followed the latter 
plan, while non-members who had no account with the reserve 
bank were obliged to furnish exchange or send coin. Although 
there was opposition from the banks which had previously made 
a profit out of this kind of exchange business, the opposition 

gradually lessened. Possibly the most vigorous form which 
it assumed was seen in the amendment to the Federal Reserve 
Act adopted in 1917, in which exchange charges made by member 
banks were recognized but which, on the other hand, practically 
neutralized such charges by providing that the Federal Reserve 
banks should not be permitted to pay exchange. The matter 
was promptly tested in the courts, and as a result of favourable 
decisions and of the evidently beneficial character of the system, 
the number of banks which agreed to clear at par was extended 
until in 1920 it included more than 29,000 institutions -practically 
all the banks of the United States. The total operations of the 
Federal Reserve intradistrict clearing system were at the rate 
of $13,124,000,000 per month during the year 1920. 

War Finance. Although the Federal Reserve System had prac- 
tically established itself during the' two and a half years of its 
existence prior to the entry of the United States into the war in 
April 1917, it was doubtful whether the resources of the system were 
sufficiently large to enable it to bear the strain which all recognized 
would be thrown upon it as soon as war demands began to make 
themselves felt. Accordingly Congress, upon recommendation of 
the Federal Reserve Board in June 1917, passed an amendatory Act 
which provided that nothing should be counted as reserve except 
balances on the books of Federal Reserve banks. The United States 
had declared war on April 6 1917, and almost immediately thereafter 
many of the larger State banks and trust companies, which had 
previously hesitated to become members, filed their applications, 
actuated partly by patriotic desire to strengthen the Government's 
accounts and partly by the fact that the severe financial stress of 
the war would be most easily met by the institutions which had 
joined the system. This movement into the Federal Reserve System 
was accelerated through the amendatory Act to which reference 
has already been made, so that in the course of the year 1917 the 
resources of the System were enormously increased, while its gold 
holdings were vastly added to through the gradual withdrawal of 
coin not only from the vaults of banks but also from circulation. 
Shortly after the declaration of war the Secretary of the Treasury 
had placed an issue of $50,000,000 of treasury certificates of in- 
debtedness with the reserve banks, but it was promptly recognized 
that this plan of financing was unsound; and subsequent issues, both 
of long-term bonds and of Treasury certificates, were placed with 
member banks and so far as possible with the public through the 
reserve banks acting as intermediaries. It was seen from the out- 
set, however, that in order to keep the rate of interest on Govern- 
ment bonds at a low figure and to insure wide distribution of the 
bonds, it would be necessary to guarantee their holders that they 
could borrow freely by using them as security at rates which would 
involve no expense. Consequently, from the date of the First Lib- 
erty Loan (June 1917) onward, banks all over the country under- 
took to loan to their customers on Liberty Bonds such amounts as 
the customers might need, running up to a total close to the face 
of the bonds, and at the same time reserve banks undertook to re- 
discount the notes collateraled with these bonds when received from 
the member banks. As the Government itself had entered, upon a 
wide scale, into business enterprises growing out of the war, a 
large and increasing volume of its payments for supplies, services 
and other needs was made out of the proceeds of bonds and certifi- 
cates and this class of paper accordingly superseded in a correspond- 
ing degree paper which would otherwise have been made by business 
men for the purpose of financing their ordinary transactions. Both 
in order therefore to assist the rank and file of the public in absorbing 
Liberty Bonds and to facilitate the Government's own operations, 
there were large additions to the portfolios or holdings of reserve 
banks and the amount of the notes they issued and the deposits 
they entered on their books increased rapidly. At the end of 1917 
there was outstanding in notes $1,247,000,000 while reserve de- 
posits were $1,446,773,000 and total resources were $3,089,945,000. 
These conditions were more and more accentuated as the war con- 
tinued, particularly in view of the fact that the U.S. Government 
found it necessary to advance large sums to foreign countries, selling 
Liberty Bonds in order to provide the means for so doing. The 
consequence was an enormous increase of general prices brought 
about partly by the steady draft upon the consumable commodities 
in the country which were exported in great quantities (the total 
shipments during 1918 being $6,149,087,545 as against $2,484,018,- 
292 in 1913), while they were partly due also to the great increase 
of bank-notes and bank deposits both on the books of memljers and 
of the reserve institutions themselves. It had been hoped that upon 
the declaration of the Armistice there would be a reaction to more 
conservative methods of financing, but the enormous commitments 
which had been made in sending about two million soldiers to 
France and in taking from the Allied Governments their obligations 
to a total eventually of about $9,600,000,000, constituted a situation 
which could not be immediately altered. In fact, war expenses con- 
tinued to increase for several months after the Armistice, and the 
floating of a Fifth, or Victory, Loan, early in 1919, was essential in 
order to fund some part of the immense floating indebtedness of 


nearly $10,000,000,000 for advances to foreign countries, fully 
$2,500,000,000 of such advances being actually paid after the 
Armistice. The war finance period thus in effect extended to the 
middle of 1919 at least. By that time, however, the advance of 
prices was tremendous, and a very serious question arose as to 
whether the reserve banks ought to announce a material increase 
in their rates of discount. The objection to their doing so was 
strongly urged by the Treasury authorities, because such a policy 
would result in increasing the cost of money to the Government. 

After the War. The final conclusion of the operations attendant 
upon the Fifth, or Victory, Loan created a financial situation which 
was distinctly better from the standpoint of the Treasury than that 
which had existed before, and somewhat reduced the opposition of 
the department to a restoration of normal discount rates. Accord- 
ingly in Nov. 1919 a tentative advance in the rate of discount on all 
classes of commercial paper was made. This had -but little effect 
upon the volume of credit outstanding, although it kept the rate of 
expansion below that which would otherwise have been unavoidable. 
Experience during the next six months showed that much more 
positive action would have to be taken, for speculation continued. 
It was not so intense in stocks and securities as during the month 
immediately after the Armistice, but prevailed very widely in 
staple materials as well as in many classes of finished products. In 
order to check this development of speculation, it was essential to 
limit the extension of credit to traders and manufacturers as well as 
to farm interests, which were seeking to obtain bank accommodation 
in order to carry large quantities of products which they withheld 
from the market. The rate of discount was eventually raised in 
May 1920 to a maximum of 7 per cent. Meanwhile a change in the 
personnel of the Treasury Department had occurred, and one of the 
features of the new regime was an alteration of policy with respect 
to methods of borrowing. The Treasury Department now advanced 
its offered rate of interest on certificates of indebtedness to a max- 
imum of 6%, a figure more nearly corresponding to the prevailing 
rate in the open market. These advances took place practically 
simultaneously with corresponding action by the Bank of England 
and the British Government. The effect in both countries was 
beneficial in two ways it tended to place the Government's ob- 
ligations more freely in the hands of investors and thus to take them 
out of the banks, while the advance in discount rates coupled with 
the initiation of an anti-speculative policy and the withholding 
of credit from those who desired to hoard and store products tended 
strongly to bring commodities directly upon the market. The 
consequence was the administration of a sharp check to the growth 
of credit, and during the latter part of the year 1920 there was a 
decided restriction of the total amount of new bank accommodation 
granted both by the reserve banks and by their members, while 
there was a very decided reduction in the degree of activity with 
which bank deposits were used. In addition to these changes in 
bank position was the fact that the extraordinarily high prices which 
had ensued upon the close of the war, reaching their peak in May 
1920, declined rapidly from the middle of 1920 onward, eventually 
reaching, at the close of the year, an average level of about 190 as 
compared with 272 in May and 100 in 1913. This rapid decline 
tended to curtail the demands upon reserve banks and had the effect 
of eliminating the borrowing of many concerns which had been con- 
ducting operations on an unsound and semi-speculative basis. The 
close of the year 1920 found the reserve banks with $3,552,922,000 
in notes outstanding, with total discounts amounting to $2,687,393,- 
ooo and total resources to $6,282,755,000. 

Expansion of Reserve Banks. Before the entry of the United 
States into the war the operations of the Federal Reserve banks had 
been restricted, for reasons already explained, so that the personnel 
employed was necessarily limited. It had not been found necessary 
to expand the number of offices although the Federal Reserve Act 
had authorized the creation of branches both at home and abroad. 
Early in the history of the system a branch of the reserve bank at 
Atlanta had been established at New Orleans because of the im- 
portance of that city as a port of communication with South America. 
This, however, continued for a good while to be the only branch bank 
in the system. The great expansion of operations resultant upon 
the fiscal transactions of the Treasury coincided with the upward 
swing of business which resulted from the complete establishment 
of the collection system. It was found that greater efficiency could 
be secured through the opening of new offices at strategic points, 
and before Jan. I 1921 there had been created in all 22 branches. 
These branches varied to some extent in the scope and character of 
their functions, certain of them acting primarily as collection 
agencies while others added thereto very considerable powers in the 
rediscounting of paper and the holding of reserves. In some cases, 
as on the Pacific coast, creation of branches resulted from the fact 
that the district in which they were situated was so large that as 
a mere matter of convenience it was desirable to establish some local 
offices. In other cases the creation of branches grew out of peculiar 
local conditions or a need for recognition of the importance of some 
industrial centre outside the city in which the parent bank was 
situated. The local branch offices were usually given a comparative- 
ly simple organization and wherever possible the effort was made 
to have them practically dependent upon the bank of the district. 
To facilitate this closeness of relationship and also to ensure prompt 

action in connexion with clearance and rediscounting operations a 
leased wire system, including both telegraph and telephone, was put 
into operation between the various banks in 1917, uniting the whole 
series of parent offices and branches with the board in Washington 
and rendering possible practically instantaneous communication 
upon matters of business policy. While it was never deemed ex- 
pedient to establish actual branches in foreign countries, the system 
early in the war entered into agency relationships with the Bank of 
England whereby that institution was to hold funds in trust for the 
Federal Reserve banks jointly while they in turn were to undertake 
similar duties for the Bank of England. It was understood at the 
time that the agency relationship would not, until after the war at 
least, lead to the performance of functions involving the buying and 
selling of bills or operations in the discount market. Similar rela- 
tionships were later concluded with the Bank of France, the Bank 
of Japan and various other international institutions, but in all 
cases the relationship was on a restricted basis and never resulted 
in the undertaking of international discount operations. From the 
opening of the war onward, the personnel of the Federal Reserve 
banks expanded very rapidly, as was necessary in order to comply 
with the heavy demands that were made upon the banks for serv- 
ices. For the year 1920 the personnel of the banks probably aver- 
aged about 10,000 persons, while their combined earnings for that 
year were $181,000,000, and their total expenses of operation, 
$29,889,000, or about i6J per cent. Earnings which had been small 
before the war, some banks barely making expenses and others paying 
a little less than the 6 % dividend provided for in the Act, shot up 
rapidly, as the result of heavy Government loans and the large ad- 
vance made by the reserve banks in connexion therewith. FoV the 
year 1920 the earnings of the entire system, after setting aside all 
reserves, providing for depreciation, etc., were well over 200% on 
the capital. This, of course, was an abnormal condition resulting 
from the financing of the war period and corresponding to similarly 
heavy earnings at the central banks of foreign countries. Under 
the terms of the original Federal Reserve Act all earnings above 6% 
on the capital stock were to be transferred to the Government in 
lieu of a franchise tax. The receipts of the Government in the form 
of profits from the Federal Reserve banks, therefore, from the be- 
ginning to the close of 1920 amounted to about $150,000,000. 

Influence of Reserve Banks on Banking and Business. The in- 
fluence of reserve banks upon business conditions in the United 
States is seen in the results of their effort to establish more uniform 
discount rates throughout the country, in their success in harmoniz- 
ing commercial paper practices, in their relief of banks which would 
otherwise have been obliged to close on account of inability to 
rediscount paper, and in a variety of other less important ways. 
The question how far the reserve banks have succeeded in establishing 
a discount market or in providing a basis for financing foreign trade, 
both points which had been much under discussion prior to the pass- 
ing of the Act, were in 1921 still matters of controversy. The pro- 
vision of the Reserve Act which was intended to aid in the promo- 
tion of foreign trade authorized member banks to make bank ac- 
ceptances and reserve banks to rediscount and buy such acceptances. 
It was natural that some time should elapse before much prac- 
tical effect could be given to this provision, but it would prob- 
ably have gone into operation as the result of a gradual and normal 
evolution had it not been for financial necessities caused by the war. 
In general the effect of the war was to disorganize all financial meth- 
ods and systems previously in use, and this was as true in the field 
of commercial paper as in any other. Early in the war American 
foreign trade was placed upon a credit basis, and due to the difficulty 
of selling the obligations of belligerent Governments there was a 
strong temptation to obtain as much credit as possible upon a pure 
banking basis. The result was the lengthening of the maturity of 
the bankers' acceptance by every possible means and eventually the 
introduction of the so-called " renewal acceptance," whereby groups 
of banks entered into agreements which involved the making of 
acceptances for financing American exports to belligerents and others, 
at the same time that other groups agreed to buy or discount these 
acceptances, the first groups in return undertaking to discount 
acceptances made by the second group and used to take up the 
first issue. This was, of course, a sheer perversion of the intent of 
the acceptance, and when after the close of the war there developed 
a widespread practice of inflation and " kiting," followed eventually 
by an effort on the part of some accepting banks to repudiate ac- 
ceptances because of the fact that heavy reductions in prices had 
occurred, the result was to impair confidence in American accep- 
tances and to retard considerably the movement for their develop- 
ment. However, so far as gross volume is concerned, the new type 
of paper maintained a very substantial development until 1921 when 
the total amount in existence was estimated by the Federal Reserve 
Board as approximately six hundred million dollars, but during 
the first half of 1921 the value declined largely. Financing of 
foreign trade has been on so abnormal a basis and the trade itself 
has been so one-sided that it would be difficult to form a conclusive 
estimate of the effect of reserve banking in that connexion further 
than to say that without the general underlying strength which 
had been afforded by the system it would probably have been 
impossible for the United States to finance any such enormous volume 
of trade as it actually took care of. The effect of the Reserve System 

6 4 


upon interest and discount rates has undoubtedly been to stabilize 
and harmonize them. Not only has there been a narrower variation 
of rates in different parts of the country than had been expected 
but the system has on the whole held the rates down. During the war 
this stability was partly due to wartime control. Subsequent to 
the close of the war there was a rebound to much higher rates of 
discount, but even these were probably by no means as high as they 
would have been, had it not been for the existence of the system. 

Relations to Foreign Financing (The Edge Act). While the original 
Federal Reserve Act had provided for the organization of foreign 
branches by qualified national banks, only a few banks showed 
real interest in the branch plan and only one or two took up the for- 
mation of branches on a considerable scale. Hence the adoption of an 
amendatory Act which authorized national banks to unite for the 
formation of banks which should engage in foreign trade financing. 
A few such banks were organized, but here also the interest of the 
different institutions was soon found to be limited. One reason 
assigned for the hesitation of banks in organizing the new corpora- 
tions was the fact that they might be compelled to give to competi- 
tors an undue amount of knowledge of their own transactions. While, 
therefore, a few foreign trade institutions were organized, usually 
under the laws of New York state, with stockholders (banks) scat- 
tered throughout the country, it was evident within a year or so 
that this attempt to provide for the financing of foreign trade had 
been unsuccessful. Only in South America and the Far East (and 
there as a result of the provisions of the original Federal Reserve 
Act authorizing the creation of branches) did the banking system of 
the United States gain a distinct foreign development. The lack 
of foreign financing mechanism was obscured during the war years 
because of the necessity to which many foreigners were subjected 
of keeping their balances in New York and generally in dealing with 
American banks regardless of the conditions established by the law. 
Immediately after the close of the war modifications of this state of 
things began, and it became apparent that as soon as Government 
financing of American export trade ceased it would be impossible 
to maintain exportation long on anything like the basis which had 
existed during the war - A measure recognizing the need for an 
organization for export banking was taken under advisement in 
the winter of 1918-9 and was eventually made law in Oct. 1919. 
Meanwhile many American enterprises had fallen into the habit of 
financing their own foreign trade by extending long credits to buyers, 
while borrowing heavily from their own banks on domestic account 
in order to get the funds they needed to carry on trade elsewhere. 
In this way between the date of the Armistice and the close of 1920 
there had been built up a foreign unfunded balance representing the 
difference between American exports and American imports reliably 
estimated as high as $4,000,000,000. One outcome of this great ex- 
port balance was seen in continuous and violent disturbances of 
rates of foreign exchange, sterling (which had a normal par of $4.86) 
being depressed as low as $3.25, while other currencies suffered 
similarly and in some cases to a greater degree. This condition of 
affairs gave an impetus to the idea of establishing upon a national 
scale " Edge Act ' corporations under the legislation already re- 
ferred to, and during the winter of 1920-1 an effort was made to 
bring about the investment of capital in such undertakings, their 
purposes being to facilitate the movement of American goods to 
foreign countries on long-term credit. 

Conclusion. The Federal Reserve System between its organ- 
ization at the end of 1914 and the close of the year 1921 passed 
through a remarkable development which not only vastly in- 
creased its resources as compared with any figures they would 
have been likely to reach had it not been for the war, but also 
necessitated active participation on the part of reserve banks in 
many types of financial transactions from which they might other- 
wise have abstained. The results of this activity were both good 
and bad good in increasing the activity of the system and in 
affording an opportunity to be of direct and material usefulness; 
bad in bringing about a mushroom growth which prevented or 
curtailed the development of methods and practices upon a 
scientific basis. The system as a whole, especially those features 
which were at first thought to be of doubtful practicability, had 
definitely found its place and established its effectiveness. There 
had been improvement in methods of business financing, in the 
type of commercial papers, and in the use of modern instruments 
in connexion with the conduct of foreign trade. There had also 
been a large advance in economy, promptness and effectiveness, 
in domestic exchange, and in the collection of cheques. Priceless 
service was rendered to the U.S. Treasury during the war and 
through it to the world at large, since without the aid of the 
Federal Reserve System the financing of the war would probably 
have been impossible. On the other hand, the Federal Reserve 
System was the instrument through which an inflation of credit 
and prices occurred in the United States. The post-war attempt 

to curtail such inflation was not begun at a sufficiently early date, 
but was steadily working during 1921. 

AUTHORITIES. Reports of Secretary of the Treasury and of the 
Federal Reserve Board, 1914-20 inclusive; Federal Reserve Bulle- 
tins, 1915-20 inclusive. (H. P. W.) 

sion was created by Act of the U.S. Congress, approved Sept. 26 
1914, for the prevention of unfair methods of competition in 
commerce. It is composed of five members appointed by the 
President, and confirmed by the Senate: not more than three 
members may be of the same political party. The Commission 
elects its own chairman. It entered upon its official duties March 
16 1915. With it was merged the Bureau of Corporations, pre- 
viously under the jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce. 

If the Commission has reasons to believe that a " person, part- 
nership or corporation " practises any unfair method to the prejudice 
of the public interest, it shall serve a notice upon such party, submit 
a statement of the charges, and set a date for a hearing. The party 
complained of has the right to appear and show cause why the Com- 
mission should not require the cessation of practices alleged to be in 
violation of the law. If the party refuses to obey the orders of the 
Commission, the Commission may apply to the U.S. Circuit Court 
of Appeals. Banks and common carriers are excepted, they being 
under other Federal supervision. The Commission is empowered to 
investigate from time to time " the organization, business, conduct, 
practices, and management " of any commercial corporation and its 
relation to any other corporation , and to make recommendations for a 
readjustment of its business alleged to be violating the anti-trust 
laws, including those relating to price discriminations, intercor- 
porate stock-holdings, and interlocking directorates. The purpose 
of the Commission is to advise and regulate rather than to punish. 
It is also empowered to investigate trade conditions of foreign coun- 
tries as affecting the foreign commerce of the United States, and to 
report to Congress with recommendations. The Commission com- 
prises .three departments: administrative; economic, in charge of 
investigations; and legal, for enforcing its findings. 

FEJERVARY, GEZA, FREIHERR VON (1833-1914), Hunga- 
rian statesman and general, was born March 15 1833. He 
began his career in the army, and as a captain he won in 1859, 
for a heroic action on the hotly contested heights of San Martino 
in front of Solferino, the highest military decoration of the former 
monarchy, the cross of Maria Theresa. In 1872 he became State 
Secretary in the Hungarian Ministry of National Defence 
(Honved) and Minister of National Defence in 1884. In 1895 
he persuaded the Emperor Francis Joseph to agree to the relig- 
ious and political reforms of the Wekerle Ministry. In 1903 he 
resigned, together with the prime minister, Szell, owing to the 
rejection of a bill to increase the contingent of recruits, and 
was appointed captain of the Hungarian Life-Guards organized 
at that time. He was appointed premier June 18 1905. The 
parliamentary majority declared that the Fejervary Ministry 
was unconstitutional, and organized a national opposition 
against it. Fejervary nevertheless succeeded in settling these 
differences by the so-called Pactum, on the basis of which the 
Wekerle Ministry was formed April 8 1906. From this time on- 
wards Fejervary's political activity ceased and he resumed his 
military career. On the death of Prince Esterhazy, captain of the 
Hungarian Body-guard, Fejervary was appointed his successor. 
He died of cancer of the tongue April 25 1914. (E. v. W.) 

FELIX, LIA (1830-1908), French actress (see 10.239). Her 
appearance in Sardou's La Haine in 1874 marked the end of her 
theatrical career. Inferior in talent to Rachel, she possessed a 
beauty which her more famous sister had not. She died in Paris 
on Jan. 15 1908. 

), British nurse, was born at Spynie House, Morayshire, 
Jan. 26 1857. She was educated privately, and in 1878 entered 
the Children's hospital at Nottingham to be trained as a nurse. 
After a short time at the Royal Infirmary, Manchester, she be- 
came a sister at the London hospital (1878-81), and in 1881 
was appointed matron of St. Bartholomew's hospital. In 1887 
she married Dr. Bedford Fenwick (b. 1855), the well-known 
gynaecologist, and henceforth devoted herself largely to the 
work of reorganizing and raising the status of the nursing pro- 
fession. From 1889 to 1896 she was managing directress of the 
Gordon House Home hospital, and in 1887 founded the British 



Nurses' Association, of which she was the first member. Mrs. 
Bedford Fenwick has been a member of many medical and 
nursing congresses and has also contributed many papers to 
medical journals. She became in 1893 editor of the British 
Journal of Nursing, and was a prominent member of the Society 
of Women Journalists. 

FERDINAND (1861- ), ex-King of Bulgaria (see 10.269), 
played a leading part in the negotiations which led to the Balkan 
Alliance and the Balkan War of 191 2. It was generally believed in 
Bulgaria that the costly prolongation of the war in Thrace was 
attributable to his ambition to capture Constantinople, and that 
it was he who, as commander-in-chief, gave Savov the order 
to attack the Serbs on June 29 1913. Thus the responsibility for 
the disastrous second Balkan War rested with him. There is no 
doubt that it was Ferdinand's policy, carried out by a subser- 
vient and discredited set of ministers, which brought Bulgaria 
into the World War on the side of the Central Powers. He ab- 
dicated in favour of his son Boris on Oct. 4 1918 and retired to 
Coburg. Queen Eleanor died at Euxinograd Sept. 12 1917 (see 
BULGARIA: History). 

FERRIER, PAUL (1843-1920), French dramatist (see 10.288), 
died at Nouan-le-Fuzelier Sept. n 1920. 

FIBRES (see 10.309). Science and technical industry during 
the World War were necessarily impressed into war service. " Fi- 
bres," animal and vegetable, had an obvious prominence in the 
actual materiel of warfare, and their most ordinary applications 
assumed intensified importance. An interesting point arose in 
Germany and among her allies in the emergency adaptations 
which were devised under the stress of short supplies of staple 
raw materials. These restricted supplies directly influenced the 
production of military explosives; cotton cellulose was supple- 
mented or replaced by wood cellulose for producing nitro-cellu- 
lose propellant explosives. The wood cellulose to be used for 
this purpose was prepared from the " bisulphite " pulps of the 
paper industry, by hydrolytic treatments under which these 
crude " celluloses " were purified by the removal of 10 to 15% 
of their weight of the less stable celluloses. The final product 
was characterized by a much-increased proportion of a-cellulose 
(Cross and Bevan), and by structural changes of the fibre; 
effects which may be comprehensively described as " cottoniz- 
ing." This modified cellulose has been established in Germany 
as " Supersulfit," and for paper-making uses it has increased 
the range of application of wood cellulose in substituting rag 
celluloses. Restricted supplies of cotton, as of flax or hemp and 
jute, also affected the textile industries of these countries, and 
forced the production of twisted paper yams to an industry of 
large dimensions, the estimated output in the concluding year of 
the war being 200,000 tons. The applications of these yarns cov- 
ered a wide range of textile effects, some of which are permanently 
adopted. But in the main such products are substitutes, with 
the fundamental defect of the short fibre-length (2-3 mm.) 
which characterizes the better-prepared pulps of the papermaker. 

These developments in any case are a permanent contribution 
to fibre technology, and have reopened a number of problems in 
the borderland region between the textile and paper-making 
industries, which have the common objective of producing a 
structure in continuous length from discontinuous elements, with 
the fundamental distinction of dry and wet methods. It is 
evident that if the control of longer fibres (e.g. 7-15 mm.) on the 
Fourdrinier machine can be realized, there would result an in- 
teresting extension of this competition of methods, in which a 
decisive factor would be the relative cost of production. 

Another raw material to claim attention especially under the 
stress of war conditions was the fibre of the common nettle. The 
textile potentialities of the Urticaceae have long been recognized 
and the most conspicuous members of the order, which furnish 
the Ramie or Rhea fibre, are the basis of established industry. 
With their characteristics of great length of (bast) fibre they 
have the defects of extreme variability of dimensions, and re- 
quire preparation by chemical methods of separation; from the 
plant, moreover, the yields of fibre on the crop- weight are low. 
Notwithstanding these defects, which are exaggerated in the 

case of the nettle, the industrial utilization of the plant has been 
seriously prosecuted in Austria and Germany, and it appears 
that, under the condition of an integral working-up of the crop 
material to salable products, there is a prospect of commercial 
development. Such treatment of the non-fibrous cellular debris 
of this crop-plant, as of others, after separation of the primary 
product in this case the fibre is indicated in recent develop- 
ments of fermentation processes. 

Still dealing with the emergency problems of the war period, 
the revival of the long-known effects of treating jute fibre with 
caustic soda (mercerizing) is noted. These effects are expressed 
in the descriptive term " woollenizing ": the fibre is so modified 
as to present many points of resemblance to wool. It yields to the 
" carding " process, and mixes well with wools: mixtures con- 
taining up to 60% of the vegetable fibre can be worked up through 
the sliver and roving stages and finally spun to useful yarns. 
These were worked on an increasing scale in the Central Euro- 
pean countries during the war period. 

As a result of the shortage of the staple paper-making raw 
materials, the European industry was served in part by miscel- 
laneous supplies of material. In England the reeds of the East 
Anglian rivers and other districts were brought into requisition, 
and experimental quantities of numerous fibrous materials were 
worked up into paper and boards. 

The restriction in supplies of food-stuffs in Germany and 
Austria -Hungary brought forth a crop of substitutes (Ersatz- 
stofe). In the agricultural section attention was directed to 
the food value of the fibrous components of vegetable material 
celluloses and ligno-celluloses generally classed as indigestible, 
and cattle foods were adopted containing considerable propor- 
tions of these more resistant elements of plant structures. 

The literature on this subject has more than the passing interest 
of the episode, and attention may be directed to the following: 
" Digestibility of Birch Wood," Rubner, Chem. Ztg. 1915, 39, 86; 
" Wood Cellulose as Fodder," Schwalbe, Z. Angew. Chem. 1918, 31, 
347, and Scurti and Morbelli, Chem. Zentr. 1919, 90, 1112, and on 
" Cereal Straws after various Chemical Treatments," Godden, 
Jour. Agr. Soc. 1920, 10, 437; Fingerling, Z. Angew. Chem. 1918, 31, 
347; Pringsheim, ibid. 1919, 32, 249. 

These researches are obviously related to the more specific inves- 
tigations of the destructive resolution of the celluloses, fibrous and 
cellular, to ultimate products of low molecular weight. The devel- 
opments of Power Spirits Ltd. and H. Langwell have established 
intensive bacterial fermentations even of the resistant cellulose which 
have the external characteristics of the familiar operations of the 
brewer and distiller in the production of alcohol. Langwell's in- 
vestigations have therefore brought these transformations withjn 
such control as to become industrial operations, and as the main 
products are alcohol and acetic acid there is the obvious economic 
basis for commercial development. 

It is clear that such developments are only indirectly involved 
in the subject-matter of this article, since the fibrous celluloses and 
ligno-celluloses subserve as such their special adaptations to human 
requirements. It is possible to apply such processes to the utilization 
of the non-fibrous rejecta of such crop plants as flax, hemp, sisal, 
manila and phormium, to the production, e.g. of acetic acid, which 
would make for the economic working-up of material, and the cover- 
ing of costs of production of the staple fibres yielded by these plants. 

The direct contributions of these investigations to organic science 
are obvious and far-reaching: they extend and define certain con- 
stitutional relationships of the celluloses, as chemical individuals, 
of first importance; and elucidate many aspects of the plant world in 
its primary functions as well as its correlations of interdependence 
with the animal world. 

The influence of war conditions likewise brought about the 
extension of the applications of the Kapok " fibre " (seed hair) 
in the composition of marine life-saving appliances. These de- 
pend primarily on the low density of a mass of this fibre, even 
when much compressed, as in the stuffing or filling of the familiar 
life-saving jackets which now replace the cork-lined appliances 
of the i gth century. The flotation powers of an enclosed mass 
of Kapok is measured in terms of the volume of unit weight 
(i gramme) when forced by hand compression into a regular 
cylinder. This volume is 10-12 cub. cm., and is a multiple of the 
volume of an equal weight of cork substance of highest quality. 
The fibre has the further advantage of being compressible in 
mass whereas cork is relatively rigid. A jacket can therefore be 
constructed and filled with the fibre in such a way as to carry 



out the ideal distribution of floating effect so as to prevent sub- 
mergence of the mouth of the wearer. The properties of the fibre 
causing this are in the main structural. The fibre canal holds 
a relatively large volume of air: the smooth contour of the fibre 
and the resilience of the air-filled tube give a large interstitial 
(air) volume of the mass even under considerable compression. 

In a general survey of the fibre industries there is no disturb- 
ance of their fundamental perspectives nor any radical changes 
in their many-sided technology to record during 1910-21. The 
developments of the artificial (celluloses) fibres was rather im- 
peded under the stress of war conditions, though without preju- 
dice to the financial prosperity of the leading manufacturing 
corporations. There is a new manufacture of an artificial silk 
from the cellulose acetate of the British Cellulose Co. (Dreyfus 
processes). This product, as a cellulose ester, has certain prop- 
erties e.g. lower specific gravity, with a water-resistant qual- 
ity which are points of superiority in relation to the cellu- 
lose " artificials." On the other hand, it is of lower tensile 
strength, of inferior dyeing capacity, and its cost of production 
is higher. Its production therefore is limited in scale. 

In raw fibrous materials for the paper-making industry, there have 
been developments in the production of cotton-seed lint, and the prep- 
aration of pulp from the bamboo, and of a concentrated fibre (quar-- 
ter-stuff) from the papyrus (Cyperus). (See E. de Segundo, " Re- 
sidual Fibres from Cotton Seed," Jour. R. Soc. Arts, Feb. 1919; 
C. F. Cross, "Cellulose Industries," ibid. 1920 [Cantor Lectures]; 
W. Raitt, " Paper Supplies from India," ibid. May 1921.) 

Note should be made of an investigation by W. L. Balls of the 
ultimate structure of the cotton fibre. By a chemical reaction which 
induces a controlled distention (by hydration) of the cell wall, 
without structural distention, the dimensions of the structure are 
exaggerated to a large multiple which brings into evidence a series 
of concentric rings which are the daily growth rings of the hair or 
fibre (Proc. R. S., B., vol. xc. 1919). (C. F. C.) 

FILON, (PIERRE MARIE) AUGUSTIN (1841-1916), French 
man of letters (see 10.345), died at Croydon May 13 1916. 
In 1910 he published a short biography of Marie Stuart, and in 
1911 L'Angleterre d'Edouard VII. and a dramatic poem Shake- 
speare amoureux. His Souvenirs et documents, relating to his 
former pupil, the Prince Imperial, appeared in 1914. 

FILTER-PASSING GERlMS. The discovery by Pasteur of the 
significance of microbic life in the phenomena of fermentation, 
putrefaction and disease and the development by Koch of an 
appropriate technique for the new science of bacteriology had 
already led in a comparatively few years to the determination of 
the causation of many infectious diseases of man and animals. 
There remained, however, a number of diseases of man and 
animals and amongst these some common maladies such as 
typhus, measles, smallpox, foot and mouth disease, swine fever, 
rabies and cattle plague in which the cause had not been dis- 
coverable by the methods of microscopical examination and 
cultivation which proved successful in so many cases. It was 
suggested by Pasteur, who searched in vain for the infective agent 
of rabies, that some microbes were too small to be visible with the 
optical apparatus at disposal. There is no reason a priori to 
suppose that the lower limit of size of microbic organisms should 
be of a dimension at present discernible, and the question raised 
by Pasteur was answered ten years later by the discovery made 
by Loeffler in 1898 that the virus of foot and mouth disease was 
invisible. The limit of visibility of a particle is in the last instance 
conditioned by the wave length of light. With the best modern 
microscopes employing white light of which the average wave 
length is 0-55/1 (n T^ira mm.) this limit is rather less than 
o-2/i. If ultra-violet light of half this wave length is used, photo- 
graphs of objects of about o-i/x in diameter can be made. The 
existence of particles of much smaller size can be demonstrated 
by the method of dark-ground illumination (Tyndall phenome- 
non), when they appear as bright points. The limit appears to 
depend upon the intensity of illumination and with direct sun- 
light is 0-004/1.. 

Invisibility of a microbe commonly handicaps every effort at 
its isolation, propagation and identification, but does not render 
them impossible of achievement, for the existence of a living 
virus in an optically clear liquid may still be demonstrated by 

its power to infect an animal or plant, or produce recognizable 
chemical changes in a medium. The existence of these ultra- 
microscopic viruses was brought to light unexpectedly through 
the instrumentality of so-called " bacterial filters." These are 
constructed of fine-grained unglazed porcelain, clay or infusorial 
earth. They are commonly moulded in the shape of hollow 
candles and fired at a high temperature. Liquid is made to pass 
through the walls of the filters, which vary from a quarter to half 
an inch in thickness, by hydrostatic pressure or by suction with 
some form of exhaust pump. Use of such filters to separate 
bacteria from the products of their activity was first made in 
1871. Since that time they have become a usual part of the 
equipment of a bacteriological laboratory and have been ex- 
tensively employed to free water from microbes for domestic use. 
In structure the wall of a filter resembles a bed of sand on a 
diminutive scale, with crevices of variable size between the 
particles and a good many splits and holes of larger dimensions 
throughout the matrix. The different types of filter vary in their 
permeability according to the fineness of the pores and thickness 
of the wall. The smallest passages are of the order of 0-2 to 
0-5 in the case of the porcelain filters and 0-2 to 0-8 in those 
made of infusorial earth. The size of the smaller pores is of the 
same order of magnitude as that of the smallest bacteria, and the 
power of a filter to hold back these microbes depends upon the 
walls being of sufficient thickness to ensure that a bacterium will 
become impacted in one of the smaller passages through which 
the liquid in which it is suspended has to pass. If a filter through 
which a liquid containing bacteria in suspension has been filtered 
be allowed to remain for a few days immersed in a nutrient fluid, 
the bacteria caught in the interstices divide and multiply and 
generally manage to grow through the walls of the filter, for, 
during growth, the cells can adapt themselves to the size and 
shape of the crevices. On this account filters cannot be relied 
upon to render drinking-water secure unless removed and steri- 
lized by heat at least every second day. The similarity in magni- 
tude of filter-pore and bacterium is not a coincidence, but due to 
selection of material for the manufacture of the filters of such 
size of grain as to afford a bacteria-free filtrate and at the same 
time the maximal flow of liquid. In other words, bacterial filters 
have been made to fit the known microbes. 

The first discovery of an ultra-microscopic or filterable virus 
was made by Loeffler in 1898 in the course of some experiments 
upon foot and mouth disease in which a filter of infusorial earth 
was being used to remove ordinary recognizable bacteria from 
the diluted contents of the superficial vesicles which are charac- 
teristic of this disease. The filtrate was free from any particles 
visible by the microscope and no bacteria developed in it on 
cultivation. Nevertheless, injection of this filtrate into animals 
caused the disease. Material removed from the vesicles of the 
animal so infected and filtered again reproduced the disease in a 
fresh animal. Similar experiments were carried out through a 
number of generations of experimental animals, so that there was 
no doubt that a virus capable of propagation was contained in 
the filtrates. In the next few years the filterability of the virus 
was established in the case of infectious pleuro-pneumonia of 
cattle, South African horse-sickness, fowl plague and mosaic 
disease of the tobacco plant, in which patches of discoloration 
occur in the leaves and, spreading rapidly, destroy them. With 
the exception of the virus of pleuro-pneumonia, which is just 
on the margin of visibility, all are invisible. 

The first virus of a human disease which was found to be small 
enough to pass a bacterial filter was that of yellow fever. The 
observation was made by the American commission to study 
yellow fever in Havana in 1901. The cause of yellow fever has 
recently been shown to be an organism which, owing to its thin- 
ness and motility, can pass through a bacterial filter. 

Up to the year 1921 the virus of 38 diseases of man, animals 
or plants had been found to pass through a bacterial filter by 
some reliable observer. The more important of these are the 
following: foot and mouth disease, contagious bovine pleuro- 
pneumonia, mosaic or spotted disease of the tobacco plant, 
African horse-sickness, fowl plague, yellow fever, cattle plague, 


sheep-pox, epithelioma conlagiosum of birds, swine fever, rabies, 
cow-pox (vaccinia), molluscum conlagiosum of man, equine in- 
fectious pernicious anaemia, canine distemper, " blue tongue " 
of sheep, dengue fever, papataci or sand-fly fever, smallpox, 
trachoma, poliomyelitis, scarlatina, measles, typhus fever, and 
trench fever. There are many observations indicating that the 
primary cause of pandemic influenza may be a filterable virus. 

Two filterable viruses fall into a class apart. They are dis- 
tinguished from the others in that they do not seem to produce 
disease directly by their poisonous activities but rather to stimu- 
late certain cells of the body in the neighbourhood of their in- 
oculation to excessive and anarchical development. The injection 
of these viruses into certain varieties of fowls leads to sarcomatous 
new-growths of great malignity. In the one case it is a pure sar- 
coma, in the other a mixed tumour, an osteo-chondro sarcoma. 
These malignant tumours spread not only by proliferation at the 
point of origin but some of the cells of which they are composed, 
boring their way into blood vessels and lymphatics, are carried 
all over the body, giving rise to similar tumours in internal organs. 
The metastases as well as the primary tumours contain the virus, 
and if extracted with water and filtered through a bacterial 
filter, whereby all the cells of which the tumour is composed 
are held back, the filtrate may be dried and powdered and the 
powder retains its original property of exciting the formation 
of these malignant tumours in suitable animals into which it is 
injected. The experiment may be repeated indefinitely through 
generations of young chicks, showing that the virus propagates 
itself and appears to live in some sort of symbiotic manner with 
the particular cells it excites to inordinate development. 

It frequently happens that one observer succeeds in passing a 
particular virus through a filter, whilst another fails. When the 
particles of a virus are of the same order of magnitude as the crevices 
of the filter this may well happen, as in any case the majority will be 
retained in the wall of the filter. Even when the size of the particles 
of virus are much less than that of the smaller pores, they are liable 
to be deposited upon the walls of the minute passages under the 
influence of surface action and the filtrate becomes thereby greatly 
reduced in concentration. 

In addition to size, shape, and rigidity of particles, the conditions 
under which filtration is carried out, pressure, temperature and 
amount of liquid passed through the filter, exert an influence. With 
high pressure some may be forced through which would otherwise 
be obstructed. This is particularly the case when the particles are of 
unequal dimensions in two planes. The nature and reaction of the 
liquid in which the virus is suspended is also of importance. If 
suspended in a colloidal solution such as blood serum or a slimy 
emulsion of nerve tissue, high dilution is necessary for the colloidal 
particles of the solution or emulsion are themselves deposited on the 
walls of the pores and rapidly reduce the permeability of the filter. 
Reaction plays a part by modifying the electric charge on the particles 
and thereby facilitating or hindering their aggregation and deposition 
on the surface of the filter pores which is also charged. 

The fact that a virus, under certain circumstances, traverses a 
bacterial filter, does not tell us any more as to its nature than that it 
is very small, or at least very thin, and of the order of o-l to 0-2 /* 
or less in its smallest diameter. It is not necessary to assume a 
contagmm fliiidum in the case of those viruses which are outside the 
range of visibility under the best optical arrangements at present 
available. The particulate nature of the infective agent of rabies, 
fowl plague, variola and vaccinia, is indicated by the fact that the 
upper layer of a liquid containing them may be deprived of infec- 
tivity by prolonged subjection to a powerful centrifugal force. 

Little is known about most of these filterable viruses. They ap- 
pear to be of various natures, and the only property common to them 
is minuteness. The parasite responsible for yellow fever is a small 
spirochaete, those occasioning bovine pleuro-pneumonia and human 
poliomyelitis are just on the margin of visibility and have been 
cultivated in artificial media. Some of them occur in the blood of 
the patient during the acute stage of the illness and are transported 
to a fresh host by the bite of blood-sucking insects. The infections 
of yellow fever and dengue are conveyed by the mosquito (Stegomyia 
fasciata). That of papataci fever is transmitted by the sandfly 
(Phlebotomus papatasu), and that of typhus and trench fevers by 
lice. In each case some days elapse before the insect is capable of 
handing on the infection, indicating that an interval for the mul- 
tiplication of the parasite is necessary. It is possible that a stage in 
the life-history of the parasite can only occur in the body of the insect 
host. Some filterable viruses, such as smallpox, cowpox, foot-and- 
mouth disease, and molluscum contagiosum give rise to superficial 
lesions, and are spread by contact; others occasion catarrh of the 
respiratory passages and are distributed by coughing and intimate 
contact, as in distemper, measles, scarlet fever and pleuro-pneumo- 

nia. In many cases the precise method of infection had still been 
undetermined in 1921. (C. J. M.*) 

FINANCE (see 10.34). The continuous developments of na- 
tional finance in the different countries of the world during 1910- 
21 are dealt with in articles under separate headings, where the 
relevant statistics in each case will be found (see ENGLISH 
FINANCE, and the sections on "finance" in the articles under 
country-headings, e.g. UNITED STATES, FRANCE, GERMANY, etc.). 
Under other headings also the mechanism of finance and the 
chief subjects of general financial-economic interest are further 
discussed, historically and statistically, on their own account. 
Thus the new developments of special moment arising in con- 
nexion with the market for securities are discussed under STOCK 
EXCHANGE, those affecting the money-market under MONEY- 
MARKET, questions of foreign exchange under EXCHANGES, 
FOREIGN, banking under BANKING (together with the article 
on the new FEDERAL RESERVE BANKING SYSTEM in the United 
States), and insurance in its various forms under INSURANCE. 
Similarly, reference may be made to the articles NATIONAL 
SECURITIES MOBILIZATION (as part of British Government fi- 
nance during the war), SAVINGS MOVEMENT, INFLATION, PROFI- 
MUNISM, MARKETING, etc., for particular questions which have 
either loomed larger, or emerged as practically new problems, 
in the financial and commercial world. Incidentally, the finan- 
cial effects of the World War form an integral part of the history 
of every form of human activity during the period, and therefore 
receive appropriate consideration under numerous other head- 
ings where the subject-matter belongs to the sphere of business 
and economics. 

It only remains here to gather up the threads of the general 
world-situation in finance, as it stood towards the close of 1921. 

The end of the war had left the whole financial world in 
1919 in a state of chaos. 1 Its conditions were comprehensively 
reviewed in 1920 at the International Financial Conference 
which, as arranged by the League of Nations in Feb., met at Brus- 
sels from Sept. 24 to Oct. 8. There were 86 representatives of 

TABLE I. National Wealth, and Budget Revenue and Expenditure ' 
(in dollars) 



C . 



*-t in 


.2 o 

+j N 






CU 1-. 

, t c 

etj <^ 

C- r^ 

-H CI 


E *--5 


> *"* 

C nT 


S T3 

It re 



V s-^. 







O *"" 






S rt 


i t 

u 0. 

9 u 



m QJ 

u ai 

E a 


^ 3 


4-J C 

V " 



" S 


O l - 




i-i 4_> 

<U o 



U "m 














United Kingdom . 
France .... 
Canada .... 
Germany 3 

1 80 




























Italy . . . . 









Japan .... 









1 Nothing is said here of Russia, which, economically and finan- 
cially, was in collapse, with its internal and external trade-relations 
completely paralyzed (see RUSSIA). It may be mentioned that, in 
192 1 , a somewhat farcical turn was given to the hopeless depreciation 
of the ruble by an official exchange-rate of 133,000 rubles to the 
being " fixed ' by the Soviet government. Any other huge figure 
would have done as well! The progress of ruble inflation is shown 
by the following figures for the total issues in circulation (in million 
rubles) : Aug. 1914, 1,700; Jan. 1915, 3,215; Jan. 1916, 5,737; Jan. 
1917, 9,225; Nov. 1917 (Kerensky), 18,917; Jan. 1919 (Bolshevist), 
61,265; Jan. 1920, 225,216; Jan. 1921, 1,168,598; Jan. 1922 (est.), 

2 Pre-war figures in dollars at par of exchange: post-war at ex- 
change of Sept. 30 1920. 3 Reparations liability excluded. 



39 countries at the conference Argentina, Armenia, Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Czecho- 
slovakia, Denmark, Esthonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Guatemala, Holland, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, 
Poland, Portugal, Rumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State 
(Yugoslavia), South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay. 

TABLE II. National Taxation per head in 1920, in dollars. 


Taxation per 
head in $ at par 
of exchange. 

Taxation per 
head in $ at ex- 
change rates on 
Sept. 30 1920. 





and Taxes 
on Trans- 

r Direct 

and Taxes 
on Trans- 








France .... 





Italy .... 










United Kingdom 










British India 





New Zealand 





South Africa 










Spain .... 






























Greece .... 










Japan .... 





In the Final Report of the Conference (as adopted on Oct. 8), 
it was pointed out that the effects of the World War had varied 
immensely according as the various nations had been involved 
in it. Among the European belligerents, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy and Portugal, 
had become burdened with an enormous volume of debt, in- 
ternal and external. Their internal debt (converted into 
American dollars at par) had reached about 155 milliards 
(thousands of millions of dollars) as compared with about 17 
milliards in 1913; and their new external debt was about 13 
milliards. Their expenditures had increased by amounts vary- 
ing between 500 and 1,500 per cent, reaching between 20 and 
40 per cent of their national incomes, the highest percentage 
being shown by France. In spite of attempts to restore their 
financial equilibrium, in some instances by the imposition of 
additional taxation, they still showed (with the exception of 
Great Britain) a large gap between income and expenditure. 

TABLE III. The Burden of Debt, 1913-20, in dollars. 




' w t 






- O 






a) d 





to _i 

tfi ~ 

O fl) 










a v 


* J 



* u 


nj i-i 

8 x 

r3 &, 

























U.S.A. . 







United Kingdom 








France . 
Canada . 

1 80 








52 '' 
















'At par of exchange. 2 At exchange on Sept. 30 1920. 'Repara- 
tions liability excluded. 

They had lost a large proportion of their pre-war gold-holdings 
and had enormously increased their paper currencies. A number 
of new states had been created as the result of the war, while 
some previously existing states had had their territories pro- 
foundly modified. These included Armenia, Austria, Czecho- 
slovakia, Esthonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Rumania, Serbia and Turkey. In most of 
them the machinery of an orderly financial system was not yet 
in operation in 1920. 

TABLE IV. Gold Movements, IQIJ-IQIQ: In Dollars at par of Ex- 
change (ooo,ooo's omitted). 


in Banks 



and in 

in Banks 
















United Kingdom .... 



























I '3 




Austria-Hungary .... 




IO-8 1 


Total '. 







Canada . . . 



New Zealand 


South Africa 





4,i83 2 









Grand Total of European and Other 




'Gold in banks only. * Includes gold in circulation. 

In the neutral European countries, including Denmark, Hol- 
land, Luxemburg, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, 
financial difficulties were also serious. Heavy expenditure had 
been incurred owing to the war, and they had had la/gely to 
increase their internal debts. This increase in expenditure was 
mainly due to rise of prices. In some cases it had been met by 
increased taxation, but Holland, Switzerland and Spain showed 
considerable budget deficits. During the war their trade bal- 
ances had been made artificially favourable, owing to demand 
by the belligerents for their products, and the stoppage of im- 
ports; and the resulting accumulation of gold in their banks had 
led to expansion of currency and a further rise in prices. After 
the war they had to import goods to replenish stocks, and, owing 
to the premium on their exchanges as compared with the de- 
preciated currencies of the belligerents, it was difficult to main- 
tain their export trade; thus what would otherwise have seemed 
favourable factors had become an embarrassment. 

It was the countries outside Europe that were most favour- 
ably situated economically. Some of them had been able to pay 
off a large part of their external debts and had even made loans 
to former creditors. This was particularly the case with the 
United States of America. But there, too, the accumulations of 
gold had helped the rise in prices, and the appreciation of ex- 
change rendered more difficult a maintenance of exports, for 
which the restoration of purchasing power among their European 
customers was necessary. 

In every country of the world, the purchasing power of the 
national currency had diminished; and the cost of living, as 



expressed in terms of that currency, had increased. With few 
exceptions, neutrals as well as belligerents (the United States 
standing alone in this respect) had ceased to be on a gold basis, 
and in any case the value of gold itself in terms of commodities 
had diminished to about one-half. International trade had been 
dislocated, and diverted from its normal channels. The inability 
of Europe to export during the war had forced normal customers 
to look elsewhere, and to develop production at home or in new 
centres overseas; and Europe's need for imports had compelled 
realization of her foreign capital holdings, which were thus no 
longer available as a credit basis. Instability and depreciation 
of exchange impeded both buyer and seller. With half the 
world producing less than it consumed and having insufficient 
exports to pay for its imports, credits alone could bridge the gulf 

TABLE V. Notes in Circulation (000,000' s omitted), 1913 and 


Notes in Circulation. 



Belligerent Countries of Europe. 

Belgium (Franc) 



Bulgaria (Leva) 



France (Franc) 



Germany (Mark) .... 



Greece (Drachma) .... 



Italy (Lira) 



Portugal (Milreis) .... 



United Kingdom () . 



Austria-Hungary (Krone) . 



Finland (F. Mark) .... 



Rumania (Leu) 



Neutral Countries of Europe. 

Denmark (Krone) .... 



Holland (Gulden) .... 



Luxemburg (Franc) .... 



Norway (Krone) 

1 08 


Spain (Peseta) 



Sweden (Krone) 



Switzerland (Franc) .... 


i, 06 1 

Countries Outside Europe. 

Argentina (Peso) .... 



Australia () .... 



Brazil (Milreis) .... 



British India (Rupee) 



Canada ($) . .... 


44 2 

Japan (Yen) ^ .... 



New Zealand () .... 



South Africa () .... 


9-o 2 

United States of America ($) 



Uruguay (Peso) 



1 Includes notes of National Bank of Rumania and notes issued 
during the German occupation; excludes kronen, ruble notes, etc. 
2 March 1920. 'February 1920. 

between seller and buyer, and credits were rendered difficult by 
the very causes which made them necessary. 

Such being described as the position in 1920, the Conference 
came to its recommendations. And the Report premised that, 
first and foremost, what the world still needed was peace. 
"Finance" was, after all, only a reflection of commercial and 
economic life; as the wealth of the world consists of the products 
of man's work, the sum total of human prosperity could only be 
increased by an increase of Production; and all that organized 
international action could provide would be conditions favour- 
able to Production, the most important of which lay outside 
the financial sphere. Social content, and the "will to work," 
must first be restored. Yet, even if a maximum Production were 
to be attained, it still required a financial system which would 
facilitate exchange and distribution, and herein lay the problems 
which the Conference had met to consider. The financial state- 
ments presented by the various countries showed that, on the 
average, about 20 per cent of national expenditures was still 
being devoted to armaments, and the Conference affirmed that 
" the world cannot afford this expenditure." There must be an 
agreement to reduce it. In nearly three out of four of the 
countries represented, and in nearly n out of 12 of European 
countries, budgets in 1919-20 did not balance, and many of them 
showed no prospect of doing so in the near future. Where na- 
tional expenditure was higher than existing revenue, fresh tax- 

ation must be imposed. Government subsidies; concealing the 
real cost price of commodities, must be abandoned. Loans 
required for urgent capital purposes must be raised out of the 
real savings of the people; and since these savings had so largely 
been pledged ahead for past war-credits, the first step must be 
to fund undigested floating debts. Currency inflation (which had 
substantially represented undertaxation or the existence of an 
unscientific system of taxation) must be stopped, and it was 
desirable to take any possible steps towards the restoration of 
an effective gold standard; but deflation must be carried out 
gradually and with great caution, and the Conference regarded 
it as useless to attempt to fix the ratio of existing fiduciary 
currencies to their normal gold value, nor would it recommend 
any scheme of "stabilization" for the value of gold, believing 
that neither an international currency nor an international 
unit of account would serve any useful purpose. Attempts to 
limit fluctuations in exchange by artificial control on exchange 
operations were futile and mischievous; but in countries where 
there was no central bank of issue one should be established, 
and if the assistance of foreign capital were required for its pro- 
motion some form of international control might be necessary. 

TABLE VI. Comparison of Foreign Trade in 1913 and 1919 (value 
in dollars). 










as % 






$(ooo ooo's) 





United Kingdom 














France . 



































Sweden . 

















1 20 




Finland . 














Greece . 








U.S.A. . 







India . . 







Canada . 







China . 


60 1 













Japan . 







Brazil . 







South Africa 







New Zealand 




1 02 










The Conference recognized that time would be needed for 
financial reconstruction, and some countries could not resume 
economic activity without foreign assistance; but a warning was 
given generally that external credits should not be accorded 
directly by foreign Governments. It was suggested that an 
international organization should be formed for arranging cred- 
its for states which needed the means of paying for essential 
imports, and such states would have to notify what assets they 
were prepared to pledge as security; bonds issued against such 
a state guarantee might be used as collateral for credits intended 
to cover the cost of commodities (the Ter Meulen plan: see 
EXCHANGES, FOREIGN). Meanwhile, international commerce 
should, as soon as possible, be freed from artificial impediments. 

Finally, the Conference drew the attention of the League of 
Nations to the advisability of providing various miscellaneous 
reforms, unification of laws relating to bills of exchange and 
bills of lading, reciprocal treatment of branches of foreign banks 
in different countries, publication of financial information in a 
clear comparative form, an international clearing-house, and 
other such matters; and an international understanding was also 
advocated under which, while effective systems of taxation 


should be adopted in each country so as to ensure full contribu- 
tion from individuals according to their capacity to pay, there 
should be avoided any such incidence of "double" taxation 
which would form an obstacle, as it was still doing, to the in- 
vestment of capital abroad. 

Among the documents presented to the Conference (and pub- 
lished with the Report) there was included a large amount of 
material of permanent value to the financial historian, the 
nature of which can only be indicated here statements of the 
existing financial position in each country, together with analy- 
ses of international trade movements, gold holdings and cur- 
rency expansion, and papers by financial experts on the main 
outstanding problems. Taken as a whole, these documents pro- 
vided a full comparative account of the changes in the inter- 
national financial position between 1913 and 1920. 

In the separate articles on national finance in this Encyclo- 
paedia, under the headings for each country, its history during 
the extended period of 1910-21 is sufficiently narrated to make 
jt unnecessary here, however, to refer to anything but general 
and comparative international considerations; and for the pur- 
pose of showing the salient changes between the pre-war and 
post-war positions the most instructive figures presented to the 
Brussels Conference (comparison being best shown in terms of 
dollars) are probably those reproduced in the accompanying 
tables (partly rearranged), representing national wealth (income) 
as compared with budget revenue and expenditure (Table I.), 
national taxation in 1920 (Table II.), the burden of debt (Table 
III.: see also NATIONAL DEBT), gold-movements between 1913 
and 1919 (Table IV.), notes in circulation (Table V.), and the 
amount of foreign trade (Tables VI. and VII.). For the foreign- 
exchange problem, see EXCHANGES, FOREIGN; but here the com- 
parative figures are brought up to the latest available dates in 
the two tables (VIII. and IX.) which show the London rates 
on Dec. 22 1921, and the New York rates on Jan. 14 1922. 

In spite of the recommendations of the Brussels Conference, 
very slight progress was made during 1921 so far as the general 
position of international finance was concerned. The depression 
in trade, affecting more particularly the United Kingdom and 
the United States the only countries intrinsically capable of 
functioning up to their productive capacity consequent on the 

lack of international purchasing-power, and really representing 
a world-condition of underconsumption (mistakenly called 
" overproduction " by those who looked only at its superficial 
aspect), added to the difficulties of immediate recovery. The 
protracted controversies in the political arena over reparation- 
payments by Germany, due partly to aggressive French insist- 
ence, partly to a general lack of comprehension of their economic 
aspects, left European statesmen little opportunity to devote 
themselves to ordinary business questions. The instability of the 
exchanges made the situation peculiarly difficult for the business 
men themselves. The fact that the United States, during 1920-1, 
had disinterested itself in European troubles, and was not lend- 
ing the financial assistance and cooperation which had been so 
confidently expected when the war ended, was a vital factor in 
the financial detente. British Labour was in serious conflict with 
Capital and with the Government; and the troubles in Ireland, 
together with the public demand for more drastic Government 
economies in expenditure (" an ti- waste "), made it impracticable 
for Great Britain to take the lead in securing any material ad- 
vance towards a constructive world-policy in international 
finance. A theoretically correct, but practically premature, 
policy of "deflation," on the part of the official pundits in 
London, together with the crippling effect of the very high scale 
of taxation, kept British Government finance technically 
"sound," but it checked British industrial and commercial 
enterprise at a stage when wiser counsels, if they could have 
been brought into operation, should, it may be thought, have 
put into the forefront the provision of financial facilities for the 
rebuilding of British trade. And in the United States the same 
policy, adopted by the American bankers and Government from 
the lead given by the Bank of England and in Whitehall, was 
followed, as in Great Britain, by a great increase of unemploy- 
ment, although, merely from a financial point of view, it might 
have seemed that American resources should now have been 
ample by contrast with British for a more "adventurous" 
programme. In the financial history of 1910-21 no fact, indeed, 
is likely to seem more remarkable eventually than that, during 
this period, the United States, which had been unhurt by the 
war and had made enormous profits during the course of it 
which had been converted from a debtor into a creditor country, 

TABLE VII. Foreign Trade: Value in National Currency (ooo,ooo's omitted). 






Excess of 
Imports over 
Exports + 
Excess of Exports 
over Imports 



Excess of 
Imports over 
Exports + 
Excess of 
Exports over 

Belgium (Franc) 
Bulgaria (Leva) 

Jelligerent Co 



Neutral Cou 
Countries i 
2,257 4 

untries of EL 



ntries of Eur 

Dutside Euro 




+ 1,002 
+ 96 

+ 1,541 { 
+ 671 
+ 59 
+ I.I34 
+ 54 
+ 134 
+ 90 

+ 134 
+ 835 
+ 249 
+ 30 
+ 544 
- 23 
+ 3 
+ 25 
- 233* 
+ 223 
+ 97 
+ 0-4 

+ , 13 
- 6qi 

29,778 ' 
29, 1 88 






8.7I3 1 
7,429 * 




+ 2,950 
+ 412 
+ 21,065' 

+ 21,759' 
+ 22,319 
+ 866 
+ 11,328 

+ 121 

+ 669 
+ 1,662 

+ 1,623 
+ I-4H 
- 427 
+ 910 
+ 235 

- 339 

- 845 
- 732 4 
+ 74 


- 4,01 8 

Germany (Mark) 

Italy (Lira) 
Portugal (Milreis) 
United Kingdom () 
Finland (Mark) . . . 

Holland (Gulden) 
Spain (Peseta) 
Sweden (Krone) 

Australia () 
Brazil (Milreis) . 
British India (Rupee) 
Canada (Dollar) . 
Japan (Yen) 
New Zealand () . 
South Africa () . 
United States of America (Dollar) 

"Including Alsace-Lorraine. 'Excluding Alsace-Lorraine. 'Estimated on nine months of 1919. 4 Including treasure. 


TABLE VIII. London Rates 

New York (to ) 
Paris (to ) 
Brussels (to ) 
Berlin (to ) 
Vienna (to ) 
Amsterdam (to ) 
Switzerland (to ) 
Stockholm (to ) 
Christiania (to ) 
Copenhagen (to ) 
Italy (to ) 
Madrid (to ) 


. 53 fr. 

55 fr. 200. 

755 m. 

11,500 kr. 

II fl. 42 c. 

21 fr. 51 c. 

16.85 kr. 

26.75 kr. 

20.85 kr. 

93 1- 5 c. 

28 pes. 35 c. 

of Exchange (Dec. 22 1921). 

Greece (to ) 
Budapest (to ) 
Warsaw (to ) 
Helsingfors (to ) 
Mexico (d. to $) 
Buenos Aires (d. to J>) 
Rio (d. to milreis) 
Valparaiso ($ to ) 
Calcutta (d. to rupee) 
Shanghai (d. to tael) 
Yokohama (d. to yen) 

TABLE IX. New York Rates of Exchange (Jan. 14 1922). 

London (to ) $4.23 

Paris (to 100 fr.) 8.23 

Belgium (to 100 fr.) 7.88 

Switzerland (to 100 fr.) 19.45 

Italy (to 100 1.) 4.44 

Berlin (to 100 m.) 0.56 

Austria (to 100 kr.) 0.04 

Hungary (to 100 kr.) 0.17 
Czechoslovakia (to iookr.)i.66 

Yugoslavia (to 100 kr.) 0.35 

Poland (to loo m.) 0.04! 

Rumania (to 100 leu) 0.82 

Finland (to 100 m.) 1.89 

Spain (to 100 pes.) $15. 
Holland (to 100 fl.) 36.87 

Greece (to 100 dr.) 4.50 

Denmark (to 100 kr.) 20. 
Norway (to 100 kr.) 15.72 
Sweden (to 100 kr.) 24.95 

Shanghai (to 100 taels) 75. 
Calcutta (to 100 rupees) 28. 
Japan (to 100 yen) 47.75 

Argentina (to 100 

paper dollars) 33-625 

Brazil (to 100 paper 

milreis) 12.875 

Chile (to 100 paper pesos) 9.55 

and had been the recipient of such huge amounts of gold from 
Europe should, in its banking operations, have only hoarded 
this gold, without utilizing it as a further basis of interest-pro- 
ducing credit, up to the point of accumulating a domestic bank- 
ing reserve of about 75 per cent, at a time when the whole of the 
rest of the world was in want of capital to set business going 
again. The American people were slow to see that the appre- 
ciation of the dollar was a source of weakness, not of strength. 
On Jan. i 1922, according to the U.S. Treasury Department's 
annual Report, the stock of gold (which had reached the highest 
point yet known), the amount of Federal Reserve notes, and 
the total stock of money, in the United States, showed the fol- 
lowing figures (in dollars) as compared with the corresponding 
figures on Jan. i in the preceding years back to 1915: 

Jan. I 



F.R. Notes 


Total Money 







In spite of this apparent evidence of monetary wealth in the 
United States, trade had languished there during 1920 and 
1921, and complaints of overtaxation were as rife as in England. 
American public opinion had not yet realized the interdepend- 
ence of international finance in its bearing on national economic 
prosperity, nor had any general appreciation of the full meaning 
of the expositions of financial doctrine given at the Brussels 
Conference penetrated to the hearts of the business community. 
It still remained for the world's statesmen to put their heads 
seriously together in a cooperative effort to restore world-con- 
sumption, through a revival of world-purchasing-power, to the 
level of world-productive-power, the first essentials being peace, 
reductions in State expenditure, and a new progress in private 
savings for capital investment. 

It was not till the Washington Conference, at the end of 
1921, that the United States once more came into practical 
touch, officially, with the European situation; and even then its 
scope did not include the great international financial problems 
still awaiting attention. At the opening of 1922, however, the 
prospect was held out of another general financial conference, as 
proposed by the Italian Goveanment to be held at Genoa in 
March; and it seemed likely in various other directions that, 

during the year, an improvement might be seen in the function- 
ing of world-finance. (H. CH.) 

FINLAND (see 10.383). The remarkable development of 
Finnish nationalism in the closing decades of the igth century 
was primarily directed against the Swedish language and Finno- 
Swedish cultural domination. Through the revival of their own 
singularly rich and beautiful tongue, the Finns of Finland had 
learnt to think of their country as " Suomi," as utterly distinct 
from Sweden and Russia, as possessing thought and literature of 
its own. Though open to European influences, specially in their 
art, and taking their political ideas from Scandinavia and Ger- 
many, the " Fennomans " (Finnish Finns) climbed " unto a 
language island " and, developing along extremely democratic 
lines, took no part at all in Russian affairs and showed little in- 
terest in those of Scandinavia. There was no sympathy even 
with the Russian proletariat in its early struggles, while the 
revolutionaries were cold-shouldered. 

Secotid Period of Russification 1008-14. The successive gover- 
nors of Russia, however, regarded the " Suomilaiset " (or the 
people of the fens) as a strange and totally different nationality 
from themselves, although the Finno-Ugrian race blended with 
the Slav is to be found all over northern Russia; they could not 
forget that the " country of the thousand lakes " had been under 
Swedish rule for 600 years, and cherished a civilization wholly 
alien to their own. This so obviously democratic, almost self- 
governing grand duchy of Finland was a thorn in the side of the 
vast autocratic Russian State conception. Out of this train of 
thought arose Russia's first attack upon the liberties of Fin- 
land during the dark years 1899-1906. 

This article does not deal with the first attempt at Russification 
when the Finnish constitution was suspended and the country came 
under the rule of the military dictator, Gen. Bobrikov. This earlier 
period of repression was arrested by the Russian Revolution of 
1905 which, in the wake of the disasters of the war against Japan, 
forced a weakened Tsardom to concessions. The manifesto of the 
Emperor-Grand Duke of Nov. 4 (Oct. 22) 1905 annulled all uncon- 
stitutional interferences of the preceding seven years and enabled the 
dominant Finnish Constitutional party to democratize the Diet on 
the broadest basis full adult suffrage, regardless of property, class 
or sex, coupled with proportional representation based on d'Hondt's 
distributive principle which contains safeguards against the tyranny 
of the majority. That was gain. But the Russia of post-revolution 
days was still the landlocked colossus whom Panslav aspirations 
directed against all that was alien in language, religion, character 
and administration. What had led to conflict with the Tsar now 
led to conflict with the imperial Duma the tendency to create one 
vast homogeneous Russia stretching from the Norwegian coast to 
the Pacific. In this scheme of power, the first step towards the ul- 
timate possession of the warm-water ports of Scandinavia was, once 
again, the Russification of Finland. 

The initial cause of friction was, as on previous occasions, the 
question of the payments to Russia in lieu of military service. The 
Diets had voted an annual indemnity of 10 million Finnish marks in 
respect of the years 1905-8, though reluctantly, not only on account 
of the financial burden the people were called upon to shoulder, but 
by reason of the unconstitutional argumentations upon which the 
demands were based. More particularly, the first one-chamber Diet 
which passed the grants in respect of the years 1907 and 1908 
expressed the hope that this matter be either thereby considered 
regulated or else settled forthwith in a constitutional manner. This 
notwithstanding an imperial ukase, dated Oct. 7 1909, declared the 
issue to lie solely within the competence of the Crown, and peremp- 
torily fixed an annual contribution which, beginning at 10 million 
Finnish marks, was to increase automatically by a million a year 
until, in 1919, it was to attain its maximum total of 20 millions of Fin- 
nish marks. The objections of the Diet, which was even now ready 
to compromise, were answered by its dissolution and the annual 
amounts due made over to the Russian exchequer. The same oc- 
curred with the new Diet in March 1910 in respect of the contribu- 
tions for the years 1910 and 1911. Finally the Duma, by the im- 
perial law of Jan. 23 (loth) 1912, approved of the principle of the 
Finnish annual indemnity in lieu of military service. 

The interference of the Tsar with the constitutional rights of 
Finland was provocative and for that reason opened the new era of 
conflict. From the spring of 1907 to the spring of 1909 had super- 
vened the two " crowded years of glorious life," of great internal 
progress and political development. The old feuds of " Sveckoman " 
(Swedo-Finn) and " Fennoman " (Finno-Finn) had been taken up 
with renewed vigour. Aristocracy, middle class and proletariat were 
all politically equal; capital and labour, though frequently in con- 
flict, yet fought their battle more scientifically than anywhere else 
in Europe. But by the end of 1909, the fresh wave of Russification 


paralysed all recent progress. The large measures of domestic re 
form passed by the Diet, and generally accepted by the Senate, were 
laid before the Tsar and never heard of afterwards. Such was the 
fate of the bill for the total prohibition of alcohol, as of measures 
relating to the care of children, insurance, old-age pensions, education 
public health and the betterment of the condition of the " torpare ' 
(landless worker upon the soil). Civil marriages, however, were 
instituted, illegitimate children placed upon a better basis, and the 
principle of " equal pay for equal work " was applied in teaching 
in the printing trade and, in 1913, in the State service. 

As early as June 2 (May 20) 1908 an imperial instruction had dealt 
with the regulation of Finnish affairs which affected the interests ol 
the Russian Empire as a whole. It provided that the measures 
passed by the Diet and sanctioned by the Senate were no longer to be 
conveyed to the Tsar through the Secretary for Finland, but in 
order to obtain the imperial assent had to come before the Council 
of Ministers. To stifle opposition, the imperial ukase of March 27 
(i4th) 1910 laid down that the question as to whether Finnish affairs 
affected the interests of the Russian Empire or not rested not with 
the Finnish Diet, but with the imperial Duma. The new law came 
into force on June 30 (i7th) 1910 after having been passed by the 
Duma amid triumphant shouts of " Finis Finlandiae. 

This, " The Imperial Legislation Act," taken as a whole, never 
came into working since in the last resort it meant the complete 
unification of the grand duchy of Finland with Russia in language, 
education, finance, customs, laws, monetary system, press restric- 
tion, rights of assembly, etc. But inconsequently applied though it 
was, it roused great indignation not only in Finland, but throughout 
Europe. The claim of this bill, which was that the assurances given 
by the Tsars depended upon their autocratic rule and became null 
when they delegated some of their governing power to the Duma, 
called forth protests from members of the British, German, French, 
Italian, Dutch and Belgian Parliaments. 

Directly the " Imperial Legislation Act " had come into force, 
two imperial laws were laid before the Diet which, however, refused 
them both and was promptly dissolved. The bills thereupon came 
before the imperial Duma, which passed them rapidly. One of these 
was the law of Jan. 23 (loth) 1912, already referred to above, in 
which the Duma affirmed the principle of an annual Finnish indem- 
nity in lieu of military service, while the other, of Jan. 20 (7th) 1912, 
accorded full citizen rights to temporary Russian residents in 
Finland. This last-named measure, apart from its manifest injus- 
tice, led to great confusion in the overlapping of two fundamentally 
different codes of law, but the judges who resigned, rather than be a 
party to it, were deprived of their pension rights. Every single 
provisional governor was forced to leave the service or did so volun- 
tarily; many high officials suffered imprisonment or exile. The 
government of the country was carried on by a packed Senate, in 
which after 1912 sat not only pliable Finns but Russian-born mem- 
bers; the Diet was capriciously summoned and dismissed, the press 
censored. Thus the conflict with the Duma in the years 1910-4 
led to sufferings analogous to those in the struggle against the high- 
handedness of the Tsar in 1899-1906. 

In addition, it should be mentioned that Finnish propaganda 
abroad met with less success on this occasion, for one thing because 
it was a twice-told tale, for another because England had, by the 
logic of European events, been drawn towards Russia politically. 

Effects of the World War, 1014-8. In these circumstances 
supervened the World War of 1914, and it was left to Lt.-Gen. F. 
Seyn, the governor-general, to supervise the stringent censor- 
ship and the harassing restrictions of personal liberty which an 
unprecedented situation called for in all the countries of Europe. 
Though Finland escaped the horrors of foreign war upon its own 
soil, a descent of the German armies upon the coast was a military 
eventuality which had to be taken into account. Accordingly 
two lines of trench covering the chief railway lines were con- 
structed across Finland, one system of fortified lines running 
from Tornea to Helsingfors, the other from Kajana to Kotka. 
Besides, the long sea border of the grand duchy was exposed to 
enemy action from the sea; and some 40,000 tons of the Finnish 
mercantile marine, which sailed under the Russian flag, exposed 
to destruction in the open waters of the Baltic Sea, remained 
locked in the harbours of the Bothnian gulf. This heavy loss to 
seaborne commerce was balanced by the extraordinary advan- 
tages which Finnish industries derived from the war partly by 
reason of the low tariff prevailing, partly through the influx of 
Russian labour. Industries connected directly with military 
supply, as also the iron, leather, glass, drugs and polishes trades 
and paper-manufacturing concerns, attained unexampled pros- 
perity. The Russians, who were well aware that the Finnish 
people at the end of a 15 years' constitutional struggle did not 
love them, strongly garrisoned the country, but, the discipline 
in the Tsarist armies being maintained at a high standard, 

collisions between the military and the civil population were few. 
The Russian authorities, impulsive as was their wont and in- 
consequent in their application of the law, suffered from divided 
councils, and were alternately bent on reconciliation and re- 
pression. There being no means as in Sweden and Denmark to 
take advantage of leaks in the Allied blockade, the price of living 
gradually rose, railway fares and telephone costs being raised 
by 25%. But the country was relieved of the burden of the 
annual military indemnity, and the Russians, in their sporadic 
anxiety to please, were strangely negligent of such essential pre- 
cautions as the surveillance of telephonic communications. There 
was, however, a special 5% tax on property and mortgage. 

The course of the war, which during the first two years carried the 
Austro-German invading hosts through Poland and Lithuania to the 
confines of Great Russia proper by the marshes of the Pripet, was 
followed by the Finns with the anxiety of a people whose hope lay 
in a Russia which, weakened by a colossal military effort, would 
again be willing to respect the legal rights of the grand duchy. The 
Polish manifesto of the Grand Duke Nicholas was held to leave 
the Russian Government with a programme aiming at the final 
destruction of Finnish autonomy and nationality. Under the 
circumstances sympathy for the sufferings of Belgium was obscured 
by the consideration that France and England were the allies of 
that Russia which, if she emerged victorious, would again turn 
oppressor. In 1915 aFinnset fire to the Allied stores at Archangel in 
service, as he considered, to his Finland, where, as is now known on 
the authority of M. Sario who became Foreign Secretary of the White 
Government in 1918, persons were not wanting who referred to Ger- 
man victories as " our victories." Only some 2,000 Finns volun- 
teered for the Russian army, where, however, they fought with tradi- 
tional valour under their own officers. About the same number 
enlisted in the German army, though ostensibly only for service on 
the eastern front, and did not return until the coup d'etat. 

Towards the close of 1916 the magnitude of the industrial effort 
in neglect of agricultural development was fast bringing its own 
punishment. Finland had changed as far as her size, climate and 
scanty population allowed from an agricultural to an industrial 
country in two and a half years. The ruin of her dairy trade drew 
workers into the factories, and, an ever more considerable part of 
Russian war material manufacture passing into Finnish hands, 
labour streamed in from the country and from across the Russian 
border. Wages rose with the increasing cost of food, and great 
fortunes were made while there was yet considerable unemploy- 
ment. This happened in a country which even normally produced 
but five-sixths of her needful foodstuffs, at a time of world shortage 
and under pressure of an ever more effective blockade; in one, 
too, which, while the old order survived in Russia, was debarred 
from any sort of political expression. True, elections were still held 
in 1916, and resulted in the return of a Social Democratic majority, 
but the Diet was not allowed to function. 

The Russian Revolution, March-Nov. 1(117. Then came the 
Russian Revolution. The Tsar Nicholas II. Alexandrovich abdicated 
on March 15 1917 and the new Provisional Government of Russia 
almost with its first breath restored representative government in 
Finland. The Russianized Senate was dissolved and a temporary 
body of twelve, half of whom were Social Democrats and the remain- 
der members of the bourgeois parties, took up the executive power. 
ppv.-Gen. Seyn was replaced by Stakovich, while Rodichev, a tried 
Viend, became Secretary of State for Finland. Kerensky, visiting 
Helsingfors at the end of the month, placed a wreath at the foot of 
the statue of Runeberg, the national poet, and uncovered his head 
when the Finnish national anthem was intoned. The former Socialist 
speaker of the Diet, M. Tokoi, was nominated president of the 
Senate; Kullervo Manner, a young Finnish Social Democrat, was 
made speaker of the Diet ; Vaino Jokinen, his former collaborator 
on the workman's journal " Tyomies," and Lauri Ingman, a 
clergyman and a Swede of the Swedish party, became vice-speakers. 
It was then quite clear that ever since 1907 the one constant factor 
n Finnish political life had been the growth of the Social Demo- 
cratic vote. But now that anarchy corroded the body politic of the 
disintegrating Russian Empire, the possessing classes of Finland 
quailed before the rising power of a party which was morally satur- 
. ted with Marxist doctrines and politically orientated towards Russia. 
The economic conditions justified the worst fears of the bourgeoisie, 
or not only had the vehement industrial development of the last 
hree years strengthened the " hooligan element, but the Imperial 
^egislation Act of 1910 and the conditions of the war had brought a 
arge number of Russians into the country as settlers and even as 
efugees from famine and nascent revolutionary disorders. Beside 
he Swedo^Finns (about one-tenth of the population) and the Fin- 
nish-speaking Finns there was now this large fluctuating industrial 
lement reinforced by some 40,000 Russian civilians. Apart from 
hese, there were the Russian soldiers who, ever more irregularly 
laid, bade fair to become a danger to the State. 

The Swedish party represented the most conservative elements in 
"inland, the nucleus of the largest property owners. There was, it 



is true, a Swedish branch of the Social Democratic party and also a 
number of purely Swedish capitalists, yet on the whole the Swedish 
element was bourgeois and its desire for independence economic 
since it foresaw the inevitable bankruptcy of Russia. 

The Social Democrats, on the other hand, saw in Russia the pos- 
sible social revolution and intended to go faster than any Miliukov 
or even Kerensky. Under such conditions the Diet which assembled 
on April 5 could do as little as the cumbrous governing body of six 
Social Democrats and six bourgeois representatives. 

As far as the Swedish party was concerned, conciliatory relations 
were to be maintained with Russia until the Peace Conference, but 
the party congress which was held in May made it clear that in- 
dependence was the final aim. Even before that the Hufoudstadt- 
bladet argued that nothing short of complete independence suited 
the country's needs, and the Finnish Government in the Diet solemnly 
proclaimed that such was its policy. But this Diet, containing 80 % 
of Social Democrats, 12 % of Old and Young Finns, 6 % Swedes and 
2 % Agrarian labourers, the bourgeois did not consider to be truly 
representative of the nation, on the ground that, at the time of its 
election in 1916, most people still boycotted the Diet by way of 
protest against Russian manipulation of the elections; it was only the 
Socialists who never gave up the class war. 

The struggle between the Provisional Russian Government and the 
Finnish Diet crystallized around the declaration which was embodied 
in what became known as the " Law of July 18 1917." In this, the 
Diet resolved that it alone decided, confirmed and put into practice 
all laws of Finland, including those relating to home affairs, taxation 
and customs. It made the final decision regarding all other Finnish 
affairs which the Emperor-Grand Duke decided according to the 
arrangements hitherto in force, though the provision of this law 
expressly stated that it did not apply to matters of foreign policy, to 
military legislation and military administration. The Diet was to 
meet for regular sittings without special summons and to decide 
when these were to be closed. Until Finland's new form of govern- 
ment was determined, the Diet was to exercise the right of deciding 
upon new elections and its dissolution. It asserted its control over 
the executive power in Finland which was, for the present, to be 
exercised by the economic department of the Finnish Senate whose 
members were to be nominated and dismissed by the Diet. This 
law reflected the standpoint of the Social Democratic majority of the 
Diet which demanded complete internal and economic freedom for 
the country, but was always ready to recognize Russia's supremacy 
in military matters and in foreign policy. The radical group of the 
Swedish Popular party, aiming further, proposed the following 
amendment:" The Diet, which regards it as its right and duty to 
demand full independence in the name of the Finnish people and 
reserves in this respect its full freedom of action, resolves, etc." This 
amendment, however, was rejected by 125 votes to 63, but the 
motion of the main committee not to submit the new law to the 
Provisional Russian Government for its sanction was passed by 104 
votes to 86. An address was, however, forwarded to the Russian 
Provisional Government, in which it was expounded that, Finland 
having always been in relation with the Tsars of Russia but not with 
any Russian Government, the overthrow of Tsardom had automat- 
ically set the country free. 

The Russian Provisional Government met this explanation by 
passing a resolution at the end of July, declaring that under no cir- 
cumstances would it consent to the separation ofFinland from Rus- 
sia, wherefore it dissolved the Diet and ordered new elections for the 
beginning of October. The Finnish Diet, however, in its turn, dis- 
puted the Russian Provisional Government's right to exercise the 
prerogative of dissolution, and a deadlock ensued! 

Pourparlers in Aug. between the Gov.-Gen. Stakoyich and the 
Finnish leaders proved of no avail, although the Russian Federalist 
Congress in session at Petrograd on the I7th and i8th of that month 
sought " to work out a basis upon which the Federalists could unite 
and then prepare for the elections to a Constituent Assembly." 
Thus the plan for a republic of all the Russias guaranteed autonomy 
in everything but matters relating to a whole and united Russia. 

But it was precisely that which the Finns did not want, anxious as 
they all were, regardless of party, to avoid taking any part in Russian 
affairs. Even the Socialists, willing as they were to concede the con- 
trol of foreign policy and the conduct of military affairs to the 
larger Power, yet met any kind of representation upon any sort of 
Russian governing body with a categorical refusal. 

In its domestic policy the Social Democratic majority of this Diet 
was similarly averse to any comprehensive measures of collective 
reorganization pending events in Russia. Thus the capitalist de- 
velopment of the country was allowed to follow its course. The 
reform bills passed in recent years and held up by the Tsar were 
passed en bloc, among these the total prohibition of alcohol and the 
eight-hour day. The municipal councils were democratized and 
a war bonus was added to the wage of all workers, part being paid 
by the State and part by the employer. The fixing of maximum 
prices for food and the control of the supply of fuel, bread, milk, 
sugar and butter were merely the extension of the work initiated by 
the pre-revolutionary Senate. 

Such action, however, did not strike at the root of the evil, for 
it was easy to see that a famine threatened the country. Nothing 
was done to avert it save that large quantities of grain were pur- 

chased from America which, owing to difficulties of transit, could not 
be delivered until starvation and civil war menaced Finland. From 
about March 1917 to Feb. 1918 there was a veritable strike mania; 
every trade, every municipal body, every committee even, flung 
down its job and the Diet and the Senate alike were unable to cope 
with the situation. The long printers' strike brought it about that 
from the beginning of July to the middle of Aug. no Moderate papers 
appeared, though the Social Democrat journals continued to be 
published. The trouble lay in the dilatoriness of the Russian Provi- 
sional Government in confirming the measures passed by the Diet 
and the Senate which had been hung up by the Tsar since 1910. The 
All-Russian Congress of Workers and Soldiers, which was already 
under Bolshevist influence, had met early in July and urged the 
Provisional Government to grant full autonomy to Finland and 
all executive power to the Diet, which action gained it the sympathy 
of the Finnish Socialists. A " general strike " was called for against 
the wishes of Tokoi and Manner, and the Diet was to reassemble de- 
spite the threats of the governor-general that its doors would be 
guarded and sealed. After two or three days of disturbances, this 
ill-considered move collapsed, but the Russian Provisional Govern- 
ment proposing that the economy department of the Finnish Senate 
should have the supreme power, Tokoi dissolved the governing body 
composed of six Social Democrats and six Bourgeois representatives 
because it was too evenly balanced for effective administrative 
work. Thereupon the Socialist senators resigned while the Moder- 
ates were induced to form a Senate. This was regrettable, as the 
Russian Provisional Government now gave way, and on Aug. 24 
ratified a number of the reform measures passed by the Diet and 
Senate between 1911 and 1914. A day later the Moscow conference, 
under Menshevik influence, expressed its desire to retain all power 
over Finland which the restored constitution allowed. 

Meanwhile the failure of the general strike and the appointment 
of Nekrasov as governor-general in place of Stakovich influenced 
the elections for the Diet which, completed by Oct. 2 1917, proved 
a setback to the Social Democrats and caused the Old and Young 
Finns, the Swedes and the Agrarians to form a Moderate bloc of 
1 08 members. The absorbing controversy, whether the Senate 
(through its economy department) was to hold the supreme power 
or the Diet, was settled on Nov. 15 by Alkio, the leader of the Agra- 
rians, in favour of the latter, and on Nov. 28 a Moderate Senate of 
eleven members was elected. Still, however, nothing was done to 
increase the food production. Though countered by the Moderate 
coalition, the Social Democrats were still the strongest individual 
party in the House, and would have had the bulk of the people 
behind them if they had been able to seize and nationalize the 
land. The economic conditions, beyond a doubt, rendered this 
task very difficult, for in Finland, as in Russia, the cultivation of 
the soil was carried on individually and the transfer to the State 
would have been a delicate operation. 

The Bolshevist advent to power in Russia between Nov. 4 and 15 
1917 deepened the pro- Russian sympathies of the Finnish Social 
Democrats who had been alienated by Kerensky's equivocal policy, 
while the bourgeois parties, arguing that there was now no settled 
government in Russia, desired complete independence. On Dec. 6 
1917 the Diet and the now bourgeois Senate drew up a very old- 
fashioned declaration of independence which, however, historically 
marks the birth of Finnish freedom. As the Socialists still sought an 
understanding with Russia, the bourgeois bloc, which governed the 
situation since it had furnished the new administration at the begin- 
ning of the month, acting with great haste sent the declaration to 
Sweden and Germany at once. Both these Powers replied that 
Finland must first obtain full recognition of her independence from 
Russia. The Diet then decided to approach the Constituent Assembly 
in Russia through a friendly manifesto which explained that the 
assertion of independence was not a hostile act and that a joint 
committee would settle outstanding questions so that Russia could 
proceed with her war without fear of trouble from Finland. But 
as the Constituent Assembly was not allowed to meet, the Finnish 
Senate finally appealed to the Bolshevist Government and was 
informed on Jan. 4 1918 that the steps taken conformed with the 
policy and programme of the Bolshevists. Immediately afterwards 
the Swedish Government recognized the independence of Finland 
and was followed by the other Scandinavian countries. Recognition by 
France preceded recognition by Germany. 

The Finnish Civil War Feb. May igi8. At this time the social 
and economic differences between the political parties were too deep 
to admit of an easy settlement. The possessing classes, that is to 
say primarily the Swedo-Finn and Finno-Finn bourgeoisie, but espe- 
cially the first-named rather than see the wealth amassed during 
three years of the World War taken from them by the rising Social 
Democrats, were jeopardizing the newly won independence, now by 
intrigues which aimed at the cession of the Aland Is. to Sweden, now 
by manoeuvres which tended to set Finland under the heel of Ger- 
many. The Moderate bloc to which the Swedo-Finns adhered was 
anyhow determined to break away from Russia, and its leaders 
openly discussed the chances of union with Sweden on the one hand 
and the adoption of some German prince as grand duke on the other. 

Apart from that, there were some Finnish contractors who had 
allowed the Russian Government credit for the provision of war 
material, food and clothing, and did not desire to incur the loss 



which a complete rupture of relations was certain to entail. They 
therefore stood for the maintenance of the connexion with Russia. 

Principally, however, the Social Democrats believed that Socialist 
governance had come to stay in Russia, and they were not minded 
to protect Finnish capital from seizure if the birth of a cooperative 
commonwealth in Finland could thereby be accelerated. When 
the Bolshevist coup d'etat in Russia became known, they unwisely 
fraternized with the Russian soldiers stationed in Finland, and with 
their help rejected municipal bodies and replaced them by Social 
Democrat committees. Such action was hardly designed to relieve 
the ever-growing food difficulties and laid their party open to the 
reproach of harbouring anarchical tendencies. The Socialists were 
almost all Maximalists and anti-militarists, and, as such, averse even 
to the formation of a democratic citizen army maintained for pur- 
poses of order and defence. They pinned their faith on the Musco- 
vite connexion to save their country from invasion oblivious 
of the fact that the Russian soldier, freed of the restraints of a disci- 
pline which had become his second nature, starving and unpaid, 
was, to say the least, an uncertain factor. While free passes were 
given, whole trainloads of revolutionary soldateska arrived from 
Petrograd nominally to assist the Socialists in their active differ- 
ences with the bourgeoisie, but in reality to create disturbances. 
Having massacred their officers and any bourgeois elements which 
remained among them, they entered the so-called Finnish " Red 
Guards," and ransacked the country. The reactionaries, getting 
together the doubtful elements of the disbanded gendarmerie and 
their own adherents, organized the " White Guards." German arms 
and explosives were imported by one side; Russian bayonets by 
the other. At Christmas 1917 matters came to a head at Abo, where 
the Social Democrats imprisoned the governor and the chief of the 
police. For about a week the " Red Guards," which were com- 
posed of casually armed Social Democrats, remained on duty not- 
withstanding the fact that their pay had been suspended by the 
local Moderate bourgeois authorities. Then they gave up their 
job, and Russian troops and "hooligan elements " seized the oppor- 
tunity to sack a part of Abo. After some days' disorders, hurriedly 
summoned " Whites " from another district and some of the original 
" Reds " restored order together. But the bourgeois bloc neglected 
to introduce a democratic citizen army and opposed the reactionary 
efforts of the Swedish party to form a conscript army round the 
nucleus " White Guards." 

The Bolsheviks were clearly bent on precipitating civil war in Fin- 
land, and poured arms, munitions and troops into the country for 
the ostensible purpose of helping the Social Democrats. For this 
reason the Senate on Jan. 29 addressed a protest against the action 
of the Russian Government to the various Powers which had recog- 
nized Finnish independence. But it was too late, as now even the 
sanest Social Democrats were swept into a flood of Bolshevism. 
Helsingfors on that very day was seized by the Red Guards and by 
Feb. 8 1918 the coup d'etat had occurred and " Whites "and " Reds 
were in brutal conflict everywhere. 

The German Intervention, March-May 1918. The Diet belatedly 
adopted, on Jan. 17 1918, certain measures suggested by Senator 
Kaarlo Castren for the strengthening of the White Guard forma- 
tions. As these were insufficient to save the White army, which was 
under the command of the former Russian general of cavalry, Baron 
Carl Gustav Emit Mannerheim, the necessity arose of seeking 
foreign intervention. As regards this it is known from the Swedish 
statesman Branting that the Finnish Government, when it " made 
its official proposal for a Swedish intervention had simul- 
taneously asked in Berlin for a German armed intervention." 
Thus Sweden, had she assented, would have been dragged into the 
war, as " nobody can imagine that Germany would have refused an 
offer so favourable to her hegemony in the Baltic." 

This judgment is true, for while Sweden refused official help, the 
Germans did not hesitate. After all, they had kindled the Bolshevist 
fires in the East and sent war material into Finland for the express 
purpose of fomenting troubles which they could exploit to their 
own advantage. The situation was favourable to them, for as Mr. E. 
Lofgren, Minister of Justice in the Swedish Coalition Government of 
1918, publicly explained, " the Finns immediately after the declara- 
tion of their independence had entered into negotiations for a treaty 
with Germany, which in a commercial political sense made Finland 
the ally and vassal of Germany. . . ." The allusion is to the Finno- 
German treaty of March 7 1918. 

But since the public knew little of the underground workings of 
German policy, the landing of a German composite division in the 
Aland island of Ekero on March 3 and in Finland by April 3 caused 
the Prussian general officer commanding, Count Riidiger yon der 
Goltz, to be hailed as the liberator of the country. He had initially 
some 12,000 men under his orders, viz., three dismounted cavalry 
regiments, three Jiiger battalions, Bavarian mountain artillery, two 
heavy batteries, a squadron of cavalry, and sundry technical and 
supply formations which were subsequently reinforced by the 
detachment " Brandenstein," consisting of three infantry battalions, 
one cyclist battalion, a squadron of cavalry and two batteries. He 
had further the support of the German navy in the landing operations, 
and the remnant of the 2,000 Finnish exiles who had joined the 
German army in 1915-6 and made up the famous "27tn" Jagers, 
who were as well drilled in Pan-Germanism as in military science. 

Gen. von der Goltz, by landing in the rear of the Red forces and 
holding part of these in a successful action near Karis on April 6, 
enabled Gen. Mannerheim to win the battle of Tammerfors, while 
he himself, by a rapid advance on Helsingfors, between April 1 1 and 
13, freed this capital which he officially entered on April 14. Finally 
his victory over the Reds in the three days' battle (April 3O-May 2) 
of Lahti-Tavastehus contributed to Mannerheim's decisive defeat 
of the Red eastern army near Viborg on April 28-29. The remnants 
of the Red army being forced eastwards into Russia, the campaign 
ended in a month with the complete victory of the Whites. 

The terrible cruelty of the Reds, however, led to the White Terror 
as the price the country had to pay for being dragged into " Mittel- 
Europa." Some 15,000 men, women and children were slaughtered 
in cold blood, and by June 27 1918 73,915 Red insurrectionaries, 
including 4,600 women, were prisoners of war. 

The Diet, which met in June 1918, was Moderate, since the So- 
cialists or 46% of the electorate were excluded from the register. 
It authorized Senator Pehr Evind Svinhufvud, who under the Russian 
regime had been an exile from his country, to exercise the supreme 
power in so far as it had not already been conferred on the Senate 
which was bringing forward proposals for a monarchical form of 
government by offering the crown to Prince Frederick Charles of 
Hesse, brother-in-law of the German emperor. 

But the Germans pursued the ulterior object of securing Finnish 
military cooperation against the Murman railway, which, having 
been built by English enterprise during the war, was now guarded 
by a British expeditionary force. The claim of the liberators upon 
the gratitude of the Finns was assuming the most peremptory forms 
known to diplomacy, when, three days later, on July 18, events took 
place on the western front which marked the turn of the war to Ger- 
many's disadvantage. One collision between a Finnish force and a 
detachment commanded by a British officer, Lt. Quinn-Harkin, oc- 
curred in northern Karelia, but valuable time was gained until the 
rapid transformation of the European war, culminating in the Armi- 
stice of Nov. 1 1 1918, caught Finnish reaction between wind and water. 
Svinhufvad, the pliant tool of Germany, relinquished the supreme 
power, and was succeeded on Dec. 12 by Gen. Mannerheim as regent, 
who formed a Coalition Government composed of six Republicans and 
six Monarchists. The persons discredited by their extreme pro- 
Germanism, among them Gen. Thesleff, the Minister of War, were 
replaced in order to obtain the recognition of Finland by the Great 
Powers and secure the food supply of which the country stood in 
need. The definite orientation towards the Entente marked the 
transition from the monarchist period of German influence towards 
the democratic regime associated with England and America. 

The German troops, in part mutinous, were conveyed back to 
Germany in the middle of Dec., but with difficulty, as the German 
navy refused to transport units which had remained faithful to the 
Emperor. Gen. Mannerheim, who as regent wielded the power 
of a quasi-dictator, was a monarchist, but not a pro-German. 

Events in 1919 and 1920. The year 1919 witnessed the 
growth of the Republic of Finland out of the ashes of a country 
laid waste by civil war. Mannerheim organized the " Skydds- 
korps " or Protective Guards, a body of over 100,000 men, 
whose loyalty to the existing order of society could be relied upon. 

The general election of March i 1919 showed the following 
division of parties: Social Democrats 80, Agrarians 42, Coali- 
tionists 28, Progressives 26, Swedish 22, Christian Labour two. 
The Social Democrats had thus diminished by 12 since the 1917 
elections. This was largely attributable to the disfranchisement 
of over 40,000 voters for participation in the Red revolt. The 
tendency towards a republican form of government was outlined 
by the Agrarian party, composed of small landowners hostile to 
the claims of the Swedish-speaking Monarchist section. 

Mannerheim's popularity being immense with the parties of 
the Right and the army, the temptation of exploiting the military 
impotence of Soviet Russia was very great. In 1919 continued 
the Entente intervention on the Murmansk and Archangel 
fronts, and when the 237th Brigade (Gen. Price), which formed 
part of the expeditionary force under the English Maj.-Gen. 
Maynard, at the end of May reached Medvyejva Gora at the 
head of Lake Onega, the Finnish Government offered coopera- 
tion in return for the possession of Petrozavodsk. The offer 
being declined, a Finnish volunteer force nevertheless assaulted 
the town independently, but without success. Again, at the 
close of the year, when the White-Russian Gen. Judenitch was 
marching on Petrograd, Mannerheim went so far as to sound the 
Allies as to their views on the proposed Finnish intervention. 
But he received no encouragement from Paris or London, nor 
from the Moderates at home. 

Already on July 17 of that year the Finnish Diet had resolved to 
establish a republic, with a president to be elected every six 



years, and, on July 25, Prof. Kaarlo Juho Stahlberg was chosen 
as the first president by 143 votes against 50 recorded for Man- 
nerheim. It was then that the Vennola Government, which was 
a coalition of the Progressive and Agrarian parties, came into 
power. Though it commanded only 64 out of 200 seats in the 
Diet, it marked a great administrative improvement from a 
democratic point of view. It introduced the Amnesty bill, which 
after a chequered career was passed by the Diet on Dec. 18 by 165 
votes to 68. Its adoption synchronized with the abandonment 
of the Communists by the extreme Left. The de jure recognition 
of the republic was accorded by Great Britain soon after the 
instalment of Stahlberg. 

The outstanding event of the year 1920 was the signing of a 
peace treaty with Soviet Russia, which after long negotiations 
was signed at Dorpat on Oct. 14, the military defeat of the Bol- 
sheviks by the Poles being a contributory factor. Pechenga was 
ceded to Finland, which thus obtained the much-desired outlet 
on the Arctic Ocean, while Russia retained eastern Karelia, 
where, after the collapse of Gen. Skobelzine's White-Russian 
front in Feb., fighting had occurred with Bolshevik troops with 
results satisfactory to Finnish arms. The treaty was approved on 
Dec. i by the Diet with only 27 dissentient voices and ratified on 
Dec. it by the President. Finland soon after was admitted as a 
member of the League of Nations. 

Aland Islands Dispute. The question of the Aland Is. was, 
in its simplest form, whether the group of islands adjacent to 
Finland and inhabited by a few thousand people of Swedish 
extraction should belong to Sweden or to Finland. In its wider 
aspect, however, the whole network of islands which form the 
archipelago of Abo and that of the Aland Is. constituted the key 
of the defence of the coast of Finland and of the gulfs of Bothnia 
and Finland against attack from the west. In 1920, as in previous 
years, sovereignty was claimed over these islands by Finland on 
the ground that it was for her a question of existence, though 
autonomy was given to the Alanders and for the safety of Sweden 
the absolute demilitarization of the islands was conceded. Under 
such circumstances the question was referred on June 19 1920 to 
the League of Nations, and in June 1921 (see ALAND ISLANDS) 
its decision was given in favour of Finland. 

BIBLIOGRAHY. Die Aalandfrage: das Kernproblem der Ostseepolitik 
(1918); Juhani Aho, Hajamietteita Kapinaviikoilta (1919); Ernst 
Brausewetter, Finnldndische Rundscliau (1901-2); Chesnais, La 
Guerre Civile en Finlande (1919); Raphael Erich, Das Staatsrecht 
des Grossfiirstentums Finnland (1912); Finnland und Russland: die 
Internationale Londoner Konferenz vom 26. Februar bis I. Marz 1910 
(191 1); Die Finldndische Frage im Jahre 1911 (191 1); Finland, Hand- 
book No. 47, prepared under the direction of the historical section 
of the Foreign Office (1920); Finland im Anfang des XX. Jahrhun- 
derls (1919); Der Friedensvertrag zwischen Deutschland und Fin- 
land; General Graf Riidiger von der Goltz, Meine Sendung in Finn- 
land und in Baltikum (1920); Wilhelm Haberman, Schwedische 
Stimmen uber die militdrpolitische Bedeutung der Finnischen In- 
selgruppe (1916); Axel O. Heikel, Etnographische Forschungen auf 
dem Gebiete der finnischen Volkerschaftsn; R. Hermanson, Beitrag 
zur Beurleilung der staatsrechtlichen Stellung des Grossfiirstentums 
Finnland (1900); Volter Hilpi, Nationell sjaloprovning (1917); Yrjo 
Koskelainen, Mannerheim, suomenvapanttajajavaltionhoitaja (1919); 
" New Europe " Review, vol. iii., No. 30, vol. viii., Nos 93. and 94 
(being the contributions by Rosalind Travers Hyndman), vol. vi, 
No. 67 (anon.), vol. vii., No.. 80 (by "V"), vol. xii., No. 155 (by 
S. E. Morison); Johannes Ohquist; Das politische Leben Finnlands 
(1916); and Finnland (1919); Olenev, Karelski Krai (1917); Peti- 
tion des finnlandischen Landtages vom 26. Mai 1910 uber Aufrechter- 
haltung der Grundgesetze Finnlands (1911); Herman Stenberg, Ost- 
karelien im Verhdltnis zu Russland und Finnland (1917); Heming 
Soderhjelm, Det roda upproret i Finland as 1918 (1918); Thure 
Svedlin, Kamp och aventyr i roda Finland (1918); Der Weisse 
Terror in Finnland, Beleuchtende Urkunden aus der Inter pettations- 
debatte im Finnischen Landtag den 30. April 1919; Treaty of Peace 
between Finland and the Russian Soviet Republic (1921); Georg 
von Wendt, Die Proportionswahl zur finnischen Vplksvertretung (1906) ; 
Konni Ziliacus, Revolution und Gegenrevolution in Russland und Fin- 
land (1912). (W. L. B.) 

(1842- ), British lawyer and politician, was born at Edin- 
burgh July ii 1842. He was educated at Edinburgh Academy 
and University, and graduated in medicine. In 1867 he was 
called to the bar, in 1882 becoming a Q.C. and bencher of the 

Middle Temple. He was elected as Conservative member for 
Inverness Burghs in 1885, and held this seat until 1892. In 1895 
he regained the seat, and was made Solicitor-General in Lord 
Salisbury's Government, when he was knighted. In 1900 he 
became Attorney-General, remaining in the Government until 
the Conservative defeat of 1906. In 1910 he successfully con- 
tested Edinburgh and St. Andrews Universities, and in 1916, 
on the formation of Mr. Lloyd George's Government, became 
Lord Chancellor and a life peer. He retired in 1918, and in 1919 
was created a viscount. Lord Finlay received hon. degrees from 
various universities, and from 1902 to 1903 was lord rector of 
Edinburgh University. 

FISCHER, EMIL (1852-1919), German chemist (see 10.426), 
died in 1919. 

FISCHER, THEOBALD (1846-1910), German geographer, was 
born at Kirchsteitz, Thuringia, Oct. 31 1846. He was educated 
at the universities of Heidelberg and Halle, and at first devoted 
himself to history. A travelling tutorship directed his attention 
to geography, and he visited many parts of Europe in the pursuit 
of this study, but especially the Mediterranean lands, including 
North Africa (Atlas lands). The " Mediterranean region," 
perhaps the primary example now in the study of regional 
geography, is a conception the world owes to Fischer: his thesis 
for the rank of Privatdozent in the university of Bonn (1876) 
was entitled Beitrdge zur physischen Geographic der Miltelmeer- 
lander, and his most important publications are a collection of 
Mittelmeerbilder and his work on the Mediterranean peninsulas 
of Europe in Kirchhoff's Allgemeine Landerkunde. He held 
professorships of geography at Kiel (1879-1883) and at Marburg 
from 1883 until his death, which took place on Sept. 17 1910. 

FISHER, ANDREW (1862- ), Australian statesman, was 
born at Crosshouse, Kilmarnock, Aug. 29 1862, and began life as 
a coal-miner. He emigrated to Queensland at the age of 23 and 
eight years later was elected to the Queensland Legislature. 
He was Minister of Railways in the short-lived Dawson Ministry 
of 1899, and in 1901 was elected a member of the Commonwealth 
Parliament, retaining his seat for 15 years. He joined Mr. Wat- 
son's Labour Cabinet of 1904 as Minister for Trade and Customs, 
and when Mr. Watson in 1907 resigned his leadership of the 
Labour party Mr. Fisher succeeded him. In 1908 he became 
Prime Minister, but his administration lasted only six months. 
At the general election of 1910, however, his party was returned 
with a sweeping majority, and he was Prime Minister for three 
years, during which period he tackled the question of imperial 
defence, adopted Lord Kitchener's report of 1909, passed a 
measure establishing universal military training, and invited 
Adml. Henderson to visit Australia and report on its naval needs. 
In 1913 his party was in a minority in the Lower House and he 
therefore resigned in favour of Mr. (afterwards Sir) Joseph 
Cook; but at the special election of Aug. 1914 he was again re- 
turned to power and took vigorous action for Australia's parti- 
cipation in the World War. At the end of 1915 he resigned and 
took up the High Commissionership vacated by Sir George Reid. 
This office he held until 1921. He represented Australia at the 
coronation of King George V. (1911), and was that year sworn 
of the Privy Council. 

man of letters and politician, was born in London March 21 1865. 
He was educated at Winchester and New College, Oxford, being 
elected in 1888 to a fellowship at his own college. After further 
study in Paris and Gottingen, he returned to Oxford as tutor at 
New College, and soon earned recognition as a scholarly histo- 
rian. He delivered the South African lectures in 1908, the Lowell 
lectures in 1909, and in 1911 was Chichele lecturer in modern 
history. He was also a member of the royal commission on the 
public services of India (1912-5). In 1912 he became vice- 
chancellor of Sheffield University. In 1915 he was appointed a 
member of the Government committee on German outrages. 
On the formation of Mr. Lloyd George's Government in 1916, 
Mr. Fisher accepted the invitation to become Minister of Educa- 
tion, and was elected to Parliament for the Hallam division of 
Sheffield. In 1918 he became member for the English universities. 



An Education bill was introduced by him Aug. 10 1917, the 
most noteworthy proposals of which were the removal of the 
limit of the zd. rate which might be raised by local authorities for 
education, the establishment of nursery schools for children under 
five, the amending of the law of school attendance, the placing 
of further restrictions upon the employment of children of school 
age, the improvement of measures for physical training, and the 
establishment of continuation schools for young people up to the 
age of eighteen (see EDUCATION). 

Mr. Fisher has published The Mediaeval Empire (1898); Studies 
in Napoleonic Statesmanship (1903); A Political History of England 
(1906); Bonapartism (1908); Life of F. W. Maitland (1910); The 
Republican Tradition in Europe (1911); Political Unions (1911) 
and Napoleon Bonaparte (1913); besides essays and review articles. 

FISHER, IRVING (1867- ), American economist, was born 
at Saugerties, N.Y., Feb. 27 1867. He studied at Yale (A.B. 
1888), Berlin, and Paris. He at first taught mathematics at 
Yale; but in 1895 was made assistant professor of political 
economy, and in 1898 professor. He was editor of the Yale 
Review, 1896-1910. He served as chairman of many commissions 
dealing with public health, prohibition, and labour. An authority 
on money inflation, he proposed that the purchasing power of the 
dollar be stabilized (see DOLLAR STABILIZATION). His plan was 
to replace coined gold dollars by " gold bullion dollar certificates " 
which should command such weight of gold bullion as might 
legally be declared to constitute a dollar at that particular time. 
The weight of this ideal gold dollar would be adjusted at in- 
tervals in accordance with its power to purchase commodities as 
shown by the " index number " of prices. 

His writings include: Mathematical Investigations in the Theory 
of Value and Prices (1892); Elements of Geometry (with A. W. 
Phillips, 1896); A Brief Introduction to the Infinitesimal Calculus 
(1897); The Nature of Capital and Income (1906); The Rate of In- 
terest (1907); National Vitality (1909); The Purchasing Power of 
Money (1911); Elementary Principles of Economics (1913); Why is 
the Dollar Shrinking? (1914) and Stabilizing the Dollar (1919). 

British admiral (see 10.428), on relinquishing the office of First 
Sea Lord in Jan. 1910 remained in retirement until 1912, when he 
was appointed chairman of the royal commission on oil fuel. 
He was a firm believer in oil as fuel for the navy, with its corollary 
the internal combustion engine. He foresaw its effects on the de- 
sign of war vessels, and the far-reaching tactical results to be 
derived from the employment of capital ships that would show 
no funnels or smoke, have immense sea-keeping powers, and 
be fuelled at sea from tankers. 

After the outbreak of the World War, the retirement of Prince 
Louis of Battenberg, in Nov. 1914, from the post of First Sea 
Lord, led to Lord Fisher's being again installed in that office at 
the Admiralty. His presence was immediately felt in the dramatic 
and brilliant piece of strategy which resulted, under Adml. 
Sturdee, in the destruction of Adml. von Spec's squadron off the 
Falklands. Fisher then, with the cooperation and hearty support 
of Mr. Churchill, initiated a great building programme of crui- 
sers, monitors, destroyers and small craft to the number of some 
600 keels, pressing the American shipyards into the service, 
necessarily at an enormous cost. Everything had to be sub- 
ordinated to haste, and in fact most of the craft were actually 
delivered within six months. Although primarily designed 
for a great strategic move into the Baltic, which Lord Fisher 
had himself drawn up in detail, this vast armada was gradually 
diverted from its original purpose to various other uses among 
them the naval attempt to force the passage of the Dardanelles; 
and it was the War Council's decision to proceed with this that 
ultimately (May 1915) led to Lord Fisher's resignation of his post 
as First Sea Lord. In the following July he was appointed chair- 
man of the Inventions Board, and in 1917 gave important evi- 
dence before the Dardanelles Commission. In 1919 he published 
two books Memories and Records. These collections of un- 
conventional and more or less fragmentary utterances taken 
down in shorthand inevitably suffer from a lack of sequence and 
coherence, and they are of little value as a guide to their author's 
actual achievements. After some months of illness Lord Fisher 

died on July 10 1920, his last public act being a press campaign 
in favour of economy. He was then in his eightieth year. 

It was still difficult in 1921 to form a just estimate of the value 
to his country of Lord Fisher's long and arduous service. In 
some ways the results of his strenuous life were disappointing to 
himself and to those whom his strong and rugged personality 
impressed with a sense of almost superhuman genius and power; 
as well as to those, such as the journalists whom he knew well 
how to flatter, who took him exactly at his own valuation. It 
needed an experience like that of the late King Edward to see 
the weak and unprotected places in the strong man's armour, 
and to understand where what was fine in him needed support 
and protection. Like so many men in his service, Lord Fisher 
suffered from the disadvantages of an incomplete education 
a defect not likely to be felt in actual fighting service, but apt 
to become more and more of a handicap as a man advances in 
his profession and deals with wider and more complex problems 
than those involved in merely technical developments. Lord 
Fisher was temperamentally as well as by training unable to 
make use of a staff, in the modern sense of that term; he thought 
alone, formulated his large but vague conceptions of war and 
strategy alone, and attempted practically alone to work them 
out with inevitable results. It is remarkable that so powerful 
and in some ways attractive a personality neither produced any 
school nor influenced any notable group in the navy; and even of 
the men whom he selected and furthered, practically none except 
Lord Jellicoe came to great distinction or achieved any signal 
success. Many of the schemes with which his name is most close- 
ly associated Osborne, the training of the engineering branch, 
the system of the " common entry " for example proved failures 
and had to be abandoned or completely remodelled. Although 
he was sponsor while First Sea Lord for the Dreadnought prin- 
ciple of design, and for such infinitely important technical 
developments as water-tube boilers, turbines, etc., his theory that 
" speed is armour, " as applied to North Sea warfare, proved to 
be dangerous, and the battle cruisers designed in accordance 
with it were to some extent at a disadvantage as a result of 
reliance on aphorism rather than on the logical and thought-out 
harmonization of means, conditions and end. Some of the more 
extreme examples of this class, still under construction on his 
retirement from the Admiralty, had to be abandoned or altered 
or adapted to other uses. On the other hand, in his large con- 
ceptions of warfare, in his prevision of the war with Germany 
and its date, in his concentration of the navy in the North Sea 
as a training ground, in his strategical strokes, such as the de- 
struction of the von Spec squadron, and his conception of a 
Baltic campaign early in the war (never carried out), and in his 
untiring advocacy of an offensive policy (also overruled), Lord 
Fisher showed a true genius and grasp of the essentials of naval 
warfare which alone would make him a memorable figure in 
British history. His character was a combination of strength, 
ingenuity and simplicity; by some mysterious throwback he had, 
both physically and mentally, a strong oriental strain in his 
composition; and the Bible was his favourite and most familiar 
book. He read, however, not so much to educate and enlarge 
his mind, as to seek and find confirmation of his own views and 
conceptions of things. In that respect he was like a great artist, 
who assimilates everything in life that will contribute to the en- 
dorsement and magnification of his own genius, and rejects the 
rest. He was sometimes ruthless and violent in his methods, 
although rather less so than he would have the world believe; 
there were indeed veins of beauty and modesty in his character, 
and he came nearest to true greatness when he was most simple. 
His were a life and character essentially of the kind to provoke 
violent controversy and sharp divisions between his admirers and 
accusers; but when these have died away his figure will stand out, 
even among the strong men of his day, as that of an enemy to 
shams and pretences, to sloth and incompetency, and as a passion- 
ate lover and defender of his country. (F. Y.) 

FITZMAURICE-KELLY, JAMES (1858- ), English man of 
letters, was born at Glasgow June 20 1858. Educated at St. 
Charles's College, London, he became Taylorian lecturer in 



Spanish at Oxford in 1902 and Gilmour professor of Spanish 
language and literature from 1909 to 1916, when he was trans- 
ferred to London as Cervantes professor of Spanish language and 
literature to the university of London. This post he resigned 
in 1920. He became a fellow of the British Academy and corre- 
sponding member of the Royal Spanish Academy and other 
Spanish societies, and a Knight Commander of the Order of 
Alphonso XII. Amongst his publications are a Life of Cervantes 
(1892); an Introduction to the editio princeps of Don Quixote 
(1898-9); a History of Spanish Literature (1898); Cervantes in 
England (1905); Cervantes and, Shakespeare (1916) and many 
other books and papers. 

FLAMETHROWERS (Germ. Flammenwerfer) . The World 
War revived the old weapon of " liquid fire." No doubt, the 
use of incendiary projectiles and devices had never altogether van- 
ished from modern warfare, but these have usually been employed 
for destruction of material rather than for effect on personnel, 
and we have to go back to the sieges of mediaeval times to find 
examples of the use of heat, as such, to repulse an enemy. The 
townspeople of a mediaeval city, having only massacre to expect 
if their walls were stormed, observed no limitations in their 
choice of weapons, and not only used incendiaries proper to de- 
stroy the besiegers' hoarding- work and catapults but also boiling 
oil against the bodies of the men. From time to time in modern his- 
tory proposals have been made for flame-throwing devices, and 
one such was actually experimented with in Prussia about 1700. 
But until modern methods of storing a gas propellant under 
pressure came into being, anything in the nature of an effective 
flamethrower was impossible. 

In reality therefore the flamethrower dates from experiments 
made in Germany a few years before the World War, when, no 
doubt in consequence of the trench warfare of Port Arthur, 
Richard Fiedler produced in 1906 a service model which was 
under experiment when the war broke out. Like other weapons 
of siegecraft this was brought into the field as soon as the nature 
of the fighting changed from open-field warfare to trench war- 
fare. Already in the winter of 1914-5 they appeared sporadically 
on the western front, and they obtained their first striking success 
in the Bois d'Avocourt (Verdun) on Feb. 26 1915. It should be 
noted that the use of such weapons was not prohibited by the 
Hague Convention, save in so far as it might be called a weapon 
" calculated to cause unnecessary suffering " a phrase which 
is susceptible of many interpretations. In this it differed from 
the gas warfare initiated at Ypres in April 1915, although by the 
accident of circumstances gas and flamethrowers have come to 
be associated in the popular mind. 

When the German Flammenwerfer appeared it was considered 
essential both in France and in England to design weapons of 
this class at once; in England the question of their employment 
was reserved, but it was felt that the soldiers who were exposed 
to flame attack should, for reasons of moral, be made aware that 
similar devices were available on their own side. In France the 
military authorities proceeded without hesitation to the creation 
not only of the apparatus but of the units to work them. This 
difference in the way in which flamethrowers were regarded in the 
two chief Allied countries persisted to the end of the war. The 
French used them as constantly as the Germans, whereas in the 
British Army their employment on service was limited to a very 
few occasions in the battle of the Somme, and to the Zeebrugge 
attack of St. George's Day 1918. By the American Expedi- 
tionary Force they were not used at all, though the question of 
their employment was taken into consideration. In 1919 they 
figured largely in the local street-fighting by which the German 
Republic made good its authority. 

The flamethrower essentially consists, in all designs, of (a) a 
container filled with some mixture of heavy and light oils; (6) a 
strong- walled vessel filled with air, nitrogen, CO 2 , etc., under high 
pressure; and (c) a discharge tube with nozzle and in most cases an 
ignition device. Between (a) and (6) is a reducing valve, and between 
(6) and the nozzle a firing valve or trigger. When air or gas under 
high pressure is admitted into (a) from (6) it expels through (c) a 
powerful jet of oil, which when ignited (either at the nozzle or sub- 
sequently) becomes " liquid fire." 

Flamethrowers are essentially short-range weapons, whose char- 
acteristic effect is to make an area untenable by living beings, by 
actual burning and also by heating the surrounding air to an in- 
tolerable temperature. This effect imposes, as a condition of their 
use, maximum range, not only because range as such is a desirable 
military quality but because the operators themselves must not be 
put out of action by their own weapon. Range, however, is difficult 
to obtain with a liquid jet. Even in vacua such a jet with an initial 
velocity of 50 metres per second would not theoretically range to 300 
yd., and, owing to the resistance of the air, the maximum range ever 
known to have been attained in practice was 134 yd. actual throw 
(with an experimental British type of heavy flamethrower). Be- 
yond the actual range of the jet there is of course an area (which 
varies according to the conditions of the shoot) made momentarily 
untenable owing to the heating of the air, and this area extends 
laterally as well as forward. But the fact of limited range remains 
a constant drawback. It is especially pronounced with the light 
portable types, few of which outrange the hand-grenade. 

Amongst the design factors influencing initial velocity and there- 
fore range, two are of principal importance, the pressure of the gas 
propellant in the oil container and the loss of energy in the discharger 
pipe and nozzle. The first would seem, at first sight, to be limited 
only by the weight and strength of the containers those of the gas 
" bottle" in the first instance and those of the oil container second- 
arily. But in practice the size of the nozzle orifice sets an upper limit 
to working pressure ; if it is too small in proportion to the pressure the 
liquid, instead of being propelled in a consistent jet, is atomized 
and loses its forward energy very soon. But the larger the orifice 
the greater the quantity of liquid discharged per unit time. Hence, 
to obtain a long throw of any useful duration the flamethrower must 
be large, heavy and cumbrous. Conversely, when minimal weight 
is important, either range or duration must be sacrificed. Up to the 
limit thus fixed, of course, maximal pressure is aimed at in design, 
and it is found that, with modern materials and workmanship, 
gas bottles capable of standing the unreduced or storage pressure 
and oil containers able to endure the reduced or working pressure 
can be constructed within practicable weights. 

The second important factor is loss of head, which varies with the 
length and smoothness of the internal surface of the discharge 
system, and is affected still more by the occurrence of abrupt bends 
and contractions in the piping or nozzle. A discharge system as 
straight, as short, and as large in bore as possible is therefore aimed 
at. But here again practical limits exist. In all heavy and medium 
and in most " knapsack " flamethrowers the position of the con- 
tainer has no relation to the axis of the jet. It is not, like a gun, 
pointed in the direction of the target, but is built in under cover or 
stood up on the ground or carried on a man's back, and aim is taken 
by pointing the nozzle only. Hence the most that can be done is to 
smooth out the angles of bend as much as possible and to diminish 
the length of piping to the strict minimum. Large bore is always 
desirable but not always attainable, since increased volume of oil 
per unit time means either increased dimensions for the oil container 
or diminished duration of action without reloading. 

The dimensions of the nozzle itself, in this connexion, are im- 
portant as affecting the form of the jet. Progressively, in its passage 
through the air, the solid vein of liquid breaks up into globules and 
loses its forward energy ; the higher the initial velocity the longer this 
break-up is delayed, and velocity is, as we have seen, a function of 
working pressure and orifice dimensions. Moreover, the larger the 
vein itself the less surface it presents to disintegration by the air 
for a given volume; and the same reasoning excludes all cross- 
sections of the nozzle other than circular. 

The oils employed varied, in the World War, according to avail- 
able supplies, but were always in principle mixtures of heavy oil 
and light oil (petrol or benzol), the former for the sake of maintaining 
forward energy in the air (giving " sectional density " in ballistic 
language), the latter for ease of ignition. In winter the proportion of 
light oil was increased up to one-third in the French service. 

The propellant gases used were also varied. Compressed air, 
being most readily available, was probably the most frequently 
employed. The Germans even tried compressed oxygen, a most 
dangerous expedient when nozzle-ignition is employed, as the 
mixture in the interior of the container is liable to detonate if a back 
flame from the jet reaches it. 1 This risk attaches also in a lesser 
degree to compressed air, and inert gases are always preferable. 
COa has the disadvantage that it forms a deposit in the piping and 
so increases loss of head, and in the end nitrogen either the pure 
product of chemical factories or a " deoxygenated air " produced 
in the field by a mobile plant was generally accepted. 

So far only the expulsion of the oil jet has been considered. Broad- 
ly, there are two forms of ignition. In the one the ground occupied 
by the enemy is sprayed with the unignited oil, and then fired by 
throwing on to it incendiary bombs or grenades. This is mechan- 
ically the simplest way, and it gives the most thorough effect, since 
all parts of the ground, even the floors of trenches, are set on fire. 
But the throwing of grenades on to the correct spot is a difficult 

1 A very serious accident occurred on one occasion in England 
from this cause, an oxygen bottle having been accidentally sub- 
stituted for an air bottle. 


matter, especially with the long-range heavy flamethrowers, and 
surprise effect which, in the opinion of some, is the principal if not 
the only asset of the weapon is entirely lost. The other method 
is to fix an igniter to the nozzle; this fires the jet at the outset, en- 
sures surprise and moral effect, for the liquid-fire jet, with its roar, 
its heat, and heavy smoke intermingled with darting masses of 
flame, is a terrifying thing. On the other hand nozzle-ignition 
presents very difficult problems which have never been satisfactorily 
solved, and the actual burning effect is more local than is the case 
with the simpler method. On the whole nozzle ignition is to be pre- 
ferred whenever a reasonably certain ignition device is available. 
The French made use of both methods, the Germans and British 
exclusively, or almost exclusively, of nozzle ignition. It was at one 
time supposed that the unignited jet ranged farther than the flaming 
jet, but this is not proved. French experiments indicate that what 
is lost in " sectional density " by igniting the jet is regained by the 
fact that the surrounding air, heated to a high temperature, offers a 
lessened resistance. 

Ignition devices may be simple portfires (or even petrol-soaked 
wads) attached by hand to the nozzle and ignited before aim is 
taken, or more elaborate electrical and mechanical devices. In all 
cases they are required to ignite, not the oil itself, which emerges 
in too rigid a column to respond to the spark, but the film of petrol 
vapour which forms round the column. The spark must be emitted 
by the igniter as close as possible to the emerging jet without actually 
touching it. Moreover it must be protected against the wind. 
Further, the igniter must remain alight and in the correct position 
during the duration of the throw; this condition is very difficult to 
satisfy in the case of portable flamethrowers which operate by a 
succession of short, sharp jets controlled by a trigger, save by the 
clumsy expedient of a long-burning portfire. Amongst the many 
forms of ignition three may be specially mentioned : 

(a) A British pattern in which two sparking-plugs were mounted 
in a cup containing petrol, and fired by a magneto generator. 

(6) A French type, giving the very long burning required for the 
successive shots of the portable flamethrowers by means of a tubular 
magazine fixed to the nozzle. In this magazine was a long stick of 
alumino-thermic composition, which was continually urged forward 
by a spring as its head burned away. Primary ignition of the 
portfire itself was by means of a cerium-steel "briquet." 




Cardboard Disc 

Striker Pellet 




FIG. I. 

(c) The German service igniter (fig. i), which was very ingeniously 
devised and was based on inertia. It was a double-walled cylinder 
attached to the nozzle-tube. The space between the inner and outer 
walls was filled with an alumino-tnermic composition, open to the 
air at the top. Inside the hollow of the cylinder and in prolongation 
of the bore of the nozzle-tube were a piston, a spring, a striker- 
needle mounted on a pellet, and a cap with powder-relay. Between 
the cap and the striker-needle was a fixed disc of cardboard. On 
release the sudden impact of the iet on the piston compressed the 
spring and the striker against the cardboard disc, then after a 
moment the needle penetrated this disc, and the spring, decompress- 
ing itself, forced it on to the cap and so fired the powder relay that 

ignited the composition. The attachments which secured the striker, 
etc., in the bore of the cylinder were instantly burned through, and 
the jet, blowing out these obstructions, issued and was ignited by 
the burning composition as it emerged. 

The types of flamethrower designed by the three belligerents were 
classified broadly as heavy, medium or semi-portable, and portable. 
Those of the heavy class, built for range, all required fixed installa- 
tions; medium types were simply smaller editions of the heavy types, 
kept down in weight so as to be able to follow up an advance without 
undue difficulty; while the portable weapons were without exception 
designed for use in the course of the attack itself, and especially for 
the " mopping-up " of captured trenches and for securing the flanks 
of a line of trenches during " consolidation." In reality, therefore, 
there are only two types, the heavy and the light, and these are 
technically very different. 

Heavy Flamethrowers. Of the various types of heavy flame- 
thrower which were evolved in the war, the British show both 
the best ranging power and also perhaps the greatest variety, 
this latter being due to the fact that, officially, they never passed 
beyond the experimental stage into that of a " service store." 

The first model to be tried was that designed by an American, 
Joseph Menchen, which was put before the War Office in March 
1915. This was a very large apparatus, several containers being 
coupled up in series to a single pipe and nozzle, the latter being 
aimed from under cover by means of power derived from a by- 
pass on the air bottle (a complication subsequently abandoned). 
The intention of the branch of the War Office concerned (which 
subsequently became the Trench Warfare Department of the 
Ministry of Munitions) was to employ the apparatus not in 
trenches, for which it was evidently too cumbrous, but to mount 
it in a large armoured vehicle of the caterpillar class. Such a 
vehicle was built, concurrently with the first tanks but on a 
larger scale so as to be able to carry a big supply of oil for the 
flamethrower, which in the Menchen design had a range of 100 
yards. This idea of the flamethrower-tank was, however, al- 
lowed to drop owing to a variety of causes, of which the principal 
were the dislike of the British G.H.Q. in France for flame- 
throwers generally, and the concentration of caterpillar-building 
resources at home on the gun-carrying tank. Experiment pro- 
ceeded therefore on heavy types intended for trench warfare, 
and greater lightness and simplicity than was possible with the 
Menchen design was aimed at. Later in 1915 the Department 
produced a heavy flamethrower " battery " which embodied 
many of the features of the Menchen, and some of those of the 
Hersent apparatus which had been evolved in France. This 
" battery " is typical of the normal heavy flame-thrower. 

The " battery " (fig. 2) consisted of four vertical cylinders 16 in. 
in diameter and 48 in. high; on the top of each cylinder was a valve 
(controlled at first by a wheel and later by special mechanism) which 
was attached to a siphon tube in the interior of the container. The 
four valves were connected up in series by short lengths of flexible 
metallic tubing. The container communicated by a length of flex- 
ible tube with a rigid tube terminating in a nozzle; this discharge 
tube was mounted in the trench parapet behind a shield in such a way 
that the jet could be delivered in any direction and with any eleva- 
tion. In the final container valve i.e. that leading to the de- 
livery piping was mounted a trigger valve. On each container 
was strapped a gas bottle (compressed air, later nitrogen) containing 
60 cub. ft. of gas compressed to 1, 800 Ib. per sq. inch. Between 



this and the oil container were interposed a reducing valve (to reduce 
the storage pressure to a working pressure of 250 Ib. per sq. in.) and 
a pressure gauge. Each oil container, when filled about three- 
quarters full (as was the usual practice), held 25 gal. and weighed 
180 Ib. filled. Ignition was at the nozzle by means of the electric 
device above mentioned. The range of this model was about 90 yd. 
actual throw. This apparatus, modified in details, was operated 
on one or two occasions in very unsuitable conditions during the 
battle of the Somme 1916, and was then rejected by G.H.Q. 1 But 
before experiment was abandoned two important alterations were 
made, (a) The valves between the separate containers were done 
away with, and the freer flow of oil thereby obtained enabled a 
" record " range of 134 yd. to be reached. (6) The " director tube " 
built into the parapet was replaced by a so-called " monitor," a 
lazy-tongs device carrying a short, universal-jointed, nozzle-tube, 
which was raised above the parapet only during firing, the whole 
Installation at other times being below ground in a dugout. Other 
improvements were made to facilitate assembly and taking down in 
trench conditions. On one occasion a complete " battery " of four 
containers and monitor was taken down, removed, reassembled, 
filled and fired in slightly less than 15 minutes by ten men. The 
container unit was also lightened. 

French heavy flamethrowers were substantially of the same 
character as the British model just described, but simpler. They did 
not range quite so well. Storage pressure was somewhat higher, 
working pressure slightly lower than in the British engines. The 
unit container was shorter and wider, and of lower capacity; the 
" battery " usually consisted of three containers placed one behind 
the other and connected by coupling-pipes at an acute angle to 
a single collector-tube which carried the nozzle. As above mentioned 
nozzle ignition and ground ignition were both used. 

The German Grof (grosser Flammenwerfer) was similar in capacity 
to the British " battery " type, but otherwise resembled the French. 

A heavy flamethrower of an entirely different type was the 
Livens, designed by Capt. Livens, R.E. In this the containers were, 
so to speak, elongated until they took the form of a single long 9-inch 
pipe stowed horizontally in a deep dugout or gallery. In the pipe 
worked a floating piston which separated the gas and the oil posi- 
tively. Along this pipe, at intervals, were placed refilling tanks, so 
arranged that at the conclusion of each shoot the pipe-container 
could be refilled with oil very quickly by power supplied from the 
main reservoir of propellant gas. In the model here described three 
shoots could be made, each of 80 gal., in four minutes. The propellant 
gas, stored in the usual bottles, was admitted to a welded reservoir 
which was tested to 1, 800 Ib. per sq. inch. This equalizing reservoir 
gave a powerful and steady drive at the relatively high working 
pressure of 325 Ib. per sq. inch. At the end of the container pipe 
was a " monitor " or rising discharger, arranged on the principle of 
a hydraulic ram, worked by the oil itself. This rose through a hole 
in the roof of the dug-out, delivered its shot, and sank automatically 
when the oil which supported it was drained off below. 

Portable Flamethrowers. These were used to a far greater 
extent in the World War than were the heavier types. In most 
cases the container with the gas bottle strapped to it was carried 
on the man's back, and the discharger tube with nozzle carried in 
his hand, the two being connected by the usual flexible pipe. The 
necessary lightness was obtained of course by the sacrifice of 
ranging power, both quantity of oil and working pressure being 
lower (3 gal., and 140-170 Ib. per sq. in. respectively in the 
French " Schilt " types). 

The general principles were similar to those of the heavy flame- 
throwers, except in- the method of release. Whereas in the heavy 
types a single long-ranging shot of great power is fired in one blast, 
in the light type or at least in those light types designed after the 
requirement had been realized a succession of very short spurts is 
arranged for by a quick-acting trigger-valve of some sort. This 
enables the user to move hither and thither, driving back now one 
party of the enemy, now another, or clearing several dugouts in 
succession without reloading. In earlier French patterns ignition 
was by incendiary grenades after a shot of unignited oil, but the 
tactical usefulness of this weapon, even more than that of the heavy 
type, suffers by this limitation, and in all later French models nozzle- 
ignition is fitted. Of these the Schilt " No. 3 bis " may be taken as 
representative (fig. 3). Its outstanding characteristic is the power of 
delivering very many short shots without reloading. The " record " 
is no less than 103, but such a figure can only be obtained at the 
expense of range, and the usual practice was to use up one filling in 
about 8 or ip shots with a range of rather less than 30 metres. The 
ignition device js the " tubular magazine " mentioned earlier and 
burns for 8-9 minutes. The dimensions are: container 2 cm. thick, 
55 cm. high and 20 cm. in diameter, tested to 427 Ib. per sq. in. with 
a capacity 3 gallons. The gas is at a storage pressure of 2,133 Ib. 

1 The available sets were handed over to Russia, a company of 
escaped Russian prisoners of war being formed and trained in Eng- 
land to handle them. No use was apparently made either of the 
apparatus or the trained men, owing to the Revolution. 

per sq. in., which a reducing valve converts to a working pressure 
171 Ib. per sq. inch. The trigger valve has to be held down in 
operation and instantly springs up and closes the passage of oil 
if the operator is shot an important point, as experience had shown 
in the case of the earlier small flamethrowers, which emptied them' 

FIG. 3. 

selves in a single shot. A tap is also fitted, at the origin of the flexible 
tube, which is turned on in going into action. The flexible tube is 
about 2 ft. long, and f in. in bore, the nozzle pipe also 2 ft. long with 
an orifice of & inch. The total weight, full, is about 65 Ib. Fig. 3 
shows the apparatus in action. Like all French flamethrowers it 
was designed by Capt. Schilt of the Paris sapeurs-pompiers, who also 
organized the special flamethrower companies named after him. 

The original German light Flammenwerfer, known as Kleif, was a 
3-gallon engine which presents no particular point of interest. It 
was replaced by a smaller weapon known as Wex, which had a 
capacity of 2 J gal. and was fitted for successive shots. Both " Kleif " 
and " Wex " were operated by two men, one carrying the container 
knapsack-fashion while the other carried the discharge pipe and 
moved about as required. 

The early British types known as the Norris, or Norris-Menchen, 
were of much the same general design as the Schilts; the first 
emptied themselves at one shot, the later ones had trigger valves. 
Another type, invented by Lt. Lawrence, R.E., and originally 
designed to throw either poison-gas or flame or both, was, after 
modification to convert it into a flamethrower pure and simple, 
found to possess a much longer range, as well as a better balance of 
the elements of the design than any existing model. Its range was 
no less than 45 yd., and it was capable of maintaining that range for 
some 15 to 1 8 shots from a single filling of 3 gallons. Safety was 
ensured by the use of inert gas and by the fact that if the operator 
lost control all valves automatically closed. This type was under 
manufacture in Russia in 1917 at the time of the Revolution. 
Experiments were also made in England with smaller models, some 
of which were used in the Zeebrugge landing in 1918. Finally, a 
flame projector was designed but never actually used, which acted 
in the same way as a land mine, i.e. it was buried and left to itself, 
inert, till the enemy in his advance stumbled upon a tripwire which 
set the machine in operation. 

Tactical Uses. Flamethrowers used in the World War were 
in all the three countries which employed them engineer weapons. 
In Great Britain those used on service were manned by a unit of 
the Special Brigade R.E. In France Capt. Schilt, the designer 
of the Schilt throwers in use, organized some seven companies of 
engineers known as compagnies Schilt for flamethrower work. In 
Germany it was the special province of a unit of pioneers which 
from small beginnings finally became the Guard Reserve Pio- 
neer regiment, and lent its weapons and its men to the " assault 
battalions " as required. These battalions generally included 
in their attack formations a number of portable " Kleifs " or 
" Wexs." The G.R.P.R. also found heavy machines (two-cou- 
pled) and personnel for shell-hole warfare and anti-tank defence. 

In reviewing, even generally, their tactical work in the war, 
and estimating their future potentialities, it is obvious that a 
clear distinction must be drawn between the heavy and the light 
types. The intermediates were, and so far as can be seen will 
always be, an unnecessary type possessing the defects without 
the virtues of the others. 

Too little use was made in the war of true heavy types, such 
as the British " battery " and " Livens," for any final judgment 



to be passed on their usefulness. But it is evident that that use- 
fulness will be confined to siege warfare, so far as ground in- 
stallations are concerned. Quite apart from the necessity of bury- 
ing the whole apparatus in shell-proof dugouts, the difficulty 
of supplying it with oil for constant use is considerable: eighty 
gallons of mixture with a specific gravity of -8 the contents of 
a Livens tube weigh 640 Ib. without the transport receptacle, 
and three shots can be fired in four minutes. Stated in this way 
the problem is the same as that of supplying an n-in. howitzer 
emplaced in the foremost trench. The load can be brought up 
in smaller units, it is true, whereas a shell cannot be subdivided 
for transport. But it is nine times as bulky, and continuous sup- 
ply would be as difficult in the one case as in the other. Another 
consideration is the material itself in some conditions of war- 
fare petrol and oil may be more precious than iron and steel. 
Thirty " Livens " machines on one mile of front would consume 
about 1,000 gal. of petrol (neglecting the oil) per minute of actual 
continued activity. Fifty-five minutes of this activity on one 
mile of front would consume as much essence as the whole fleet of 
lorries belonging to the French Army consumed in a day during 
the winter of 1917-8. Evidently then the heavy flame projector 
if used at all will only be used in situations and tasks for which 
no more economical and handy weapon is available. The ques- 
tion is do such situations exist? And the answer is evidently 
that, even if they do exist, they are not found on any considerable 
frontage at the same time. And so we find that the utility of the 
immobile heavy flamethrower is restricted to certain points and 
certain circumstances, such as may here and there be found 
(but not necessarily foreseen) in siege warfare. Any future that 
the heavy flame projector may possess in field warfare, or even 
in large-scale trench warfare, then, will depend on its being made 
mobile, i.e. on its being mounted in a tank. 

The portable flamethrower, on the contrary, found many 
occasions of useful employment in varied conditions during the 
World War. Amongst its roles were: surprise attack following 
a stealthy approach, to enable an infantry attack to debouch 
from trenches; " mopping-up," i.e. clearing a captured trench 
system of isolated but still dangerous parties of the enemy while 
the main attack presses on; blocking the flanks of a captured 
length of trench; forcing the surrender of enemy parties which 
have taken refuge in dugouts (perhaps the most frequent, if not 
the principal r61e in trench-warfare offensives) ; holding off close 
attack upon a party withdrawing, e.g. after a raid; engaging a 
strong point frontally while infantry work round the flanks. This 
catalogue shows the variety of functions which may be and have 
been carried out by small flamethrowers. It will be noticed that 
many of these r61es are by no means peculiar to trench warfare, 
and also that nearly all presuppose close cooperation with small 
bodies of infantry, the tactical units of the future. It is too much 
to say that the flamethrower is indispensable in the performance 
of the average battle task of modern infantry, but it is, on occasion, 
undeniably more useful than other close-range auxiliaries of the 
infantryman. Its main handicap is the difficulty of maintaining 
oil supply in an advance of great depth. This is serious, and 
may restrict it to employment in the methodical attack and 
defence of fortified regions. (C. F. A.) 

FLECKER, JAMES ELROY (1884-1915), British poet, was born 
at Lewisham Nov. 5 1884, the son of the Rev. W. H. Flecker, 
D.D., afterwards headmaster of Dean Close school at Cheltenham. 
He was educated at Uppingham and Trinity College, Oxford, 
proceeding later to Caius College, Cambridge, where he studied 
oriental languages for two years before entering the consular 
service. He was sent to Constantinople in 1910 and to Beyrout 
in 1911. There he married a Greek lady. But his health failed 
early and he died at Davos Platz, Switz., Jan. 3 1915. His poetic 
output, though small, was choice, showing much affinity with 
the French Parnassien school, as well as with Swinburne and 
Francis Thompson. During his lifetime he published four small 
volumes of poetry; one more and two privately printed volumes 
appeared after his death, and his Collected Poems, with an intro- 
duction by J. C. Squire, were published in 1916. He also left two 
unpublished dramas, Hassan and Don Juan. A short satire, 









5 ^ 


The Last Generation (1908), and a novel, The King of Alsander 
(1914), were his only important prose works. 

FLEMING, SIR SANDFORD (1827-1915), Canadian engineer 
and publicist (see 10.494), died at Halifax, N.S., July 22 1915. 

FLINT, ROBERT (1838-1910), Scottish divine and philosopher 
(see 10.521), died at Edinburgh Nov. 25 1910. 

FLORIDA (see 10.540). The pop. of the state in 1920 was 
968,470 as compared with 752,619 in 1910, a gain of 215,851 
or 28-7% for the decade. There were 17 cities with a pop. of 
over 5,000; those exceeding 10,000 with their proportional gain 
for the decade were: 


Tampa . 



Key West . 

St. Petersburg 

Despite a comparatively rapid growth of its cities and towns 
the pop. of the state was still predominantly rural. The urban 
pop. (those living in cities and towns of over 2,500 inhabitants) 
numbered 3 5 5,8 2 5 in 1920, 36- 7% of the whole, as contrasted with 
219,080 or 29-1% in 1910. This gave Florida the largest propor- 
tion of urban population of any southern state. During the win- 
ter months the population was each year largely augmented by 
thousands of tourists and winter residents. The E. -coast and 
Gulf-coast resorts were the chief objectives, but many of the 
inland towns and cities were beginning to attract visitors. In 
1916 the Baptists were numerically the strongest denomination, 
with a membership of 131,107; the Methodists second, with 
114,821; followed by the Roman Catholics, 24,650; Episcopalians, 
10,399; Presbyterians, 10,170; and Congregationalists, 2,878. 

Industries and Commerce. Florida's most extensive industry is 
agriculture. According to figures of the Florida Experiment Station 
there were approximately 6,000,000 ac. of land in farms in 1920, not 
including open or fenced range lands. Of this, 1,700,000 ac. were 
in crops and 200,000 ac. of crop lands were idle; 180,000 ac. were in 
fruit; 1,120,000 ac. were in pasture; and 2,800,000 ac. in woodland. 
On approximately one-third of the cultivated acreage crops were 
produced by intertillage (the growing of two or more crops on ihe 
same land at one time) and by succession planting (where two or 
more crops follow each other on the same land during the year). 
The number of farms in Florida in 1910 was 50,016; in 1920, accord- 
ing to preliminary figures of the U.S. census, 54,006. Fruit was the 
most important crop. By the practical eradication of citrus canker, 
and the control of the white fly, through the vigorous campaign 
that has been waged against these enemies of citrus growth under 
the direction of the State Plant Board, the citrus industry has been 
greatly benefited and has prospered despite the fact that some of 
the groves in the more northern parts of the state have suffered by 
several severe winters. In 1920 the production of oranges was 
8,500,000 boxes valued at $18,700,000, and of grape fruit 5,000,000 
boxes valued at $10,000,000. In the sub-tropical part of the state 
pineapples, lemons, guavas, and avocadoes were grown profitably 
on a commercial scale. Other fruits were peaches, pears, bananas, 
grapes, figs, and limes. Other crops produced in Florida, with their 
1920 yields and values were : 

Indian corr 

Oats (bus.) 

Hay (tons) 

Wild hay (tons) 

Peanuts (bus.) 

Rice (bus.) 

Irish potati 

Sweet pota 

Sorghum s; 


Cowpeas (bus.) 

Velvet beans (I 

Cotton (bales) 

Tobacco (Ib.) 

Pecans (Ib.) 

The encroachments of the boll weevil and the scarcity of farm 
labour, together with the unsettled condition of the cotton market, 
caused a falling off in the production of cotton during the decade 
1910-20, and in many sections where cotton used to be raised it is 
no longer planted. The tobacco-growing section of western Florida 
produces profitably a shaded leaf, grown from Cuban and Sumatran 
seed, which is in great demand in cigar manufacturing. The pecan 
industry is comparatively new, most of the commercial groves having 
been planted since 1905. It is believed that in the northern part of 




(bus.) . 





, . 






s.) . . 





es (bus.) 



oes (bus.) 



rup (gal.) 



syrup (gal.) 






s(bus.) . 



2s) . . 









the state, the pecan crop soon may compete closely with the citrus 
crop of the southern part of the state. The open winters and light 
soil of Florida make many of its counties well adapted to the pro- 
duction of early vegetables for the northern markets. The industry 
is developing rapidly and the Florida producer can put vegetables 
on the northern markets earlier than any of his competitors. The 
chief obstacle in the way of further development of this industry is 
costly rates and inadequate railway freight service. The latest 
available figures on truck production, for the season of 1917-8, the 
trucking season being the winter, spring and early summer months, 
are given by the Florida Commissioner of Agriculture as follows: 

Crops Ac. Crates Value 

Onions . . . . 1,155 94,4*9 $ 175.539 

Lettuce .... 2,683 747.346 518,874 

Celery .... 1,661 854,298 798,161 

Peppers .... 8,039 845,213 1,363,264 

Irish potatoes . . . 38,596 4,552,465 4,403,361 

Cabbage .... 10,253 1,032,379 1,358,633 

Tomatoes .... 21,186 2,852,426 6,287,557 

Squashes .... 596 82,543 124,716 

Egg-plant . . . 1,616 358,737 596,336 

Cucumbers . . . 2,497 35,5l6 497,615 

Watermelons (cars). . 7,558 2,773 494> 6 36 

Beets .... 380 73,571 105,391 

String Beans . . . 8,006 1,360,136 1,933,578 

In Florida much attention is paid to stock-raising. During the 

decade 191020 there has been a consistent grading up of both beef 

and dairy herds. Especially is this true of dairy herds, the average 

.value of milch cows being more than five times as much in 1921 as 

in 1910. The live stock in Jan. 1920 was: horses, 60,000 valued at 

$8,400,000; mules, 40,000 valued at $7,840,000; milch cows, 156,000 

valued at $11,232,000; cattle other than milch cows, 945,000 valued 

at $25,798,000; sheep 95,000 valued at $494,000; swine, 1,588,000 

valued at $20,644,000; a total for all stock of 2,884,000 head with a 

total valuation of $74,408,000. 

In 1916 the total value of minerals produced in the state was 
$5,859,821, the more important of which were phosphates, lime, 
limestone, brick, tile, and fuller's earth, of which latter Florida 
produced in that year more than three-fourths of the entire output 
of the United States. Phosphate production according to the last 
available figures in the Ninth Annual Report of the Florida Geologi- 
cal Survey was, in long tons: 
Pebble 1913 1916 

Exported 887,398 172,427 

ForuseinU.S 1,168,084 1,296,331 

Total 2,055,482 1,468,758 

Hard Rock 

Exported 476,898 28,045 

For use in U.S 12,896 19,042 

Total 489,794 47,087 

Grand Total .... 2,545,276 1,515,845 
The total mineral production for 1919 was put by the State Geologi- 
cal Survey at a valuation of $10,603,620. 

In 1916 the output of lumber was 1,425,000,000 ft., in 1918 
950,000,000 ft. In 1918 Florida stood second in the production of 
cypress with a total of 85,376,000 ft., and sixth in production of yellow 
pine with a total of 765,912,000 ft. The high prices of lumber dur- 
ing most of the decade 1910-20 made this industry highly profit- 
able. Naval stores are produced from the pine forests, where the 
sap of the trees is collected and distilled, yielding turpentine and 
rosin. In 1905 Florida's naval stores were valued at $9,901,905. 
In 1917 there was a production of 8,824,295 gal. of turpentine valued 
at $13,018,447, and of 414,226 bar. of rosin valued at $3^260,107, or 
a total valuation for naval stores of $16,278,554. The manufacture 
of cigars and, to a much smaller extent, cigarettes is carried on chiefly 
in Tampa and Key West. In 1905 the gross value of production 
was $16,764,276. In 1917 Florida produced 469,301,042 cigars 
valued at $30,127,941 and 7,800,000 cigarettes valued at $154,000. 
A rapidly growing Florida manufacture is the production of com- 
mercial fertilizers, large amounts of phosphate mined within the 
state being used for this purpose. 

History. The outbreak of the World War in 1914 interrupted 
two of Florida's more important exports .to Europe, naval stores 
and phosphates, thus creating a temporary business depression. 
In the naval stores industry the recovery was comparatively 
rapid, owing to the high prices of and increased domestic demand 
for the products during the period of the war, with the exception 
of its early months. The phosphate industry was more seriously 
affected, as Germany had been a large purchaser of Florida 
phosphates. Many of the Florida phosphate mines closed down, 
to resume operation only after the signing of the Armistice. 

The political history of the state during the decade 1910-20 
was uneventful. The question of prohibition played a large part 
in state politics until the ratification of the Eighteenth (Pro- 
hibition) Amendment to the Federal Constitution by the Florida 

Legislature Dec. 14 1918. Since 1876 Florida has been uniformly 
democratic and, except in 1916, when a contested primary elec- 
tion in the democratic party resulted in the nomination of Sidney 
J. Catts as a prohibitionist and in his election as governor, all of 
the state's executives have been democrats. The governors after 
1910 were: Albert W. Gilchrist, 1909-13; Park Trammell, 1913-7; 
Sidney J. Catts, 1917-21; and Gary A. Hardee from 1921. 

A proposed constitutional amendment to effect reapportionment 
was passed by the Legislature in 1921, to become operative if voted 
on favourably in Nov. 1922. This measure would give more adequate 
representation to parts of Florida that have increased greatly in 
population. Several new counties have been created since 1910. 
From territory taken from De Soto co. the four new counties of 
Glades, Hardee, Highlands, and Charlotte have been formed; 
Lafayette co. has been divided, the southern part to be known 
as Dixie; Hillsborough's western part has become Pinellas co.; 
Flagler co. has been formed from the northern territory of Vol- 
usia and the southern part of St. John's; parts of Palm Beach and 
Dade have been joined to create Broward; the western part of Wal- 
ton and eastern part of Santa Rosa have been combined under the 
name of Okaloosa; part of Bradford has been made into Union; part 
of Manatee into Sarasota; parts of Washington and Walton have 
become Bay ; parts of Osceola, St. Lucie and Palm Beach are now 
known as Okeechobee ; and from the northern part of Orange Sem- 
inole has been created. 

Florida furnished 42,301 soldiers, sailors and marines for the World 
War and the casualties among them were 1,171, including 467 dead. 
The state's subscriptions to the Liberty and Victory loans were: 
First Liberty Loan, $5,271,000; Second $8,611,000; Third $18,- 
053,900; Fourth $27,538,100; Victory Loan, $17,918,100 the total 
for the five being $77,392,100. (J. M. L.) 

FLYING CORPS. Aviation, as a military service, took new 
organized forms during the World War, and its development 
in this respect is dealt with in the following pages; the art of 
flying itself is treated under AERONAUTICS. At the present time, 
the general name of " Air Force " has come into official use to 
cover the different forms of organized military and naval avia- 
tion, but earlier in the World War the usual term was " Flying 
Corps." The development of the British air forces will be 
treated here first. 

I. MILITARY AVIATION. The first official appearance of any . 
form of aircraft as part of the British army (for the navy, see 
later) was in 1878, when a Royal Engineers balloon equip- 
ment store was established at Woolwich Arsenal. In the fol- 
lowing years, besides practice in manoeuvres (both field and 
siege), experimental work was carried on at Woolwich, and later 
at Chatham, in the direction of getting a better gas, a more 
suitable fabric for the envelope, and more adequate means of 
filling the balloons than existed at the time. The question of 
transport for balloons was also carefully gone into. As a result 
of this decision a small factory, depot and school of instruc- 
tion were started at Chatham in 1883. In 1884 it was decided 
to include a balloon detachment among the R.E. units mob- 
ilized for service in Bechuanaland and in the following year 
a similar detachment was sent on service in the Soudan. In 
1890 the balloon section was recognized as an individual unit 
of the R.E.; the factory and the school were moved to Alder- 
shot, the depot remaining at Chatham. At this time its strength 
was 33 all ranks. 

Up to the beginning of the S. African War of 1899-1902 tht 
organization of the balloon section remained the same. On the 
outbreak of that war it was decided to send balloons to S. 
Africa, and three sections in all went out. 

In 1902 the first British airship, " Nulli Secundus," was 
commenced at the balloon factory, which also continued 
research into man-lifting kites, photography, signalling between 
ground and balloons, petrol motors, elongated balloons and 
mechanical hauling apparatus. In 1905 the balloon factory was 
moved to S. Farnborough, and experiments were carried out at 
Gibraltar with a view to seeing to what extent balloons could be 
utilized in spotting submarines and mines. 

The growing importance of aeronautics was signalized in Oct. 
1908 by the appointment of an appropriate standing sub-com- 
mittee of the Committee of Imperial Defence. This committee 
reported in Jan. 1909 in favour of a small expenditure being 
authorized for building a rigid airship for the navy, and ex- 



perimenting on non-dirigibles for the army, but recommended 
discontinuance by the balloon establishment of its experiments 
with aeroplanes for progress in which it would be better to rely 
on private enterprise. In April 1909 the " Advisory Commit- 
tee for Aeronautics " was appointed under the presidency of 
Lord Rayleigh to advise on questions relating to the science 
of aeronautics, to arrange when necessary for experimental 
work at the National Physical Laboratory and generally to 
advance the practical application of the science. 

In Oct. 1909 the balloon factory and balloon school at S. 
Farnborough, which had hitherto been under one control, were 
separated, a commandant of the school and superintendent of 
the factory being appointed. The next step of any importance was 
the formation in 1911 of the Air Battalion R.E. This Air Battal- 
ion absorbed the existing elements of the balloon section, and con- 
sisted of a headquarters and two companies, No. i (airship and 
kite) and No. 2 (aeroplane), the latter being the first heavier- 
than-air unit to form part of the B*ritish army. The expansion of 
the Air Battalion on mobilization was provided for by the selec- 
tion of officers of the regular army to form the Air Battalion 

At this time there were less than 12 efficient aeroplanes and 
two small airships for both naval and military requirements, 
while France had 250 aeroplanes and several airships, and 
Germany had 20 to 30 military aeroplanes and about 20 air- 
ships. Towards the end of 1911, therefore, it was realized that 
the rapid development of aeronautics abroad rendered necessary 
further study of the possibilities of aviation in its relation to 
Imperial Defence, and on Nov. 18 1911 the Prime Minister 
requested an air sub-committee of the Committee of the Imperial 
Defence to consider the question. This sub-committee delegated 
to a technical sub-committee the task of drawing up a scheme. 
Its main recommendations, accepted by the air sub-committee 
and finally by the Committee of Imperial Defence and the 
Government, were as follows: 

(a) That the British air service should be regarded as one, and 
called the " Flying Corps." This corps to provide the personnel 
necessary for naval and military wings, for the Central Flying School 
and for a Flying Corps Reserve, (b) That the Central Flying School 
should be established on Salisbury Plain at the joint expense of the 
Admiralty and the War Office, but administered by the latter. 
(c) That after graduating as pilots at the Central Flying School 
officers should go for further instruction to the Naval Flying School 
at Eastchurch, or to a military squadron as the case might be, or 
else pass into the reserve of the Flying Corps. 

The technical sub-committee also recommended that the technical 
requirements for both wings of the Flying Corps should be provided 
by the army aircraft factory, which should henceforth be known as 
the " Aircraft Factory." This aircraft factory, which was the direct 
descendant of the balloon factory, and out of which was eventually 
evolved the Royal Aircraft Establishment, should be charged with 
the higher training; of mechanics for the Flying Corps, the repair of 
engines and machines, research and experiment. 

Further, it was recommended that in order to secure close collab- 
oration between the naval and military wings, the Central Flying 
School, the aircraft factory and the Advisory Committee on Aero- 
nautics, a permanent air sub-committee of the Committee of Im- 
perial Defence should be constituted under the chairmanship of the 
Under-Secretary of State for War, and having as its members the 
senior officers of the corps and the factory, with War Office and 
Admiralty representatives. 

With regard to the supply of personnel for the Flying Corps, the 
technical sub-committee recommended that its officers should be 
exclusively graduates of the Central Flying School, the supply being 
from either the navy or the army or by direct entry from civil life. 
After graduating, officers should serve continuously for four years 
in the Flying Corps with the naval wing, military wing, on the 
permanent staff of the Central Flying School or the Flying Corps 
Reserve. The Flying Corps Reserve to consist of personnel only, 
and to be divided into two classes : (a) those who were required 
to keep themselves in flying practice; (b) others not under this 
obligation. The first were to receive a retaining fee. 

It was estimated that the navy would require 40 officers trained 
as pilots per annum. As regards the military wing, the seven 
aeroplane squadrons considered necessary for the Expeditionary 
Force would require a total of 182 officer pilots and 182 N.C.O. 
pilots. Assuming four years of active flying work as the limit for 
the average individual and adding 25% for casualties, failures, etc., 
the number eventually to be passed through the Central Flying 
School per annum would be about 164. In addition it was recom- 

mended that 15 civilians should be trained annually as pilots and 
passed into the Reserve. 

With regard to the naval wing of the R.F.C., the technical sub- 
committee recommended that after being at the Central Flying 
School officers should then pass on to Eastchurch for further training 
in the special forms of naval aeronautics. It was, incidentally, further 
recommended that in view of the great cost involved it was not con- 
sidered advisable to build rigid airships. 

As regards the military wing of the Flying Corps, it was recom- 
niended that it should comprise all branches of military aeronautics, 
including aeroplanes, airships and kites, and should accordingly 
absorb the existing Air Battalion of the R.E. For an expedition- 
ary force of six divisions and one cavalry division it was estimated 
that one headquarters, seven aeroplane squadrons of 12 machines 
each, one airship and kite squadron and one line-of-communication 
workshop would be required. The organization of a squadron was 
to be headquarters (seven officers, 17 other ranks), and three flights 
of four machines each (each flight consisting of four officers and 46 
other ranks). 

On May 13 1912 the R.F.C. was inaugurated. The pro- 
gramme adopted for its development, apart from a few alter- 
ations in detail, was on the lines recommended by the technical 
sub-committee. The first two squadrons to be formed of the 
military wing were Nos. i and 3. The former was No. i (Air- 
ship) Co. of the Air Battalion. It had on charge two air- 
ships, " Beta " and " Gamma," the " Delta," " Zeta " and 
" Eta " being added subsequently, as well as man-lifting kites 
and free balloons for training. No. 3 Squadron was formed 
from No. 2 (Aeroplane) Co. of the Air Battalion. Later in 
1912 Nos. 2 and 4 companies were formed, 1 and in June the 
Central Flying School opened at Upavon. Wing headquarters 
and the line-of-communication R.F.C. workshop (later known 
as the Flying Depot and then as the Aircraft Park) were located 
at S. Farnborough. The naval airship service, which had been 
constituted in 'connexion with naval airships experiments in 
1909 and disbanded in 1912, was re-raised and attached to 
No. i Airship Squadron. 

Considerable progress was made in 1913 both in organization 
and otherwise, and at the end of the year 92 officers were serv- 
ing with the military wing, 25 officers in the reserve and 22 in 
the special reserve. Other ranks totalled 999. The approximate 
strength of the naval wing was 125 officers, including warrant 
officers, and 500 men. The annual report of the Central Flying 
School showed that 28 naval and 69 military officers had passed 
out, and 14 N.C.O.'s. had obtained 2nd-class pilot certificates. 
Experiments with machine-guns mounted on aeroplanes were 
made during 1913 by the military wing, and the aeroplane 
inspection department was formed at S. Farnborough. 

A sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, 
appointed in 1913 to consider the control of aircraft in peace 
and war, recommended that the Aerial Navigation Act of 1911 
should be amended so as to give power to requisition aircraft 
in time of war, and that the commandant of the Central Flying 
School should keep a register of privately owned aircraft. The 
Aerial Navigation Act of Feb. 1913 amended the previous Act 
in accordance with these recommendations. It was also laid 
down that one of the conditions in qualifying for the Royal 
Aero Club certificate should be an obligation to serve in any 
branch of the R.F.C. in time of war. 

In Sept. 1913 a directorate of military aeronautics was formed 
at the War Office. It was to be an entirely self-contained 
department, and its head had direct access to the Secretary of 
State. It was charged with the general administration of the 
Army Air Service, and was made responsible for all work in 
connexion with the personnel and equipment of the Central 
Flying School, the military wing and the Royal Aircraft Factory. 

In Jan. 1914 it was decided that in war each squadron should 
have 1 2 active and three reserve aeroplanes, and the flying depot 
21 reserve machines. In peace, squadrons were to have 21 
aeroplanes and the flying depot 28. The airship material of 
No. i Squadron was handed over to the Admiralty, who became 
responsible for all lighter-than-air craft, and the squadron was 
re-formed as an aeroplane squadron. 

1 No. 5 was formed in 1913 and Nos. 6 and 7 in the first half of 


Development during the World War. The directorate of mil- 
itary aeronautics had, prior to the outbreak of war in Aug. 1914, 
drawn up a mobilization scheme providing for the dispatch 
overseas of 4 squadrons and the retention in England of 2 squad- 
rons. The register of civilian pilots and privately owned 
machines had also been drawn up. All the existing squadrons 
were short of pilots, though nearly up to establishment in 
N.C.O.'s and men. The Central Flying School had been formed 
on a scale calculated gradually to build up the establishment of 
the naval and military wings that had been laid down, and was 
not capable of meeting at short notice the requirements that 
arose out of the emergency. Even the mobilization of four 
squadrons, therefore, was rather more than the existing resources 
of machines and pilots justified, and it became necessary to draw 
upon the Reserve and the Central Flying School. 

On Aug. 3, when mobilization commenced, Maj.-Gen. David 
Handerson, director of military aeronautics at the War Office, 
was appointed general officer commanding the R.F.C., with 
the Expeditionary Forfe, and Maj. W. S. Brancker took over 
the War Office work as assistant director. 

On Aug. 13 and 15, Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5 Squadrons (less one 
flight of No. 4 left behind for Home Defence), flew from Dover 
to Amiens, followed by R.F.C. headquarters, .the mechanics and 
transport of the squadrons, and the Aircraft Park, proceeding 
by boat and train. The Park was established at Amiens. 1 

The three main problems confronting the military aeronautics 
directorate at the War Office, after the departure of the Expedition- 
ary Force, were (a) the training of pilots, (6) provision of skilled 
other ranks, (c) manufacture of aeroplanes and engines. 

With regard to (c), coordination between the military aeronautics 
directorate and the Air Department of the Admiralty had hitherto 
been regulated by the air committee of the Committee of Imperial 
Defence ; but on the outbreak of war the other preoccupations of its 
members led to a complete cessation of its functions and no con- 
trolling influence remained to balance the claims of the two wings. 

With regard to (a) and (6), the existing organization provided for 
no expansions on the scale to be expected in the near future, and, 
with the exception of the Central Flying School, which had already 
been seriously depleted in both personnel and equipment, Farn- 
borough was the only station in commission. No. I (Reserve) 
Aeroplane Squadron was formed at Farnborough and undertook the 
training of pilots. The number of mechanics was short, and skilled 
civilians were enlisted direct into the R.F.C. At the end of Sept. 
1914 some pilots were sent home from France in order to reenforce 
the instructional resources at home, the demand for the replacement 
of wastage and for forming new squadrons promising to become heavy 
in the near future. The policy of expansion adopted was for the form- 
ation of as many reserve squadrons as the personnel permitted, and 
for each reserve squadron, in addition to training pilots ab initio, 
to be responsible for producing the nucleus of a service squadron. 

By Oct. 1914 the scheme for the organization of the new armies 
had been drawn up by the War Office, and since experience in the 
field had made one artillery observation squadron per division a 
basis for estimating requirements, with, in addition, two or three 
fighting and reconnaissance squadrons per corps, it thus early be- 
came apparent that eventually at least 60 service squadrons would 
be required by the B.E.F. The question of long-distance bombing 
raids ^ into Germany was not overlooked, but the urgency of the 
army's needs for cooperating units was such that their provision was 
for the time of primary importance and detailed consideration of an 
aerial offensive was postponed. 

With the gradual increase in the number of units both at home and 
in the field, the need for decentralization became apparent, and led 
to the adoption of the " Wing " as an intermediate organization 
between the squadron and headquarters. Further, it was found in 
France that the tactical employment of aircraft suffered through 
their being controlled directly by G.H.Q. instead of being allotted 
permanently to subordinate commands. Accordingly, in Nov. 1914 
wings were formed, and this reorganization of the R.F.C. (head- 
quarters and squadrons) in the field synchronized with that of the 
higher army commands, the 1st Wing being allotted to the I. Army, 
and the 2nd Wing to the II. Army. It was laid down at the time 
that wings would be allotted to certain areas and would cooperate 
with units in that area. Special missions and strategical recon- 
naissances would be ordered by R.F.C. headquarters. 

At home in the meantime the formation of No. I and No. 7 
Squadrons (temporarily held up in order that all efforts might be 
concentrated cm preparing No. 6 Squadron for overseas) was being 

1 On Oct. 7 eight machines of No. 6 Squadron flew to Bruges to 
take part in the operations of the 7th Division. By the l6th of the 
month, however, this squadron had withdrawn S. and had come under 
the orders of R.F.C. headquarters. 

proceeded with, the two squadrons being moved a little later to 
Netheravon, where a school had been started as an annex to the 
Central Flying School. The formation of other squadrons and re- 
serve squadrons soon followed. 

In France, during the opening months of 1915, the scope of R.F.C. 
activities rapidly extended, and the demands made on it for bombing, 
photography, message-dropping and artillery observation increased. 
Accordingly, a 3rd Wing was formed (March i) and the number of 
squadrons in each wing was increased to three, a decision that led to 
the formation, in France, of No. 16 Squadron and the dispatch 
from England of Nos. I, 7 and 8 Squadrons (March-April 1915). 
These increases necessitated a corresponding extension to the Air- 
craft Park. In Jan. 1915, an establishment of 50 squadrons was 
sanctioned. At the end of July a programme of development was 
drafted providing for the raising of 30 service squadrons and 10 
reserve squadrons by Jan. I 1916, and another 30 service squadrons 
with five reserve squadrons Dec. I 1916. This development pro- 
gramme was based essentially upon what were considered the 
army's requirements in aircraft, the scale adopted being one squad- 
ron per corps for artillery observation and photography, one squad- 
ron for each army and one squadron for G.H.Q. 

By this time aerial fighting had become general, and aircraft 
were armed so as to enable reconnaissance and artillery observation 
machines to protect themselves. After some experience it became 
evident that pure fighting machines would be required and that upon 
their ascendency over the enemy would depend command of the air 
and consequently the freedom from hostile interference so necessary 
for artillery machines to function efficiently. The machine that 
proved itself to have the last word in aerial combat was the fast, 
easily manoeuvred fighting scout, which though designed for scout- 
ing ultimately developed into the modern fighting machine. 

It was not, however, until early in 1916 that the policy of having 
scout squadrons was generally adopted, 2 the practice up to then 
having been to allot a few scouts to each squadron. Thus it was that 
at the time of the drafting of the 1915 programme the two-seater 
machine largely predominated. 

In Aug. 1915, it was decided that the increase in the number of 
wings (the 6th Wing being now formed, and the 7th and 8th fol- 
lowing in Nov.) demanded the institution of a higher intermediate 
formation, and in Sept. the brigade organization was adopted under 
this. Each brigade, commanded by a brigadier-general, was to con- 
sist of three wings and one Aircraft Park the R.F.C. then in the 
field forming the 1st Brigade. The 2nd Brigade comprised the 4th, 
5th and 6th Wings and the independent stations of Montrose and 
Brooklands. Under the Administrative Wing were placed the units 
at Farnborough and Northolt. A school of aerial gunnery was 
also opened at Dover (subsequently moved to Hythe) and the 
Aircraft Park organization was recast. 

A school and officers' depot (subsequently known as the School of 
Military Aeronautics) was started in Nov. at Reading where officers 
joining the R.F.C. could be put through a course in engines, rigging, 
artillery cooperation, map reading, signalling, etc., before joining a 
reserve squadron for instruction in flying. A wireless telegraphy 
school was also formed at Brooklands. 

Towards the end of 1915 it was decided to increase the strength of 
the R.F.C. in France so as to have one brigade or two wings with 
each army, and in addition to have one or two wings with G.H.Q. 
One of the wings in each brigade to be entrusted with close recon- 
naissance, photography and artillery work with corps and divisions, 
the strength of the wing being calculated at one squadron per corps, 
whilst the other wing would be available as required by the army 
commander for bombing, reconnaissance and patrol operation. 
This involved an establishment for the R.F.C. of 70 service squad- 
rons and 20 reserve squadrons, which besides training pilots func- 
tioned as draft-producing units. 

At the end of Jan. 1916, the brigade organization took definite 
shape in France, with the 1st, 2nd and 3rd units as "corps wings" 
and the loth, nth and I2th Wings as " army wings." 

The question of home defence against aerial attack now became 
of primary importance. Up to Jan. 1916, a certain number of 
aeroplanes and pilots had been allotted to Home Defence, but on 
the War Office taking over the responsibility for anti-aircraft 
defence from the Admiralty in Feb. 1916, a definite Home Defence 
organization was adopted. At first some 25 B.E.C.2. aeroplanes 
were allotted to the defence of London, but were scattered about in 
small detachments and placed under officers commanding various 
reserve squadrons. As this was found unsatisfactory, all the de- 
tachments were placed under a single officer, whose headquarters 
were at Hounslow. As further development became necessary cer- 
tain squadrons were converted into Home Defence Squadrons. In 
April a new Home Defence Squadron was constituted out of various 
detachments employed on Home Defence duties, and in June the 
Home Defence wing was formed to include all Home Defence units. 
This wing was attached to G.H.Q. Great Britain for operations. 
The two brigades at home were merged into one, this brigade being 
known as the 6th Brigade and later as the Training Brigade. It was 

1 No. 24 Squadron with De Haviland Scouts was the first of this 
type to go overseas on Feb. 6 1916. 

8 4 


also decided to raise the number of aeroplanes in each squadron from 
12 to 18. This increase was to a large extent due to improvements in 
wireless telegraphy which enabled a larger number of machines 
to work on a given front. Subsequently, Fighter Reconnaissance 
(Army) Squadrons were raised to 24 machines per squadron. 

It may be interesting here to examine the factors that tended to 
influence the policy that governed development as the war went on. 
It was out of events in France that these governing factors arose, 
and the requirements formulated by R.F.C. headquarters set the 
standard which those at home strove to reach. The scale that was 
adopted in the summer of 1915 provided for one squadron per corps 
for artillery observation, close reconnaissance, and photography; 
one squadron for each army headquarters and one squadron (to be 
later increased to two) for G.H.Q. for extended reconnaissance 
and special missions. The War Office accordingly committed itself 
at the time to providing 27 squadrons by the end of March 1916, 
but events in the field led to a request that this number should be 
increased by two artillery observation, one long-distance reconnais- 
sance squadron and two fighting squadrons (one of single-seater 
machines and one of two-seaters). Injune 1916, a revised schedule of 
anticipated requirements for the spring of 1917 was prepared, based 
upon the increase of the B.E.F. to five armies of four corps each 
and the growing importance of aerial fighting. This scheme, which 
provided for 66 squadrons (including 23 artillery and 20 fighter 
squadrons, with five night-flying squadrons and later 10 long- 
distance" bombers, as well as two medium-distance bombers and 
four fighter squadrons under G.H.Q.) , marked the growing impor- 
tance of the fighter, a conception of an offensive into the enemy's 
country by means of long-distance bombers, and a break-away from 
the idea that close cooperation with other fighting forces was the 
beginning and the end of aerial operations. 

By the middle of Nov., however, aerial fighting had increased 
still more, and the vital importance of the constant struggle for air 
supremacy had been so often emphasized that 20 fighting squadrons 
supplementary to the above programme were asked for. This 
meant a proportion of two fighting to one artillery squadron, in 
place of the parity in numbers of the two types previously accepted 
as a basis. So vital a question did the supply of fighters appear at 
the time that it was urged that, failing the 20, at least 10 extra 
squadrons should be provided, even at the expense of delaying the 
bombing and night squadrons. The situation in France in June 
1917 showed that there was a total of 52 squadrons of different types. 
In addition to raising new squadrons, existing squadrons had to be 
equipped with more modern machines. It was, therefore, impossible 
for the War Office to promise that more than 73 squadrons would 
be in France by the end of 1917, including the five R.N.A.S. units. 

In June 1917, the Air Board drew up a scheme providing for the 
expansion of the R.F.C. to 200 service squadrons and 200 training 
squadrons. Further evidence of the growing realization of the value 
of the aerial offensive is afforded by the fact that this proposal em- 
bodied (in addition to fighter squadrons) the raising of, at first, 40 
bombing squadrons (DHg and larger machines) to be organized 
into wings of five squadrons each, the wings to be grouped into 
four brigades. G.H.Q. France were accordingly asked to be ready 
for 40 squadrons in addition to 86 already expected to be ready by 
Aug. 1918. In Nov. 1917, the 1918 programme was drafted as 
follows : 

40 squad, single-seater fighter. 

15 squad, single-seater fighter for ground fighting. 

15 squad, two-seater fighter reconnaissance. 

l squad. long-distance 2-seater for reconnaissance and photography. 

IO squad, short -distance day-bombers. 

10 squad, short-distance night-bombers. 

21 squad, for corps work. 

I squad, long-distance machine carrying Q.F. gun. 

In addition, for the Bombing Brigades: 

25 squad, day-bombers. 

20 squad, night-bombers. 

20 squad, two- or three-seater long-distance fighters. 

I squad, long-distance machine with Q.F. gun. 

This programme for 179 squadrons involved the supply of 2,400 
machines for armies and 1,028 for the bombing brigades. 

Finally, in Feb. 1918, 240 squadrons (in addition to training units) 
was accepted as the goal to be reached, 179 being for France and 
Italy, 40 for other theatres, and 21 in reserve. 

Meanwhile, at the end of 1916 the home organization included: 
(i) The Administrative Wing, Farnborough ; (2) the Training 
Brigade of 9 wings, totalling 21 service squadrons and 43 reserve 
squadrons; (3) the Home Defence Wing, comprising II service 
squadrons and one depot squadron for the training of night pilots; 

(4) the Kite Balloon Training Wing, including a training depot, an 
inspection branch and two schools of instruction. The following 
training centres and schools had been formed, in addition to numer- 
ous reserve squadrons: (l) Recruit Training Centre, Halton 
Camp ; (2) School for Wireless Operators, S. Farnborough ; (3) Balloon 
Training Wing, Roehampton; (4) No. I Balloon School, Larkhill; 

(5) No. I School of Military Aeronautics, Reading (including 
Equipment Officers' School and the School of Technical Training for 
other ranks); (6) No. 2 School of Military Aeronautics, Oxford; (7) 

Cadet Wing, Denham; (8) School of Aerial Gunnery, Hythe; (9) 
Central Flying School, Upavon; (10) Wireless and Observers' 
School, Brooklands; (ll) Scottish School of Fitters, Edinburgh. 

In Nov. 1916, with a view to meeting the deficiency in the supply 
of skilled men, arrangements were made to place about 400 men 
continuously under instruction at various polytechnic institutes 
throughout the country. During 1917 further expansion of the Home 
Defence service took place. A Northern Home Defence Wing 
was formed with headquarters at York and the Home Defence Wing 
became the Home Defence Group, which, as other wings were 
formed, subsequently became the 6th Brigade, and by 1918 had 
become responsible for the aerial defence of England and the South 
of Scotland, cooperation of coastal batteries, and the training of 
night-fighting pilots and night-bombing pilots for France. Other 
developments at home during 1917 included the formation of air- 
craft depots which were transferred from the Army Ordnance De- 
partment to the R.F.C., principally for the supply of spares. Ac- 
ceptance parks were also formed the duties of which were to receive 
aircraft from the manufacturers, to erect, test and finally issue them 
to units or dispatch them overseas. The creation of a Department 
of Production under the Ministry of Munitions placed on a more 
satisfactory basis the supply of equipment for the R.F.C. The 
number of training units had increased to such an extent that it was 
found necessary to form them into groups (southern, northern, eastern, 
western). These groups became, shortly, brigades (the old training 
brigade then becoming the division), and the standard training 
unit, the reserve squadron, was renamed " training squadron." 

For theatres of war other than France, separate arrangements 
were made from time to time for providing for the requirements in 
Egypt, E. Africa, Mesopotamia, Salonika, and Palestine. 

II. NAVAL AVIATION. The British Admiralty's first practical 
steps in aeronautics were taken in June 1908, when as a result of 
the Committee of Imperial Defence recommendations, it was 
decided to build a rigid airship. This ship, known as No. i 
naval airship (the "Mayfly"), was completed in May 1911, 
but was wrecked in the following September. This experience 
discouraged further attempts until Feb. 1911, when two civilian 
pilots offered their services free, with two machines, for the 
instruction of four naval officers as aeroplane pilots. Four 
naval officers were accordingly selected out of some 200 volun- 
teers to undergo a six-months' course of instruction on the 
Royal Aero Club ground at Eastchurch. At the end of the year, 
land adjacent to the Royal Aero Club ground at Eastchurch 
was purchased by the Admiralty, and a naval flying school was 
formed there, four officers having in the meantime qualified as 
pilots. Thereafter, pupils were trained continuously at the 
school both before and during the World War. Apart from 
being used for training purposes, Eastchurch was the scene dur- 
ing 1911 and 1912 of many interesting experiments in the ap- 
plication of aircraft to naval uses. On the formation of the 
R.F.C., it was decided to form an Air Department at the Ad- 
miralty, this Department actually coming into being in Sept. 
1912. By June 1913, the total number of aeroplanes and sea- 
planes in possession of the Naval Air Service were 37, and by 
October, 61 were in commission with three airships. 

In Aug. 1913, the Admiralty decided to establish air stations 
at various points along the coast. An " Inspecting Captain of 
Aircraft " was placed in general charge, under instructions from 
the Director of the Air Department of the Admiralty. He was 
also responsible to the commander-in-chief home fleets regard- 
ing all matters concerning aircraft with ships afloat. 

In June 1914, the increasing importance of the naval wing 
R.F.C. led to a reorganization of the service, and the R.N.A.S. 
came into being. It comprised the Air Department, Admiralty; 
the Central Air Office, Sheerness; the Royal Naval Flying School, 
Eastchurch; the Royal Naval Air Stations and all seaplanes, 
aeroplanes, airships, seaplane ships, balloons, kites and other 
types of aircraft that might from time to time be employed for 
naval purposes. Regulations were drawn up for the entry of 
officers as probationary flight sub-lieutenants direct from civil 
life and special designations were instituted for the various com- 
missioned ranks in the flying branch. 

With regard to airships, which by this time had passed entirely 
under Admiralty control, in the early part of 1913 German 
activity with rigid airships of the Zeppelin type led to a reconsid- 
eration of the question as to whether similar aircraft should be 
constructed for the British navy, and it was decided to arrange 


for the construction of two rigid and six non-rigid airships. In 
June 1913 orders were accordingly placed for one Parseval in 
Germany, two Parsevals with Vickers, one Forlanini in Italy 
and two others of this type with Messrs. Armstrong. A contract 
for one rigid airship was signed with Messrs. Vickers in March 
1914. But on the outbreak of the World War delivery of the 
airships building in Germany and in Italy became impossible, 
and the British firms could not complete the airships they had 
begun. Work ceased on the rigid airship in the early stages of 
construction, but was resumed during the war, and on comple- 
tion this airship became known as Naval Airship Rg. 

It had been decided at the end of 1913 that the Admiralty 
should take over all airships and airship equipment from the 
army. Accordingly, on Jan. i 1914 the naval and military 
airship sections were amalgamated at Farnborough, and the 
navy took over control of all airship administration. 

The War Period. At the outbreak of the World War the 
stations on the organized east coast system of aerial patrol were 
as follows: Eastchurch, Isle of Grain with advanced bases at 
Westgate and Clacton, Felixstowe, Yarmouth, Immingham, 
Calshot, Dundee, Cromarty and Fort Grange. There was also 
the airship station at Kingsnorth. Patrols were organized 
between the Humber and the Thames estuary, and a cross-Chan- 
nel seaplane and airship patrol was started between the Isle of 
Grain and Ostend, a temporary base for seaplanes being estab- 
lished there. The Channel seaplane patrol was discontinued 
when the enemy advanced to Ostend. An additional base was 
established at Skegness, and for a short time, until Aug. 12, 
the naval machines at Eastchurch were reenforced by machines 
from No. 4 Squadron R.F.C. The Admiralty acquired as sea- 
plane-carriers the " Engadine," the " Riveria " and the " Em- 
press," structural alterations being necessary before the ships 
could be used for the purpose. The necessity for aircraft to 
cooperate with the Grand Fleet led to the establishment of a 
base for seaplanes and aeroplanes at Scapa Flow, a seaplane- 
carrier, the " Campania," being later commissioned to convey 
machines with the fleet when it proceeded to sea. 

The first Naval Air Service aeroplane unit to proceed overseas 
was formed at Eastchurch, and went to Ostend on Aug. 27 1914 
to cooperate with the naval division at Antwerp. In order to 
protect the United Kingdom against German airship raids, an 
aircraft and seaplane base was established at Dunkirk. 

In the meantime the organization of the R.N.A.S. at home under- 
went rapid development, both in the matter of the training of 
pilots and the construction and design of machines. On Sept. 3 
1914, the R.N.A.S. assumed responsibility for the defence of the 
United Kingdom against hostile aircraft attacks, and a special 
anti-aircraft section was formed in the Air Department. The 
coast patrols were continued both by seaplanes and by airships, an 
additional station for these patrols being opened at Dover. 

In 1915 squadrons and wings were formed and sent overseas to 
Dunkirk and the Dardanelles. A detachment of three seaplanes pro- 
ceeded to E. Africa and subsequently to Mesopotamia. Towards the 
end of Feb. 1915 the naval squadron at Dunkirk was relieved by 
No. i Naval Squadron, which had been forming at Gosport, and 
proceeded to the Dardanelles as No. 3 Wing. Later the 2nd Wing 
from Eastchurch also proceeded to the Dardanelles where, moreover, 
were sent the seaplane-carriers " Ark Royal " and ".Ben-my-chree." 
In the early part of Sept. 1915 the R.N.A.S. units at Dunkirk and 
Dover were amalgamated into the 1st Wing under the command of 
the senior Air Service officer at Dover. During the year a small unit 
of seaplanes cooperated with the fleet in the operations against the 
" Konigsberg " on the E. coast of Africa. 

Increased activity of enemy submarines led in Feb. 1915 to the 
building of a small airship known as the S.S. type (Submarine 
Searcher). Whilst this small airship proved successful within its 
restricted radius of action, an airship with a longer effective range 
was found to be necessary and the "Coastal" type was designed. 
Some 30 of these ships were eventually ordered. This development 
necessitated the establishment of various airship bases around the 
coast. In Nov. 1915, a scheme for the establishment of a large cen- 
tral school exclusively for the R.N.A.S., but similar to the Central 
Flying School, was proposed, and resulted in the establishment of 
training stations at Cranwell and Frieston early in 1916. In that 
year also a school for training both R.N.A.S. and R.F.C. personnel 
was opened in France. The policy of offensive patrols started by 
the R.N.A.S. units at Dunkirk during the latter part of 1915 was 
developed throughout 1916 and they worked in close cooperation 
with the R.F.C. on the western front. 

At the end of Feb. 1916 a squadron of Sopwith ij-strutter ma- 
chines was formed with the intention of bombing factories in the 
Essen and Diisseldorf districts, the raids being carried out from Eng- 
land. Instead of this, however, the squadron was eventually used 
for long-distance bombing from French territory and was designated 
the 3rd Wing R.N.A.S. 1 A considerable number of raids were carried 
out by this wing, which was based near Belfort. During 1916, too, 
the activities of the R.N.A.S. in the Mediterranean and in E. 
Africa were increasingly prominent ; and at home additional stations 
were formed round the coast, mainly for anti-submarine and anti- 
Zeppelin patrol. In the course of the year valuable cooperation was 
given to the army by squadrons of the R.N.A.S. operating on the 
French front, in Palestine, at Salonika, and elsewhere. The year 
1917 marked the definite realization of the bombing policy already 
adopted by the R.N.A.S. Handley Pages and Dtfy machines be- 
gan to be delivered in the spring of 1917, and special bombing squad- 
rons were organized at Dunkirk. Considerable development took 
place, too, in the employment by the R.N.A.S. of " lighter-than- 
air " craft in anti-submarines operations and in escorting convoys. 

When the war started, the airships available for the R.N.A.S. 
were the former army airships, " Beta," " Gamma," " Delta " 
and " Eta," and the Naval Airships 2, 3 and 4, the total personnel 
employed in airship work being 23 officers and warrant officers and 
171 ratings. During 1915, as already noted, new types of airship, 
known as "Submarine Searchers" and "Coastals were added; 
and at the end of 1916 the strength of the naval airship service had 
risen to 192 officers and 1,540 ratings. 

During 1917 standard designs for the different classes of airships 
were adopted. The " Submarine Searcher " had evolved into a 
type called the S.S. Zero, and an improved " Coastal " (designated C- 
Star) was adopted. New ships of the rigid type were also being 
built, two of which (R27 and R2g) were completed in the spring of 
1918. The next ships to be completed were the RSI, constructed 
mainly of wood after the Schiitte-Lanz design, and a sister ship, the 
R32, followed by R33 and Rty At the time of the Armistice there 
were five rigid and 98 non-rigid airships of different classes in 
commission. The personnel totalled 580 officers and 6,580 ratings. 

III. ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM. As already indicated, the 
British army and navy, at the opening of the World War, had 
separate administrative organizations for their air services. It was 
not till the creation of the Air Ministry in 1917-8 that the two 
were amalgamated. At the War Office, before that, the director- 
ate of military aeronautics was divided into its own technical 
branches; and its organization developed under further technical 
subdivisions, as the duties to be dealt with increased in com- 
plexity and volume. Similarly, the organization of the Admiralty 
Air Department was subdivided in administrative sections. 

It was inevitable that, even with the best will in the world, the 
two departments would enter into competition with one another 
for personnel and material ; and as the war progressed this question 
became acute. Early in Feb. 1916, the Prime Minister appointed a 
" Joint War Air Committee," to coordinate, design and supply 
material for the naval and military Air Services. In addition to the 
chairman, Lord Derby, the committee included representatives of 
the War Office and the Admiralty, with Lord Montagu of Beaulieu as 
independent advisory member. This committee was authorized 
to refer any question disputed between the Admiralty and the 
War Office to the Government. After two months, however, this 
committee collapsed, followjng on Lord Montagu's resignation. 
Since the chairman was not himself a member of the Government he 
lacked the necessary authority to arbitrate between two great de- 
partments of State, each of which had its own organization, esprit 
de corps and aspirations; moreover, no clearly defined division of 
functions was adopted between the War Office and the Admiralty. 

The next attempt at reorganization was the formation of the 
first Air Board in May 1916, with Lord Curzon as president, the 
other members being Lord Sydenham, Rear-Adml. Tudor, Rear- 
Adml. Vaughan Lee, Lt.-Gen. Sir David Henderson, Brig. -Gen. 
Brancker, and Maj. J. L. Baird, M.P. It was to be free to discuss 
policy and make recommendations to the War Office and Admiralty, 
but had no authority with regard to policy. It could, however, 
recommend types of machines for the army and navy Air Services. 
If either the War Office or the Admiralty declined to follow the 
Board's advice, the Board were empowered to refer the matter to 
the War Committee of the Cabinet. It was further charged with 
the organization and coordination of supply and material, and with 
the prevention of competition between the two fighting departments. 
It was provided that the Board should discuss air problems with 
representatives of the army and navy and such bodies as the Naval 
Board of Inventions and Research, the Inventions Branch of the 
Ministry of Munitions, the Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 
National Physical Laboratory, etc. It was laid down also that the 
Board should be provided with a secretariat. 

1 The original 3rd Wing had been disbanded on the withdrawal 
of the Dardanelles expedition. 



On the formation of Mr. Lloyd George's War Cabinet in Dec. 1916, 
Lord Curzon resigned the position of president and Lord Cowdray 
took his place in Jan. 1917. This second Air Board came into being 
under the New Ministries and Secretaries Act of 1916; and under 
this Act the president of the Air Board was specifically " deemed to be 
a Minister," and the Air Board a " Ministry." An Order in Council 
of Feb. 17 1917 laid down that the Board, in addition to the presi- 
dent, should consist of (a) the Parliamentary Secretary, (o) the 
appropriate member of the Board of Admiralty ; (c) the appropriate 
member of the Army Council ; (d) the two controllers of aeronautical 
supplies and of petrol engines in the Ministry of Munitions; and 
such additional members as might be appointed by the president. 

For carrying out its duties the Air Board comprised a secretariat, 
a technical department, and a directorate of requisitions and 
statistics. Towards the end of 1917 the staff of the technical de- 
partment was composed largely of officers drawn from the naval 
and military Air Services. Its duty was to consider and advise the 
Board as to the design of aeroplanes, seaplanes, engines and ac- 
cessories, and, with this object, to carry out the necessary experi- 
ments and trials, and to keep in close touch with the scientific bodies 
and committees which were concerned with aeronautical research. 

When the Admiralty and the War Office communicated to the 
Air Board the numbers of aeroplanes, seaplanes, and accessories re- 
quired by the two Services for a given period, and when the Air 
Board had determined to what extent these requirements could be 
complied with and had come to a decision regarding design, requisi- 
tions were passed to the Controller of Aeronautical Supplies, whose 
department (a section of the Ministry of Munitions) was also housed 
in the Air Board Office. The Air Board also dealt with similar 
requisitions by Allied Governments (other than those in connexion 
with lighter-than-air craft and wireless tejegraphy). 

The director of requisitions and statistics kept analytical records 
of requirements, etc., and of the progress made in construction. A 
Central Air Intelligence Division was also established. 

Aeronautical inventions were referred for consideration to an 
Inventions Committee, which was in touch with the Advisory 
Committee for Aeronautics, and the National Physical Labora- 
tory. The department of the Controller of Aeronautical Supplies 
(Ministry of Munitions) placed contracts in accordance with the 
designs approved by the Air Board and carried out inspection during 
manufacture. The Controller of Aeronautical Supplies also had the 
Royal Aircraft Factory under his administration. 

In addition to the departments of the Air Board and of the 
Controller of Aeronautical Supplies, there were also housed in the 
Air Board Office the H.Q. administration of the R.N.A.S. under the 
Fifth Sea Lord and Director of Air Services, and that of the R.F.C. 
under the Director-General of Military Aeronautics. 

With sundry expansions in internal organization this Air Board 
continued to function until the new Air Ministry was created at the 
end of 1917, absorbing the existing Air Board organization as well 
as the military aeronautics directorate and the Admiralty Air De- 
partment (although a " division " with a similar designation was 
still retained at the Admiralty). 

The Air Ministry came into being under the Air Force Constitu- 
tion Act (1917), which provided definitely for the amalgamation 
of the two flying services under the title of the Royal Air Force. 
In accordance with this Act the Air Ministry was constituted as a 
department of State, the final authority being vested in an Air 
Council which was formed in Jan. 1918 as follows: 

The Secretary of State (president), chief of the air staff, deputy 
chief of the air staff, master-general of personnel, controller-general 
of equipment, director-general of aircraft production, administrator 
of works and buildings, parliamentary under-secretary. 

IV. THE ROYAL AIR FORCE. The Royal Air Force itself did 
not come into being until April i 1918. At that time the R.F.C. 
at home consisted mainly of (a) the Training Division, (6) the 
6th Brigade (Home Defence), (c) the Balloon Wing, and (d) 
miscellaneous establishments. The R.N.A.S. units were organ- 
ized into a number of groups directly under the Admiralty. 

On the formation of the R.A.F. the United Kingdom was 
divided into five areas, comprising all units of the new service 
(with the exception of a few directly under the Air Ministry). 
Each area was further subdivided into groups. The Training 
Division and its brigades were done away with, the former's 
functions being assumed by the training directorate of the Air 
Ministry. The technical administration of airship stations 
remained under the control of the superintendent of airships 
at the Admiralty, naval operation groups were under the naval 
commander-in-chief concerned for operations, but their main- 
tenance and administration was the concern of the appropriate 
area headquarters. Units of the R.A.F. serving with the Grand 
Fleet were entirely controlled by the commander-in-chief. 

At the same time it was decided to form an Independent Air 
Force. In Oct. 1917 it had already been decided to return to the 

policy that had been visualized when, in 1916, the dispatch of 
the 3rd Wing R.N.A.S. to Belfort was being contemplated. 
Squadrons No. 55, 216 and too, were then sent to the Nancy 
area, and they carried out bombing operations against German 
towns during the closing months of the year and the spring of 
1918. By April 1918 the 8th Brigade, as the force was designated, 
had been reenforced by No. 99 Squadron; and when now it was 
reestablished as the Independent Air Force six more squadrons 
(104, 97, 215, 115, no and 45) were added. 

In planning the post-war organization of the R.A.F., it was 
assumed that in the immediate future nothing in the nature of 
a general mobilization need be contemplated, that efforts should 
be concentrated on providing for existing needs, and on founding 
a highly trained and efficient force, inherently capable of expan- 
sion should the necessity arise. The purpose was, accordingly, 
to limit the number of service squadrons to what was considered 
essential to meet existing responsibilities, to devote the remain- 
ing resources to perfecting the training of officers and men, and 
to construct a sound framework on which to build the R.A.F. 
of the future. In forming the framework it was felt that the 
main portion of the R.A.F. would consist of an independent 
force, together with the personnel required to carry out aero- 
nautical research. In addition, there would be a small part of 
it specially trained for work with the navy, and a small part 
specially trained for work with the army. It seemed possible 
that the main portion, the Independent Air Force, would grow 
larger and larger, and become the predominating factor. 

The training for officers and men is briefly as follows: The 
channels of entry for permanently commissioned officers are through 
the Cadet College at Cranwell, from the universities, and from the 
ranks. The Cadet College is the main channel. The course lasts 
two years, during which the cadets are thoroughly grounded in 
theory and practice and learn to fly the approved training machine. 
On leaving the College, the cadets are commissioned and posted to a 
squadron. Apart from courses that every officer will normally pass 
through, such as gunnery and air pilotage, officers will be required, 
after five years' service, to select the particular technical subject 
they will make their special study during their subsequent career, 
e.g. navigation, wireless, engines. 

The career of an officer commissioned from the universities or 
from the ranks will be identical with that of those from the Cadet 
College, except that they will be taught to fly at training wings before 
joining the squadron. Short-service and seconded officers will be 
taught to fly at training wings, and will attend a course of aerial 
gunnery and probably one of air pilotage. 

With regard to the other ranks the most difficult problem it was 
decided to enlist the bulk of those belonging to long apprenticeship 
trades as boys, who will undergo a course of three years' training 
before being passed into the ranks. The boys, on successfully passing 
their final examination, will be graded as leading aircraftsmen, and 
a certain number will be specially selected for a further course of 
training, at the end of which they will either be granted commissions 
or promoted to N.C.O.'s. Those granted commissions will join the 
Cadet College. The mechanics, of whom more than half will be- 
long to short apprenticeship trades, are enlisted as men and re- 
ceive 12 months training before being posted to units. Non- 
technical men are given a short course of recruit training at the 
R.A.F. depot at Uxbridge. 

The R.A.F. estimates for 1920-1 provided for an establishment 
of 29,730 officers, warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, air- 
craftsmen and boys (exclusive of those serving in India). 

V. THE FUTURE OF AIR-FIGHTING. It is now universally 
recognized that in future wars the operations of naval and 
land forces will be largely influenced by the degree of assistance 
that can be rendered by aircraft. It is equally clearly under- 
stood that such assistance can only be rendered to the full extent 
of the resources available if air supremacy has been definitely 
established and can be successfully maintained. It is realized 
that, as is the case with sea command, air supremacy is an issue 
that can only be settled by combat (assuming a certain degree 
of equality and of readiness to fight in the opposing air forces). 
It is therefore by the air fighting and consequently by the air 
fighter that subsequent operations, whether on sea or on land 
or in the air, will be influenced. 

Whether the last word in air fighting would always rest with 
the small, swift, easily manoeuvred machine was in 1921 still 
an open question. It is possible that we shall see, in the future, 
armament replacing speed as the determining factor in aerial 


tactics, and that aerial battleships will be evolved capable 
not only of fighting but of carrying the war into the enemy's 
country and crippling his power of resistance in the early stages 
of the struggle. It is in recognition of this principle that the 
French Military Air Service has been divided into formations 
the functions of which are purely ancillary to the army, and 
into formations whose functions it is first to establish air suprem- 
acy and secondly, when its attainment makes it possible, to 
develop the essentially offensive form of aerial war, the long- 
distance bombing raid. Accordingly, in addition to cooperat- 
ing formations, the French maintain what is analogous to the 
British Independent Air Force, a force composed entirely of 
fighters and bombers. 

There is no doubt that ultimate air power must depend largely 
upon the place of aviation in the economic life of the community, 
but this does not mean that air power is focussed entirely in a 
flourishing civil industry. The suddenness and effectiveness 
that lies in aerial action must not lead to a striking force being 
held in constant readiness to act whenever war appears immi- 
nent. The manner of employment of this force, and the efficiency 
it displays, may have a vital bearing upon the subsequent course 
of the war, and no country would risk doing altogether without 
some form of standing military air force. 

There is also every indication that civil and military air- 
craft will tend to develop along divergent lines, and that the 
civil machine will never be a factor in air supremacy excepting 
as an auxiliary. The most important factor in the civil machine 
is productive economy, whereas the designer of service craft 
strives for destructive performance; and individual aircraft can 
hardly be equally efficient for both purposes. (A. W. H. E. W.) 

VI. GERMAN AIR FORCES. Before the World War, the German 
military air service, in splitting off from its parent body, the Pio- 
neers, had been made administratively part of the Communication 
Troops. From Oct. 1912 the Flying Troops had formed a separate 
entity within the Communication service. Nevertheless, when 
it took the field in Aug. 1914, and for some months thereafter, they 
were still nominally under the inspector-general of Communication 
Troops, an arrangement which worked badly in practice besides 
tending to prevent the growth of esprit de corps in the flying service. 
It was not till Aug. 25 1915 that it was freed from this control. 

But already on March II 1915 all German formations serving 
at the front had been placed under a " Chef des Feldflugwesens," 
and a month later this officer (Col. Thomsen) was made the official 
superior of all other army services as well, his functions including 
control of all motor transport included in the air establishment. 

About the same time a staff officer for aviation was appointed to 
the H.Q. of each army, but it was not until Nov. 1916 that this 
officer was renamed " Kommandeur " and placed in executive com- 
mand of the air forces within his province. 

Somewhat earlier than this, on Oct. 8 1916, Gen. von Hoeppnerhad 
been appointed " Kommandierender General " of the military air 
forces, with Thomsen as his chief of the staff. As in the German 
army system a " Kommandierender " (i.e. Commander of an Army 
Corps and its Region) enjoyed wide powers, both under the laws and 
under the regulations, and as the office of chief-of-staff likewise 
carried with it known and definite powers, the status of the air force 
was for the first time thereby assured. Moreover, the commanding 
general, not being under any army or group of armies H.Q., had 
direct access to G.H.Q. From this point, the organic development of 
the air force went on straightforwardly. But it is interesting to note 
that even in the German system, with all its sense of order and 
organization, conservatism sufficed to delay the consummation till 
nearly two and a half years after the outbreak of war. 1 

In spite of army proposals however, no single command was ever 
created in German military and naval air forces, which remained 
wholly separate to the end. One retarding influence was the par- 
ticularism of the various German states. The Wurttemberg 
Government, for instance, gave formal orders to its own aviation 
depot unit not to supply flying officers to any but Wurttemberg units. 

The working organization in the field as finally developed was as 
follows: The commanding general had his own H.Q., and reported 
direct to the chief of the general staff of the army. His immediate 
air service subordinates were the " Kofls (Kommandeur der Lufts- 
triebkraften)," one to each army, with as above mentioned, occa- 
sional groupings of the forces of several armies under one " Kofi." 
Under his orders, flights of aircraft were commanded by group 

1 Shortly after the creation of the " Commanding General," 
some grouping of air forces within the group of armies was effected 
by making the " Air Force Commanders " of one of its armies re- 
sponsible for coordination of effort, and to a certain extent for dis- 
tributing forces as well. 

commanders (instituted 1917) who gave instructions to the flight 
commanders and through whom their liaisons with the military 
command, and especially the artillery, passed. 

At each corps H.Q. a staff officer looked after both operations 
and liaison. 

In the earlier years of aviation, the confidence of the German 
authorities and public in the lighter-than-air ship retarded the 
growth of aviation. But in 1912 the dangers of further neglecting the 
aeroplane were realized, and an active propaganda resulted in a 
national subscription for the manufacture of aeroplanes and the 
training of pilots. In the autumn of the same year an army flying 
school was provisionally established and this became permanent in 
the spring of 1913. At the moment of mobilization 254 pilots and 
271 observers were available. 

The following summary of the development of German aviation 
units during the war, while necessarily brief, will serve to' show how 
the needs revealed by war experience were successively met by 
changes of organization. 

In the beginning, German aviation units like others were for 
general service, the same machines (two-seater fighters) serving all 
purposes, reconnaissance, spotting, bombing and fighting. 

In the middle of 1915 came the first specialization of functions 
the separating out of air-fighting elements. These units (two-seater 
fighters) were originally known as " battle squadrons " and had the 
r&le of barring the German froat line against Allied aircraft as well as 
such bombing as was then done. But the necessities of aerial combat 
very soon produced a further subdivision on this side, " Fokker " 
flights (of single-seaters, equivalent to British " scouts ") undertak- 
ing the offensive air battle and the residue the protection barrage and 
the bombing. Presently they too subdivided into protective flights 
and bombing flights (the latter being grouped later in squadrons). 

When the fighting elements separated off from the reconnaissance 
elements, the latter (organized in flights only and allotted as re- 
quired to groups) were limited to their proper functions, and a 
further specialization presently came about by which artillery flights 
were separated from reconnaissance flights. In these artillery 
flights the personnel was largely, if not entirely, drawn from the 
artillery, but their special character did not prevent them from being 
used occasionally for photographic work. Many, though not all, 
artillery flights were equipped with wireless telegraphy apparatus. 

The high-fighting " Fokker abteilung," always increasing in num- 
bers as it became more and more evident that the British policy of 
offensive protection was the true one, developed into the " pursuit 
flight " (Jagdstaffel). Occasionally, a number of these pursuit flights 
were grouped into a semi-permanent squadron under a leader of 
note, e.g. Richthofen ; a squadron of this kind was colloquially and 
very aptly called a " circus," both on account of the acrobatic powers 
of its members and the fact that it moved up and down the front as 
its services were required to obtain local control of the air. 2 The old 
" Kampfgeschwader," charged with protective barrage and with 
bombing, was also subdivided into two parts the so-called pro- 
tective flight, whose duty was local escort for friendly, and local 
barrage against enemy reconnaissance machines, and the pure 
bomber, for whom more and more powerful machines were evolved 
and whose radius of action was constantly increased. 1 

Lastly, the protective flight, whose defensive function was dis- 
credited, became a battle flight (SMachtstaffel). The practice of 
low-flying for direct intervention in a ground battle had been growing 
steadily since the battle of the Somme, and in the German and Allied 
offensives of 1918 it attained a maximum. In contrast to the British 
custom of training and trusting flights of the reconnaissance type 
(called contact patrols) to carry out this dangerous duty, the 
Germans treated it as an essentially combatant function, and 
used for it a branch of the aviation service which had always be- 
longed to the fighting as distinct from the reconnaissance side. In 
the last phase some of the battle flights had armoured machines. 

On the combatant side therefore, German aviation was finally 
classified into three branches: pursuit flights (high-fighting for 
command of the air, with 18 machines per flight); bombing squad- 
rons (long-distance bombing, with about 24 machines per squadron) ; 
battle flights (low-fighting in connexion with ground operations, i.e. 
bombing and machine-gunning of troops and transport, with six 
to twelve machines per flight, average about eight). One other type 
of fighting unit was created for air defence at home. It was known 
as the " Kampfeinsitzerstafel " (single-seater battle flight), and re- 
stricted to local defence of munition areas, etc. 

From statistics given in Neumann's Die deutschen Luftstreitkrafte, 
it appears that, apart from reserve machines, the Germans em- 
ployed for various purposes during the war 220 machines in 1914, 
480 in 1915, about 1,100 in 1916, about 1,300 in 1917, and about 3,500 

* After Richthofen's death his squadron was officially designated 
by his name and the number I as a permanent organization. Two 
other squadrons were formed in the summer of 1918. 

* The original bombing squadron was a group set aside in 1915 for 
the ultimate purpose of bombing England from Calais, when that port 
should have been occupied by the Germans. The rapidity of air 
evolution in the war is well shown by the fact that within a year of 
that date, London was bombed by an aeroplane based on Ghent. 



in 1918. Interesting and significant figures are given by the same 
author as to numbers and losses in personnel, and expenditure of 
materiel. In actual flying personnel at the front, the hjghest total 
present at one time (in 1918) was about 5,500, with a like number 
under training at home. The total deaths of flying personnel or 
candidates in the war numbered 6,840, of whom about two-thirds 
died at the front. The number of wounded and injured (7,350) is 
little more than that of the dead. Approximately 2,128 planes were 
lost under known circumstances (about 1,900 of these on the western 
front). In addition about 1,000 missing were presumed as lost. In 
all, 47,637 machines and 40,449 motors were taken on charge from 
contract. The monthly expenditure of fuel at the end of the war was 
7,000,000 kgm., and the total for the whole war about 232,000,000 
kgm. Rather over a million bombs were dropped, of which 860,000 
were of the 12-kgm. type and 710 of the monster i,ooo-kgm. type. 

The organization of German naval aviation before the war was 
considerably in arrears as compared with that of army flying. The 
predominance of the airship was the main cause of this, but other 
causes contributed, especially, it is said, the lack of interest in sea- 
plane design on the part of manufacturers, whose establishments 
(except that of Friedrichshafen) were far from water. The first 
seaplane competition, organized by a few enthusiasts, was to have 
been held on Aug. I 1914. Only some 20 naval officers had been 
trained as pilots in the single existing seaplane station. 

These conditions continued to hamper progress for some time after 
the outbreak of war, as the army impounded all the motor manufac- 
turing resources for its own needs. Nevertheless, seaplanes were 
established on the Flanders coast by Dec. 1914, and thereafter the 
organization of the seaplane service expanded till there were finally 
32 stations in the different theatres of war and on the German coast. 
For naval work, the organic unit was the station ; the equipment, of 
course, varying according to the work expected of each station. 

At the same time, a number of aeroplane flights organized as 
such, were created by the navy for land service, of which nine or ten 
served in the eastern and south-eastern theatres. The other fifteen, 
in Flanders, belonged to the Marine Corps, a mixed organization 
responsible for the land defence of the Yser front, the coast defence 
of the Belgian coast and the submarine operations based on that 
coast. The commander of Flying Troops of that corps had under him 
a correspondingly mixed air force. 

Naval aviation generally was under the control of a naval avia- 
tion chief, who was independent of the army air authorities. 

Airship Organization. In spite of the popular enthusiasm evoked 
by the work of Count Zeppelin and other airship constructors before 
the war, the naval and military authorities were not, before the war, 
very ready to commit themselves to a strong and permanent air 
organization. The army airship organization dated only from 1906-7 
and the naval from 1910-1. The army acquired Zi in 1906 and Z2 
in 1909, and after the wreck of the latter, a pause occurred in which 
commitments were avoided pending further competitive experiments 
between the Zeppelin, Parseval and Gross types. In 1912, however, 
the decision went in favour of the Zeppelin and the Schiitte- 
Lanz, and airship battalions were formed to fly and to maintain 

At the outbreak of war the army possessed seven ships (six 
Zeppelin and one S-L) of the rigid type, and two others, and took 
over three more from private ownership. Organization, nominally 
by battalions, was in reality dependent on the number and station 
of ships. This rapidjy increased. But from the first there was a 
strong current of opinion adverse to the airship in land warfare, 
and the authorities concerned with personnel looked with disfavour 
on the huge landing parties which the ships required at each station. 
In spite, therefore, of the occasional achievements of individual 
ships, 1 it was decided early in 1917 to discontinue the army airship 
service. The still useful snips were handed over with part of the air 
personnel to the navy, and the remainder of the personnel was 
allocated to the army kite balloon service. 

Excluding Parseval and small airships the manufacture of 
which was discontinued at the outbreak of war 37 Zeppelin and 
10 S-L ships were commissioned by the army from first to last, of 
which 17 were lost in action, 9 lost from other causes, 17 scrapped, 
and 4 handed over to the navy on discontinuance. 

The navy, on the other hand, beginning later than the army, went 
on developing the airship service to the end of the war. In Aug. 
1914 it possessed only one ship, obtained from the Zeppelin company 
to replace Government ships lost in 1913. 

Inclusive of the effective ships taken over from the army in 1917 
74 ships were commissioned for naval service, of which 23 were lost 
in action, 30 from other causes (4 by lightning), and 1 1 were scrapped. 

Kite Balloons. The development of dirigible airships and of 
aeroplanes, in Germany as elsewhere, thrust the captive balloon 

1 In many respects the most remarkable achievement of airships 
in the war was the voyage of L59 in the autumn of 1917. This was a 
naval ship, but the service in question was overland. Starting from 
Yamboli in Bulgaria the attempt was made to reach von Lettow- 
Vorbeck in E. Africa with medical and other small and valuable 
stores. This ship was recalled by wireless after passing Khartum, 
but returned safely, after a 7,ooo-km. voyage lasting 96 hours. The 
record for endurance, however, was held by LZi2O (loij hours). 

into the background, and although 8 field and 15 fortress balloona 
were mobilized in 1914, the question of their abolition was actually 
being considered when the unexpected coming of trench warfare 
opened up a new field for them. Early in 1915 the introduction of 
power winches (at first improvised in the field) and of the parachute 
added greatly to their efficiency, and by the end of that year more 
than 40 sections, each of 2 balloons, were in the field. But the war 
experience of 1916, and notably the sight of Allied sausage balloons, 
hanging in the air " as thick as grapes," compelled the army au- 
thorities to develop their kite balloon service at a faster rate. The 
organization, hitherto in single unconnected sections, was expanded 
to provide over 50 staffs, each of which controlled 2 to 3 sections of 
balloons. In the end, 184 such sections existed in the field, as well as 
a certain number lent to Turkey or employed in instructional duties. 
In the latter part of the war the admittedly inferior balloon of 
German design was replaced by one of the Caquot type, a captured 
specimen being copied almost exactly. 

In all, 1,870 kite balloons of all types were delivered from contract 
and about 350 power winches. In course of the war about 600 bal- 
loons were lost in action (75 % to 80% by aeroplane attack), 100 by 
weather and other causes, and 500 condemned as unserviceable. 

The Meteorological Service in the German army formed part of 
the air forces, although its observations and reports served the ar- 
tillery, chemical warfare and other branches as well. At the begin- 
ning of the war an embryonic organization already existed, with a 
central section at Berlin, 14 sections at airship stations and aero- 
dromes and 2 sections organized on a mobile basis. These last at 
once expanded to 8 (one per army) and by the close of the war these 
23 units had grown to a total of 316. 

The general lines of the organization were as follows: (l) The 
Berlin H.Q. ; (2) Western Front H.Q. at Brussels; (3) Eastern Front 
H.Q. at Warsaw; (4) South-eastern Front H.Q. at Temesvar (later 
Sofia), and (5) Turkish H.Q. at Constantinople. Under each of these 
(except the last) there were in strength varying according to condi- 
tions, Haup/welter Warten, which were concerned with focussing 
information from Berlin, from the naval weather service, and from 
the front, and also with local meteorological services for troops 
behind the line in occupied areas (e.g. flying schools); and Armee 
Wetter Warten which had the chief tactical and technical respon- 
sibility at the front, and controlled a network of minor units, some 
attached to particular services but most distributed on an area basis. 

Air Defence. In Germany and at the front the commanding 
general of air forces was responsible for air defence. A few mobile 
guns only were available for anti-aircraft work in 1914, but the 
75-mm. guns captured in the advance to the Marne and -especially 
the high velocity Russian field guns taken on the eastern front, 
provided a considerable A. A. armament, pending the design and 
supply of special ordnance. By the end of the war the original 20 
guns had grown to a total of over 2,000. The evolution of technical 
adjuncts of air defence, searchlights and direction-finding detectors 
(see AIR DEFENCE), proceeded as on the Allied side. 

As regards organization, after various alternative methods had 
been tried, the Germans separated off all " Flak " (Flugabwehr Ka- 
none) troops from the rest of the artillery and centralized the control 
in each army area in the hands of a special officer, to whom all sub- 
ordinate Flak commanders were alone responsible though they were 
authorized to advise corps commanders on the technical aspects of 
air defence in the corps area. In 1916 the Flak service passed with 
the rest under the control of the new commanding general of air 
forces; thenceforward all the means of air defence were coordinated 
under the same authority in each area, both in the field where 
" Commanders of air forces " (see p. 87) exercised local control, and 
in Germany, where a deputy of the commanding general was re- 
sponsible for defence of munition areas. This organization ensured 
an intimate connexion between guns, aeroplanes, observation posts 
and lights, based on a common doctrine taught in the Flak depot at 
Freiburg and in Flak schools at the front. 

VII. UNITED STATES. In the United States, as elsewhere, the 
organization of air forces before the World War was in its infancy, 
and although between 1914 and the entry of the United States into 
the war a certain amount of air research and training had been 
carried on, and some practical war experience gained in Mexico, 
yet their position as neutrals prevented the American authorities 
from obtaining technical data concerning the progress in aviation 
that was evidently being made by the belligerents. 

In April 1917, therefore, when the Allies invited America to train 
and equip a force of 5,000 aviators for service in Europe, there was 
little likelihood of the demand being met. At that date the American 
forces possessed 55 machines of which a scientific commission had 
just declared 51 to be obsolete, and about 75 trained officer pilots. 

The first necessities, therefore, were instructors and training 
machines. Of the latter, or rather of a type of the latter considered 
good enough for primary instruction, delivery in quantity began 
before the winter of 1917, and by the Armistice there were about 
9,500 planes and 17,500 engines suitable for training. 

The need of instructors was met partly by borrowing _British and 
French officers, and partly by retaining the best pupils in the early 
classes to become instructors to those formed later. In the sequel, 
8,600 pilots were graduated from the elementary courses and 4,000 
from the advanced courses before operations ceased, and some 



6,500 more were at that date in training. After graduating from the 
advanced course, pilots and observers joined the expeditionary 
forces where they underwent a final training before going into action. 
The total of qualified flying officers in March 1918 was 2,248 in the 
United States and 650 overseas; these numbers had grown in July 
1918 to 4,974 in the United States and 2,692 overseas, and in Nov. 
1918 to 7,118 in the United States and 4,307 overseas (of whom, 
however, only 1,238 were as yet at the front). Inclusive of ground 
personnel and students, the total personnel of the U.S. air forces 
was nearly 200,000 at the date of the Armistice. 

In the production of service machines for these men to fly, grave 
difficulties arose, none the less grave because in the excitement of 
the time unreasonable expectations had been formed and encouraged. 

After study of the problem, not only from the standpoint of quali- 
tative efficiency in the machine but also from that of man produc- 
tion, the British DH4 (observation and day-bombing) and the 
Handley Page and Caproni night-bombers were selected as standard 
types for American production, being redesigned to take American 
motors. 1 For pursuit flights, only non-American machines were 
employed. At the end of the war, out of the 7,889 service planes 
on charge, about half were American-built, and of the total of 
22,000 engines nearly three-quarters. 

With kite balloons, these supply troubles seem hardly to have 
existed. From zero (or rather from an establishment of 20 borrowed 
balloons) in Jan. a total of 662 had been reached by Nov., of which 
43 had been destroyed, 35 handed over to the British and French, 
leaving 574 in service. 

The organization of the American air forces in the field was by 
squadrons, classified as pursuit, observation, day-bombing and night- 
bombing. The premier American squadron was one of American 
volunteers, the " Escadrille Lafayette," which had been serving in the 
French army and was transferred to the U.S. army in the winter of 
1917-8. In the spring of 1918 squadrons formed and came into the 
field in twos and threes, but in the late summer DH4 machines 
became available in large numbers, and observation and day-bomb- 
ing squadrons began to increase more rapidly. From a July total 
of 15 squadrons, the figure of 30 was reached in Sept. and 45 in the 
first week of Nov. (exclusive of balloon companies in each case). 
The machines, however, were still preponderantly of foreign make. 
Twenty-six squadrons and 14 balloon companies took part in the 
St. Mihiel battle, and 45 squadrons with 740 machines, and 23 
balloon companies in the final Meuse-Argonne battles. 

(C. r . A.) 

FOCH, FERDINAND (1851- ), French marshal, was born 
at Tarbes Oct. 2 1851, his father being a civil official and his 
mother's father an officer of Napoleon's army. Educated at 
Tarbes, Rodez, and finally at the Jesuit colleges of St. Michel 
(Loire) and St. Clement (Metz), he was preparing for the 
entrance examination for the Ecole Polytechnique when the war 
of 1870 broke out. He enlisted in the army, but saw no active 
service, and returned to Metz, then in German occupation, to 
complete his studies, entering the Ecole Polytechnique in Nov. 
1871. On being commissioned in 1873 he was posted to the 
artillery, in which arm the whole of his regimental service was 
spent. As a captain, he became a student of the Staff College 
(ficole de Guerre) in 1885 and left, with fourth place, in 1887. 
From this time till 1901, save for a period in which as major he 
commanded a group of horse artillery batteries, his work lay in 
the general staff of the army, the staff of formations and the 
Ecole de Guerre. It was in the Ecole de Guerre that he devel- 
oped his doctrines and his influence on the education of the army. 
From 1895 he was assistant-professor, and from 1898, as 
lieutenant-colonel, professor of military history and strategy in 
that institution, first under Gen. Langlois, and then under Gen. 
Bonnal, the two leaders of military thought whose work, with 
his own to complete it, established the new French doctrines of 
war, based on re -study and application to modern conditions of 
Napoleon's practice. This is the key idea of Foch's classical 
treatises, Principes de Guerre and La Direction de la Guerre. 

Foch's career as a professor at the Ecole de Guerre lasted 
hardly more than five years. The army was at that time in the 
midst of acute political troubles. The Minister of War, Gen. 
Andre, was engaged in a drastic, and not overscrupulous attempt 
to make the army safe for democracy; the Dreyfus affair was 
running the last stages of its fierce course, and, in his responsible 

1 The British " Bristol Fighter," originally selected as one of the 
types, proved unsuitable foradaptation to American engines and was 
not adopted. It should be added that American machines were 
designed to suit these motors, but none had passed into quantity 
production at the Armistice. 

post at the Ecole de Guerre, Foch was an obvious target of 
attack, as an openly devout and practising Catholic, educated 
under Jesuit influence. He was returned to regimental duty, 
and his promotion to colonel only took place in 1903. 

In 1905 Clemenceau, then Prime Minister, determined to 
make use of his military ability to the full, irrespective of political 
considerations, and, after a short time spent as deputy chief of 
the general staff, he was appointed commandant of the Ecole de 
Guerre. Already in 1907 he had been made general of brigade. 
In 1911 he was promoted general of division and in 1912 corps 
commander. In 1913 he was appointed to command the most 
exposed of all the frontier corps, the XX. at Nancy, and he had 
held this appointment exactly a year when he led the XX. Corps 
into battle. Foch was then the only intellectual master of the 
Napoleonic school still serving. And the doctrines of the brilliant 
series of war school commandants, Maillard, Langlois, Bonnal, 
Foch, had been challenged, not only by the German school (see 
25.994), but also since about 1911 by a new school of thought 
within the French army itself, which, under the inspiration of 
Gen. Loiseau de Grandmaison (d. 1915), criticised them as 
lacking in vigour and offensive spirit, and conducing to needless 
dispersion of force. The younger men carried the day, and the 
French army took the field in 1914 governed by a new code of 
practice. But history decided at once and emphatically against 
the new idea in the first battles of August, and it remained to be 
seen whether the Napoleonic doctrine would hold its own, give 
way to doctrines evolved in the war itself, or, incorporating the 
new moral and technical elements and adapting itself to the war 
of national masses, reappear in a new outward form within 
which the spirit of Napoleon remained unaltered. To these 
questions, it must be admitted, the war has given an ambiguous 
answer which will long provide material for expert controversy. 

It was, in reality, as a leader in the field, far more than as 
thinker, that Foch personally influenced the course of the war on 
the western front. His conduct of operations in the first battles 
before Nancy, as a corps commander, presents no special char- 
acteristics, but in a few weeks he was placed at the head of the 
newly formed IX. Army, to fill the gap in the line caused by the 
divergent directions of retreat of the IV. and V. This army he 
commanded in the battle of the Marne, being opposed to the 
German III. Army and part of the II. in the region of Fere 
Champenoise and the Marais de St. Goud. After several crises 
he finally repulsed the attack, and initiated a counterstroke 
round which a legend promptly grew up and on which was 
founded a popular reputation that, no doubt, gave Foch the one 
element lacking in his equipment for the highest commands 
prestige. Almost immediately after the battle, when the 
mutual attempts of Allies and Germans to outflank one another's 
northern wing produced the so-called " race to the sea," Foch 
was designated assistanf to the commander-in-chief and sent 
north to coordinate the movements of the various French 
armies and eventually those of the British and Belgian armies 
concentrating towards Flanders. Over the French army com- 
manders he possessed the powers of a commander-in-chief, but 
over the British and Belgian forces, like Joffre, he had no author- 
ity. This delicate relation, in the midst of one of the greatest 
crises of the war one which for Britain and Belgium was of 
graver import than even that of the Marne, inevitably led at 
times to friction between the coequal commands, and after the 
war a rather unworthy controversy was waged in the press as to 
some incidents of this period. But in sum, the reputation which 
Foch already enjoyed amongst European soldiers before the 
war, and the fact that he had long been in intimate relations 
with Gen. Sir Henry Wilson, deputy-chief of Sir John French's 
staff, enabled him to carry out successfully a mission with which 
no other general could have been entrusted. 

After the battle of Ypres and the stabilization of the fronts, 
Gen. Foch commanded the French " Group of Armies of the 
North " during 1915 and 1916. In this period, under Joffre, he 
was responsible for the offensives in Artois during the spring 
and autumn of 1915, in which again he stood in close relation to 
the British on his left, though now the sectors of each were 


exactly defined and there was neither a crisis nor an inter- 
mingling of forces such as those of the Ypres period. Moreover, 
the general headquarters of the two commanders-in-chief , Joffre 
and French, were now fixed, and the two armies made their 
liaison between St. Omer and Chantilly rather than through 
the local headquarters of Foch, who was no longer assistant 
commander-in-chief, but a subordinate. 

In 1916 Foch's group of armies supplied the French element 
in the battle of the Somme. Towards the close of that battle, 
his reputation underwent a temporary eclipse, motived no doubt 
largely by the disappointment felt both in England and in 
France as to the results; but also and perhaps more by somewhat 
obscure domestic intrigues within the French staff. At that 
time the movement for Joffre's supersession had come to a head, 
and, it is said, his adherents within the headquarters sought to 
maintain him in power by suggesting that Foch, the most likely 
candidate for the place, was broken down in health. Though 
this did not prevent the removal of Joffre, it excluded Foch from 
the succession. Gen. Nivelle was appointed commander-in- 
chief, and a certain control by him over the British forces was 
agreed to by Mr. Lloyd George's Government, then newly in 
office. Foch was relieved of his command and sent first to the 
Swiss frontier to report on the possibilities of attack and defence 
in that quarter and then to Italy to negotiate with the Comando 
Supremo as to aid from France in case of a disaster to Cadorna's 
forces. But on May 15 1917, after the tragic failure of Nivelle's 
offensive and the supersession of that general by Petain, M. 
Painleve called Foch to Paris as chief of the general staff of the 
French army. But in this capacity his influence only became 
really effective after the accession to power of the Clemenceau 
Ministry in November. From that point to the events of 
March 1918, the evolution of Foch's authority was rapid. He 
was first, as adviser to Clemenceau and as a soldier whose 
counsels carried more weight than those of any other, a powerful 
indirect influence in the inter-Allied discussions as to the plan 
of campaign for 1918. Then as French member of the " Execu- 
tive Committee," a sort of board of inter-Allied command 
founded in Jan. 1918, he took his place almost as dejure president 
of that body. Lastly, the storm of the German offensive broke 
on the British V. Army on March 21, and although Haig and 
Petain managed by cordial cooperation to reconstruct the broken 
line and check the German advance, the situation remained so 
critical that the last step was taken. On March 27 Foch by 
general consent was nominated to coordinate the operations of 
the British and French in France. On April 14 the title and 
authority of commander-in-chief was granted to him by the two 
Governments concerned, and on April 15, April 17 and May i 
respectively by the Belgian, American and Italian Governments. 

On Aug. 6 1918 Foch was made a marshal of France. In the 
interval the Germans had renewed their offensives four times, 
and more than once there had been a crisis as grave as that of 
March which Haig and Petain had had to face, notably on May 
27. But these crises had been surmounted, and towards the end 
of June, with his resources greatly augmented through the 
emergency measures taken by the American Government, the 
British sea transport authorities and Gen. Pershing in France, 
he could begin preparations for his counter-offensive. The story 
of the battles in Champagne in which the last German offensive 
and the first Entente counter-offensive coincided (July 15-18), 
of the battles on the Somme area about Amiens (Aug. 8) and 
Bapaume-Peronne (Aug. 21), and of the simultaneous offensives 
of the Americans on the Meuse-Argonne front, the British on the 
Cambrai-St. Quentin front, and the Belgian, British and French 
under King Albert in Flanders (Sept. 26-28) is told elsewhere 
(see also the article TACTICS). From Sept. 26 to the Armistice 
the whole front from the sea to Verdun was one continuous 
battlefield, controlled by one commander-in-chief. An extension 
of this battlefield into Lorraine, where the final blow was to 
be delivered on Nov. 14, was only prevented by the capitula- 
tion of the enemy. 

After the war Marshal Foch received the highest honours 
from his own country and from the Allies. In one of his frequent 

visits to London he was created a field-marshal in the British 
Army, and he was also awarded the O.M. He became a member 
of the Academic Fran$aise in 1919. He had a great reception in 
the United States on his visit in 1921. 

Various biographical sketches of Marshal Foch have appeared, 
for the names of which the reader is referred to any good subject 
index. The history of the single-command idea will be found in detail 
in M. Mermeix's Les Crises de Commandement and Le Commandement 
unique (part I.) and that of the internal politics of the French head- 
quarters in the same, and in J. de Pierrefen's G. Q. G., Secteur I. 
(2 vols.), Paris 1920. The story of his final campaign, from the point 
of view of Foch's headquarters, is given in Louis Madelin's La 
Bataille de France and R. Recouly's La Bataille de Foch. 

(C. F. A.) 

FOGAZZARO, ANTONIO (1842-1911), Italian novelist and poet 
(see 10.590), published in 1910 his last novel, Leila, a sequel to 
// Santo. He died at Vicenza March 7 1911. Ultime, a volume 
of his latest writings, appeared in 1913. 

A collection of records and memorials of the poet was published 
in two volumes in 1913-4. See also Eugenio Donadoni, Fogazzaro 
as Man and Writer (1913); L. Gennari, Fogazzaro (1918); and A. F. 
Crispoliti, Antonio Fogazzaro; Discorso commemorative (1911). 

FOOD SUPPLY. During the World War of 1914-8 practically 
all the belligerent and neutral countries of Europe experienced 
a shortage in the supply of food and other necessaries. The 
shortage was traceable to three distinct causes: first, the diver- 
sion of productive power to destruction or to making the means 
of destruction; second, the increased rate of consumption of 
those who were fighting or were undertaking harder physical 
labour than usual in the production of munitions; third, the 
deliberate blockades which with varying success the belligerents 
directed against one another and against neutrals. The blockades 
had as one feature a destruction of shipping which is perhaps 
sufficiently important to be reckoned as a fourth cause of short- 
age, additional to the other three. These causes of reduced supply 
or increased demand applied more or less to all useful artscles; 
they naturally produced their most sensible effects in the case 
of necessary articles and above all in that of food. There, the 
failure of the ordinary channels of supply to meet the demand 
sooner or later became in every European country so serious as to 
call for direct intervention by the Government and to make 
" food control " one of the features of the war. Every country 
had its succession of food controllers. 

The degree of the food shortage and the methods available 
or adopted for dealing with it naturally varied from one country 
to another. In all of them it may be said that the food controller 
had three main problems to consider, namely, the maintenance 
of supplies, the regulation of prices, and the control of consump- 
tion by distribution and rationing. The three problems are 
naturally connected. A solution of the first of them so complete 
as to keep supplies up to or above the pre-war standard would 
prevent the other two from arising at all or at least in any serious 
form; this happened with bread-stuffs in the United Kingdom. 
On the other hand an attempt to fix prices without controlling 
supplies would lead either to a disappearance of supplies or to 
their distribution in an unjust and wasteful manner. While 
the problems are thus connected, the third of them distribu- 
tion and rationing can to some extent be described separately 
and is so described under the heading of RATIONING. The present 
article will deal mainly with the action taken in respect to sup- 
plies and prices and will touch on distribution and rationing only 
to indicate points of contact. No attempt can be made here to 
describe, even in outline, food control in all countries. All that 
can be attempted is to give some account of what was necessary 
and what was accomplished in the United Kingdom, and to 
mention the salient points of similarity or difference in the 
experience of other countries. 

For the first two years of the war questions of food control 
attained little prominence in the United Kingdom. The cutting 
off of the Central European sources of sugar supply led to the 
anticipation of a considerable shortage of that particular food, 
and a Royal Commission was established in Aug. 1914, which 
undertook on Government account the purchase and importation 
of all supplies from that time onwards. A special organization 


for securing army meat from abroad was also found necessary 
from the beginning; this involved control of refrigerated tonnage 
under the Board of Trade. A system for obtaining weekly re- 
ports on retail prices (mainly through the staff of the Labour 
Exchanges) was put into action at the outbreak of the war; these 
reports yielded material for subsequent estimates of the in- 
crease of the cost of living. The use of cereals and sugar for 
brewing was limited by an Output of Beer Restriction Act, 
coming into force on April i 1916. Apart from this, food supplies 
were allowed for two years and more to take their course. 

By the autumn of 1916, prices, which had risen more or less 
steadily from the beginning of the war, reached a level which 
began to evoke acute discontent, and the prospects of an in- 
tensified submarine campaign caused anxieties for the future. 
Two important steps were taken. The first was the establish- 
ment in Oct. 1916 of a Royal Commission on wheat supplies, 
parallel to that on the sugar supplies. This Commission almost 
immediately took on an international character through the 
signing in Nov. 1916 of the " Wheat Executive Agreement " 
between Great Britain, France and Italy, under which the pur- 
chase, importation, distribution and shipping not only of wheat 
but of all cereals was arranged on a common basis for the three 
Allies, the administrative work being undertaken in London. 
The Wheat Executive gradually extended its activities to other 
allies and even to neutrals. The Wheat Commission and the 
Sugar Commission retained their existence as separate bodies 
even after the appointment of the food controller, but the latter 
in practice decided questions of policy and became responsible 
for supplies of cereals and sugar as of all other foods. 

The second step was the making of an Order in Council under 
the Defence of the Realm Act (Nov. 16) which practically em- 
powered the Board of Trade to introduce a complete system of 
food control, by regulating the importation, production, dis- 
tribution, prices and quality of all kinds of food or articles neces- 
sary for the production of food. Food control actually began 
under this Order in Council, immediate steps being taken to 
lengthen compulsorily the extraction of flour (i.e. increase the 
proportion of the wheat berry which was made into flour, and 
so into human consumption, as against that which was left as 
" offals " to be used as feeding-stuffs for animals), to fix milk 
prices and to restrain extravagance in public meals. The Govern- 
ment of the day at the same time announced their intention to 
appoint some person with adequate authority to exercise these 
extended powers, in other words a " Food Controller." Before 
a suitable candidate for the post could be prevailed upon to 
accept it, the Government itself fell. The new Coalition Govern- 
ment of Dec. 1916 included among its novelties a food controller 
to whom full powers were given under a " New Ministries Act." 
The first holder of the new post, Lord Devonport, gave valuable 
support to the Wheat Commission in securing adequate tonnage 
and foreign credits, and carried a stage further the policy of con- 
servation of cereals already embodied in the Output of Beer 
Restriction Act and the order lengthening the extraction of flour. 
To facilitate this the whole of the flour-mills were taken over 
and run on Government account as from April 1917. An appeal 
to the public to ration themselves voluntarily on the basis of 4 Ib. 
of bread per head per week, 25 Ib. of meat and f Ib. of sugar was 
issued in Feb. 1917, and, backed by an extensive advertising 
campaign, produced a definite though limited effect on the bread 
consumption, particularly of wealthy and middle-class house- 
holds who were better able to obtain alternative foods; for the 
working-classes alike in industry and in agriculture the suggested 
ration of 4 Ib. a head was impracticably low and among them the 
appeal met with little response. The failure of the potato crop 
gave trouble and a first illustration of the dangers of price fixing. 
Considerable thought was expended by successive committees in 
devising better methods for the distribution of sugar, but before 
any could be adopted Lord Devonport resigned (June 1917). 

During the spring of 1917, the submarine menace was growing. 
The very possibility of feeding the people seemed to be threat- 
ened. Meanwhile, the people themselves were mainly disturbed 
by the rise of prices and the bad distribution of sugar. The re- 

ports of the Commissioners on Industrial Unrest, received in 
June 1917, emphasized these two points above all as the causes 
of unrest. With the coming of the second food controller, 
Lord Rhondda, the food problem had reached a more serious 
stage and was met by far more serious measures. 

Lord Rhondda prepared himself and the Ministry of Food to 
deal thoroughly with all three aspects of supplies, prices and 
distribution. First he attacked prices. In Sept. 1917 the price of 
bread was lowered from is. or is. id. to gd. for the quartern loaf , 
the difference being paid by the Government as a subsidy. At 
about the same time there was fixed a scale of prices for meat and 
for live stock, descending month by month from 745. per cwt. in 
Sept. 1917 to 6os. in the following January. The fixing of meat 
and live-stock prices needed to be and was intended to be ac- 
companied by measures for regulating slaughter and marketing, 
but for various reasons the latter measures did not become effec- 
tive till the end of 1917. The scale of prices standing by itself 
gave the farmers a strong inducement to hurry on their beasts 
to market, so as to profit by the early high prices and avoid the 
later low ones; too many beasts were thrown on the market before 
Christmas and too few were kept for the new year; how the en- 
suing shortage, aggravated by large purchases of home-grown 
meat for the army and by other circumstances, wasdealt with by 
rationing in the early part of 1918 is described elsewhere. 

On the general principle of controlling supplies of all essential 
foods as a condition of fixing prices Lord Rhondda never hesitated. 
This policy was carried out most completely in the case of im- 
ports. Cereals and sugar were already being imported by the 
two commissions. Under Lord Rhondda all bacon, ham, lard, 
cheese, butter and similar provisions, all oils and fats (edible and. 
otherwise), condensed milk, canned meat and fish, eggs, tea and 
even such extras as apples, oranges, jam and dried fruits, brought 
into this country, came to be directly imported by the Ministry 
of Food or requisitioned on arrival. All home-produced meat 
and cheese and most of the butter passed through the hands of 
the Ministry as also, through the control of flour-mills, did all the 
wheat and most of the barley. Even the whole potato crop of 
1918 was taken over under a scheme framed in the time of Lord 
Rhondda, though not put into force till after his death. Ulti- 
mately 85 % of all the food consumed by civilians in Great Britain 
was actually bought and sold by the Ministry of Food. The 
only important exceptions were milk, fresh fish and fresh vege- 
tables. The total turnover of the Ministry's trading (including 
the two Royal Commissions) was nearly 900,000,000 a year. 

Lord Rhondda made a budget of the food required for the 
country as a whole, and then took steps to see that that amount 
of food was available. This was partly a matter of securing 
imports; for this was needed, on the one hand tonnage, and on 
the other finance, that is to say, foreign credits; the Ministry 
of Food acting through or with the Governments concerned 
made bargains with the producers for the whole exportable sur- 
plus of Canadian cheese or Australian wheat or American bacon. 
It was partly a matter of encouraging food production at home. 
A vigorous food production campaign was started under the 
Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Food cooperated 
with the agricultural departments, in fixing only such prices as 
appeared likely to secure adequate supplies. In effect, in fixing 
prices for home produce, it made bargains with the farmers as 
to the prices at which, with whatever show of reluctance or 
grumbling, they would be able and willing to produce and to 
deliver their produce to the Ministry or its agents. The legal 
power of the Ministry to fix any prices it thought good was 
absolute; the prices for home produce were actually fixed only 
after apparently interminable consultations, and were prices which 
could be expected to produce the required supplies, and did. 

The largest single source of imported supplies was the United 
States. Here a special department of the Ministry was estab- 
lished (Oct. 1917), to purchase on its behalf all food-stuffs other 
than cereals, for which an organization already existed in the 
Wheat Export Co. ; a branch in Toronto dealt with Canadian 
supplies. The department speedily grew into an international 
organization of vast scope; the " Allied Export Provisions Com- 


mission " purchased between Oct. 1917 and Feb. 1919 nearly 
2j million tons of food valued at 267,000,000, at a cost for 
administration amounting to about 1*5 of i % on this turnover. All 
these figures exclude cereals and sugar. 

The success of this policy of ensuring supplies by direct pur- 
chase abroad and consultation at home was unquestionable. 
The United Kingdom came nearer than any other European 
country to maintaining during the war a pre-war standard of 
supplies, and at the same time achieved a far more equitable 
distribution. This was due to the fact that there was a single 
national authority making itself responsible for looking after 
food supplies as a whole, and for using such influence with other 
departments as would secure that they were forthcoming. 

Upon control of supplies was founded an even more extensive 
control of prices. Once goods were in the hands of the Ministry, 
it only remained to fix the margins of profit to be allowed to the 
various classes of distributors and the resulting prices to the 
public. This was done on the basis of " costings " that is to say, 
investigation of the actual costs incurred and margins of profit 
required by typical distributors; effect was given to the recom- 
mendations of the Costing Department of the Ministry by 
statutory orders fixing the prices or the profits to be allowed at 
each stage. Ultimately out of everything consumed in the United 
Kingdom by way of food and drink, 94% was subject to fixed 
maximum prices. Almost the only articles untouched were fresh 
vegetables, canned fruits, honey, salt, vinegar, spices, aerated 
waters and meals in restaurants. Many of these but barely 
escaped, and only the Armistice prevented the Ministry of Food 
from fixing prices for soap and candles. It did regulate the prices 
of tallow, beehive sections, horsemeat and desiccated coco-nut 
as well as those of oil cakes and other feeding-stuffs. At the 
time of Lord Rhondda's appointment, many authorities were 
inclined to say that any fixing of maximum prices must check 
supply and lead to the disappearance of the article in question. 
Lord Rhondda secured himself against this by controlling the 
supply to start with and only fixing the price when the supply 
was assured. In one or two cases alone, of which beer and the 
" disappearing rabbit " are the most familiar, did he depart 
from this policy; he then did so more or less deliberately because 
it seemed more important to give the public the comfort of 
protection against profiteering than to ensure them the food. 

Lord Rhondda died in July 1918, after a year of office as food 
controller and nine months of active work. His successor (from 
July to Dec. 1918) was Mr. J. R. Clynes, who had previously 
held the post of Parliamentary Secretary at the Ministry and, 
amongst other matters, had taken an active part in the formation 
and work of the " Consumers' Council"; this was an advisory 
body, consisting mainly of representatives of trade unions and 
cooperative societies, which did a great deal to keep the Ministry 
in touch with the feelings and grievances of working-class con- 
sumers. Mr. Clynes naturally made no great changes from the 
policy of Lord Rhondda. The most marked feature of his tenure 
of office was the development of international action, following 
upon a visit to Europe of the American food controller, Mr. 
Hoover. An Allied Food Council, consisting of the four food 
controllers of Britain, France, Italy and the United States, with 
a standing " Committee of Representatives," was established in 
Aug. 1918. There was thus extended to food generally the plan 
already in force in respect of cereals (and to a less extent sugar 
and one or two other articles), of making international instead 
of merely national programmes of food requirements, and pre- 
senting these international programmes to the financial author- 
ities and the shipping authorities for supply if possible of the 
necessary foreign credit and tonnage. 

By the latter part of 1918, the submarine menace had been 
practically mastered by the convoy system, and the limits of 
the food problem had been defined by the success of rationing. 
The greatest pinch of all, however, was apparently still to come. 
Considerations of shipping dictated a concentration of traffic on 
the shortest route the N. Atlantic and the abandonment so 
far as possible of any attempt to get supplies from the Far South 
and the Far East. Financial considerations by a natural reaction 

dictated the exact opposite; the British Treasury had relatively 
ample sterling credit for purchases in Australia, very few pesos 
in S. America and hardly a cent to spare in the United States or 
Canada. The Ministry of Food, and other supply departments, 
constantly found themselves being offered ships only where they 
could not get credit, and credit only where they could not get 
ships. On top of this standing or rather gradually growing dif- 
ficulty came in Sept. 1918 the necessity, as it then appeared, of 
hastening the transport of the American army so as to deliver a 
decisive blow in the coming spring. The framing of shipping 
programmes had by that time reduced itself to a division of two 
lions' shares between the Ministry of Munitions and the Ministry 
of Food (or their international extensions), with a few scraps for 
import of raw cotton or fertilizers and the like; each of these 
departments was compelled to accept for the winter of 1918-9 a 
provisional import programme totally inadequate for its needs 
and to hope that the war would end before its stocks ran out. 

This hope was realized. The Armistice of Nov. 1 1 put an end 
to hostilities though not to food control, or food shortage in the 
United Kingdom or other countries. The Ministry of Food, 
under two more food controllers Mr. G. H. Roberts (from 
Jan. to Feb. 1920) and Mr. C. A. McCurdy (from March 1920 
to March 1921), lived longer after the end of hostilities than it 
had done during them, and after its formal demise on March 31 
1921, left a substantial legacy of work and staff to be transferred 
as a " Food Department " to the Board of Trade. The winding up 
of a business so vastly beyond the scope of any private concern 
and the adjustment of accounts with the accuracy required of 
public departments inevitably took much time. The problem 
of judicious de-control, that is to say of handing back to private 
traders the responsibility for maintaining food supplies, without 
risking any failure of supplies or any excessive rise of price, 
proved exceedingly difficult; it was complicated by more than 
one change of view as to the speed with which and the extent to 
which de-control should be accomplished. A reason for not 
hastening the end of food control appeared in the disturbed con- 
dition of industry and the perpetual threat of paralysis in the 
essential services of coal or transport. The success with which, 
during the railway strike of Oct. 1918, the supplies and dis- 
tribution even of perishable foods were maintained by the Min- 
istry of Food shed lustre on its declining years. 

At the end of 1918 the Ministry of Food issued a short mem- 
orandum with tables and diagrams illustrating its work under 
the four main heads of supplies, stocks, prices and rationing. 

In respect of supplies a comparison is made in the accompany- 
ing table of the amounts of the principal food-stuffs available 
per head for consumption in 1918 and before the war, in the 
United'Kingdom, Germany and Holland: 

Weekly Domestic Consumption of Bread, Meat, Fats and Sugar per 

Head per Week in the United Kingdom, Germany 

and Holland. Pre-war and iQl8. 

United Kingdom 









Bread and flour 
Fats . 



o\5 1 












The consumption during 1918 is based on the rations, except 
in the case of bread in the United Kingdom, where the actual 
consumption is taken; In the, case of sugar no figure of pre-war 
domestic consumption is given by the Ministry of Food; it is 
commonly estimated at about i Ib. per head per week. 

It appears from the table that in 1918 the United Kingdom 
" had half as much bread again as Germany, three times as much 
meat and fat, and substantially more sugar. As compared with 
Holland, the United Kingdom had twice as much bread, three 
times as much meat, more fats, and practically the same amount 
of sugar." In comparison with pre-war consumption, the 
bread consumption per head in the United Kingdom had actually 
increased slightly in 1918; fats had fallen very little; meat had 
fallen by a little over a third; sugar had fallen somewhat, but 



an exact comparison was impossible. In all cases the deficiency 
in 1918 on pre-was figures was far greater, both for Germany and 
for Holland. In respect of stocks, the figures show how at Sept. 
i 1916 wheat, fats, meat and sugar were near the pre-war level, 
" a dangerous point in war, having regard to the uncertainties 
of transport," and by Sept. 1918 had been built up to a level 
ensuring safety for the coming winter. 

The course of prices is shown in two stages; one from July 1914 
to July 1917, when the main development of food control in the 
United Kingdom began, and the other from July 1917 to Oct. 
1918. For each of these periods the course of British food prices is 
contrasted (a) with that of the prices of certain other staple 
articles (textiles, coal and soap) in the United Kingdom; (b) 
with that of food prices in France, Germany and Sweden, re- 

Rise in Price of Food and Other Necessary Articles in United Kingdom. 
(Price in July 1914 = 100.) 









J U1 / 



j ui y 


July 1914 


July 1917 

Oct. 1918 

Principal controlled 

foods . 







Principal controlled 

foods assuming 

no s u b s i d y on 

bread . 







Principal uncon- 

trolled foods 
All principal foods 








Textiles, leather, 






















Candles . 







Household oils 







Comparison between Prices of Bread, 
United Kingdom and in Other Countries 

Butter and Milk, in the 
(Price in July 





Average monthly 
increase between 

July 1914 
July 1917 

July 1917 
Oct. 1918 

United Kingdom 
United States . 

1 60 
1 80 

1 60 














The following comments from the memorandum of the Min- 
istry of Food are interesting: 

" The effect of the introduction of price control from July 1917 
onwards is very marked. The rate of increase for controlled food 
since that date is one-quarter of the rate before then and is also very 
much less than the rate for other articles and for other countries. 
If the prices of such food had continued after July 1917 to rise at the 
same rate as before, they would in Oct. 1918 have stood not 115% 
but 150% above the pre-war level. If they had continued after 
July 1917 at the same rate as textiles, they would have reached 185 %. 
The controlled foods cover 94% of the total food expenditure. 

" The keeping down of food prices is of course to some extent due 
to the introduction of the bread subsidy. Though with this allow- 
ance the effect of control in slowing down the rise of prices is naturally 
less, it is still clearly marked. The rate of increase in food prices 
after July 1917 remains little more than half the rate before then, and 
less than the rate of increase for any of the other articles shown. 
To this result two distinct factors have contributed one, the fixing 
of prices and margins by the Ministry of Food on a costing basis in 
this country ; the other, the action of the Government of the United 
States and other exporting countries in controlling the prices paid 
to the producers there. 

" It is probably no exaggeration to say that a large part of the 
population have been better fed during the war than at any previous 
period, because for the first time they have been assured of regular 
work and wages. A number of luxuries and subsidiary foods fruit, 
canned fish, sweets, etc. have been cut off. The supply of essential 
foods, though reduced as a whole, has been sufficient for all because 
it has been fairly distributed among rich and poor." 

The Ministry of Food in the United Kingdom accomplished,, 
with a reasonable minimum of mistakes, the work for which it 
was established. The rationing system adopted is dealt with 
separately under RATIONING. Two cautions or criticisms are not 
out of place. First, the administrative machinery required was- 
very extensive. The staff directly employed by the Ministry, 
either at headquarters or in the offices of the Divisional Food 
Commissioners and Livestock Commissioners, numbered at its 
maximum over 8,000. In addition the local food control com- 
mittees employed varying numbers, rising at times of exceptional 
pressure to as many as 25,000 persons. The printing and station- 
ery bill for a single year exceeded 1,500,000. The expenditure 
was no doubt fully justified by results, and under the arrange- 
ments made it did not fall on the taxes but was covered by a 
trifling percentage on the price of the articles in which the Minis- 
try dealt. Second, while the profits and margins secured by 
distributors were undoubtedly lower than they would have been 
in a time of scarcity without control, they were probably not 
as low as in a time of plenty without control but with competition. 
The policy was adopted, indeed no other policy was possible, of 
preserving the normal channels of trade. This meant that the 
margin at each stage of distribution, i.e. the difference between 
the price at which the distributor received his supplies and that 
at which he was compelled to pass them on, had to be fixed at a 
point which would afford a living to the distributor of average- 
or less than average efficiency. The more efficient distributor 
could still make very large profits and did so; he had no motive 
for cutting prices in order to increase business, since his share 
of the total business was stereotyped. 

If the position of the United Kingdom be briefly compared 
with that of other countries, it is seen that the central fact 
facilitating food control in the former was that it had to look to 
imports rather than to home production for the bulk of its sup- 
plies. This simplified the problem of the British food controller 
(till he was driven to rationing) by making it largely a question 
of how much shipping he could extort from the shipping con- 
troller and how much foreign credit from the Treasury. Both 
Italy and France produced a larger proportion of their cereals at 
home, and required less meat. In Italy even sugar was mainly 
home grown. For the food controllers of Central Powers, ques- 
tions of importation hardly arose. Their main problem and 
one which they solved only to a limited degree was that of 
inducing the farmer to give up a fair proportion of his produce 
at the official price to the public authorities. They seem, indeed, 
to have been considerably less successful than the British food 
controllers in getting agreement with the agricultural population 
on production and prices; sometimes, at least, prices were fixed 
which the farmers regarded as arbitrary and which they evaded 
systematically by contraband sales. Two minor features may be 
mentioned as having simplified the British task. One is the con- 
centration of the great bulk of flour-milling in the United King- 
dom in a small number of important mills (less than 700), which 
could be readily controlled and which furnished the only easy 
market to the farmer and the corn merchant; in most other 
countries mills are more numerous and smaller, and it is common 
for the farmer to grind his own corn. The other is the limited 
power of the British municipal authorities. In Germany it was. 
the natural thing for the separate municipal councils to act as 
independent organs of food control, making their own contracts 
with neighbouring rural districts for the supply of food to their 
citizens, fixing prices in their markets, and rationing when need 
arose. This made possible competition, confusion and difference 
of standard between the authorities, and made difficult a survey 
of the nation's needs and resources as a whole. In the United 
Kingdom, Lord Rhondda, as housekeeper for a family of forty 
millions, made a single bargain with each group of producers, 
put all the supplies from different sources into one pool, and 
distributed them fairly at standardized prices. 

In the United States (see p. 98) the problem was different. 
That country in itself experienced no shortage of any essential 1 
food, but became the great source of supply to all the Allies in 
Europe, and gained in importance as shipping was concentrated 



on the shortest and most defensible N. Atlantic route. To 
perform this function it applied (i) a great food production 
campaign, (2) a campaign for voluntary food saving in order 
to leave a surplus for the Allies. It had then to face the admin- 
istrative problems of getting these supplies along the railways 
and through the ports in competition with munitions, and with 
its own army. (W. H. B.) 


The feeding of any army is a feature of the Supply Depart- 
ment, the term " supplies," from a military point of view, being 
applied to all stores and articles required for the maintenance of 
an army in the way of food or fuel for men, forage for beasts, 
or fuel, petrol and oil for aircraft or mechanical transport, 
hospital requirements in the way of food, medical comforts, etc., 
with the exception of medicines, drugs or surgical appliances 
(see generally SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT). 

For a proper understanding of the problem of feeding a modern 
army, and of what was done in this connexion by Great Britain 
during the World War, it is necessary to recall how armies were 
fed in the past. In primitive times, when one nation or tribe 
invaded another, the subsistence of an invading army depended 
upon indiscriminate individual plunder. The process was so 
wasteful that this individual plunder was soon supplanted by a 
more economical system of gathering the spoil into heaps or 
magazines; but accumulation is but a means to the end of 
distribution, and in return for such distribution of victuals a 
deduction or stoppage was soon made from the pay of the soldier. 
This was the beginning of the financial control of the department 
of supply. The third stage was to organize plunder more thor- 
oughly by compelling inhabitants to form magazines, or in other 
words, by recourse to requisition. The fourth stage was speedily 
reached by its being discovered that such magazines were more 
readily and effectively created if the inhabitants were paid 
instead of compelled to fill them; thus for robbery was sub- 
stituted purchase, and instead of the military hand was substi- 
tuted the financial hand, and the hold of the Treasury over 
thfe province of supply was strengthened. As the means ot 
communication improved, the mobility of armies called for a 
better organization of supply. It became imperative to import 
foodstuffs from a distance, as, owing to the growth of armies, 
the theatre of war was no longer able to maintain them from its 
local resources. To bring food from a distance requires trans- 
port, and consequently the Treasury or civil side were gradually 
obliged to organize a transport as well as a supply system. In 
military operations, the maintenance of order on roads, and 
means of communication, are of first importance, and order cannot 
be maintained without discipline. Transport therefore very 
early passed under the military or semi-military control, whereas 
supplies remained much longer under civilian or Treasury con- 
trol, with the result that there was constant friction. 

For two long centuries in Great Britain the Treasury struggled 
against the concession of any financial powers to any military 
department, and as a consequence, untold millions of money 
were wasted; only in 1888 the two Departments of Transport 
and Supplies were blended into one and placed upon a military 
footing by the creation of the Army Service Corps, thus bringing 
these two important services completely and entirely under the 
commander-in-chief , or as it is to-day under the Army Council. 

What might be described as the first systematized endeavour 
to feed British troops in the field was introduced during the 
wars in the Low Countries. The Treasury appointed a com- 
missary, who. was invested with supreme financial control, and 
was responsible for the maintenance of the army. His system 
of going to work was to make a contract with some individual 
to supply the army with bread and bread waggons, and with the 
supply of this article his responsibility for the feeding of the 
army came to an end; all other provisions were a regimental 
matter and were furnished by private speculators, namely, 
vintners, sutlers and butchers. This system of contracting 
practically continued, with slight if any modification, right down 
to the outbreak of the World War, with considerable modifica- 

tions, of course, as the centuries and years passed, so far as the 
soldier's ration was concerned; meat was added first, and 
bread and meat formed the sole ration issued free to the troops 
in England up till towards the end of the ipth century, when 
during peace-times a soldier got a money allowance in addition, 
for the purpose of buying the remaining portion of his rations. 

During the ordinary peace-times, and before the outbreak of 
the World War in 1914, the system in force in Great Britain as 
regards the feeding of the army was by means of contracts. The 
General Officers holding the chief commands made arrangements 
by periodical contracts, varying in duration from anything to 
3, 6 or 12 months, for the supply of commodities required. 

The soldier was supplied with his bread ration i lb., his meat 
ration | of a lb. He was credited personally with 3d. per diem. 
This sum was supplemented in a well-run unit by an additional 
grant of |d. or so from the canteen funds; the money was ex- 
pended in the Regimental Institute on the remaining portion 
of the soldier's food, i.e. groceries, vegetables, extra dishes, etc. 

In war-time the entire maintenance of the soldier became the 
duty of the State, so that from providing only two articles, 
bread and meat, the State was faced with the problem of pro- 
viding a complete and full diet, consisting of a very large number 
of articles and other requirements. 

In order to fulfil these duties, the system in the past had been 
for the War Office to enter into a number of contracts with 
numerous army contractors for the supply of the various goods 
required. The contractors would undertake to supply so much 
biscuit, cheese, jam or any other of the many and various articles, 
either delivered at the base of operations abroad, or more fre- 
quently on board ship at a port of departure in this country. 
In order to insure that the requisite quality of the goods was 
kept up, a number of (generally speaking, retired) officers were 
appointed to carry out periodic inspections at the factories or 
other places of production. It will be readily seen that such a 
system was bound to lead to grave abuses, and at the termina- 
tion of every war up to that of 1914-8, there had always been 
either grave complaints or scandals, necessitating an enquiry as 
to why the troops were supplied with bad food, and frequently 
as to why the State was swindled. 

In the event of a general mobilization, the laid-down scheme 
or plan was that so far as the Expeditionary Force was concerned, 
the War Office would enter into contracts for the supply of the 
necessary articles required; the supply of meat being insured by 
employing contractors to drive live cattle behind our army in 
the field, and all other supplies to be obtained as explained above 
For the feeding of the troops mobilizing or being trained at home, 
general officers and commanders-in-chief were to make their own 
arrangements in the way of entering into contracts to meet the 
requirements of their troops, and this system was practically the 
same as had been approved and agreed on ever since any pro- 
posal for general national defence had ever been considered. 

Early in 1909, the British War Office, having received infor- 
mation as to the rapid mobilization plans for the German army, 
decided that it would be necessary to increase the rapidity of 
British mobilization, and with this end in view, instructions were 
issued for considerable acceleration. Up to that time it had 
always been considered that it would be quite impossible for any 
Expeditionary Force to leave Great Britain in under three weeks, 
whereas under the new proposed scheme it was suggested that 
the larger portion could be in a position to depart almost in as 
many days. In order to carry out these proposals, it was of 
course necessary to accelerate considerably the supply mobili- 
zation machinery. There was at Woolwich Dockyard an accu- 
mulation of preserved meat, biscuit, tea, coffee, sugar, jam, salt, 
medical comforts, etc., sufficient for the requirements of the 
Expeditionary Force for a few days. The proposal then was 
that, by means of urgent priority telegrams, army contractors 
would be got into touch with, and arrangements made for all 
supply requirements at the earliest possible moment. 

In July 1909, Col. (later Maj.-Gen.) S. S. Long (b. 1863), on 
vacating the position of Commdt. of the A.S.C. Training Estab- 
lishment at Aldershot, was posted as Assistant-Director of 



Supplies; at Woolwich Dockyard, and on assuming charge there 
he found that the total written instructions as regards supply 
mobilization in the event of war were embodied in some three 
or four typewritten sheets of foolscap, the bulk of the instructions 
being little more than pious hopes. Up to that period, Col. Long 
(who, having been through the S. African War, had in that 
war become D.A.A.G. and then A.A.G. for transport) had been 
looked upon at the War Office as a leading transport authority, 
he having compiled the official taxt-book upon this important 
subject. He proceeded to make a close study of the whole 
supply problem, with the result that he gradually evolved a new 
system for the feeding of the British Expeditionary Force. This 
system was put into operation from the outbreak of the World 
War to its termination, without being in any way materially 
altered. Instead of the costly and wasteful way of obtaining 
and driving live cattle for the purpose of meat supply, behind 
the armies, he proposed that frozen-meat ships, loaded up with 
tens of thousands of carcasses of sheep or quarters of beef, be 
placed at convenient ports, and from these ships the fresh meat 
supply would be absolutely guaranteed, and at a cost very 
slightly above the usual price pertaining during peace-times, and 
much less than half what it had cost in any previous war. The 
frozen meat ships not only fulfilled the purpose of insuring the 
meat supply, providing an adequate reserve of from 50 to 60 
days at a time, but they also served a further purpose of acting 
as cold storage for quantities of hospital supplies, such as fish, 
poultry and many other commodities required for the invalid 
feeding of the many sick and wounded. 

The original supply mobilization proposals presupposed army 
bakery companies, moving immediately behind the troops and 
baking bread to meet the requirements. In the S. African War 
of 1899-1902, similar arrangements had been made, but actual 
practice had proved that it was impossible of fulfilment, and 
the bulk of the British troops were then almost entirely fed upon 
the much-disliked army biscuit. Col. Long now suggested that 
the more feasible and sound plan was to locate the army 
bakeries a long distance in the rear of the fighting troops; that 
the loaves of bread as baked should be put 50 at a time into the 
cheap, loosely woven sacks which are readily and plentifully to 
be obtained in the trade at comparatively small cost, known as 
offal sacks, and by this means they would be readily handled 
and railed forward daily to the troops right into the fighting line. 
His recommendations and their adoption were proved quite 
correct, with the result that for the first time in its history, the 
British troops were during the World War fed largely on bread 
instead of biscuit, in spite of the vast numbers under arms. 
Instead of the old system of contractors putting the goods they 
had contracted to supply on board ship, or delivering overseas, 
Col. Long suggested that a definite home port should be selected 
as the spot from which all supply requirements for the army 
would be despatched, to be known as " The Home Base Supply 
Port," and after consultation with the Admiralty it was finally 
agreed that Newhaven should be earmarked for this purpose. 
It was then arranged that directly on the outbreak of war, an 
already earmarked staff in the way of Naval Embarkation 
Officer and officer in charge of the Supply Depot, with all the 
necessary staffs, etc., would instantly proceed to this port, taking 
over all the available stores, and generally carrying out the 
duties of such a port, whilst all contractors would consign their 
goods to that port, where they would be thoroughly examined 
and passed as sound and fit to be embarked on the various supply 
ships. In order further to protect the public and the soldier's 
interests, arrangements were made with the Public Analytical 
Department of Somerset House, for that department to send a 
staff of chemists down to Newhaven to analyze the goods on the 
spot, so as to save time; and it is only right to emphasize the 
debt of gratitude due to the Analytical Department for insur- 
ing not only that the goods were of the proper quality, but 
also that the fighting soldiers were adequately fed. 

During the years that followed from the end of 1909 onward 
to 1912, the schemes and plans to be adopted in the event of a 
general mobilization and the despatch of the B.E.F. were 

gradually elaborated and extended, until at the end of 1912 aU 
supply requirements had been most fully thought out and pro- 
vided for, together with complete instructions for the Home Base 
Depot, the overseas depots, etc. Nothing remained to be done 
in the event of mobilization beyond putting the scheme in force. 

Meantime, Col. Long had been evolving schemes for the 
modernizing of the feeding of a nation in arms, which he foresaw 
must result in the event of a great European war, involving 
general mobilization. However, at this period although direct- 
ly under the War Office, not being a member of the War Office 
staff he found little opportunity of ventilating his opinions or 
successfully bringing his suggestions to notice. In Jan. 1913, 
Gen. Long moved from Woolwich Dockyard into the War 
Office becoming Director of Supplies. He then set to work to 
inaugurate an entirely new system, the essence of which was the 
complete elimination of contractors with the British forces 
either in the field or at home. Except in a very minor degree 
as regards home forces, everything required for the forces would 
thus be obtained direct from the factories, so that the middle- 
man's opportunity had disappeared. 

Up to this time it had been left to individual generals, com- 
manders-in-chief, commanders of district or coast defence, to 
make their own arrangements and contracts, so far as feeding 
and forage were concerned, with the result that in the event of 
war occurring, there would have been a very large number of 
authorities going on the general markets of the country, and 
purchasing not only against the public, but against each other. 
This old system, in circumstances such as those at the outbreak 
of the World War of 1914, would have undoubtedly created a 
veritable Eldorado for the unscrupulous contractor, who would 
thus have been enabled to make vast fortunes; and there is very 
little doubt that, had the old system continued, a very much 
worse question would have arisen owing to the uncontrolled 
purchasing by a large number of authorities, since in addition 
to those named above, the War Office itself and the Admiralty 
would also have been heavy buyers, and a panic would undoubt- 
edly have occurred on the market. Furthermore, under such a 
system, it would be absolutely impossible to move troops in large 
bodies from one part of the country to another. 

Gen. Long pointed out that only one system was possible or 
would insure safety, and that was for one Government depart- 
ment under one individual alone to be responsible for all army 
maintenance. According to his proposals, it was suggested that 
three great base depots be formed, one in London, one at 
Bristol and one at Liverpool, and that in addition, a number of 
main depots be created, one at Glasgow for the supply of Scot- 
land, one in Dublin to meet the requirements of troops in 
Ireland, and three down through the centre of England, at Leeds, 
Northampton and Reading; the idea being that at each of these 
great depots at which cold storage was available would be 
accumulated sufficient reserves of rations of all kinds to meet the 
requirements of so many hundred thousand men for a given 
number of days, so that when it became necessary to move 
large bodies of troops in any direction desired, all that it was 
necessary to do was to increase automatically the reserves of the 
depot affected by the number of troops based thereon; the War 
Office being entirely responsible for the provision of these 
depots. The general proposal was that each of these proposed 
depots should be very carefully surveyed, all plans and arrange- 
ments drawn out, together with the necessary establishment of 
officers and other personnel. Standing orders and full instructions 
would be prepared for each depot, so that, in the event of being 
required, everyone connected therewith could step into their 
place with the minimum of confusion. Then, should occasion 
arise, for the first 10 days after mobilization was ordered the 
depot would not be called upon to perform any duties other than 
organizing itself and receiving the supplies which would be 
poured into it, under arrangements to be made centrally by the 
War Office. Meanwhile at the War Office itself would be kept 
not only full details of each depot, but a consolidated return 
showing the total requirements, so that directly mobilization 
was ordered the Contract Branch of the War Office, working 

9 6 


under the instructions of the Director of Supplies, would at once 
proceed to make the necessary contracts to purchase the supplies 
required to meet the needs of each particular depot. Under the 
old system it was, of course, obvious that, in the event of a 
general mobilization, the ordinary contract system of feeding 
the troops in the United Kingdom would necessarily break down, 
owing to the fact that at many of the stations the contractor 
would possibly be only a small butcher or baker, supplying 
depots of possibly one or two hundred men in number, whereas 
on mobilization that same depot at once expanded into several 
thousand, entirely beyond the ordinary small contractor. 

Gen. Long's proposal for dealing with this matter was that on 
mobilization, as all contracts failed, and owing to popular excite- 
ment, possible inflation of prices, etc., it would not be possible 
to make other satisfactory contracts, every commanding officer 
would be authorized to take credit in his regimental messing 
accounts for zs. for every man present with or joining the unit 
under his command, and similarly the sum of is. gd. per diem 
per horse, and that he was then to make the best local arrange- 
ments he could with the money in question for the feeding of 
his men and animals. This system would go on for 10 days. At 
the end of that period the great depots throughout the country 
would be stocked and in working order and ready to take up the 
whole army supply throughout the United Kingdom. 

These ideas were so novel and completely at variance with the 
general accepted ideas of the past, that when Gen. Long first 
made these proposals, they met with determined opposition 
from the finance side of the War Office. It was not indeed till 
July 1914 that he succeeded in getting his way and forcing the 
civil side of the War Office to accept his proposals, and it was not 
until towards the end of that month that the final instructions to 
all commands went out, directing exactly what was to be done in 
the way of feeding men and animals on mobilization. Similarly 
he met with strong opposition to his proposals for the formation 
of the great depots, not only from the civil side of the War 
Office, but also from the military as well. 

Incidentally this complete change of system of army supply, 
and entire departure from all the laid-down rules of army feeding 
of the past, successful as it was from an army point of view, was 
if possible of even greater importance to the nation at large. 
Had the old system continued and been in operation when the 
war broke out, every army contractor, and every trader who 
aspired to be such, would instantly have proceeded to buy up 
the maiket and corner the various commodities, in the hopes of 
selling them at a great profit under contract to the various 
generals seeking to make contracts for the feeding of the troops 
under their command. As a matter of fact, in a measure this did 
happen on the outbreak of the war, so far that holders of goods 
and commodities withheld their stocks and ceased to put them 
on the market. Immediately after the outbreak of the war, it 
suddenly became impossible to buy a number of household 
requirements in the way of sugar, bacon, etc., owing to there 
being none on the market; well-to-do people, in a panic, began 
to lay in stocks at exorbitant prices, and from many large towns 
came the sounds of ominous murmurings from the poorer popu- 
lation who were unable to obtain their daily food. This con- 
tinued for some three or four days; and it was not generally 
realized that it was the adoption of Gen. Long's system that 
suddenly restored an absolutely free market, with commodities 
little if anything above the prices prevailing at the end of July 
1914. The reason for this was that the War Office being the sole 
buyers, and finding that importers, manufacturers and holders 
of goods were refusing to sell, Gen. Long, without waiting for 
authority, and taking the law into his own hands, proceeded to 
requisition certain requirements urgently wanted by the Expe- 
ditionary Force. He thereby forced the Government to pass 
immediately a requisitioning Act, and within 24 hours the 
holders of commodities were throwing their goods on the market, 
fearing to hold lest they should be requisitioned. Also, the War 
Office being the only buyers of meat other than the ordinary 
public, they were in the position of forcing the meat market to 
continue reasonable prices under the threat of requisition if they 

failed to do so. This close control over the meat market was 
practically maintained right up to the middle of 1916, when the 
price of good average quality frozen meat to the Government 
landed in England was only a decimal point or two over 6d. per 
pound, and to the public at large only some couple of pence more. 

During peace-time, in order to insure that the quality of 
supplies composing the soldier's ration should be kept up to a 
good sound standard, all A.S.C. officers were carefully trained 
so as to be good judges in this respect, and in addition, some 
exceptionally well-qualified officers were appointed special 
inspectors. On the outbreak of war, of course, all such officers 
were necessarily required for the fighting formations or for other 
almost equally important duties in connexion with the mobilized 
armies, and consequently the general inspection of supplies as 
to quality had to be relegated to a number of retired officers. 
The result of this in the past had been that, although such 
officers did their best, many of them had been retired for a 
great number of years, and were entirely out of touch with 
modern requirements, or, owing to age or infirmity, the work 
required was beyond their capabilities. The day following the 
outbreak of the World War, Dr. MacFadden, the medical head 
of the Public Health Department of the Local Government 
Board, went to Gen. Long at the War Office, to know if he could 
be of any assistance to him. Gen. Long at once replied that 
there was no one who could do more for the country and the 
soldier than the Local Government Board if they would under- 
take the duties; he was well aware that, under the procedure 
adopted by great Government departments, opposition would 
be raised by the Military Medical Authorities and the War 
Office, to the idea that the Local Government Board should in 
any way be allowed to interfere with the food of the soldier or the 
methods of its supply, etc. ; but he for his part could not devise 
any system for a proper inspection, whereas the Local Govern- 
ment Board had all machinery ready to its hand, which could be 
turned over for the protection of public interests, and also the 
soldier's, without it costing one single penny. Gen. Long 
therefore proposed to Dr. MacFadden that he (Dr. MacFadden) 
should undertake the entire responsibility of seeing that all food- 
stuff supplied for use of the soldier should be of unexceptional 
quality, thoroughly sound and good, and fully complying with 
all the conditions of purchase; that he himself (Gen. Long) 
would supply Dr. MacFadden with copies giving specifications of 
everything in the way of food-stuffs; he would also supply Dr. 
MacFadden with a list of every factory, warehouse or other 
persons supplying the War Office with food-stuffs throughout the 
United Kingdom, and keep him so supplied; and then, if Dr. 
MacFadden would supply to each Health Officer a copy of the 
specifications and a list of the premises where food was being 
stored or manufactured for the War Office within that Health 
Officer's area, and request him to keep the closest watch upon 
the same, and immediately to take action under the Public 
Health Acts, if any wrong were committed or attempted then 
a perfect system of inspection would be attained. 

All these duties Dr. MacFadden readily undertook, and the 
result exceeded the most sanguine expectations. The prosecu- 
tions were singularly few, but this undoubtedly was largely due 
to the closeness of the inspection. Medical Officers of Health 
threw themselves whole-heartedly into the scheme, and not only 
visited factories daily, but posted their inspectors of nuisance 
almost continuously on the premises. As a result of the first 
prosecution, a letter was sent to the Medical Officer of Health 
for the district in question, by Gen. Long on behalf of the Army 
Council, thanking him for his public services in safeguarding 
the interests of the country and more particularly the interests 
of our fighting men. The result of this was that every Medical 
Officer of Health throughout the United Kingdom redoubled his 
efforts to insure the best of quality, in the hopes that, could he 
catch a supplier slipping, he would then have the good fortune 
to obtain a similar letter. It is a well-known fact in official life 
that one Govt. Dept. objects to giving credit to another depart- 
ment for any work which it may do, and consequently it is not 
to be wondered at that little or no acknowledgment was made 

by tl 



by the War Office for the services which were performed for 
them by the Local Government Board in general, and Dr. 
MacFadden and all his officers in particular. The Local Govern- 
ment Board also undertook to send specially qualified Health 
Officers abroad to see that the quality of preserved meat being 
manufactured in both the United States and S. America was 
kept up to the highest possible standard. 

It is unnecessary to go in detail into the very slow but gradual 
improvement of the soldier's ration in war. The appalling mis- 
takes and lack of suitable feeding for the British armies during the 
various modern campaigns from the Napoleonic wars down to 
the outbreak of the World War can in a large measure be read 
the various histories of those wars. The starvation and 
eglect of the armies in the Crimea are well dealt with by 
Kinglake; but although Great Britain had been involved in a 
great number of minor wars, the authorities still seemed to 
lack the power of organizing our supply service upon a proper 
basis. To take only two campaigns to exemplify the fact: 
the Egyptian War caused many complaints and grumblings as to 
the unsuitability or lack of proper food, and the heavy cost of 
the same, although at that period the improvement of the sol- 
dier's diet was greatly in advance of previous campaigns; S. 
Africa showed still more improvement, but owing to the lack of 
iystem it was a frequent complaint that the supplies on arrival 
at the front were in a rotten and putrid condition there were 
many instances of their arriving in that condition at the base of 
operations at Cape Town or other ports. The cost was out of 
all proportion to what it should have been. Great fortunes were 
made by unprincipled contractors, and at the end of that war 
lengthy enquiry was held into many grave irregularities. 
Shortly before the outbreak of the World War, some experi- 
icnts in food values had been carried out in America, and under 
War Office orders similar experiments were carried out in 
ngland. A special committee was appointed by the War 
ffice to go into the whole question, and to recommend a suitable 
' active service " diet for the soldier. The result of this com- 
ittee's labours was that a very carefully balanced diet was got 
>ut, which would be not only palatable, but also would contain 
all the necessary calories or energy units sufficient to maintain 
.e normal man exposed to the rigours of a bad climate on active 
:rvice. The recommended daily ration for the soldier on 
active service was as follows: 

Bread ij Ib. or biscuit I Ib. or flour I Ib. 

fresh, if obtainable .... 



Meat extract (part of iron ration) 


Fresh Vegetables, when available 
Or peas, or beans, or potatoes, dried . 






Pepper ........ 




I " 
4 oz. 




6 /8 



(At d scretion of G.O.C. 
on recommendation 
of medical officer.) 
2 oz. a week. 

This ration undoubtedly gave universal satisfaction. The 
only improvement that it contained over that supplied to troops 
in S. Africa was the addition of the 4 oz. of bacon and 3 oz. 
cheese; but the really great improvement was that the quality 
was invariably well maintained, and the soldier received the 
same with the utmost regularity. 

During the last week in July 1914, the officers who were ear- 
marked for the command of the eight great supply depots in the 
United Kingdom attended at the War Office under instructions 
which had been issued some few weeks earlier, and before the 
imminence of the outbreak of the war had ever occurred to any- 
one, in order that as a precautionary measure they might re- 

ceive some general instructions as to the new method of feeding 
the army on mobilization, and in order that they might then 
visit the actual spot where they would be employed in the event 
of the necessity arising, so as to be thoroughly au fait with the 
whole position so far as they were concerned. This visit to the 
War Office was certainly well-timed, so that after the whole of 
their duties had been fully explained to them by G v en. Long, they 
at once proceeded to their war stations, and as a consequence, 
on Aug. 4 1914, they had already had some few days to work 
out their preparations locally. 

On Aug. 5, so perfect were the supply arrangements, that 
many trains had already been loaded and were on their way to 
Newhaven; the necessary Supply Officers and personnel crossed 
on that day to France; and on Aug. 6, two days after the decla- 
ration of war, British supply ships were already steaming across 
the Channel, actually preceding the troops by some hours. 

The Director of Supplies, Expeditionary Force, attended at 
the War Office the day following the declaration of war, when he 
received not only printed instructions, which had been most care- 
fully prepared as regards his own duties, but copies of instruc- 
tions for Supply Officers of base depots, rail depots, advance 
depots and for all Supply Officers doing duty with formations. 

From the moment the Expeditionary Force left, the Director 
of Supplies Overseas was in close daily correspondence with the 
Director of Supplies at the War Office, so that, as a matter of 
fact, the latter officer kept his hand upon the feeding of the 
army down to the very smallest particular. 

Under a good system it is comparatively easy to maintain an 
army when it is victoriously advancing, but the great test of 
war is the maintenance of an army in retreat. If proof were 
ever needed as to the perfection of the supply arrangements, it 
is in the fact that during the British retreat to the Marne, so far 
as the official records go, there was only one occasion when a 
division went a day without its food, and was compelled to fall 
back on the emergency ration, consisting of i-lb. tin of preserved 
meat, i Ib. biscuit done up in a small linen bag and a grocery 
ration, and even on the one occasion when the division missed 
its daily supply of full rations, it was not the fault of the Supply 
Units of the Formation, but owing to bad staff work, as it was 
subsequently found that there were supply columns looking for 
this division on its right, on its left and even between it and the 
advancing Germans. When the forces in France were joined 
by divisions of native troops from India, there was a break- 
down of the Indian Military Supply system; the War Office took 
up the duties, and never in its history had native troops been 
so well fed and looked after. 

When it became necessary to send an expedition to the Dar- 
danelles, and later on to Salonika, then to E. Africa, the supply 
system was expanded to meet requirements with apparent ease. 
The system, as laid down and provided for, continued in existence 
throughout the whole war in all theatres of operations, with 
the exception of Mesopotamia, which was under the Indian 
Government, and which, as is well known, hopelessly broke down; 
whereas Gen. Long's system remained in force from start to finish 
with but the very slightest modifications. 

The business of supply being officially part of the quarter- 
master-general's department, at the head of which, during the 
World War, was the late Gen. Sir John Cowans, it must be 
recollected that, so far as the Expeditionary Force was concerned, 
Gen. Long's proposals had been agreed to during the earlier 
period when Gen. Sir Herbert Miles was quartermaster-general. 
As regards the general regulations for supply mobilization intro- 
duced by Gen. Long in 1913, Sir John Cowans was then quarter- 
master-general, but it is only right to say that there was not a 
single detail of the work which originated from him, and the 
greater bulk of it was carried through without even his knowing 
exactly what was being done. There are War Office minutes in 
existence, in which Gen. Cowans himself acknowledged that, so 
far as the supply system was concerned, during the first 20 
months of the war at the end of which Gen. Long, knowing 
that it was running smoothly, left the War Office he had never 
in any way interfered therewith. 

9 8 


The crowning success of the whole BritisK Supply system dur- 
ing the World War is undoubtedly the fact that not only were the 
troops, in spite of their great number, the best fed that the world 
has ever seen, but from a cost point of view possibly the cheap- 
est fed, considering the enormously inflated world prices; and 
throughout the whole course of the war, for the first time in 
British military history, there was a complete absence even of 
rumours of corruption in connexion with the feeding of the army. 

(S. S. L.) 

Upon its entry into the World War, the U.S. Government 
was confronted with the fact that the previous heavy demands 
upon the country's markets had drained the grain reserves and 
diminished other important basic stocks, such as the number of 
breeding hogs. This situation was aggravated by the fact that 
the 1917 wheat harvest was far below norm